
ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN 281. BAND

Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy

Proceedings of the
Third International Dharmakīrti Conference
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Edited by

Shoryu Katsura



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BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

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
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Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, November 4^{th}, 1997

CONTENTS

Preface

The Third International Dharmakīrti Conference was held at Hiroshima International Conference Center, November 4–6, 1997. I would like to acknowledge the generous support and sponsorship of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science as well as the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai (Tokyo). Many thanks are also due to the Shibuya Scholarship Foundation (Fukuyama) which, with the advice of the Hiroshima University Young Buddhist Association, provided a substantial part of the publication cost of the proceedings.

Nearly one hundred scholars and students of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition and its related areas gathered for the conference and forty-two papers were presented during the three-day intensive meeting. Some papers are not included in this volume for various reasons; I hope that they will be published somewhere in the future. Two reports of the conference in Japanese have been published by Prof. Takashi Iwata (*Tōyō no Shisō to Shūkyō* 15, 1998, 1–11) and by myself (*Tōhōgaku* 96, 1998, 163–168).

The camera-ready copy of these proceedings was prepared by the staff and students of the Department of Indian Philosophy of Hiroshima University. I would like to thank Prof. Hideyo Ogawa, Mr. Yoshichika Honda, Mr. Shunichi Fujihara, Mr. Junji Hirose, Mr. Hisayasu Kobayashi, Ms. Yoshie Kobayashi, Mr. Nobumichi Kusumoto, Mr. Hirotaka Morie, Ms. Kiyomi Nagao, Mr. Makoto Suehiro, Mr. Toshikazu Watanabe and Mr. Keisuke Yamamoto for their tremendous efforts to bring these proceedings to the completion. Papers written by some Japanese authors have been read and corrected by Ms. Birgit Kellner (Hiroshima), Ms. Sara McClintock (Lausanne), and Ms. Lisa Grumbach (Berkeley). I am grateful to these three young scholars for their kind help at the final moment of our editorial work.

A few remarks on what follows. Prof. Kimura's new chronology of Dharmakīrti is essentially based upon one Chinese passage from the *Guan suo yuan lun shi* (觀所縁論釋 Dharmapāla's commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*) which contains the two Chinese characters 法稱, seemingly equivalent of 'Dharmakīrti'. However, it is to be noted that there has been raised a serious doubt whether the passage can be read in that way. Therefore, we must look for more substantial evidence before adopting his new chronology.

On the first day of the conference there was a heated debate between Prof. Oetke and Dr. Franco, regarding how to interpret the initial six verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Pramāṇasiddhi chapter which are generally believed to contain the definitions of *pramāṇa* (valid means of knowledge). The same topic was dealt with by Prof. Lindtner and Drs. Dreyfus and Franco at the previous conference in Vienna. I welcomed this continued discussion and allowed Dr. Franco to respond to Prof. Oetke's criticism and the latter to further clarify his points. In this connection I would like to point out that the so-called disjunctive particle *vā* is used in various ways; e.g., the *Amarakośa* III.3.249 (ed. by A. A. Ramanathan, Madras 1971) lists four different meanings, viz., *upamā*, *vikalpa*, *avadhāraṇa* and *samuccaya*. In the particular context of the *pramāṇa* definition I would like to propose to read *vā* in the sense of *atha vā*, i.e., 'or rather', which has the function of correcting or modifying a previous statement. It is a common practice among classi-

cal Indian authors to mention their own final statements after listing the alternative views connected by *vā* or *atha vā*. Thus, in my opinion, verse 5c (*ajñātārthaprakāśaḥ*) represents Dharmakīrti's own definition of *pramāṇa*, which contains both characteristics of 'novelty' (expressed by '*ajñāta*') and 'non-deception' (expressed by '*artha*'), and verse 1 (*avisaṃvādi jñānam*) represents a commonly held definition of *pramāṇa* at his time.

I have also allowed Prof. Gillon to respond to the critical remarks on his article made by Dr. Ganeri's paper at the conference concerning the interpretation of the particle *eva*. Here again we see the continued discussion of the same topic originally started by Prof. Kajiyama. I regret that both Dr. Ganeri and Prof. Gillon examined only the three verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Parārthānumāna chapter, viz. 190–192. They both ignored the following verse 193 which in my opinion is crucial to the understanding of the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of the particle *eva*. It reads: *pratiyogivyavacchedas tatrāpy artheṣu gamyate / tathā prasiddheḥ sāmarthyād vivakṣānugamād dhvaneḥ //* (Steinkellner's tr.: "Und dabei ergibt sich bei [Verwendung der Partikel mit allen drei] (Satz-)Inhalten die Ausschließung des (jeweiligen negativen) Gegenstücks, weil es (allgemein) so bekannt ist und weil [die Partikel zur Ausschließung] fähig ist und weil sich (schließlich) ein Wort nach der Intention des Sprechers richtet." *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil II*, Wien 1979, 33f.). Thus, the principal meaning of the particle *eva* is '*pratiyogi-vyavaccheda*', i.e., '*anyāpoha*' (exclusion of others), 'others' being determined by *prasiddhi* (common sense), *sāmarthya* ('word-force' or context), or *vivakṣā* (an intention of a speaker).

The above two cases lead me to offer some remarks on the methodology of our discipline. I would think that there are three approaches currently practiced by our colleagues: viz. (1) the philological approach, (2) the historical approach, and (3) the philosophical approach. Some of us have been trying to collect original manuscripts, and to edit and translate the texts. Some of us further try to interpret the contents of the texts, to examine them in their historical context, and to reconstruct the history of particular ideas and theories. And some of us try to reconstruct the theories of Buddhist epistemology and logic in a systematic way, mainly with a help of our knowledge of Western philosophy, and to compare the results with the theories of Western philosophical traditions. What is missing here is the traditional Indian approach. As a matter of fact we often rely on the traditional Indian commentaries in order to understand the texts. However, as the above cases indicate, we do not do this thoroughly in many cases. It is not easy but we should try to understand the texts written by classical Indian authors in a way as faithful as possible to that conceived by the authors themselves, which requires a good knowledge of their historical as well as contemporary backgrounds. I would like to see future Dharmakīrtian studies be carried out with a balance of these four approaches.

One of the remarkable features of the present proceedings in comparison with the previous one is the increase of the number of contributions devoted to the study of Tibetan traditions of Buddhist epistemology and logic. This faithfully reflects the current trend of interests among young Buddhologists. The Land of Snow seems to be the focal point of future studies of Buddhist epistemology and logic, for we now know that the monastic libraries there possess many original Sanskrit manuscripts of this field. We sincerely hope that they will be made available to foreign scholars and students in the near future.

Regarding the styles of the papers printed here, we tried our best to follow the last proceedings edited by Prof. Steinkellner. However, whenever we found a difficulty in an individual text, we consulted *The Chicago Manual of Style* (14th ed. Chicago 1993). The result is a mixture of both styles. I hope that readers will not be perplexed. It is to be noted that some authors followed the unique Viennese uses of parentheses and brackets.

Finally I would like to thank my old friend, Prof. Jonathan Silk (Yale University), for his kind help to smoothen the English text of this preface.

Hiroshima, November 1998

Shoryu Katsura

Account of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference in Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997

PROGRAM

TUESDAY, November 4th

Registration (9:00–10:00)

Presidential Address by Prof. Yūichi Kajiyama (10:00)

MORNING SESSION (10:05–12:00): *Apoha* and Philosophy of Language
(Chairperson: Prof. Akihiko Akamatsu)

1. Johannes BRONKHORST
   "Nāgārjuna and *apoha*"
2. Futoshi ŌMAE
   "Dharmakīrti as a Varṇavādin"
3. Hideyo OGAWA
   "Bhartṛhari on Representations (*buddhyākāra*)"
4. Ole PIND
   "Dharmakīrti as Interpreter of Dignāga's *apoha* Theory: The Case of PV I.125–128"
5. Mark SIDERITS
   "Apohavāda, Nominalism and Resemblance Theories"

Discussion (15 minutes)

Lunch Break (12:00–13:00)

AFTERNOON SESSION I (13:00–14:15): On *Pramāṇavārttika* Chap. II
(Chairperson: Prof. Takashi Iwata)

1. Claus OETKE
   "On the Disjunction in the Pramāṇasiddhi"
2. Eli FRANCO
   "Two Circles or Parallel Lines?"
3. Richard HAYES
   "Whose Experience Validates What for Dharmakīrti?"

Discussion (15 minutes)

Coffee Break (14:15–14:45)

AFTERNOON SESSION II (14:45–17:00): Dharmakīrti and Logic (1)
(Chairperson: Prof. Yūichi Kajiyama)

1. Motoi ONO
   "Dharmakīrti on *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*"
2. Brendan GILLON
   "The Development of Indian Logic up to Dharmakīrti"
3. Tom J. F. TILLEMANS
   "How Much of a Proof Is Scripturally Based Inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*)?"

4. Takashi IWATA
   "On the Interpretation of the Subject (*dharmin*) of the Inference Negating Invariable Entities in Buddhist Logic"
5. Ernst STEINKELLNER
   "Yogic Cognition and Tantric Goal: Examples of Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* Theorem in Use as a Methodological Tool"

Discussion (25 minutes)

Official Photograph (17:00)

Banquet at Mielparque (18:00–20:00)

WEDNESDAY, November 5th

MORNING SESSION I (9:00–10:15): Dharmakīrti and Ontology (1)
(Chairperson: Prof. Brendan Gillon)

1. Horst LASIC
   "Dharmakīrti and His Successors on the Determination of Causality"
2. Masahiro INAMI
   "On the Determination of Causality"

Discussion (15 minutes)

Coffee Break (10:15–10:45)

MORNING SESSION II (10:45–12:00): Dharmakīrti and Ontology (2)
(Chairperson: Prof. Richard Hayes)

1. Tomoyuki UNO
   "Ontological Affinity between the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas Viewed by Buddhist Logicians"
2. Raghunath GHOSH
   "Is Relation Really Unreal? A Critique of Dharmakīrti"
3. Alex WAYMAN
   "Does the Buddhist 'Momentary' Theory Preclude Anything Permanent?"

Discussion (15 minutes)

Lunch Break (12:00–13:00)

AFTERNOON SESSION I (13:00–14:40): Dharmakīrti and His Successors (1)
(Chairperson: Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans)

1. Birgit KELLNER
   "Levels of Perceptibility—the Expression *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta* and Its Significance for the Buddhist *anupalabdhi* Theory"
2. Ryūsei KEIRA
   "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of *anupalabdhi* in the *Madhyamakāloka*"
3. Tōru FUNAYAMA
   "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of *abhrānta* (Non-erroneous) in the Definition of Direct Perception"

4. Seitetsu MORIYAMA
   "Kamalaśīla's Proof of Non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*) and the Reversed Formula from the *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*)"

   Discussion (20 minutes)

Coffee Break (14:40–15:10)

AFTERNOON SESSION II (15:10–17:00): Dharmakīrti and His Successors (2)
(Chairperson: Prof. Ernst Steinkellner)

1. Vincent ELTSCHINGER
   "Śubhagupta's *Śrutiparīkṣā*: Tibetan Text, Analysis and Dharmakirtian Background"
2. Taiken KYŪMA
   "*bheda* and *virodha*"
3. Kazufumi OKI
   "On *pravṛtti*"
4. Tadashi TANI
   "Reinstatement of 'Extrinsic Determination on Logical Necessity (*bahirvyāpti*)': Jñānaśrīmitra's Proof of Momentary Existence"

   Discussion (20 minutes)

Supper Break (17:00–18:30)

EVENING SESSION (18:30–20:30): Dharmakīrti and Logic (2)
(Chairperson: Prof. Hideyo Ogawa)

1. Noboru UEDA
   "On the Deduction of *vyāpti* from the Second Condition of *hetu*"
2. Jonardon GANERI
   "Dharmakīrti's *trairūpya* and the Role of the Particle *eva*"
3. Shōryū KATSURA
   "Indian Proof Procedure Compared with Toulmin's Model"

   Discussion (15 minutes)

Exchange of Information about Ongoing Research Projects
(Chairperson: Prof. Shōryū Katsura)

THURSDAY, November 6th

MORNING SESSION I (9:00–10:15): Dharmakīrti and Non-Buddhist Philosophers (1)
(Chairperson: Dr. Ernst Prets)

1. Piotr BALCEROWICZ
   "Taxonomic Approach to *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* in *Nyāyabindu* and in Siddharṣigaṇi's *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*—Dharmakīrti's Typology and the Jaina Criticism Thereof"
2. Kyō KANŌ
   "On *anyathānupapatti* and *avīta/āvīta*"
3. Helmut KRASSER
   "Dharmakīrti and Kumārila on the Refutation of the Existence of God"

   Discussion (15 minutes)

Coffee Break (10:15–10:45)

MORNING SESSION II (10:45–12:00): Dharmakīrti and Non-Buddhist Philosophers (2)
(Chairperson: Dr. Helmut Krasser)

1. Ernst PRETS
   "Dharmakīrti's Refutation of *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin* Reasons in the Light of the Naiyāyikas' View"
2. Chishō Mamoru NAMAI
   "Śrīdhara's Criticism on the Buddhist *cittasantāna* Theory"
3. Shōdō YAMAKAMI
   "Dharmakīrti vs. Bhāsarvajña on Perception"

Discussion (15 minutes)

Lunch Break (12:00–13:00)

AFTERNOON SESSION I (13:00–14:40): Dharmakīrti and Tibetan Buddhism (1)
(Chairperson: Dr. Helmut Tauscher)

1. Chizuko YOSHIMIZU
   "*dṛśya* and *vikalpya* or *snang ba* and *btags pa* Associated in a Conceptual Cognition"
2. Hideomi YAITA
   "*Yogācārabhūmi* and Dharmakīrti on Perception"
3. Ronald M. DAVIDSON
   "Masquerading as *pramāṇa*"

Discussion (20 minutes)

Coffee Break (14:40–15:10)

AFTERNOON SESSION II (15:10–17:00): Dharmakīrti and Tibetan Buddhism (2)
(Chairperson: Prof. Katsumi Mimaki)

1. Toshihiko KIMURA
   "New Chronology of Dharmakīrti"
2. Helmut TAUSCHER
   "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge's Opinion on *prasaṅga* in His *dBu ma'i shar gsum gyi stong thun*"
3. Leonard van der KUIJP
   "When a Definiens Requires a Definition: Some Remarks on *mtshan nyid* by Mtshur ston Gzhon nu seng ge (ca. 1160–1220)"
4. Georges DREYFUS
   "Getting Oriented in the Tibetan Tradition: A Contribution"

Discussion (20 minutes)

FRIDAY, November 7th

Outing to Miyajima Island

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. AKAMATSU Akihiko, Kyūshū Univ.
2. AKIMOTO Masaru, Chikushi Women's Univ.
3. Piotr BALCEROWICZ, Warsaw Univ.
4. Johannes BRONKHORST, Univ. of Lausanne
5. Ronald M. DAVIDSON, Fairfield Univ.
6. Mahinda DEEGALLE, Aichigakuin Univ.
7. Georges DREYFUS, Williams College
8. EJIMA Yasunori, Univ. of Tōkyō
9. Vincent ELTSCHINGER, Univ. of Lausanne
10. Eli FRANCO, Univ. of Hamburg
11. FUJITANI Takayuki, Saga Pref.
12. FUKUDA Yōichi, The Tōyō Bunko
13. FUNAYAMA Tōru, Kyōto Univ.
14. Jonardon GANERI, Univ. of Nottingham
15. Raghunath GHOSH, Univ. of North Bengal
16. Brendan GILLON, McGill Univ.
17. HARIKAI Kunio, Saga Medical School
18. HATTORI Masaaki, Prof. Emeritus, Kyōto Univ.
19. HAYASHI Keijin, The Eastern Inst., Inc.
20. Richard HAYES, McGill Univ.
21. HONDA Yoshichika, Hiroshima Univ.
22. Pascale HUGON, Univ. of Lausanne
23. ICHIGŌ Masamichi, Kyōto Sangyō Univ.
24. INAMI Masahiro, Tōkyō Gakugei Univ.
25. IWATA Takashi, Waseda Univ.
26. KAJIYAMA Yūichi, Sōka Univ.
27. KANŌ Kyō, Kōbe Women's Univ.
28. KATAOKA Kei, Univ. of Tōkyō
29. KATSURA Shōryū, Hiroshima Univ.
30. KEIRA Ryūsei, Univ. of Lausanne
31. Birgit KELLNER, Hiroshima Univ.
32. KIMURA Toshihiko, Shitennōji Internat. Bud. U.
33. Helmut KRASSER, Austrian Academy of Sciences
34. KURIHARA Shōdō, Hiroshima
35. KYŪMA Taiken, Univ. of Vienna
36. Horst LASIC, Austrian Academy of Sciences
37. MAEDA Hidekazu, Waseda Univ.
38. MARUI Hiroshi, Univ. of Tōkyō
39. Sara McCLINTOCK, Univ. of Lausanne
40. MIKOGAMI Eshō, Ryūkoku Univ.
41. MIMAKI Katsumi, Kyōto Univ.
42. MORIYAMA Seitetsu, Bukkyō Univ.
43. MORIYAMA Shinya, Univ. of Tōkyō
44. MURAKAMI Shinkan, Tōhoku Univ.
45. MUROYA Yasutaka, Kyōto Univ.
46. NAGASAKI Hōjun, Ōtani Univ.
47. NAMAI Chishō Mamoru, Kōyasan Univ.
48. NOMURA Shōjirō, Waseda Univ.
49. NORIYAMA Satoru, Ryūkoku Univ.
50. NOTAKE Miyako, Waseda Univ.
51. Joseph O'LEARY, Sophia Univ. (Tokyo)
52. Claus OETKE, Stockholm Univ.
53. OGAWA Hideyo, Hiroshima Univ.
54. OKAZAKI, Yasuhiro, Chiyoda High School
55. OKI Kazufumi, Shuchiyin College
56. ŌMAE Futoshi, Shimane International College
57. ONO Motoi, Univ. of Vienna
58. ONO Takuya, Univ. of Tōkyō
59. PARK Kiyeol, Kyōto Univ.
60. Gregor PAUL, Univ. of Karlsruhe
61. Holten Ole PIND, Critical Pāli Dictionary
62. Raynald PRÉVÈREAU, Univ. of Lausanne
63. Ernst PRETS, Austrian Academy of Sciences
64. SAITŌ Akira, Mie Univ.
65. SAITŌ Hisakuni, Tōhoku Fukushi Univ.
66. SAKO Toshio, Surugadai Univ.
67. SATŌ Kōju, Ōtani Univ.
68. SATŌ Masamichi, Waseda Univ.
69. SHIMA Iwao, Kanazawa Univ.
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71. Mark SIDERITS, Illinois State Univ.
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74. Helmut TAUSCHER, Univ. of Vienna
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77. TODA Hirohisa, The Eastern Inst., Inc.
78. TOHI Kōhō, Hiroshima Pref.
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80. TOSAKI Hiromasa, Yamaguchi Pref. Univ.
81. UEDA Noboru, Bunkyō Univ.
82. UNEBE Toshiya, Ōtani Univ.
83. UNO Tomoyuki, McGill Univ.
84. Leonard van der KUIJP, Harvard Univ.
85. WAKAHARA Yūshō, Ryūkoku Univ.
86. WATANABE Chikafumi, Univ. of Calgary
87. Alex WAYMAN, Prof. Emeritus, Columbia Univ.
88. WOO Jeson, Univ. of Pennsylvania
89. YAITA Hideomi, Naritasan Inst. for Bud. St.
90. YAMAKAMI Shōdō, Kyōto Sangyō Univ.
91. YAMAMOTO Kazuhiko, Ōtani Univ.
92. YOSHIMIZU Chizuko, Naritasan Inst. for Bud. St.

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE AND SUPPORTING STAFF

KATSURA Shōryū, OGAWA Hideyo, HONDA Yoshichika; HIROSE Junji, KAWAKAMI Miyuki, KOBAYASHI Yoshie, NAGAO Kiyomi, ŌTA Kaori, SHIBA Ayami, SHIMONO Michiko, and SUEHIRO Makoto.

Opening Speech

Honored colleagues, I welcome you to the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference at Hiroshima. Please allow me to greet you with a few words in celebration of this conference.

The first International Dharmakīrti Conference was held at Kyoto University, Japan, on June 16 and 17, 1982, with the attendance of 52 Japanese and foreign scholars who were interested in Dharmakīrti in particular and Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition in general. The conference was planned and realized on the occasion of Professor Ernst Steinkellner's three-month stay as visiting professor at Kyoto University. Profs. Steinkellner, K. Mimaki and S. Katsura as well as myself wanted to make the International Dharmakīrti Conference a lasting organization, wishing to gather scholars again within a few years. Thanks to Prof. Steinkellner's sponsorship, the second International Dharmakīrti Conference was convened in Vienna, Austria, between June 11–16, 1989, which was attended by 42 Dharmakīrtians from all over the world. All the papers read in the conference were collected in *The Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference*, edited by E. Steinkellner and published by Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien in 1991.

Today—once again—fifteen years after the first conference, and eight years after the second conference, we have gathered together in Hiroshima to hold the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference. Many attendants of the first and second conferences have been very active and have become world-renowned Buddhist logicians, and many young scholars have joined our third conference. We are indeed grateful to Prof. Shoryu Katsura of Hiroshima University who has devoted himself to organizing, communicating, and collecting funds for this conference. We are also much obliged to Prof. Steinkellner, Director of the Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Universität Wien, who has been and still is not only the central pillar of Buddhist logico-epistemological studies in the world, but was the key figure in establishing the first International Dharmakīrti Conference.

We know that during the past few decades remarkable advancement has been made in works on Dharmakīrti and Buddhist logic and epistemology, and we note such achievements have been made mainly by scholars who are members of our conference. It is necessary to maintain the development of Buddhist epistemology which is a treasure of world religions, philosophy and civilization in general. It is my earnest desire that we continue to meet every few years to promote further studies of Buddhist logico-epistemology and cement friendships between world-wide scholars of Dharmakīrtian philosophy.

Thank you.

Nov. 4, 1997

Yuichi Kajiyama

PROCEEDINGS

TAXONOMIC APPROACH TO *DṚṢṬĀNTĀBHĀSA* IN *NYĀYABINDU* AND IN SIDDHARṢIGAṆI'S *NYĀYĀVATĀRAVIVṚTI* —DHARMAKĪRTI'S TYPOLOGY AND THE JAINA CRITICISM THEREOF

by

Piotr Balcerowicz, Warszawa

In the third chapter of *Nyāyabindu*, Dharmakīrti lists a typology of nine fallacies of the example based on similarity (*sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) and of complementary nine varieties of the fallacy of the example based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*).

Interestingly enough, Dharmakīrti's classification is replicated by Siddharṣigaṇi in his classification found in his *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, a commentary that with its historio-philosophic implications surpasses even the significant role played in Jaina epistemology by the *Nyāyāvatāra* aphorisms of Siddhasena Divākara. That Siddharṣigaṇi was indeed indebted to Dharmakīrti can be clearly seen in Tables I and II shown below. Sections marked with a single underline and bold letters are passages that are found in *Nyāyabindu* as well as in *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, and that are basically identical, whereas those in bold letters are replenished portions of *Nyāyabindu*—that can be either supplied from foregoing aphorisms of *Nyāyabindu* or reconstructed solely on the basis of *Nyāyabindu* or the commentary thereon—that tally with the reading attested in *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*. Expressions with a single underline are synonymous in both texts, though not entirely identical.

As it can easily be seen from the tables below, the only exceptions, i.e., cases when Siddharṣigaṇi diverges from Dharmakīrti's illustrations, are clearly [S1], [S2], [V1] and [V2]. In case of a few other varieties, the differences in wording between Siddharṣigaṇi's and Dharmakīrti's formulations are so insignificant that they can altogether be discarded and a detailed analysis seems here unnecessary.

To sum up, the number of similar or identical formulations alone is so ample that there can hardly be any doubt that the Jaina classification of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* in the person of Siddharṣigaṇi evinces deep indebtedness to Dharmakīrti. A single occurrence of the same phrasing might be claimed to be nothing but coincidental, but there can be no question of coincidence in a situation when most (though not all) of the eighteen statements of the fallacious example are in total or partial agreement. Moreover, the way Siddharṣigaṇi makes the selection of three 'syllogistic' proofs—viz., [S7], [S9] and [V9]—that are to be supplied from the context of preceding *sūtra*s in accordance with Dharmakīrti additionally corroborates my thesis. In their complete formulation, the missing (*sc.* to be supplied for the preceding) parts of Dharmakīrti's 'syllogistic' proofs reconstructed solely on the basis of *Nyāyabindu* or *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (for details see respective footnotes), correspond virtually in every particular to the examples given by Siddharṣigaṇi (cf.

TABLE I: *sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*

	variety	*Nyāyabindu*	*Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*
[S1]	*sādhyavikala*	*nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt, karmavat* (NB III 124)	*bhrāntam anumānaṃ, pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat*[1]
[S2]	*sādhanavikala*	*nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt, paramāṇuvat* (NB III 124)	*jāgratsvaṃvedanaṃ bhrāntaṃ, pramāṇatvāt, svapnasaṃvedanavat*
[S3]	*sādhyasādhanavikala*	*nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvād,* ***ghaṭavat*** (NB III 124)	*nāsti sarvajñaḥ, pratyakṣādyanupalabdhatvāt,* ***ghaṭavat***
[S4]	*sandigdhasādhya-dharma*	*rāgādimān ayaṃ vacanād* ***rathyāpuruṣavat*** (NB III 125)	*vītarāgo 'yaṃ, maraṇadharmatvād,* ***rathyāpuruṣavat***
[S5]	*sandigdhasādhana-dharma*	***maraṇadharmāyaṃ puruṣo rāgādimattvāt, rathyāpuruṣavat*** (NB III 125)	***maraṇadharmāyaṃ puruṣo, rāgādimattvād, rathyāpuruṣavat***
[S6]	*sandigdhasādhya-sādhanadharma*	***asarvajño 'yaṃ rāgādimattvāt, rathyāpuruṣavat*** (NB III 125)	***asarvajño 'yaṃ, rāgādimattvād, rathyāpuruṣavat***
[S7]	*ananvaya*	[****rāgādimān** ayaṃ, **vaktṛtvād,***[2]] *yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimān; iṣṭapuruṣavat* (NB III 126)	***rāgādimān*** *vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo,* ***vaktṛtvād,*** *iṣṭapuruṣavat*
[S8]	*apradarśitānvaya*	***anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavat*** (NB III 126)	***anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvād, ghaṭavat***
[S9]	*viparītānvaya*	[****anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād,***] *yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam* [****ghaṭavat***[3]] (NB III 127)	***anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt,*** [. . .] ***yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam ghaṭavat***

[1] Cf. NB I 4: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*. Cf. also Diṅnāga's formulation in PS I 3c–d: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham*, as well as Dharmottara's in NBṬ on NB I 4: *bhrāntaṃ hy anumānam*.

[2] This is how the thesis and the logical reason should be reconstructed, first, in view of the explication of the positive concomitance in NB III 126 itself (*yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimān*), and secondly in view of the NBṬ *ad loc.*: ***yo vakteti*** *vaktṛtvam anūdya* ***sa rāgādimān*** *iti rāgādimattvaṃ vihitaṃ*, wherein the gerund *anūdya* of *anu√vad* is used in its conventional meaning of "having called something to mind [as well known]" and the past passive participle *vihita*, a derivative of the verb *vi√dhā*, occurs in its well attested meaning "introduced as something new; taught as something yet unknown (*sc.* to be proved)." Also DhP *ad loc.* (*vaktṛtvasya heto rāgādimattve sādhye pratiniyamaḥ pratiniyatatvam uktam iti śeṣaḥ*) expresses plainly the logical reason (*hetu*: *vaktṛtva*) and the probandum (*sādhya*: *rāgādimattva*).

[3] The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason (*anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt . . .*) along with the example (*. . . ghaṭavat*) are to be supplied from the preceding aphorism NB III 126. The statement *yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam* is the formulation of the invariable concomitance (*anvaya*) referring to the incomplete—inasmuch as it lacks its explicit statement, being the fallacy of *anavayava* type—'syllogistic' proof in NB III 126. Cf. also NBṬ *ad loc.*: ***yad anityam*** *ity anityatvam anūdya* ***tat kṛtakam*** *iti kṛtakatvaṃ vihitaṃ*. This 'syllogistic' proof bears resemblance (barring the lack of negation in the thesis of *sādhanadharmāsiddha* type of fallacious example, which is to be supplied further on in the *viparītānvaya* type) to the one found in NP (1) 3.3.1 (= NP (2) 5,19–6,14): *tatra sādharmyeṇa tāvad dṛṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ, tad yathā*: [. . .] [1] *sādhanadharmāsiddho yathā: nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt paramāṇuvat*. [. . .] [5] *viparītānvayo yathā: yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityaṃ dṛṣṭam iti vaktavye yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti bravīti //*. The reconstruction is independently confirmed by the reading found in the corresponding section of NAṬ.

TABLE II: *vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*

	variety	*Nyāyabindu*	*Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*
[V1]	*sādhyāvyatirekin*	[**nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt,*[4]] *paramāṇuvat* (NB III 129)	*bhrāntam anumānam, pramāṇatvāt;* [...] *yat punar bhrāntaṃ na bhavati na tat pramāṇaṃ, tad yathā svapnajñānam*
[V2]	*sādhanāvyatirekin*	[**nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt,*] *karmavat* (NB III 129)	*nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ, pramāṇatvāt;* [...] *yat punaḥ savikalpakaṃ na tat pramāṇaṃ, tad yathānumānam*
[V3]	*sādhya-sādhanāvyatirekin*	[**nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt,*] *ākāśavat* (NB III 129)	*nityānityaḥ śabdaḥ, sattvāt;* [...] *yaḥ punar na nityānityaḥ sa na san, tad yathā ghaṭaḥ*
[V4]	*sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka*	*asarvajñāḥ kapilādayo 'nāptā vā, avidyamānasarvajñatāptatā-liṅgabhūtapramāṇātiśayaśāsanatvāt;* [...] *yaḥ sarvajña āpto vā sa jyotirjñānādikam upadiṣṭavān. yathā ṛṣabhavardhamānādir iti* (NB III 130)	*asarvajñā anāptā vā kapilādayo, āryasatyacatuṣṭayāpratipādakatvāt;* [...] *yaḥ punaḥ sarvajña āpto vā 'sāv āryasatyacatuṣṭayaṃ pratyapīpadat, tad yathā śauddhodaniḥ*
[V5]	*sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka*	*na trayīvidā brāhmaṇena grāhyavacanaḥ kaścit vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo rāgādimattvāt;* [...] *ye grāhyavacanā na te rāgādimantaḥ, tad yathā gautamādayo dharmaśāstrāṇāṃ praṇetāraḥ* (NB III 131)	*anādeyavākyaḥ kaścid vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo rāgādimattvāt;* [...] *yaḥ punar ādeyavākyo, na sa rāgādimāṃs, tad yathā sugataḥ*
[V6]	*sandigdhasādhya-sādhanavyatireka*	*avītarāgāḥ kapilādayaḥ, parigrahāgrahayogāt;* [...] *yo vītarāgo na tasya parigrahāgraho yatharṣabhādeḥ* (NB III 132)	*na vītarāgāḥ kapilādayaḥ, karuṇāspadeṣv apy akaruṇāparīta-cittatayādattanijakamāṃsaśakalatvāt;* [...] *ye punar vītarāgās te karuṇāspadeṣu karuṇāparītacittatayā dattanijamāṃsaśakalās, tad yathā bodhisattvāḥ*
[V7]	*avyatireka*	*avītarāgo 'yam vaktṛtvāt; yatrāvītarāgatvaṃ nāsti sa vaktā. yathopalakhaṇḍa iti* (NB III 133)	*avītarāgaḥ kaścid vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo, vaktṛtvāt;* [...] *yaḥ punar vītarāgo, na sa vaktā, yathopalakhaṇḍaḥ*
[V8]	*apradarśita-vyatireka*	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvād; ākāśavat* (NB III 134)	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvād, ākāśavat*
[V9]	*viparītavyatireka*	[**anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvād,*] *yad akṛtakam tan nityaṃ bhavati,* [**ākāśavat*[5]] (NB III 135)	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvād,* [...] *yad akṛtakam tan nityaṃ bhavati, yathākāśam*

[4]The thesis and the logical reason (*nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt*) here as well as in the two following cases ([V2], [V3]) are to be supplied from the parallel aphorism of NB III 124. Besides, the reconstruction is directly confirmed by NBṬ: *nityatve śabdasya sādhye hetāv amūrtatve paramāṇuvaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyāvyatirekī.* The same applies to [V2] and [V3].

[5]The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason along with the example are to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. NB III 134 states incomplete syllogistic reasoning lacking the explicit formulation of the negative concomitance which NB III 135 supplies, though in the reversed order. The 'syllogistic' proof formed correctly would run as follows: *anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt, yad akṛtakaṃ tan nityaṃ bhavati, ākāśavat.* This 'syllogistic' proof—with the correct formulation of the negative concomitance—occurs in NP (1) 2.2 (= NP (5) 2.2 = NP (2) 1,11–13). Similarly to [S9], also this 'syllogistic' proof bears certain resemblance (barring the lack of negation in the predicate *anitya*) to the one found in NP (1) 3.3.2(= NP (2) 6,14–7,8).

the tables, [S7], [S9] [V9]). Siddharṣigaṇi himself reveals inadvertently, as it were, one more evidence in confirmation of his dependence on Dharmakīrti's typology. In his gloss on [V4] he considers the *sandigdhasādhyavyatireka* type to be reducible to [V1]. It is solely the extra-logical grounds that are responsible for classifying this fallacious example as a separate variety, namely the need to take into consideration the opinion of some people 'lacking the recognition' of certain substantial facts, to whom a particular case of a fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum "appears to be [the fallacious example] in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful."[6] Even being assigned the role of a commentator, he was not compelled by Siddhasena Divākara's aphorism of NA 25[7] to classify *sandigdhasādhyavyatireka* as a separate type, inasmuch as the NA.25 aphorism could easily be interpreted to enunciate the varieties [V1], [V2], [V3] as well as one or more out of the triad [V4], [V5], [V6], but not necessarily all of them.[8]

One can easily notice a couple of regularities following the above comparison of the varieties of fallacious examples as illustrated by Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigaṇi. What is conspicuous regarding the exposition of fallacious examples of both authors is the almost complete absence of any similarity in the group of [S1], [S2], [S3], [V1], [V2], [V3] (with a partial exception, *vide supra*). However, there is much correspondence in categories [S4], [S5], [S6], [V4], [V5], [V6] (with minor differences), whereas the remaining sub-types—[S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8], [V9]—are identical. Now, a question arises what factor could account for this evident incongruity in treating Dharmakīrti's sub-categories by Siddharṣigaṇi, if there is any? Why does the latter cite some of Dharmakīrti's phrasings without any modification, whereas he gives an entirely individual treatment to some other sub-varieties?

Siddharṣigaṇi's analysis of the sub-varieties [S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8], [V9], is, in fact, an open polemics—which is evident from the way the appropriate sections of NAV commence[9]—directed against an opponent, in which Siddharṣigaṇi questions the status of a separate fallacious

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[6] NAV 25: *ayaṃ ca sādhyāvyatirekī vāryasatyacatuṣṭayasya duḥkhasamudayamārganirodhalakṣaṇasya pramāṇabādhitatvena tadbhāṣakasyāsarvajñatānāptatopapatteḥ. kevalaṃ tannirākārakapramāṇasāmarthya-paryālocanavikalānāṃ sandigdhasādhyavyatirekatayā pratibhātīti tathopanyastaḥ. tathā hi: yady apy āryasatya-catuṣṭayaṃ śauddhodaniḥ pratipāditavāṃs, tathāpi sarvajñatāptate tasya na siddhyataḥ, tābhyāṃ sahāryasatya-catuṣṭayapratipādanasyānyathānupapattyasiddher, asarvajñānāptenāpi parapratāraṇābhiprāyapravṛttanipuṇa-buddhiśaṭhapuruṣeṇa tathāvidhapratipādanasya kartuṃ śakyatvāt. tasmāc chauddhodaneḥ sakāśād asarva-jñatānāptatālakṣaṇasya sādhyasya vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdheti sandigdhasādhyavyatirekitvam iti.*

[7] NA 25: *vaidharmyeṇātra dṛṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ / sādhyasādhanayugmānām anivṛtteś ca saṃśayāt //*

[8] While *anivṛtteḥ* is construed with *sādhyasādhanayugmānām* in any case, the expression *saṃśayāt* could be taken, theoretically speaking, separately, without any dependance on *sādhyasādhanayugmānām*. An instance of different conceivable ways of construing an aphorism by commentators in this way is offered by *Nyāyāvatāra* itself, cf. NA 8: *dṛṣṭeṣṭāvyāhatād vākyāt paramārthābhidhāyinaḥ / tattvagrāhitayotpannaṃ mānaṃ śābdaṃ prakīrtitam //* The aphorism is solved differently by the commentators, viz., (1) NAV *ad loc.*: ***dṛṣṭena*** *pramāṇāvalokitene**ṣṭaḥ** pratipādayiṣito* ***'vyāhato*** *'nirākṛtaḥ sāmarthyād artho yasmin vākye tattathā*; and (2) NAṬ *ad loc.*: ***dṛṣṭenetyādi.*** *ayaṃ bhinnādhikaraṇas tripado bahuvrīhiḥ yadi vā iṣṭo 'vyāhato 'rtho yatra tad iṣṭāvyāhataṃ vākyam, tadanu dṛṣṭena pramāṇanirṇītena iṣṭāvyāhatam iti tatpuruṣaḥ.*

[9] Respectively (1) NAV 24: *nanu ca parair anyad api dṛṣṭāntābhāsatrayam uktam, tad yathānanvayo 'pradarśitānvayo viparītānvayaś ceti* and (2) NAV 25: *parair apare 'pi dṛṣṭāntābhāsās trayo 'vimṛśyabhāṣitayā darśitāḥ. tad yathā—avyatireko, 'pradarśitavyatireko, viparītavyatirekaś ceti. te 'smābhir ayuktatvān na darśayitavyāḥ.*

example of these six varieties and endeavours to prove them to be misconceived and faulty solely either due to the defects of the logical reason (*hetu*) or due to the incompetence of the speaker, but not because of their deficient nature as separate and independent fallacies of the example. Firstly, in the light of what has been said above there can be no doubt that the 'others' (*paraiḥ*) referred to by Siddharṣigaṇi is the tradition of Dharmakīrti. Secondly, in order to refute an antagonistic point of view, doubtlessly spurious in one's own opinion, the best conceivable method would be, generally speaking, to quote the thesis with the name of its advocate. The general practice in India, however, was to refer the hearer's (reader's) attention to the original source by the incipit alone and an *in extenso* quotation of alleged six sub-varieties was more than enough to identify Dharmakīrti as the adversary and the supporter of the doubtful varieties of the fallacious example. On the other hand, it would not be methodologically very much advisable for undisguised refutation purposes to emend, interpolate or alter in any other way passages quoted from the opponent, firstly, because a modified quotation might not be a univocal indication of the source of the excerpt or of the adversary any longer and, secondly, because the proponent could easily expose himself to the opponent's criticism of refuting a thesis which was not upheld by the opponent in such a formulation. These rather obvious remarks explain, I believe, the motives why Siddharṣigaṇi left Dharmakīrti's illustrations of the six sub-varieties, that he intended to invalidate, untouched, and felt himself relatively free—having pointed out the target of his criticism—to introduce certain modifications to a few illustrations taken over from *Nyāyabindu*.

Thus, we are confronted with a kind of a puzzle what Siddharṣigaṇi's motivation to interpolate or modify a few of Dharmakīrti's eighteen illustrations of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* was.

An examination of Dharmakīrti's original instances of fallacious examples, which were later reformulated by Siddharṣigaṇi (i.e., [S1], [S2], [S3], [V1], [V2], [V3], [V4], [V5], [V6]), will prove that Siddarṣigaṇi's modifications were made in a systematic and well thought manner. As a matter of fact, Siddharṣigaṇi's every alteration or introduction of a new illustration in place of Dharmakīrti's original one has a direct doctrinal bearing and evinces a considerable amount of sectarian prejudice on his part, largely directed against the Buddhist, with [V3] being the only exception. Accordingly, we may distinguish three categories of illustrations modified by Siddharṣigaṇi:

(1) sectarian-biased illustrations provoked by Dharmakīrti's own anti-Jinistic statements, i.e., [V4] and [V6],
(2) sectarian-biased, doctrinally-bound illustrations without Dharmakīrti's sectarian instigation directed against the Jainas, i.e., [S1], [S2], [V1], [V2] and [V5], and
(3) theses prompted by general anti-Jinistic doctrines—i.e., [S3]—which will not be discussed in the present paper.

Surprisingly, I have failed to spot even a single modification of Dharmakīrti's original illustration that was introduced by Siddharṣigaṇi irrelevantly, viz., without any sectarian or doctrinal relevance!

Let us now examine more closely each of the modifications especially from the point of view of the author's dogmatic convictions or sectarian partiality revealed by the illustrations, less from the point of view of logical structure.

(1) Anti-Buddhist illustrations provoked by Dharmakīrti's biased position. They are on the whole of insolent nature and do not intend to demonstrate any doctrinal thesis of the Jainas.

[V4] *sandigdhasādhyavyatireka*

In Dharmakīrti's illustration of fallacious reasoning based on the fallacious example,[10] the distinguished quality of cognition that should serve as "the mark of possessing the status of an omniscient or an authoritative person, [which] is not present," is represented by science of astronomy-astrology (*jyotirjñāna*). Obviously, thinking along these lines, Kapila and many other thinkers did not teach astrology, as Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna and other Jaina teachers did, hence they cannot aspire to possess omniscience or authority. The doubtful element in this reasoning is—as Dharmottara specifies—whether teaching astrology necessarily entails being an omniscient or an authoritative person, inasmuch one may be an expert in astrology without being omniscient or authoritative.[11] In this manner, the omniscience and authority of Jaina Tīrthaṃkaras are put to doubt. Thus, the thesis pertaining to 'Kapila and others'—inasmuch as it cannot be proved by the faulty 'syllogistic' proof, even though the Buddhist (as well as the Jainas) would take it to be true—is less harmful than the example itself, in which the spiritual or/and intellectual accomplishment of Jaina teachers is discredited. Siddharṣigaṇi employs precisely the same procedure to question the Buddha's omniscience and authority: "it is absolutely possible that a charlatan may teach the Four Noble Truths and intentionally deceive people at the same time, without being omniscient or authoritative" (cf. n. 6). The way the doubt is formulated by Siddharṣigaṇi additionally insinuates that the Buddha was indeed such a person.

[V6] *sandigdhasādhyasādhanavyatireka*

Likewise in this variety (NB III 132), the scapegoat of the thesis are the Sāṃkhyas, headed by Kapila, and others, while that of the example are the Jainas. What is liable to doubt in Dharmakīrti's opinion is whether the Jaina Tīrthaṃkaras are both dispassionate as well as free of covetousness and greed. What is conspicuous in this regard is his deliberate selection of the logical reason, that is further on imputed to the Tīrthaṃkaras ('being endowed with covetousness and greed', *parigrahāgrahayoga*), particularly offensive to the Jainas, or 'Digambaras' as the commentator calls them, who were well known to refrain even from wearing clothes and various utensils such as a begging bowl in order to curb the desire for possessions and thereby manifest its total absence. No wonder that he is repaid tit for tat by Siddharṣigaṇi, who parallels his method in every detail, the only difference being that this time the butt are Boddhisattvas and two sensitive doctrinal points are oppugned in their case, viz., their compassion and the tenet that

[10] NB III 130: *asarvajñāḥ kapilādayo 'nāptā vā, avidyamānasarvajñatāptatāliṅgabhūtapramāṇātiśayaśāsanatvāt*; [. . .] *yaḥ sarvajña āpto vā sa jyotirjñānādikam upadiṣṭavān. yathā—ṛṣabhavardhamānādir iti.*

[11] NBṬ *ad loc.*: *atra pramāṇe vaidharmyodāharaṇam. yaḥ sarvajña āpto vā sa jyotirjñānādikaṃ sarvajñatāptatāliṅgabhūtam upadiṣṭavān. yathā ṛṣabho vardhamānaś ca tāvādī yasya sa ṛṣabhavardhamānādidigambarāṇāṃ śāstā sarvajñaś ca āptaś ceti. tad iha vaidharmyodāharaṇād ṛṣabhāder asarvajñatvasyānāptatāyāś ca vyatireko vyāvṛttiḥ saṃdigdhā. yato jyotirjñānaṃ copadiśed asarvajñāś ca bhaved anāptā vā. ko 'tra virodhaḥ? naimittikam etaj jñānaṃ vyabhicāri na sarvajñatvam anumāpayet.*

"Boddhistattvas have offered bits of their own flesh to hungry people who deserved compassion."[12] As if disbelieving the latter tenet was not enough to serve as a logical reason on its own, Siddharṣigaṇi appends it strangely enough (*sc.* without any internally motivated need to keep the logical structure of the reasoning complete and intact!) with the supposition that the Bodhisattvas may not even be compassionate. Indeed, he does repeat this charge explicitly in the concluding part of his argument, where he expresses his doubt that "it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas] are endowed with passion etc. or whether they are dispassionate; similarly, [it is not known] whether they have offered bits of their own flesh to those deserving sympathy or not." Nevertheless, the idea that "[their] consciousness is not filled with compassion" has to be read into the subsequent lines from the initial statement of the logical reason (*karuṇāspadeṣv apy akaruṇāparītacittatayādattanijakamāṃsaśakalatvād*). The question arises why Siddharṣigaṇi inserts another doubt concerning a second characteristic of Bodhisattvas into the logical reason and a possible answer could be that he does so in order to match two doubts expressed by Dharmakīrti (*parigraha* and *āgraha*). Astounding as it may be, this is, as a matter of fact, the only case of a double logical reason in Siddharṣigaṇi's whole classification as well as the only case when Dharmakīrti avails himself of a double logical reason, too!

(2) Anti-Buddhist illustrations without Dharmakīrti's anti-Jaina provocation. Siddharṣigaṇi strives to bear out the accuracy of a Jaina thesis among the lines of an illustration.

[S1] *sādhyavikala* and [V1] *sādhyāvyatirekin*

In place of Dharmakīrti's 'syllogistic' proof—that is not admissible to the Jainas in view of their theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*)—Siddharṣigaṇi indirectly disallows the Buddhist well-known doctrine of erroneousness of inference[13] and his criticism is this time hidden in the thesis of the 'syllogistic' proof justified by the logical reason, not in the example (which was never acceptable to the Buddhist, either). Behind the selection of the 'syllogistic' proof apparently lied the quandary—discussed in NAV 5 at length—that if both perception and inference are considered to be cognitive criteria, neither of them can be erroneous.[14]

[S2] *sādhanavikala*

In Dharmakīrti's illustration the 'syllogistic' reasoning is very akin to [S1], the only exception being *paramāṇu* that plays the role of a fallacious example lacking the probans, instead of *karman* lacking the probandum in [S1]. Siddharṣigaṇi, however, takes this opportunity to criticise another tenet of the Buddhist idealist, namely the doctrine of illusory character of worldly ap-

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[12] NAV 25 *ad loc.*: *na vītarāgāḥ kapilādayaḥ, karuṇāspadeṣv apy akaruṇāparītacittatayādattanijakamāṃsaśakalatvād iti. atra vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ: ye punar vītarāgās te karuṇāspadeṣu karuṇāparītacittatayā dattanijamāṃsaśakalās, tad yathā—bodhisattvā iti. atra sādhyasādhanadharmayor bodhisattvebhyo vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdhā; tatpratipādakapramāṇavaikalyān na jñāyate kiṃ te rāgādimanta uta vītarāgāḥ; tathānukampyeṣu kiṃ svapiśitakhaṇḍāni dattavanto neti vā. ataḥ sandigdhasādhyasādhanavyatirekitvam iti.*

[13] Cf. PVin II 24,6–7: *de ma yin la der 'dzin phyir. 'khrul kyang 'brel phyir tshad ma nyid.* Regarding the quotation cf. also Franco [1987: n. 179] as well as the criticism in TUS 176,1–3: *na ca satsāmānyaviṣayatve bhrāntatopapadyate. bhrāntir apy arthasambandhataḥ prameti na vaktavyam.* Cf. also NBṬ on NB I 4: *bhrāntaṃ hy anumānaṃ svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt.*

[14] The thesis of the defective 'syllogistic' proof in question is antithetical to NA 5cd.

pearance, and the whipping boy becomes an alleged Buddhist idealist thesis given a form of the so-called 'Dreaming Argument':[15] "The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in a dream" (*jāgratsaṃvedanaṃ bhrāntaṃ, pramāṇatvāt, svapnasaṃvedanavat*). This is an altered formulation—Siddharṣigaṇi has *pramāṇa* in place of the usual *pratyaya*—of a 'syllogistic' argument, commonly ascribed to the Buddhist, the references to which can be found in non-Jinistic sources. In its usual formulation (with *pratyaya* or *khyāti* as the logical reason), the 'Dreaming Argument' is refuted, for instance, by Kumārila,[16] Uddyotakara,[17] Śaṅkara[18] and by Siddharṣigaṇi himself later on.[19] Thus, Siddharṣigaṇi joins the party of critics of the idealist standpoint and refers, by availing himself of this illustration, to the 'Dreaming Argument' either directly[20] or indirectly.

[V2] *sādhanāvyatirekin*

Siddharṣigaṇi's illustration has to be viewed with reference to the famous Buddhist position stating that "perception is free from conceptual construction,"[21] and the motive underlying Siddharṣigaṇi's choice in favour of the selected illustration was apparently to oppose in a disguised manner the Buddhist thesis of the non-conceptual character of perception and to corroborate the Jaina claim that a perception that is free from any conceptual construction could never be experienced by any cogniser.[22]

[V5] *sandigdhasādhanavyatireka*

The elucidation of this particular fallacy of the example carried out by Dharmakīrti is of much interest in itself. In the reasoning[23] he evinces an anti-Brahmanical bent when he rises a

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[15] As it has been shown in Taber [1994: 28–31], the so-called Dreaming Argument has never been expressed by the Buddhist thinkers in the form it appears in anti-Buddhistic works.

[16] ŚV, Nirālambanavāda, v. 23: *stambhādipratyayo mithyā pratyayatvāt tathā hi yaḥ / pratyayaḥ sa mṛṣā dṛṣṭaḥ svapnādipratyayo yathā //*

[17] NV 1077: *ayaṃ jāgradavasthopalabdhānāṃ viṣayāṇāṃ cittavyatirekiṇām asattve hetuḥ khyātiḥ svapnavad iti.*

[18] BSŚBh 2.2.5.29 (p. 476): *yad uktaṃ bāhyārthāpalāpinā svapnādivaj jāgaritagocarā api stambhādipratyayā vinaiva bāhyenārthena bhaveyuḥ pratyayatvāviśeṣād iti tad prativaktavyam.*

[19] The argument—in its typical wording—reoccurs later in NAV 29 (the Śūnyavāda section): *nirālambanāḥ sarve pratyayāḥ, pratyayatvāt, svapnapratyayavad.*

[20] It is not so absurd as it might appear at first sight to contend that Siddharṣigaṇi may have seen no qualitative difference *in this particular case* (*sc.* the refutation of the "Dreaming Argument") between *saṃvedana, pramāṇa* and *pratyaya* and used them interchangeably to describe cognitive states in the subsequent lines (e.g., *svapnasaṃvedanasya pramāṇatāvaikalyāt tatpratyanīkajāgratpratyayopanipātabādhitatvād iti*). Moreover, the term *pratyaya* in any standard formulation of the "Dreaming Argument" (**mithyā stambhādipratyayaḥ pratyayatvāt, yathā svapnādipratyayaḥ*) is used in the sense of a cognition that is taken by ordinary people—erroneously, according to the Buddhist—to be factual and reliable, and therefore, in this manner, *in this particular* sense not very remote from the *pramāṇa*. Such being the case, Siddharṣigaṇi's illustration would be a *direct* criticism of the "Dreaming Argument."

[21] Cf. NB I 4: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*, PS I 3c–d: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ* as well as NP (2) 7,12–3.

[22] Siddharṣigaṇi refutes the Buddhist thesis at length in NAV 4 [NA (1) 44–49; NA (2) 29–32], cf. e.g.,: *tan na kadācana kalpanāpoḍhatvaṃ pratyakṣasya pramātur api pratītigocaracāritām anubhavati.*

[23] NB III 131: *sandigdhasādhanavyatireko yathā: na trayīvidā brāhmaṇena grāhyavacanaḥ kaścid vivakṣitaḥ*

query whether philosophers or law-makers of the Brahmanic tradition, like Gautama Akṣapāda, Manu,[24] etc., are driven by passions or not. In fact, by labelling the example a variety of a fallacy he casts a doubt on their dispassionateness and, thereby—pragmatically speaking—indicates the contrary. The direct consequence of implying, in the context of the 'syllogistic' reasoning in question, that Brahmanical philosophers or law-makers might be subject to passions is a conclusion that they should rather not be trusted, inasmuch as their sincerity and truthfulness are subject to doubt, as well, for, if the logical reason (*sādhana*, *hetu*) is not established, or open to doubt, then the probandum (*sādhya*), a property to-be-proved, cannot be established, either. Hence an unspoken conclusion—which is *directly* expressed by Dharmottara in his commentary[25]—that it is unreasonable to rely on words of teachers of the Brahmanical tradition (e.g., Gautama and Manu), but such is the behaviour of most people who have confidence in their teaching. At the same time, Dharmakīrti questions the veracity of statements of other Brahmanic philosophers like—if we are to believe Dharmottara[26]—Kapila etc. In view of the mention of 'a Brahmin learned in the three Vedas' (*trayīvidā brāhmaṇena*), who is a follower and/or promulgator of the Brahmanic philosophical and religious tradition in everyday life, in the thesis and in view of a conceivable situation in which the knowledge of the three Vedas could be relevant, clearly, the expression 'a particular person in question' (*kaścit vivakṣitaḥ puruṣaḥ*) could by no means be employed in a context outside of the philosophic or religious discourse, e.g., referring simply to a man in the street (*rathyāpuruṣa*), viz., to basically anyone. That is why Dharmottara's identification of *kaścit vivakṣitaḥ puruṣaḥ* as one of the philosophers was apparently right. The overall picture of the Brahmanical society relying on tradition would be, therefore, that neither proponents of the main stream in the tradtition (e.g., Gautama Akṣapāda, Manu etc.) nor preceptors of some alternative religious or philosophical schools (e.g., Kapila etc.) are a suitable source of reliable teaching to a Brahmin. Since he lived at least a century after Dharmottara,[27] Siddharṣigaṇi[28] must have been aware of that fact and have had a similar idea in mind. Accordingly, Siddharṣigaṇi leaves the basic structure of Dharmakīrti's argument untouched, with the only exception being the Buddha (*sugata*), whose dispassionateness (*ergo* his teaching) is subject to doubt, in place of

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puruṣo rāgādimattvād iti. atra vaidharmyodāharaṇaṃ: ye grāhyavacanā na te rāgādimantaḥ, tad yathā gautamādayo dharmaśāstrāṇāṃ praṇetāra iti. gautamādibhyo rāgādimattvasya sādhanadharmasya vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdhā.

[24] This is an addition, or elucidation, of Dharmottara, cf. NBṬ *ad loc.*: *gautama ādir yeṣāṃ te tathoktā manvādayo dharmaśāstrāṇi smṛtayas teṣāṃ kartāraḥ* [. . .]. Cf. also DhP *ad loc.*: *gautamo 'kṣapādāparanāmā nyāyasūtrasyāpi praṇetā muniḥ. manur iti smṛtikāro muniḥ.*

[25] NBṬ *ad loc.*: *gautamādibhyo rāgādimattvasya sādhanasya nivṛttiḥ sandigdhā. yady api te grāhyavacanās trayīvidā* tathāpi kiṃ sarāgā uta vītarāgā iti sandehaḥ.* (* Cf. n. 7: '°*vidā tathāpi* A.P.H.E.N.', the main text reads: °*vidas tathāpi*)

[26] NBṬ *ad loc.*: *vivakṣita iti kapilādi dharmī.*

[27] C. 740–800, cf. Steinkellner/Much [1995: 67].

[28] Shastri [1990: 27] assigns him to 9/10th century. He was also the author of a commentary titled *Heyopādeyā* on the *Upadeśamāla* and of *Upamitibhavaprapañcākathā*. He finished the latter work on 1st May 906 C.E. (Vikrama Saṃvat 962), cf. Vaidya [1928: XXI] and Chatterjee [1978: 287]. He is said to be a cousin of Māgha (c. 905 C.E.), acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa [1920: 147], and should be placed slightly earlier than Māṇikya Nandi, for he seems not to know the latter. Māṇikyanandin, on his part, must have been active in the first decades of the 10th century; Shastri [1990: 41] places him about 900 C.E. Assigning him to circa 800 C.E. by Vidyābhūṣaṇa [1920: 188] is certainly too early.

the original *gautamādayo dharmaśāstrāṇāṃ praṇetāraḥ*. Siddharṣigaṇi's exposition[29] of reasons why the particular 'syllogistic' reasoning in question should be deemed a fallacy reveals a couple of similarities[30] and seems to parallel the construction we find in Dharmottara's elucidation. His novelty lies in the fact that Siddharṣigaṇi extends the general picture of the society to embrace also the members of Buddhist *saṅgha* by truncating the original thesis and by leaving out the agent *trayīvidā brāhmaṇena*. Thereby, the group of vulnerable people who rely on and are exposed to false teachings promulgated by passionate (hence, most probably, false) thinkers is no longer limited by the agent *trayīvidā brāhmaṇena* to members of the Brahmanical society.

As it has been pointed out above, Siddharṣigaṇi dismisses six sub-varieties of the fallacious examples (viz., [S7], [S8], [S9], [V7], [V8] and [V9]) listed by Dharmakīrti as irrelevant and wrongly classified due to a dyad of reasons: they are either due to the defects of the logical reason (*hetu*) or due to the incompetence of the speaker.

Worth while is to mention in passing at this stage that, *structurally* speaking, it is interesting to notice that Dharmakīrti—while discussing various types of the fallacious example—does not mention any example *expressis verbis* in some *sūtras* and they have to be supplied from the preceding aphorism, as it is the case in [S9] or [V9]. Since the *sūtras* describe a fallacious example either with inverted positive concomitance (*viparītānvaya*) or with inverted negative concomitance (*viparītavyatireka*) and the respective terms *viparītānvaya* and *viparītavyatireka* are simply *bahuvrīhi* compounds, one could naturally expect that the object being an example and playing the role of the homologue (*sapakṣa*) or of the heterologue (*vipakṣa*) should be mentioned explicitly in the text by Dharmakīrti, who contents himself, however, with stating the negative concomitance alone in the *sūtra*, as he did, for instance, in [V1], [V2], [V3]. It shows beyond doubt that an essential part of the fallacious example, nay, of any example in 'syllogistic' reasoning, was the formulation of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). If we are to rely on Dharmottara's explanation in this regard, the role of the example was to demonstrate the sphere of application and validity of the invariable concomitance.[31] That stands in a direct opposition to what Siddhasena Divākara and Siddharṣigaṇi thought, namely that the role of example was merely 'the recollection of the relation (*sc.* of the invariable concomitance)' and the example was not supposed to prove anything nor to corroborate anything; its role was solely auxiliary.[32] Their

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[29] NAV 25 *ad loc.*: *yady api taddarśanānuraktāntaḥkaraṇānāṃ sugatasyādeyavacanatā siddhisaudhamadhyārūḍhā, tathāpi rāgādimattvābhāvas tatpratipādakapramāṇavaidhuryāt sandehagocaracāritām anubhavaty, ataḥ sugatād rāgādimattāvyāvṛttisaṃśayāt sandigdhasādhanavyatirekitvam iti.*

[30] Three points seem most conspicuous: (1) the constrution with two clauses *yady api . . . tathāpi . . .*, (2) the occurrence of the term *sandeha* in both cases and (3) the use of *nivṛtti* in case of Dharmottara and of *vyāvṛtti* in case of Siddarṣigaṇi, to be construed with the Ablative case of *gautamādibhyaḥ* or of *sugatād*, respectively (Siddharṣigaṇi uses the terms *vyāvṛtti* and *nivṛtti* interchangeably). Naturally, the issue to what extent Siddharṣigaṇi is indebted to Dharmottara in this and other cases would necessitate a more detailed study.

[31] NBṬ on NB III 8: *vyāptisādhanasya pramāṇasya viṣayo dṛṣṭāntaḥ. tam eva darśayitum āha—yathānya iti. sādhyadharmiṇo 'nyo dṛṣṭānta ity arthaḥ.*

[32] Cf. NA 18: *sādhyasādhanayor vyāptir yatra niścīyatetarām / sādharmyeṇa sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ sambandhasmaraṇān mataḥ //* Siddharṣigaṇi's comments on it in NAV 18 *ad loc.*: *ayaṃ cāvismṛtapratibandhe prativādini na prayoktavya ity āha:* ***sambandhasmaraṇād*** *iti, lyablope pañcamī, prāggṛhītavismṛtasambandhasmaraṇam adhikṛtya* [. . .] *gṛhīte ca pratibandhe smaryamāṇe kevalaṃ hetur darśanīyaḥ, tāvataiva bubhutsitārthasiddher dṛṣṭānto na vācyo,*

standpoint was based on a very intuitive and strongly context-bound assumption that there are three kinds of logical proof conceivable;[33] the most elementary and pragmatic, most dependant on the context of the demonstration was, in their opinion, a 'syllogistic' proof consisting of 'a mere demonstration of the logical reason', provided both the speaker and the interlocutor knew the thesis and remembered the invariable concomitance. Thus, in the opinion of the Jaina thinkers, the pronouncement of the example was not necessary at all and the invariable concomitance was rather intrinsic to the logical reason instead of constituting, in a way, a part of the logical example that was supposed to demonstrate such a relation. In other words, the role to demonstrate the invariable concomitance was assigned to the logical reason alone, not to the example. It deserves special mention that conceiving of a 'syllogistic' proof as consisting of two stages only should be viewed as a methodologically important advancement in the history of Indian logic, inasmuch as the Jaina step tended to simplify the logical structure of the proof by neglecting everything that was logically unnecessary and by reducing the number of 'syllogistic' members further on, along the lines pursued by Vasubandhu (cf. his three-membered 'syllogistic' proof).

What has been said above can easily explain why Siddharṣigani disagrees to accept two of these varieties ([S7][34] and [V7][35]) as fallacious examples and, in the final result, classifies them as erroneous cases, or wrongly classified cases of fallacious logical reasons. His opinions contradict that of Dharmottara, viz., that the example should either demonstrate—or is, at least, directly related to demonstration of—the invariable concomitance.[36] Four remaining sub-types (viz., [S8], [S9], [V8] and [V9]) are taken by Siddharṣigaṇi to be caused by incompetence of the speaker.[37] In his rebuttal of the Buddhist position, he avails himself of a quotation from Dharmakīrti

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vaiyarthyāt. yadā tu gṛhīto 'pi vismṛtaḥ kathañcit sambandhas, tadā tatsmaraṇārthaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ kathyate.

The same remark applies to both kinds (positive and negative) of the example, cf. NAV 19 (on *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*): *yatra kvacid dṛṣṭānte sa vaidharmyeṇa bhavatīti śabdena sambandhasmaraṇād iti.*

[33] NAV 20: *tatsiddhau tata eva sādhyasiddher akiñcitkarī dṛṣṭāntodāhṛtir iti* ***nyāyavido*** *nyāyavidvāṃso* ***vidur*** *avabudhyanta iti. iha ca prakaraṇe śeṣāvayavānām upanayanigamanaśuddhipañcakalakṣaṇānāṃ saṅkṣipta-rucisattvānugrahaparatvād asya, yady api sākṣāl lakṣaṇaṃ noktaṃ, tathāpy ata eva pratipāditāvayavatrayād buddhimadbhir unneyaṃ; yato 'vayavāpekṣayā jaghanyamadhyamotkṛṣṭās tisraḥ kathā bhavanti. tatra hetupratipādanamātraṃ jaghanyā. dvyādyavayavanivedanaṃ madhyamā. sampūrṇadaśāvayavakathanam utkṛṣṭā. tatreha madhyamāyāḥ sākṣāt kathanena jaghanyotkṛṣṭe arthataḥ sūcayati, tadsadbhāvasya pramāṇasiddhatvād iti.*

[34] NAV 24: *yadi hi dṛṣṭāntabalena vyāptiḥ sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratipādyeta, tataḥ syād ananvayo dṛṣṭāntābhāsaḥ, svakāryākaraṇād, yadā tu pūrvapravṛttasambandhagrāhipramāṇagocarasmaraṇa-sampādanārthaṃ dṛṣṭāntodāhṛtir iti sthitaṃ, tadānanvayatvalakṣaṇo na dṛṣṭāntasya doṣaḥ, kiṃ tarhi hetor eva, pratibandhasyādyāpi pramāṇenāprati-ṣṭhitatvāt, pratibandhābhāve cānvayāsiddheḥ. na ca hetudoṣo 'pi dṛṣṭānte vācyo, 'tiprasaṅgād iti.*

[35] NAV 25: *ayuktaś cāyaṃ vaktum, avyatirekitāyā hetudoṣatvāt. yadi hi dṛṣṭāntabalenaiva vyatirekaḥ pratipādyeta, tadā tathāvidhasāmarthyavikalasya tadābhāsatā yujyeta, na caitad asti, prākpravṛttasambandha-grahaṇapravaṇapramāṇagocarasmaraṇasampādanārthaṃ dṛṣṭāntopādānāt. na hy ekatra yo yadabhāve na dṛṣṭaḥ, sa tadabhāve na bhavatīti pratibandhagrāhipramāṇavyatirekeṇa sidhyaty, atiprasaṅgāt. tasmād asiddha-pratibandhasya hetor evāyaṃ doṣo, na dṛṣṭāntasyeti.*

[36] NBṬ on NB III 8: *vyāptisādhanasya pramāṇasya viṣayo dṛṣṭāntaḥ.* Cf. also NBṬ on NB III 126: *ato 'nvayārtho dṛṣṭāntas.*

[37] Re. [S8] and [S9], cf. NAV 24: *tathāpradarśitānvayaviparītānvayāv api na dṛṣṭāntābhāsatāṃ svīkuruto, 'nvayāpradarśanasya viparyastānvayapradarśanasya ca vaktṛdoṣatvāt, taddoṣadvareṇāpi dṛṣṭāntābhāsapratipādane tadiyattā viśīryeta, vaktṛdoṣāṇām ānantyāt.* Similarly, re. [V8] and [V9], cf. NAV 25: *vyatirekāpradarśanaṃ viparītavyatirekapradarśanaṃ ca na vastuno doṣaḥ, kiṃ tarhi vacanakuśalatāvikalasyābhidhāyakasya.*

in order to show inconsistencies in Dharmakīrti's view.[38]

Surprisingly enough, Dharmottara apparently knew and accepted that some fallacies of the example were rather to blame on the ineptness of the speaker to communicate his thoughts properly.[39] Nonetheless, being an ardent commentator, he accepted the overall typology proffered by Dharmakīrti. A reason given was, that although there is a deficiency solely on the part of the speaker, nevertheless, it becomes a fallacy of the example in case of the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). Perhaps, his candid assertion that all these sub-types are due to various defects of the speaker inspired his Jaina adversaries and was eventually taken over by them. An important question that crops up here is whether already Dharmakīrti was aware of the fact, or approved of the opinion, that at least some of the sextuplet of fallacious examples could be classified as instances of incompetence of the speaker alone and had nothing to do with the fallacious nature of the examples in question. Due to lack of space I will not venture upon this question in the present paper.

Thus, I hope to have shown on the foregoing pages the great role Dharmakīrti played in the process of conceiving and formulating fallacies of the example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) in the Jaina epistemological tradition represented by Siddhasena Divākara and Siddharṣigaṇi. Furthermore, Siddharṣigaṇi's criticism, in particular directed against Dharmakīrti and his disciples, is of considerable interest to the student of Indian epistemo-philosophical tradition of the second half of the first millennium CE due to a triplet of reasons. Firstly, the present case is one of a plenitude of instances pointing to the prevailing direction of influence exercised in the exchange, far from being reciprocal,[40] of ideas between Buddhism and Jainism. The analysis of the typologies of fallacious examples offered by Dharmakīrti and Siddharṣigaṇi shows the way Dharmakīrti inspired his rivals in two aspects. His influence was not only visible in the realm of strictly logical research (in our case: classification of fallacies), but also in a methodological procedure to attack one's own opponents via arguments clad in—at first sight—harmless illustrations of faulty 'syllogistic' proofs, that, in fact, expressed basic doubts concerning the veracity of some fundamental doctrines upheld by the rival school. Secondly, the divergent Buddhist and Jaina classifications may testify to a different role assigned to the example in relation to presenting the invariable concomitance in the so-called Indian 'syllogistic proof' by the two parties. Thirdly, the most careful selection of locutions and exemplifications of fallacious examples decided upon by

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[38] PV I 27cd found in NAV 25: *yad uta svārthānumānakāle svayaṃ hetudarśanamātrāt sādhyapratīteḥ parārthānumānāvasare 'pi hetupratipādanam eva kartavyaṃ "viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevala" iti vacanāt teṣāṃ 'kṛtakatvād' itīyatā hetūpanyāsenaiva sisādhayiṣitasādhyasiddheḥ samastadṛṣṭāntābhāsavarṇanam api pūrvāparavyāhatavacanaracanācāturyam āvirbhāvayati* [. . .].

[39] Re. [S8], cf. NBṬ on NB III 126: *ato 'nvayārtho dṛṣṭāntas tadarthaś cānena nopapāttaḥ. sādharmyārthaś copapātto nirupayoga iti vaktṛdoṣād ayaṃ dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ. vaktrā hy atra paraḥ pratipādayitavyaḥ. tato yadi nāma na duṣṭaṃ vastu tathāpi vaktrā duṣṭaṃ darśitam iti duṣṭam eva.* Re. [S9], cf. NBṬ on NB III 127: *tasmād viparītānvayo 'pi vaktur aparādhāt, na vastutaḥ. parārthānumāne ca vaktur api doṣaś cintyata iti.* Re. [V8], cf. NBṬ on NB III 134: *sa śuddho 'pi svato yadi pareṇāśuddhaḥ khyāpyate ca viparītavyatireko 'pi vaktur aparādhād duṣṭam.*

[40] The only case known to me of a direct Jaina influence on the Buddhist epistemology are the notions of *ūrdhvatāsāmānya* (diachronic homogeneity) and *tiryaksāmānya* (synchronic homogeneity). The problem is discussed at length in Balcerowicz [1995].

Siddarṣigaṇi reveals a considerable amount of prejudice against the Buddhist. Such a biased position on his part was, beyond doubt, provoked to a larger degree by Dharmakīrti himself, and Siddarṣigaṇi in his exposition of fallacious examples emulates, as a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti's own method of favouring illustrations that convey extra-philosophical contents and serve a purely sectarian purpose of discrediting and affronting the antagonist. At the same time, a sociologist may find it worth noticing that even such eminent thinkers as Dharmakīrti or Siddarṣigaṇi were humans flesh and blood, not free from such base emotions as prejudice, and used every available opportunity, even 'dry' formulations of logical reasonings, to express their convictions even in a concealed way.

Abbreviations and Literature

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1995–96. Śaṅkarasvāmin: *Nyāyapraveśa*—'Introduction to logic' ('Wprowadzenie w logikę'). Parts 1 and 2. *Studia Indologiczne* (Warsaw) 2 (1995): 39–87; 3 (1996) 5–47. [Part 1: I. Polish Translation, II. Sanskrit Text, III. Notes § I, Abbreviations and Bibliography. Part 2: III. Notes §§ II–V, IV. Comments, V. Glossary of Selected Sanskrit Logical Terms; VI. Indices.]

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BSŚBh *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya* (Śaṅkara): J. L. Shastri, ed. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, with the commentaries, Bhāṣyaratnaprabha of Govindānanda, Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra, Nyāyanirṇaya of Ānandagiri.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980. Reprint, Delhi, 1988.

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DhP *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): Dalsukhabhai Malvania, ed. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955. 2nd ed. 1971.

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NA *Nyāyāvatāra* (Siddhasena Divākara): *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara; with the *Vivṛti* of Siddharṣigaṇi and the *Ṭippana* of Devabhadra (1) Ed. Bhagavandas Harakhchand. Ahmedabad, Patan, 1917; (2) Ed. P. L. Vaidya. Bombay: Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference, 1928. Reprinted in *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1 (1971): 1–95. [All quotations are based on these two editions and a selection of manuscripts, cf. Appendix.]

NAṬ *Nyāyāvatāraṭippana* (Devabhadra): See NA.

NAV *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti* (Siddharṣigaṇi): See NA.

NB *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): See DhP.

NBṬ *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See DhP.

NP *Nyāyapraveśa* (Śaṅkarasvāmin): (1) See Balcerowicz [1995–96, pt. 1: 72–77]. (2) A. B. Dhruva, ed. *The Nyāyapraveśa, part one, Sanskrit text with commentaries.* Gaekwad's Oriental Series 38. Baroda, 1930. (3) Vidushekhara Bhattacharyya, ed. *Nyāyapraveśa of Ācārya Diṅnāga, part two, Tibetan text.* Gaekwad's Oriental Series 39. Baroda, 1927. (4) *Nyāyapraveśasūtram Haribhadrasūrikṛta-Nyāyapraveśavṛttisahitam.* Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica 6. Sārnath and Vārāṇasī, 1983. [Tibetan.] (5) See Tachikawa [1971].

NV *Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): *Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā-sahitam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭikā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Vol. 1. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calcutta, 1944. Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.

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PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib.): Masaaki Hattori. *Dignāga, on perception: Being the Pratyakṣa-pariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, translated and annotated*. Harvard Oriental Series 47. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See PS.

PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): Ram Chandra Pandeya, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with the commentaries Svopajñavṛtti of the author and Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.

PVin II *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

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ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa): Rāmaśāstrī Tailanga, ed. *Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa with the Commentary called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra*. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 3. Benares, 1889–99.

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TUS *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* (Jayarāśi): See Franco [1987].

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Appendix

All quotations taken from NA and NAV in the present paper are based on two editions (mentioned in Abbreviations and literature above) and on the following selection of manuscripts (cf. Pāṭaṇa-Catalogue, Vol.1 Part I, p. 80):

MSS No.	title	folio	author
2448	*Nyāyāvatāravṛtti*	1-28	*Siddhavyākhyānika*
2448	*Nyāyāvatāravṛttiṭippanaka*	28-41	*Maladhārī Devabhadrasūri*
2449	*Nyāyāvatāravṛttiṭippana*	22	*Maladhārī Devabhadrasūri*
6808	*Nyāyāvatāravivaraṇa*	33	*Siddhavyākhyānika*

NĀGĀRJUNA AND *APOHA*

by

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The theory of *apoha* has attracted a fair amount of attention in recent years. Books and articles give access to the relevant texts, and explain the intricacies of the arguments involved. One question does not, however, seem to have attracted the attention it deserves: Why was this theory developed in the first place? What problems was it meant to solve? Among the answers that have been proposed to this question I briefly mention two. According to Erich Frauwallner, the *apoha* theory was created to solve a problem connected with logical theory.[1] However, Frauwallner's own explanations suggest rather that Dignāga's theory of inference served as an example for the *apoha* theory, perhaps that the two had been created together.[2] The latter did not however solve any problem of logical theory. Bimal Krishna Matilal [1990: 38], who echoes here the opinion of various earlier scholars, held the opinion that "[t]he *apoha* doctrine [was] first introduced by Diṅnāga to account for the origin of knowledge of the object in the hearer from hearing the word (*śabda*) without conceding *objective* thing-universals." But was this the only, or even the main reason? Is it conceivable that the *apoha* theory constituted an answer to more pressing problems? It has to be conceded that various factors may have contributed to the creation of the *apoha* theory. I do not, therefore, claim that what I am going to present here is the final and definitive historical explanation of that theory. It may however draw attention to one aspect of the issue which has not so far, as it seems to me, drawn the attention which it may deserve.

The theory of *apoha* was invented (if that is the right term to use) by Dignāga, and presented for the first time in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, probably his last work. The term *apoha* had been used, to be sure, by Bhartṛhari before him, and it is not impossible that he was indeed Dignāga's source.[3] The *apoha* theory, on the other hand, is Dignāga's. Why did he develop it?

The name of Bhartṛhari has just been mentioned, and there is no doubt that this Brahmanical author has exerted a major influence on Dignāga's thought. This is particularly evident in what may have been Dignāga's earliest work, the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* (or *Trikālaparīkṣā*). This work, as is well-known to scholars, is hardly more than a copy of part of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, of a

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[1] Frauwallner [1959: 101 (777)]: "Dignāga's Lehre von der Sonderung von anderem ist also geschaffen, um ein Problem aus dem Gebiet der Schlußfolgerung zu lösen."

[2] See Frauwallner [1959: 103 (779)]: "Die Lehre vom Begriff als Sonderung von anderem, wie sie Dignāga im 5. Kapitel des Pramāṇasamuccaya vorträgt, wurzelt in seiner Auffassung der Schlußfolgerung und ist von ihr aus entwickelt"; [104 (780)]: "Wir kommen also zu dem Ergebnis, daß Dignāga seine Lehre von der Vorstellung im Zusammenhang mit der Lehre von der Schlußfolgerung geschaffen hat."

[3] VP 3.1.100, 3.14.102. Cf. Hattori [1977: 50]. Also Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 6.4 uses the term; see van Bijlert [1992: 601].

section of the Sambandhasamuddeśa, to be precise. This proves, if proof was needed,[4] that Dignāga was intimately acquainted with the *Vākyapadīya*, and that there were parts of this work (or at least one part) with which he agreed to the extent of being willing to lend his own name to it, with hardly any modifications.

The part of the *Vākyapadīya* which Dignāga copied in the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* contains some verses which refer to a problem that occupied Bhartṛhari also elsewhere in the same work. Verses 61 and 62 of the Sambandhasamuddeśa, in particular, which correspond to *Traikālyaparīkṣā* 10 and 11, state that something non-existing cannot come into being, and that something existing does not disappear. The cause of something non-existent, moreover, is ineffective, precisely because that something does not exist. The cause of something that does exist, on the other hand, has no function, because that something is already there.[5]

These kinds of arguments are referred to elsewhere in the *Vākyapadīya*, too. They are the kinds of arguments that had been formulated and systematically used, perhaps for the first time, by Nāgārjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka. Bhartṛhari was obviously very concerned about these arguments, because he offers at least three solutions to them, which I have dealt with elsewhere. Bhartṛhari's solutions are not immediately relevant to the present paper, so I will not discuss them here. The important thing to be noted is that these kinds of arguments are so characteristic of the style of reasoning of Nāgārjuna that it seems to me completely safe to state that Bhartṛhari had been influenced, directly or indirectly, by Nāgārjuna.

But if this is true, also Dignāga was acquainted with the arguments of Nāgārjuna, or at least with certain among them. This is in itself hardly surprising. What is surprising is that Dignāga at some point of his life, probably in his youth, had been so impressed by these arguments that he published some of them in a work, the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, of which he himself assumed the authorship. This is surprising, because none of his later works appear ever to present these same or similar arguments again. What is more, Richard Hayes, probably the most recent scholar who has published a full-length book on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* [1988], has claimed, in an even more recent paper [1994: 299], that "Nāgārjuna's writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy." He also states there: "And despite Nāgārjuna's radical critique of the very possibility of having grounded knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti dominated Indian Buddhist intellectual circles, . . . without any explicit attempt to answer Nāgārjuna's criticism o[n] their agenda." Elsewhere Hayes [1988: 13] observes that "we find in [Dignāga's] *Pramāṇasamuccaya* no explicit references to Mādhyamaka (sic!) notions, and we certainly find no systematic attempt to come to terms with arguments delivered by Nāgārjuna or subsequent M[a]dhyamaka authors." What then happened

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[4] Verses from the *Vākyapadīya* are also cited in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*; see Hattori [1968: 6 with n. 33].

[5] VP 3.3.61ab, 62: *nābhāvo jāyate bhāvo naiti bhāvo 'nupākhyatām / . . . // abhāvasyānupākhyatvāt kāraṇaṃ na prasādhakam / sopākhyasya tu bhāvasya kāraṇaṃ kiṃ kariṣyati //*. See, on these verses and on the Sambandhasamuddeśa as a whole, Houben [1995], esp. p. 283f. Houben translates: "Neither is *abhāva* 'something non-existent' born as *bhāva* 'something existent', nor does *bhāva* 'something existent' go to a state beyond specification (i.e. become *abhāva* 'non-existence'). . . . Because *abhāva* 'non-existence or a non-existent thing' is beyond specification, a cause cannot be effective [towards it]; but what can a cause do to *bhāva* 'existence or an existent thing' that has specific designations?"

to Dignāga's interest in Nāgārjuna's arguments after his early years? Do we have to agree with Hayes, who claims that "Nāgārjuna's arguments, when examined closely, turn out to be fallacious and therefore not very convincing to a logically astute reader"? Did Dignāga, after the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, discover the fallaciousness of Nāgārjuna's arguments and decide to ignore them henceforth?

I believe it is possible to maintain that Hayes is mistaken on both counts: not all of Nāgārjuna's arguments are logically fallacious; and Nāgārjuna was not ignored by all who came after him—even if the interest in him seems to have declined dramatically after Dignāga, for very good reasons, as I shall try to show below.[6] A number of texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, most of them from the period between Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, show in my opinion that Nāgārjuna was not ignored during that time. I cannot present all the evidence here. I will however mention once again Bhartṛhari who, as I pointed out earlier, was very concerned with some of Nāgārjuna's arguments. I also devoted an article to an analysis of a major part of Nāgārjuna's arguments in which I have tried to show that this part of Nāgārjuna's arguments can be understood, and becomes logically sound, on the assumption that Nāgārjuna believed (consciously or unconsciously) in the close correspondence between words and things. His belief can be formulated more precisely, but still tentatively, as follows: "the words of a statement correspond, one by one, to the things that constitute together the situation described by that statement." I have called this the 'correspondence principle'. I cannot repeat here the arguments that led me to formulate this principle and I have to refer to the articles concerned for further details.[7] I must however emphasize that I do not claim that Nāgārjuna's arguments are about language. They are not; they are, without a shade of doubt, about the phenomenal world, which they try to prove to be self-contradictory. For the remainder of this paper I will take my earlier conclusions for granted and proceed on the assumption that indeed for Nāgārjuna the words of a statement correspond to the things that together constitute the situation described by that statement. Once the correctness of the correspondence principle is accepted, Nāgārjuna-like contradictions come up almost of their own. The statement "Devadatta makes a jar," for example, requires, on that assumption, there to be Devadatta, the act of making, and the jar, just as the words of the less problematic sentence "Devadatta reads a book" correspond to the three items Devadatta, reading and a book. However, when Devadatta makes a jar there is no jar. If there were one it would not have to be made.

Let us be clear about it that *logically* there is nothing wrong with this last argument. The problem lies not with logic but with the correspondence principle. One might simply reject it and state that no one-to-one correspondence between the words of a statement and the things that constitute the situation described is required. Judging by the early Indian authors whose reactions to this problem I am acquainted with there was a tendency not to reject the principle.

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[6] Eli Franco, in a lecture delivered in October 1997 at the The International Institute for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo, has drawn attention to the peculiar views of the 9th century commentator Prajñākaragupta (author of the *Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya* or *-alaṅkāra*, commenting on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*) who maintained that a future thing can exert a causal influence on a present event, and who supported his position by referring to phrases like "The sprout arises" and "He makes a pot" (*aṅkuro jāyate, ghaṭaṃ karoti*; PVA 68, on verse 2.50), precisely the kind of phrases that troubled pre-Dignāga thinkers so much. I thank Eli Franco for drawing my attention to this.

[7] Bronkhorst [1996, 1997].

Rather, thinkers would claim, for example, that future or past objects exist, so that words would refer to existing things even in the case of statements like "Devadatta makes a jar." Others, whose ontological views allowed such a solution, would indicate that, to stick to our example, the word 'jar' in "Devadatta makes a jar" denotes not the individual jar that does not yet exist but the universal ('jar-ness' or the like) that inheres in all jars and that is always present. The solution to Nāgārjuna's arguments, or at least to the arguments that are based on the correspondence principle, lies therefore, or can lie, in semantics. The central question is: what exactly do words denote? If they denote individuals, Nāgārjuna's arguments stand. If we do not like Nāgārjuna's conclusions, the question presents itself: what then do they refer to?

I have already indicated that Nāgārjuna's arguments were not so catastrophic for the Brahmanical thinkers belonging to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought. They accepted the existence of universals, and we have already seen how convenient that could be. Let me observe in passing that the threat of Nāgārjuna for the Sarvāstivādins was not all that terrible either. They maintained that a future jar (more precisely: future *dharmas*; for ease of exposition I will ignore the difference at this moment) exists, so the problem connected with the statement "Devadatta makes a jar" was practically non-existent for them: the word 'jar' refers to the existing jar which finds itself as yet in the future. The *Yoga Sūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* accept exactly the same solution, whereas the Sāṃkhya school of thought accepted the closely similar doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, which, too, allowed for the existence of objects before their coming into being. By and large one can say that two types of answers found most favour with the different schools of thought: either they admitted that words refer to individuals but stipulated that individuals exist already before they come into being; or they claimed that there is such a thing as a universal, which then constitutes the denoted object of a word. Both these answers have in common that they allow the correspondence principle to remain valid. Let me further point out here that both the *Nyāya Sūtra* and its *Bhāṣya*, where they introduce the notion that words refer to universals along with forms and individuals, mention the example "he makes a mat" as an example to show the impossibility to maintain that words denote individuals only.

The problem was however far more serious for those who neither accepted the existence of universals nor the position that future things exist. Many Buddhists found themselves in this situation. What could they do?

It is here, I believe, that Dignāga's *apoha* theory provided an answer. Words do not refer to individuals, he points out at the beginning of the chapter concerned, which is chapter 5 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Universals, on the other hand, do not exist. However, the *apoha* theory creates something which is as good as the universals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools but without ontological implications. The problems posed by Nāgārjuna's arguments (i.e., the ones based on the correspondence principle) are therefore now solved, also for these Buddhists. It has to be admitted, of course, that strictly speaking Dignāga abandons the correspondence principle. In his *apoha* theory there is nothing in the situation described by a sentence that corresponds to the words of that sentence. The *apoha* theory signifies therefore a departure from the correspondence principle. This departure is justified by pointing at the close similarity—Dignāga might say: essential identity—between the process of denotation and logical inference. Both are based on exclusion, according to Dignāga.

One might think that the link between Nāgārjuna's arguments and Dignāga's *apoha* theory is not all that obvious. And indeed, Dignāga does not present his theory as a solution to the problems posed by Nāgārjuna. But then he does not seem to present it as a solution to any particular problem at all. Yet historical scholarship should always try to determine the problem-situation of the thinker it studies. In the case of Dignāga we are extremely fortunate, for his *Traikālyaparīkṣā* shows that he was, or had been, concerned with the problems evoked by Nāgārjuna. It may very well be that his *apoha* theory solved, or was meant to solve, other questions than the one to which I have drawn attention. It seems however inconceivable that a thinker of Dignāga's stature should not have realized that this theory would answer Nāgārjuna's arguments. And it is very tempting to think that his earlier involvement with these arguments explains to at least some extent his creation of the *apoha* theory.

A final possible objection has to be dealt with here.[8] Were the correspondence principle and the problems it evoked still an issue among Buddhist thinkers at the time of Dignāga? Is the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* not an exception, perhaps difficult to explain but not at all typical for Buddhist thought at that time? Had the correspondence principle and its supposed consequences not been discarded by earlier Buddhist thinkers, among them Vasubandhu the author of the *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya*? In order to answer this question, we have to consider that the Buddhist thinkers who did concern themselves with this principle and its consequences did so in the context of everyday reality. Nāgārjuna had done so and concluded from it that everyday reality does not exist. If we want to find out whether the correspondence principle was still relevant for Vasubandhu we must primarily pay attention to passages in his *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya* that deal with everyday reality. Such passages are not frequent, for this work deals primarily with the higher reality of dharmas where the correspondence theory does not apply in its usual manner. However, one passage, which criticizes the position of a grammarian (at least according to the commentator Yaśomitra), speaks about the everyday world and uses in this context arguments that show that for Vasubandhu the correspondence principle was still very much a factor that applied to this level of reality. The grammarian criticizes Vasubandhu's interpretation of the expression *pratītyasamutpāda*, according to which it means "appearance having reached." The grammarian protests, pointing out that the absolutive *pratītya* "having reached" indicates that the action of reaching precedes that of appearing, i.e. of coming into being, which is absurd. No, replies Vasubandhu, for at the level at which the grammarian argues the problem is not confined to the expression *pratītyasamutpāda*. In fact, nothing can come into being at that level. A solution is only possible at the level of the dharma-theory, for there there is no distinction between an agent and the action it performs. The relevant part of the discussion reads:[9]

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[8] This question was actually raised by Tom Tillemans during the conference. I thank him for his thoughtful reflections, and hope that the following observations constitute a satisfactory answer.

[9] AKBh 138,10–13: *naiṣa doṣaḥ / idaṃ tāvad ayaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ śābdikaḥ / kimavastho dharmaḥ utpadyate vartamāna utāho 'nāgata iti / kiṃ cātaḥ / yadi vartamāna utpadyate / kathaṃ vartamāno yadi notpannaḥ / utpannasya vā punar utpattāv anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ / athānāgata utpadyate katham asataḥ kartṛtvaṃ sidhyati* (the edition has *siddhaty*) *akartṛkā vā kriyeti /*

> There is nothing wrong [with our position]. The grammarian (*śābdika*) should be asked in what state, present or future, something comes into being. If something that is present comes into being, how can it be present without having come into being? Alternatively, if something comes into being that has already come into being, this would lead to an infinite regress. And if something future comes into being, how can something non-existent be the agent [of the action of coming into being] or how can there be the action [of coming into being] without agent?

This is a clear example of reasoning based on the correspondence theory. Indeed, Vasubandhu insists that there has to be something corresponding to the agent/subject in a phrase like "the jar comes into being." It is true that he has a way to avoid these difficulties (as do practically all thinkers of the period preceding Dignāga who are confronted with these contradictions), which it is not necessary to discuss here in detail. The main thing is clear: the correspondence principle was still considered valid by Vasubandhu, and it is not until Dignāga that the principle is deprived of its sting.

Abbreviations and Literature

AKBh — *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu): Prahlad Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967. 2nd ed. by Aruna Haldar. Patna, 1975.

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JIP — *Journal of Indian Philosophy.*

Matilal, Bimal Krishna.
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PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

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VP *Vākyapadīya* (Bhartṛhari): *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya: Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften Herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index Versehen.* Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Band 42,4. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1977.

WZKSO *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.*

MASQUERADING AS *PRAMĀṆA*: ESOTERIC BUDDHISM AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL NOMENCLATURE*

by

Ronald M. Davidson, Fairfield

The starting point for this paper will be an examination of the current discourse on Buddhist *pramāṇa* systems, preeminently those of Dharmakīrti and his followers. Much excellent textual and historical work has been accomplished to date on these interesting, provocative, and difficult authors. Yet, however worthy and essential these trajectories may be, little attention has been given to the consequences visited on other Buddhist systems by the rise of epistemology and its appropriation of scholastic center stage from the seventh century onwards. Those familiar with modern developments in the articulation of literary history will understand the primary issues: how were these epistemological treatises and doctrines received by the disparate Buddhist communities during the early medieval period, and how did the new ideas cause them to reformulate their own presentations? Such questions hinge on the idea of context and frame of reference for the development of a body of thought and literature, and that literature's capacity to alter the context so that new standards of intellectual authenticity are identified for systems competing in the marketplace of Indian religiosity. My investigation is prompted by the concerns which have been articulated over the last few decades by the "Konstanz group" at Universität Konstanz in Germany, where the application of reception theory to literary history has taken on some urgency beginning in the late 1960s, but which has been anticipated in ethnographic and folklore literature.[1] Jauss and his colleagues, indeed, have concerned themselves primarily with literary aesthetics rather than the social history of literary movements, and historians have noted the difference between the two.[2]

It certainly is not my intention to try to ascertain all of the dynamics of epistemological

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[1] For an outline of this movement, see Robert C. Holub, *Reception Theory—A Critical Introduction* (London and New York: Methuen, 1984). Ethnographic concerns with the issue of reception are seen in Mellville Jacobs, *The Content and Style of an Oral Literature: Clackamas Chinook Myths and Tales* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1959). More recent expressions of related concerns are found in a variety of works on South Asia: William S. Sax, ed., *The Gods at Play—Līlā in South Asia* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Arjun Appadurai, et al., eds. *Gender, Genre, and Power in South Asian Expressive Traditions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).

[2] See Hans Robert Jauss, *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics*, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1982), and compare his position with the analysis of Brian Stock, "Literary Discourse and the Social Historian," *New Literary History* 8/2 (1976–77): 183–194. For a more recent discussion of the difference between literary-critical and historical-critical presentations, see Robert Eric Frykenberg, *History and Belief—The Foundations of Historical Understanding* (Grand Rapids, MI & Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1996), 278–336; I cannot support all of Frykenberg's discussion, however.

influence on other strands of Buddhist writing—such would be a monumental challenge. We do have some indication that a wider authorship was subject to some of the same intellectual forces in India which supported epistemology in Buddhist monasteries. In the *Lalitavistara*, the late hagiography of the Buddha, after the bodhisattva's assault by the forces of Māra, the tempter actually claims victory because no one has witnessed Siddhārtha's equipoise in the face of Māra's onslaught. In wording not employed in any of the earlier hagiographies of the Buddha, the bodhisattva replies that the earth will be his evidence or witness [*pramāṇa*]:

> This earth, the foundation of the world of all [beings]
> Is impartial, equitable for all that moves or is motionless.
> This will be my *pramāṇa*, since I have no mendacity.
> Let it offer testimony for me in this matter.[3]

The verse curiously invokes questions of evidence validity and jurisprudence, rather than the perennial model of investigating validity for philosophical reasons. Yet, we might wonder if the *Lalitavistara* paradigm was not in fact closer to the reality of Indian religious disputation than the ideology of a Socratic dialogue. Indians regularly demanded that the loser convert to the position of the winner as the cost for losing a doctrinal dispute. In the environment of 'winner-takes-all', questions of valid testimony and valid inference appear remarkably similar to the legalese invoked for other reasons by Indians in their exceptionally litigious society.

My primary interest, however, is in the theoretical literature associated with Buddhist meditative systems, from the period of the Yogācāras forward, and especially with reference to esoteric Buddhism. The volume of this literature is massive enough as it is, and I cannot claim to have but scratched the proverbial surface. That surface, though, reveals a definite proclivity on the part of the meditative theoreticians to employ philosophical and doctrinal terminology for their own purposes. This is the reverse of the model which has been occasionally proposed, by authors such as Reginald Ray, where meditative monks are seen as the fountainhead of a new movement.[4] In the case at hand, meditative litterateurs have appropriated epistemological vocabulary, yet have invoked the nomenclature either as supplementary to their system or in ways decidedly foreign to normative *pramāṇa* discourse.

The former is the case for Asaṅga, who is certainly not outside of mainstream Indic Buddhist praxis. Long ago, Wayman called attention to the sections in the *Śrutamayī* and *Cintāmayī Bhūmis* which discuss the issues of *hetu-vidyā*, and concern themselves primarily with syllogistic reasoning, valid and invalid proofs, and much of the kind of material later to be classified

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[3] P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Lalita-Vistara*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 1 (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1958), 232,29–233,2: *iyaṃ mahī sarvajagatpratiṣṭhā / apakṣapātā sacarācare samā / iyaṃ pramāṇā mama nāsti me mṛṣā / sākṣitvam asmiṃ mama samprayacchatu //.* Beyond the interesting feminine spelling of *pramāṇā*, we note also the prose use of this term in the introduction to the section, 232,22. This language is not found in either the *Mahāvastu* or the *Buddhacarita*, for example, and appears to indicate the lateness of the editing of the *Lalitavistara*.

[4] Reginald A. Ray, *Buddhist Saints in India: A Study in Buddhist Values & Orientations* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 439: "When new developments occur within Buddhism, they often come from the solitary and remote locales of forest renunciants." Not only in the current instance, but broadly I cannot agree with this romanticized image of *āraṇyakabhikṣus*. My study of the preeminent among them, the Yogācāras, indicate that they are among the most conservative.

under reasoned discourse (*parārthānumāna*).[5] The inclusion of this material into the larger corpus of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and abbreviated in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, is not indicative of epistemology's centrality to Asaṅga's exegetical direction.[6] Rather, like the lengthy section on the sixteen varieties of opponents' claims in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*, the purpose of the *hetu-vidyā* presentation is ancillary to the domain of meditative praxis and supplementary to the system. We may presume that it was included primarily for the purposes of completeness in education.[7] Indeed, we see that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* finishes its discussion by noting that one desiring his own benefit will simply recognize the different varieties of verbal expression, but will not spend his time disputing with others.[8]

Conversely, mainstream Vijñānavāda materials were to be centrally influenced by the rise of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* systems, especially noticeable in the Nālandā school of exegesis, where Dharmapāla's *Cheng wei shih lun* (成唯識論) clearly shows the effects of the new scholastic movement's accelerating authority.[9] Yet it is questionable at this juncture whether we can authentically classify these authors as representing a truly meditative tradition, since the Gandhāran and Kashmiri institutions had been seriously impaired, if not totally decimated, by the influx of the Ephthalites since the end of the fifth century. Whatever the relationship of the Valabhī and Nālandā teaching colleges to the Kaniṣka-vihāra—said to have been the residence of Asaṅga—or to other Gandhāran and Kashmiri Yogācāra convents, it is evident that the *āraṇyaka* monasteries, producing the likes of Saṃgharakṣa and Buddhasena, seemed to be eclipsed in authority by the degree-granting institutions engaged in the instruction of clergy and laity alike.

In North India, from the post-Gupta period forward, meditative traditions become increasingly esoteric. Yet there is a relative lack of consideration given to the later meditative system of the Vajrayāna, particularly by experts in Buddhist epistemology, who frequently privilege non-Buddhist developments over contemporary Buddhist forms in their discussions. This neglect is sadly true for both traditional and modern scholarship. According to this model, religious praxis and conduct are epiphenomenal to rigorous philosophical investigation; the context of institutional life is an adiaphoron to philological or philosophical research. This state of affairs is understandable, given the dynamic dialogue between Buddhist and Brahmanical authors over their respective claims to authority. Consequently, many philologists treat the epistemologists' selective involvement with esoteric praxis as a curious anomaly, analogous to eccentric personal-

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[5] Alex Wayman, "The Rules of Debate According to Asaṅga," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 78 (1958): 29–40.

[6] Cf. Pralhad Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga* (Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1950), 104–6.

[7] Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, ed., *The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957), 118–160; these are placed in the text for the purpose of recognizing incorrect mental application, *ayoniśomanaskāra*.

[8] Pradhan, *Abhidharma Samuccaya*, 106,4–5: *api khalu svahitasukhakāmena vādeṣv abhijñātuṃ pravarttitavyaṃ na paraiḥ vivādaṃ karttuṃ /*. This is followed by a lengthy quotation from the notorious *Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra* verifying his position; cf. Nathmal Tatia, ed., *Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣyam*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series No. 17 (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976), 154; and Jinaputra's *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*, Peking 5555, TTP vol. 113, 227.3.7.

[9] See Yoshifumi Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 17 (1967): 155–166.

ity quirks among current scholars, as if some members of a school of famous philosophers were unaccountably discovered dressing in ridiculous animal costumes and singing Vivaldi on mountain tops at dawn. Yet, the data on epistemologists' investiture of time and energy in esoteric lore hold true through most periods of Buddhist *pramāṇa*, not surprising since the two most creative developments in early medieval Indian Buddhism are esoterism and epistemology.[10]

The easiest affirmation would be that there were Buddhist scholars in all the New Translation (*gsar 'gyur*: late 10th to 17th centuries) periods of Tibetan history who were simultaneously students of *pramāṇa* and meditators of the esoteric school. Given the continuity of curriculum between the great teaching establishments of India and Tibet, it would be very odd if this condition were not true for medieval India as well. A relatively strong case for simultaneous involvement could be made for figures like Ratnākaraśānti, who worked directly with Tibetans and for whom there is early testimony.[11] Just as clearly, we must be wary of name appropriation, in which esoteric masters use their predecessors' identities. Indeed, the difference between the author of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the author of a lengthy commentary on the *Hevajra-tantra* is profound, even if they both claim the designation 'Dharmakīrti.'[12]

Even then we might affirm that Buddhist *pramāṇa* came of age at a time when Buddhist institutions became increasingly ritualized. From the time of the Puṣyabhūtis forward (ca. 606 CE), this reality is observable in archaeology, art history, and in textual materials unassailably by *pramāṇa* authors as well. We note that the earliest mention of a *ḍākinī-bhaginī-tantra* is to be found in the *Svavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*.[13] Kamalaśīla mentions mantras as well, and quotes from the *Vairocanābhisambodhi-sūtra* in his first *Bhāvanākrama*; the third *Bhāvanākrama* furthermore mentions *maṇḍalas*.[14] It is even more curious, from a purely historical perspective, that the work to date on Ratnākaraśānti has almost exclusively been via his philosophical works, particularly the *pramāṇa*-related issues of intrinsic concomitance (*antarvyāpti*), and his philosophical distance from figures like Jñānaśrīmitra of Gauḍa and Ratnakīrti.[15] Yet even a cursory glance at Ratnākaraśānti's corpus of work must indicate that one of his primary contributions to Buddhist thought was his systematic treatment of ritual and esoteric exegesis through the lens of Vijñānavāda. Ratnākaraśānti's masterful commentaries on the *Guhyasamāja*, the *Kṛṣṇa-*

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[10] Some excessively philosophical philologists might consider that the involvement of epistemologists with esoterism remains unproven. It is long past time to dispense with the chimera of historical proof, for no data-driven system—science or history—ever comes to final 'proof', a luxury available only to non empirical disciplines, like mathematics, logic, or philosophy. History, like science, has its hallmark in falsifiability rather than in certainty. For a good discussion of the question of historical certainty, see Frykenberg, *History and Belief*, 1–95.

[11] See Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan's *bLa ma brgyud pa bod kyi lo rgyus*, in bSod nam Rgya mtsho, ed., *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), vol. 3, 173.1.6–174.1.6, esp. 173.2.2–3.

[12] Cf. the *rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po dpal dges pa rdo rje'i dka' 'grel spyan 'byed*, Tohoku 1191.

[13] Raniero Gnoli, ed., *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti—The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Serie Orientale Roma XXIII (Rome: IsMEO, 1960), 163. I have already discussed this item in "The *Litany of Names of Mañjuśrī*—Text and Translation of the *Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti*," in Michel Strickmann, ed., *Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honour of R. A. Stein, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* XX (1981), 1–69, esp. 8, n. 21.

[14] Giuseppe Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part 2, Serie Orientale Roma IX-2 (Rome: IsMEO, 1958), 195–196; idem, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part 3, Serie Orientale Roma XLIII (Rome: IsMEO, 1971), 26.

[15] Eg. Yuichi Kajiyama, "On the Theory of Intrinsic Determination of Universal Concomitance in Buddhist

yamāri, and the *Hevajra*, his shorter exegesis of the *Khasama* and the *Mahāmāyā*, and his theoretical works on *abhiṣeka*, the three vehicles, and so forth, are in aggregate his longest and most detailed treatises.[16] They are only approached in depth and dedication by his material on *Prajñāpāramitā*.

Such authorial trajectories might be seen in light of the relative non-opposition encountered by the esoteric system. For example, unlike the ambivalence towards spells found in the *Milindapañha*, we find little sustained opposition to the employment of spells from the seventh century forward in India and apparently none from representative intellectuals.[17] Not only does Śāntideva in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* recommend multiple circumstances for the employment of mantras, but Bhavya in the *Tarkajvālā* defends the use of spells as part of the Mahayanist practice.[18] Indeed, not until eleventh century Tibet and China do we begin to hear strong voices of protest against the esoteric dispensation.

No social or ideological movement is unidirectional, however, and the gateway between *pramāṇa* authors and esoteric literature swung both ways. Most esoteric litterateurs evince one of three general positions towards scholasticism: **1.** They employed the older Buddhist castigation of speculative philosophers as '*tārkika*' to relegate philosophical pursuits to a subordinate status, much as we already have seen that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* warned bodhisattvas not to spend their time arguing with opponents. Such emotional distance in fact reflects Buddhist core values. We may recall that the four-fold refuges (*catuḥpratisaraṇa*) frequently noticed in early Buddhist literature mentions that monks are to follow *jñāna* and not *vijñāna*.[19] This is the direction of transformation, after all, espoused in esoteric literature: the categories of consciousness are transformed into the varieties of gnosis, a system developed from the earlier statements in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (IX.41–48) and the *Buddhabhūmi sūtra*. Many of the Siddha *dohā* or *vajragīti* collections—such as those of Saraha and Virūpa—contain such sentiments, addressed

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Logic," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 7/2 (1958): 364–360.

[16] So far as I know, only two commentaries of his have been published in Sanskrit to date: his *Mahāmāyātantraṭīkā Guṇavatī*, in Samdhong Rinpoche and Vrajavallabh Dvivedi, eds., *Mahāmāyātantram with Guṇavatī by Ratnākaraśānti*, Rare Buddhist Text Series 10 (Sarnath, Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1992); and his *Khasamaṭīkā*, Jagannatha Upadhyaya, ed., "Khasamā-nāmaṭīkā," *Saṃkāy Patrikā* (Saṃpūrṇānand Saṃskṛt Viśvavidyālay) 1 (1983), 226–255. The neglect of this material is obvious when we reflect that, so far as I am aware, the only major work of his surviving in Sanskrit manuscript that is as yet unedited is his commentary on the *Hevajratantra*, the *Hevajrapañjikā Muktikāvalī*; see Thakur Sain Negi, ed., *Durlabha Granthon ki Adhara Samagri*, Rare Buddhist Text Series 4 (Sarnath, Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1990), 76–7.

[17] Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., *Milindapañha Pāli* (*Questions of Milinda*), Bauddha Bharati Series 13 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1979), 114–116; the section discusses the efficacy of *parittas*.

[18] Cecil Bendall, ed., *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Bibliotheca Buddhica I (St. Petersburg: l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1897–1902), 138–143; *Tarkajvālā*, Tohoku 3856, bstan-'gyur dbu ma, vol. dza, fols. 183a6–188a3; I wish to thank Matthew Kapstein for drawing my attention to this passage some time ago. Jens Braarvig, "Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavors on Behalf of Mahayana," *Studia Indoloczne* 4 (1997), 31–39, has recently studied this important section.

[19] Étienne Lamotte, "La Critique d'authenticité dans le Bouddhisme," *India Antiqua* [Vogel Festschrift] (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1947), 213–222.

towards Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike.[20]

2. Alternatively, esoteric representatives simply looked at epistemology as a function of the 'method of the perfections' (*pāramitānaya*), and engaged in intellectual activities as part of the larger contemplative system. This line of reasoning is found implied in the *Hevajra-tantra*'s command (*Hevajra Tantra* II.viii.9–10) to study the major Buddhist philosophical positions as preliminary to esoteric practice, and is explicit in the *Sampuṭa-tantra*.[21] Ratnākaraśānti and Advayavajra might also be taken as exponents of this attitude, which is the implication of positions articulated in the former's *Triyānavyavasthāna* and in Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvalī*. However, their respective address of *pramāṇa* must be inferred in these works from their affirmative statements concerning the study of *sākāra-* and *nirākāra-vijñānavāda*.[22]

Finally, **3.** they appropriated epistemological language for the purpose of gaining derivative authority. I have been able to identify two categories of texts for this latter variety of appropriation: the tantric scriptures and esoteric *śāstras*. It is hardly surprising that such an idea would show up in both areas, but it would be curious if only one or the other were so privileged. The earliest source of which I am aware is the *Vajrapāṇy-abhiṣeka-mahātantra* (Tohoku 496, Pe. 130). This lengthy and neglected text, dedicated to the mythology and ritual of Vajrapāṇi's *abhiṣeka*, is probably an eighth century production. Haribhadra, in the introduction to the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka*, refers to a scripture called *Vajrapāṇy-abhiṣeka*, but it is unclear if this text is indicated, or if so, what form of the text existed.[23] The Tibetan translation is reputedly a royal dynastic production, though, under the aegis of Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes-sde, and is entered into the *dKar-chag ldan-dkar-ma*.[24] We may have a degree of confidence that some version of the text circulated in the later decades of the eighth century, but since the work is missing from the list of thirty-six tantras in the Dun-huang list of Devaputra, we may presume that it was not as widely studied as other esoteric scriptures.[25]

Typically, for esoteric literature, the *pramāṇa* definition comes in the middle of a discussion on the *maṇḍala*, the drawing of the *maṇḍala*, and related questions. The *maṇḍala*, in this instance, is to be drawn or painted by an Ācārya who is endowed with a number of qualities, one of which is authenticity in esoteric instruction (*man ngag*: *upadeśa*). At this point, a rhetorical

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[20] The best examination of the *dohā* literature remains M. Shahidullah, *Les Chants Mystiques de Kāṇha et de Saraha* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1928). Many of the *dohā* collections surviving in Tibetan contain these sentiments; two ascribed to Virūpa come to mind, the *Śrībirūa-caürasi*, Tohoku 2283, bsTan-'gyur, rgyud 'grel vol. zhi, fols. 138a4–139a6; and the *Suniṣprapañcatattvopadeśa*, Tohoku 2020, bsTan-'gyur rgyud-'grel vol. tsi, fols. 81a7–84a6.

[21] Peking 26, TTP vol. 2, 258.2.3, and the subordination of philosophical endeavor to esoteric guru devotion is explicit in the same chapter, 258.4.3–4.

[22] Peking 4535, TTP vol. 81, esp. 153.1.2–5, and 153.5.7–8; cf. Haraprasad Shastri, ed., *Advayavajrasaṃgraha*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 40 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927), 14–22, esp. 14,5–16.

[23] P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā With Haribhadra's Commentary Called Āloka*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 4 (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1960), 270.13.

[24] Marcelle Lalou, "Les Textes bouddhiques au temps du Roi Khri-sron-lde-bcan," *Journal Asiatique* 241/3 (1953): 313–353, esp. 326, n. 318.

[25] Joseph Hackin, *Formulaire Sanscrit-Tibétain du X^e Siécle*, Mission Pelliot en Asie Centrale, Tome II (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1924), 5–8.

question on the definition of *upadeśa* is addressed by Vajradhara/Vajrapāṇi to Mañjuśrī:

> O Prince, what is meant here by *upadeśa*? It is [that which occurs between] the Ācārya and the Śiṣya. The Ācārya, clearly, is endowed with certain qualities, so that one might follow his example and direction without his *upadeśa* being subject to contravention *(avisaṃvādin)*. There being this *pramāṇa*, the valid means of knowledge, such is the *upadeśa*. Moreover, O Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta, what is *pramāṇa*? That which may be first (*pūrva*) understood in the uncontravened meaning of the sūtras and the mantras, and then has its flavor tasted, its significance internalized, and thus stabilized without disintegration, just *that* we conventionally designate *dharmatā*—that is the articulation of *upadeśa*. It is just that which is spoken by the Tathāgata, the Arhat, the Abhisamyaksambuddha, just thus, since it is not otherwise (**tathaivānanyathātvāt*): it is the valid means of knowledge for the world, even for divinities—that is [the quality of] noncontravention. It is realization, direct perception, and acquisition of the fruit—that is *dharmatā*. Moreover, the application (**prayogatā*) of the yoga obtaining that dharmatā is *yukti*.[26]

Here, the scriptural author is clearly appropriating *pramāṇa* categories with the purpose of buttressing the public presentation of the authenticity of the Vajrācārya. He has done some work in or has been around *pramāṇa* definitions at some stage. This is evinced by his emphasis on 'not being subject to contravention' (**avisaṃvādin*: *mi slu ba*), which is probably the most ubiquitous characteristic of *pramāṇa* in the period following Dharmakīrti. It is well known that the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the *Pramāṇavārtika* is dedicated to articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions for valid knowledge, with *avisaṃvādin /avisaṃvādana* as one of the primary points of departure. Likewise, we might be tempted to see qualification that it is "first (*pūrva*) understood in the uncontravened meaning of the sūtras and the mantras" implying the idea of "not being previously cognized" (*ajñātārtha*: PV I 5c), expressed in Mokṣākaragupta's primer as a completely new object (*apūrvagocara*).[27]

Whether or not this latter is indicated, the primary trajectory of the statement supports some very traditional Buddhist value systems, interwoven with the epistemological posturing. Here, as elsewhere, the touchstone of the Buddhavacana is its capacity to lead to realization of the fruit of the Buddhist path, even if the Buddhist path as articulated in the tantra is very far from similar protestations in such works as the *Adhyāśayasaṃcodana-sūtra*.[28] That the path could be confidently followed to conclusion meant that it exhibited the capacity to efficient action—indicating

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[26] Peking 130, TTP vol. 6, 51.3.1–5: *gzhon nu de la man ngag gang zhe na / 'di lta ste / slob dpon dang slob ma'o / slob dpon ni slob dpon gyi yon tan dang ldan pa'o / de ni de'i spyod pa'i rjes su 'jug cing tshig bzhin du byed la mi slu ba'o / tshad ma de ni man ngag go / 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa / gzhan yang tshad ma gang zhe na / gang mdo sde dang gsang sngags kyi don mi slu ba dang po shes nas de'i ro myong ba dang don de shin tu chud bas de las mi nyams pa dang / brtan par gyur pa de ni chos nyid do zhes tha snyed 'dogs pa de ni man ngag bshad pa'o / de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas ni gang gsungs ba de de bzhin te gzhan du mi 'gyur bas lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyi tshad ma ste de ni mi slu'o / de mngon par rtogs pa dang mngon sum du byas pa dang 'bras bu thob pa gang yin pa de ni chos nyid do / gzhan yang chos nyid de thob par byed pa'i rnal 'byor la sbyor ba nyid gang yin pa de ni rigs pa'o /.*

[27] H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, ed., *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna* (Mysore: The Hindustan Press, 1952), 1.

[28] For the manner in which this value plays out in the verification of earlier scriptures as Buddhavacana, see Ronald Davidson, "An Introduction to the Standards of Scriptural Authenticity in Indian Buddhism," in Robert E. Buswell, Jr., ed., *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 291–325. See also

concerns similar to epistemologists' use of 'efficiency' (*arthakriyā*) as a sign of reality. Moreover, the conformity between the instructions given and the path tread indicated the noncontravention of the esoteric master's *upadeśa* and signified his claims to authority.

As may be expected, the definition of *pramāṇa* altered with the changing circumstances of esoteric literature. Once the *yoginī tantras* become part of the canon, we see that the language is now applied to the goddesses assembled in the *maṇḍala*, although there is a curious conservation of language in the context of these statements. The *Saṃvarodaya-tantra*, for example, describes the circumstances of the drawing of the *maṇḍala* and the qualities of the excellent Vajrācārya, much as we have already encountered in the *Vajrapāṇy-abhiṣeka-tantra*. Once the *maṇḍala* is constructed, though, the goddesses from the various places of pilgrimage—an important aspect of the *yoginī tantras*—are called to the *maṇḍala*, and then described.

> The goddesses are *pramāṇa*, the sacraments are *pramāṇa*, that spoken by those goddesses are the highest *pramāṇa*. By this statement of truth may those goddesses become the veritable means of my assistance. (VIII.26)[29]

Here the pronouncements of the *ḍākinīs* are under consideration, and the application of authority to such pronouncements is directly in line with claims made in esoteric literature about the celestial *yoginīs* of such pilgrimage places, especially the mythic land of Uḍḍiyāna. Esoteric literature of the *yoginī tantra* genre is replete with mythology of the instruction of yogins by these dangerous spiritual companions. The *Sampuṭatilaka-tantra* even posits the question—which proves to be rhetorical—asking how the utterances of these sky-going females previously have been collected into canonical literature, given the circumstance that Ānanda certainly did not recite them at the 'Council of Rājagṛha'[30]

Doubtless, there are similar applications of *pramāṇa* in other esoteric scriptures; these are the most indicative instances I have noted, although I cannot say that I have made a systematic review of the literature for these relatively insignificant passages. The passage, though, between the scriptural appropriation of this terminology and its application in esoteric *śāstras* is fairly short, particularly as the terms are clearly employed to vindicate the Vajrācāryas' instructions or their report of the goddesses' instructions about behavior in the *maṇḍala* gathering or within other assemblies. We note, for example, that a text ascribed to the Siddha Tilopa, the *bKa' yang dag pa'i tshad ma*, represents itself as the valid source for knowledge of the word of the Buddha (*samyakpravacana*: *bka' yang dag pa*). Contrary to expectations of the philosophical crowd, here *samyakpravacana-pramāṇa* is the yogic regimen described in the pages of the text, leading

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David Snellgrove, "Note on the *Adhyāśayasaṃcodanasūtra*," *Bullettin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 21 (1958): 620–623.

[29] Shinichi Tsuda, *The Samvarodaya-Tantra—Selected Chapters* (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1974):
devyaḥ pramāṇaṃ samayaḥ pramāṇam / taduktavācaś ca parapramāṇam /
etena satyena bhaveyur etāḥ / devyo mamānugrahahetubhūtāḥ // VIII.26 //

[30] *Sampuṭa-tilaka-tantra*, Peking 27, TTP vol. 2, 280.5.2: *re shig lha mo rnams kyi tshig / btu bar byas pa ji ltar lags /*.

to the realization of the real meaning of the Buddha's words.[31] There is even some uncertainty built into the text, since the beginning of the work describes itself as the esoteric instruction of the *ḍākiṇī* (*mkha' 'gro ma'i man ngag*) whereas the conclusion of the text indicates it is the speech of Vajradhara himself (*dpal rdo rje 'chang nyid kyis gsungs ba*).

Also indicative of the movement between scripture and śāstra is one section of the esoteric works attributed to the siddha Virūpa, who is described as the later career appearance of the previously intellectual Dharmapāla, an abbot of Nālandā monastery. The actual appropriation plays a small part in the beginning section of the central instructional treatise of the *Mārga-phala (Lam-'bras) system, the *Lam 'bras bu dang bcas pa'i gdams ngag dang man ngag tu bcas pa*, or *Lam-'bras rtsa-ba*, as it is known in its Tibetan translation.[32] This translation is said to be an eleventh century production of the collaboration between 'Brog-mi Shākya ye-shes and Kāyastha Gayādhara, during their five years together in and around Mu-gu lung, 'Brog-mi's monastery in the Mang-mkhar valley.[33] However, the report on the translation's source is only found in the annals related to the text and the Lam-'bras system as a whole. The text itself is without a translator's colophon, a fairly unusual development for the period, when the capacity to claim the authorship of important translations was sometimes the path to financial security and regional notoriety.

Towards its beginning, the *Lam-'bras rtsa-ba* identifies the fruit of the path as being defined or structured by the "fourfold episteme" (*tshad ma bzhis 'bras bu gtan la phab*). These are not explained in the ostensibly Indic text, but the Lam-'bras authorities in twelfth century Tibet understood the text to denote **a.** the infallible speech of the Tathāgata, **b.** the validity of the instructions of the esoteric master, **c.** the authority of the recollection of the yogin's own experience, and **d.** the reliability of interdependence in the relationship between master and student. We have no surviving Indic commentary on the Lam-'bras text, but the longest of the early Tibetan commentaries—the *Sras-don ma* ascribed to Sa-chen Kun-dga' snying-po (1092–1158)—explains that the entire Buddhist path may be summarized into these four *pramāṇas*.[34]

The scriptural source for these four is sometimes identified as the *Sampuṭa-tantra*, but there is nothing directly quoted from that tantra which actually articulates these four as cited, and the tantra itself seems to make no reference to them as a group.[35] Perhaps that is one reason why the

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[31] *bKa' yang dag pa'i tshad ma*, Tohoku 2331.

[32] Tohoku 2284. I have prepared a critical edition of the *Lam-'bras rtsa-ba* and am in the process of finalizing a translation, both of which will be published as part of a larger study on this tradition.

[33] Mu-gu-lung is seen in a variety of spellings—Myu-gu-lung, Mu-khu-lung, etc. For the most complete discussion of the early Lam-'bras history, see Ngor-chen Kun-dga' bzang-po (1382–1456), *Lam 'bras bu dang bcas pa'i man ngag gi byung tshul gsung ngag rin po che bstan pa rgyas pa'i nyi 'od, in bSod nam Rgya mtsho,* ed. *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), vol. 9, 108–126. This work was not completed by Ngor-chen and was finished by Gung-ru Shes-rab bzang-po (1411–1475); for this latter figure, see David P. Jackson. *The Early Abbots of 'Phan-po Na-lendra*, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhsmuskunde Heft 23 (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1989), 13–16.

[34] *Lam-'bras gzhung-bshad Sras-don-ma*, Sa skya khri 'dzin Ngag gi dbang phyug, ed., *The Slob Bśad Tradition of the Sa-skya Lam-'bras* (Rajpur, Dehra Dun District: Sakya Centre, 1983–84). Vol. XIII.170–175.

[35] Cf. the quotations found in the *Sras-don-ma*, vol. XIII.173.1.2. Compare the citation found in the *Yongs*

exact content of these four has been modified from the twelfth century until the present, with more than one 'fourfold episteme' being identified as written in the *Lam-'bras rtsa-ba*.[36] As with several categories in the Lam-'bras text, the order and significance of these have been contested, but it is clear that again the authenticating characteristic of the esoteric pronouncement is its capacity to elicit the experience of absolute truth, which Sa-chen indicates is the nature of the *dharmakāya*. He argues in several places that the extension of the designation *pramāṇa* to these categories is a result of their 'not being subject to contravention' (**avisaṃvādin*: *mi slu ba*), with much the same sensibility as we saw above in the *Vajrapāṇy-abhiṣekha-mahātantra*. Even though the precise nature and order of the four have been disputed, we should note that their interpretation has been rather augmented over time, such that later Sa-skya authors, like A-myes zhabs writing in 1621 CE, maintained that the whole Lam-'bras was defined by this 'fourfold episteme' and by one other, explicitly esoteric, category structure, the 'fourfold aural continuity' (**catur-karṇatantra*: *snyan brgyud bzhi)*.[37] Space prevents me from entering into a detailed discussion of the use of these in the Sa-skya tradition, but we may note again that the relationship between scripture, initiatory lineage, and personal authentication are the mainstays of this esoteric definition of *pramāṇa*.

Conclusions

The appropriation of epistemological language for the verification of esoteric Buddhism's rhetoric on questions of authority stems from that archaic tension between doctrines held and the individuals holding them. In early Buddhist terms, the admonition to follow the truth (*dharmapratisaraṇa*) and not the individual (*pudgalapratisaraṇa*) is indicative of the tradition's efforts to establish authority outside of an embodied state, analogous to disembodied law. Clearly, though, this answer did not resonate with a strong theme in Indian culture—the tendency to organize institutions around personalities. This theme historically has played as important a position among intellectuals as it has in the sphere of popular religion, and we may even observe the artificiality of boundaries between the 'intellectual / popular' dialectic in the Indic environment. Thus, when Dignāga began the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with the homage to the Buddha as 'embodied authority' (*pramāṇabhūta*), it was both his affirmation of a fundamental Buddhist perspective and acknowledgment that his audience might find a purely logocentric system less attractive than one espousing the intersection of theoretical aims and personal issues. Dharmakīrti's maintenance of the same direction in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* is indicative of the continued power of personality paradigms, for all persons at every literate level.

Esoteric Buddhist representatives, whether the authors of scriptures or separate technical treatises, could employ much the same language for some of the same purposes, but with shift in

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rdzogs bstan pa rin po che'i nyams len gyi man ngag gsung ngag rin po che'i byon tshul khog phub dang bcas pa rgyas par bshad pa legs bshad 'dus pa'i rgya mtsho (known as the Lam 'bras khog phub), The Slob Bśad Tradition vol. XXI.231.3, which comes from the *Sampuṭa-tantra*, Peking 26, TTP vol. 2, 258.2.3. The phrase is obscure and requires the editing of the available Sanskrit manuscripts before it will become entirely clear, but it is obvious that there are not four *pramāṇa*s articulated.

[36] Cf. the list in the *Lam 'bras khog phub*, 230,3–4.

[37] See the lengthy discussion of these two in tandem, *Lam 'bras khog phub*, 230,2–243,4.

focus. Instead of the Buddha, the 'embodied authority' became the Vajrācārya, the initiatory master. Instead of the epistemological concerns—syllogisms, doctrines of *apoha*, questions of the perceptions of universals, etc.—the esoteric authors identified the practices of meditation and the rituals of the tantras as not subject to contravention, since they were convinced that these yielded the fruits of practice when the teacher's directions were followed exactly.

Given their syncretic penchant and their flippant use of language, I have concluded that the image of a masquerade might be an appropriate metaphor for the Vajrayāna *pramāṇa* statements. A masquerade requires a costume, in this case philosophical nomenclature. It needs actors, here the Vajrācāryas. An occasion is necessary, such as the increased authority of the philosophical systems during the early medieval period. The purpose of the event was clearly the movement for the institutionalization of esoteric Buddhism, a purpose well served by this language. Finally a sense of play is required, and there can be few religious systems with such a sense of the absurd as esoteric Buddhism. As the *Mahāmudrātilaka* puts it, "If I [*Jñānaḍākārka] don't play, none of the Buddhas will arise."[38] Indeed, the Vajrācāryas may be the best examples of Homo Ludens—the playful human—with a serious purpose and a vision of the world as one continuous party thrown for their benefit.

Abbreviations

Tohoku — Hakuju Ui, et al., eds. *A Complete Catalogue of The Tibetan Buddhist Canons.* Sendai: Tohoku Imperial University, 1934.

TTP — Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed. *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition.* Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957.

[38] Peking 12, TTP vol. 1, 244.5.4–5: *bdag ni rol pa mi byed na / sangs rgyas thams cad 'byung mi 'gyur /.*

GETTING ORIENTED IN THE TIBETAN TRADITION: A CONTRIBUTION

by

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One of the important factors in the development of Dharmakīrtian studies in the recent years has been the growing interest on the part of modern scholars in the Tibetan logico-epistemological tradition. Such development is certainly most welcome, for it is only fitting that this great scholarly tradition receives due recognition. The appreciation of Tibetan sources and their use in the understanding of Buddhist logic and epistemology is not, however, without raising questions. Tibetan commentaries cannot be understood in isolation from their context without incurring the danger of being absolutized and dehistoricized. They need to be understood within the overall trajectory of the tradition. For example if we were to use Gyel-tsap's (*rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen*, 1364–1432) texts to explain Dharmakīrti's *svalakṣaṇa* without understanding his overall standpoint, we could end up creating some confusion, not realizing that Gyel-tsap's otherwise excellent explanations contain a kind of moderate realism quite different from Dharmakīrti's own views. Although Gyel-tsap's view is not without precedents in the Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition and is not without merit, it represents a revisionist position within the overall trajectory of the tradition.

Thus, it is important when one deals with Tibetan sources to locate their views in the overall development of the tradition in order to understand the particular standpoint they defend. This essay intends to facilitate this process by providing a general understanding of the main lines of this tradition, a kind of general map, even a provisional one, that would allow the scholars interested in using Tibetan sources to know the point of view reflected by the authors they are referring to. Without such a map there is the danger of using sources without understanding the particular views that they reflect.

I believe that this work is already well under way, though far from completion. Several scholars such as Leonard van der Kuijp, Ernst Steinkellner, Tom Tillemans, Paul Williams, Roger Jackson, David Jackson, Anne Klein and others have provided significant contributions in this direction. My own work has been to a large extent devoted to a similar endeavor, focusing mostly around the issue of universals.[1] I believe that this is a fundamental issue in Buddhist philosophy of language and epistemology. Distinctions concerning universal provide a good guide to some of the main differences in the Tibetan tradition. In this paper, however, I explore a different though related issue, the nature of perception (*pratyakṣa*, *mngon sum*).

In this area, there are also differences, which one needs to be aware of. When Gyel-tsap, for

[1] G. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpreters* (Albany: Suny, 1997).

example, speaks of perception, he is using a traditional Dharmakīrtian concept,[2] but he is using it in a way which is quite different from its original use. In the following pages, I explore some of the issues surrounding some of the Tibetan theories of perception. I focus mostly on Cha-ba's new epistemology, which offers a view of perception that seeks to solve some of the problems in Dharmakīrti's theory but in doing so also modifies some of the basic terms and tenets of the system. Cha-ba exemplifies the revisionist strategy which has become the hallmark of many other Tibetan commentators such as Gyel-tsap and other Ge-luk scholars who follow Cha-ba's tradition (*cha lugs*). I contrast this approach with the more literal views of Sa-paṇ's tradition (*sa lugs*), which has stressed the anti-realist or nominalist commitment present in Dharmakīrti, before concluding with a few general remarks on the nature of Tibetan contributions to Buddhist epistemology.

Let me immediately add that I understand this mapping of the Tibetan tradition into two main lines of interpretation to be a simplification that reflects more the state of affair obtaining after the fifteenth century when the tradition became dominated by the debate between the followers of Sa-paṇ's views and the Ga-den-ba (*dga' ldan pa*) tradition, which was later to become known as Ge-luk (*dge lugs*). Before this period there were many different views, some of which fitted this distinction only partly. Nevertheless I believe this distinction to be useful and fundamental to the understanding of the Tibetan epistemological tradition.

Cha-ba's Epistemology of Perception

One of the particularities of Cha-ba's new epistemology[3] is that it makes an important but controversial distinction between perception (*mngon sum*) and valid perception (*mngon sum gyi tshad ma*). In Dharmakīrti's works, perception is one type of valid cognition, and he never suggests that some perceptions are not valid. By contrast, Cha-ba holds that perception is not necessarily valid though it is always undistorted.[4] Though there are elements in Dharmottara that

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[2] For an exploration of Dharmakīrti's definition of perception and its relation to Dignāga's see: M. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (New York: Dover, 1930, 1962), S. Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (Delhi: Motilal, 1935), and R. Hayes, *Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).

[3] The problem with the study of his ideas is that his works are not available, so we must rely on second-hand sources, usually Śākya Chok-den's rich presentation. Śākya Chok-den, however, is not always fair. He clearly has an axe to grind against some of his contemporaries and predecessors. Using the works of Cha-ba and others, he argues that the views of his contemporaries are actually distorted renderings of the original Dharmakīrtian views due to their reliance on misinterpretations of that tradition. Thus, while Śākya Chok-den brings us worthwhile information, it would not be wise to accept it uncritically. Another problem with Śākya Chok-den is that he tends to overemphasize for polemical purposes the differences between Tibetan thinkers and their Indian predecessors. He also assumes, as commentators often do, that his sources present uniform view. But, in the hopefully provisional absence of original material, Śākya Chok-den is our best resource, and I will assume generally that "he got Cha-ba right."

[4] Cha-ba defines perception as "that cognition which is free from conceptions and non-mistaken with respect to its held object" (*rtog pa dang bral zhing rang gi bzung yul la ma 'khrul ba'i rig pa*). Śākya Chok-den, *Defeater of Bad Systems through the Wheel of Reasoning, an Ornament to the Thought of [Sa-paṇ's] Treasure on the Science of Valid Cognition* (*tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ngan pham byed*, in Collected Works IX and X, Thimphu [Bhutan]: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), II.376.5.

suggest such a move, this distinction is quite new in Buddhist epistemology.[5]

In general, most Buddhist epistemologists agree that cognitions require both non-deceptiveness (*avisaṃvādi, mi slu ba*) and novelty to be valid. But whereas Dharmakīrti and his classical commentators understand non-deceptiveness in pragmatic terms, Cha-ba understands it in an intentional sense. Assuming that validity is to be understood in those terms, he defines a valid cognition as a mental episode that newly realizes (*gsar du rtogs pa'i blo*), that is, identifies its object. Two criteria are implied by this definition: a) a cognition must identify its object (criterion of cognitive success) and b) this identification must be novel (criterion of novelty).

This definition is problematic in relation to perception, for not all perceptions fulfill these two criteria, according to these thinkers. For example, suppose that I am staring at a painting. The first moment is valid according to these thinkers since it provides new information. But what about the second and the following ones? They are veridical but they do not meet the two above delineated criteria since they do not contribute anything new to the epistemic process. Hence, they are not valid in the technical sense of the term since they are not knowledge-generating. Hence, they are not forms of perceptual knowledge. Another problematic example: I distractedly listen to music while writing this essay. When this task is over, I have no recollection of what I listened to. I just have a vague memory of listening to some music. Was my musical perception valid? It certainly does not seem to determine anything and, hence, it is not valid by virtue of failing the first criterion.

To account for these problems, Cha-ba distinguishes valid perceptions from non-valid and yet non-mistaken perceptions. That is, certain perceptions are knowledge-contributing while others are not, though they are veridical. To support this distinction, Cha-ba proposes his famous sevenfold typology which contains two new types of perception. The second moment of my seeing a painting in the first example is described as a subsequent perception (*bcad shes*). It is not valid because it does not bring any new information. My hearing music in the second example is described as an inattentive cognition (*snang la ma nges pa*). It does not induce certainty with respect to its object, and, therefore, is not valid (in the technical sense of the word).[6] Nevertheless, both types of cognitions are perception because their objects appear without any distortion.

Among the two criteria implied by Cha-ba's definition of valid cognition, the criterion of novelty is accepted by most Indian epistemologists. The criterion of cognitive success, however, is more problematic. Let me elaborate this important point which will provide a view of the nature of Cha-ba's new epistemology. According to Cha-ba, a cognition must correctly identify its object in order to be valid. For example, I return home and see my favorite rocking chair. For Cha-ba, my perception does not just hold passively its object but actually identifies this object as being my favorite rocking chair. Technically, this process of correct identification is described by Cha-ba as the elimination of false superimpositions (*sgro 'dogs gcod pa*) and understood as being equivalent to the obtention of the identified object (*bcad don thob pa*). Cognitions are valid if, and only if, they eliminate the appropriate false superimpositions and thus epistemically secure the object being identified. False superimpositions can be eliminated in two ways: by relying on

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[5] See H. Krasser, "Dharmottara's Theory of Knowledge," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 23 (1995): 247–271.
[6] Śākya Chok-den, *Defeater*, II.382.3–6.

reasoning or by experience. Whereas the first is characteristic of inference, the second is how valid perception identifies its object.

We may wonder: why is Cha-ba's commonsensical idea of correct identification put in a negative form? The answer is that this negative description is meant as an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's views. These are, however, quite different in several respects. For Dharmakīrti, perception is passive in that it merely holds its object within its ken. The active integration of the object within a categorical framework does not happen at the perceptual level, but is the product of conceptuality. Moreover, for Dharmakīrti, elimination of false superimpositions does not concern perception but only inference. Elimination by experience is a contradiction in terms, because elimination is a conceptual task performed by judgments (or by inference) and, hence, cannot be performed by perception.

By opposition, for Cha-ba, perception is more active; it is not limited to mere sensing but includes an element of cognitive identification. Perceptual knowledge actively presents us with common sense objects already integrated into a categorical scheme, and not just with bare particulars. I am not just seeing a color and a shape which I interpret conceptually as a chair, I am seeing my favorite rocking chair. Thus, the activity of perception is not limited to inducing judgments (as Sa-paṇ and the anti-realist tradition hold), but actively determines its objects. We could imagine Cha-ba agreeing with Schopenhauer's claim that "the sensation does not separate itself clearly from the idea which is constructed out of it, as the raw material, by the understanding."[7] For Cha-ba, perception (Schopenhauer's sensation) is not limited to bare particulars. Experience shows that "we see things themselves quite directly, and indeed as lying outside us."[8]

The description of a more active cognition is not limited to perception but concerns both types of valid cognition. It does not, however, change the cognitive role of conception which is conceived by both realists and anti-realists as active. When applied to perception, however, the idea of an active cognition modifies the very idea of perception, for it extends the capacities of perception beyond the mere holding of an object. Hence, Cha-ba's idea of perception is rather different from Dharmakīrti's and indeed represents a new development. Let me emphasize that this new epistemology is, however, not without sources in the Indian Buddhist tradition. We can see related ideas in Dharmottara and other later Indian thinkers, though they did not seem to have gone as far as Cha-ba.[9]

Cha-ba's views greatly influenced Tibetan tradition in general and the Ge-luk school in particular. Ontologically his moderate realism is the source of the Ge-luk view that some universals are both real and dependent on their instances. Epistemologically, several of his ideas have been taken over by this latter tradition. Although Ge-luk thinkers do not follow completely Cha-ba's epistemology and sometimes disagree among themselves, the view of a more cognitively active perception seems to be universally agreed upon among scholars belonging to this tradition.

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[7] A. Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Idea* (London: Trübner, 1886), II.188. The similarity between Cha-ba and Schopenhauer concerns their arguments against the opposition between a passive sensation and an active conceptualization, not their overall view.

[8] Schopenhauer, *World*, 188.

[9] See for example Y. Kajiyama, *Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1966), 56–8.

For example, Kay-drup (*mkhas grub*), who is regarded by the later Ge-luk tradition as offering an important though slightly dissenting interpretation of Buddhist epistemology, may not always agree with Gyel-tsap on interpretive details. They agree, however, on their understanding of epistemic validity.[10] For both thinkers, as well as for other Ge-luk scholars, the explanation of valid cognition as the elimination of a superimposition is obvious. This has important consequences for their understanding of perception. As such, it constitutes a new conception of perception which is much closer to the common understanding than Dharmakīrti's idea of bare perception.

Sa-paṇ's Rejection of Cha-ba's Typology

Quite different is the view of Sa-paṇ, who offers a theory of perception which is much closer to Dharmakīrti than Cha-ba and is meant as a vigorous critique of the latter's new epistemology. For example, Sa-paṇ criticizes Cha-ba's conception of subsequent cognition (*bcad shes*) discussed above. Sa-paṇ grants that subsequent cognition exists, but does not accept it as a division of non-valid cognition. For Sa-paṇ, subsequent cognitions are non-realizing cognitions (*ma rtogs pa'i blo*). He rejects the idea that subsequent cognitions have any cognitive role. It merely repeats a previous cognition without contributing to the identification of an object. Hence, it is not even a realization of a previously realized object, as Cha-ba would have it. Sa-paṇ compares the identification of an already cognized object to cutting a tree already cut.[11] Just as something that is already established and not forgotten does not need to be re-established, something previously understood cannot be understood unless one forgets it in the meanwhile.

Sa-paṇ is particularly critical of the idea that the second moment of a perception is a subsequent cognition. Since perception merely holds its object and since this object is in constant transformation, the subsequent moments of perception are as valid as the first moment.[12] Therefore, no perception can ever be a subsequent cognition. Only the conceptions that are recollections (*dran shes*) of something previously realized can be subsequent cognitions.

Sa-paṇ is also highly critical of the idea of inattentive cognition (*snang la ma nges pa*) on the grounds that though such cognitions exist, they are not invalid, as wrongly asserted by Cha-ba and his followers, who assign them to a separate category. For Sa-paṇ, even more than the preceding two, this third mistake clearly reveals the difference that separates Cha-ba's new epis-

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[10] For example, Kay-drup speaks of "the object [determined by] the elimination of superimposition by valid cognition" (*tshad mas sgro 'dogs gcod pa'i yul*). *Extensive Explanation of the Extensive Commentary on "Prime Cognition," the Ocean of Reasoning* (*rgyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, Collected Works X. Lha-sa: Zhöl blocks, 1897. New-Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982), II: 57.6. A similar passage can be found in *Ornament of the Seven Treatises Clearing Mental Obscurity* (*tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel*), Collected Works X (Lha-sa: Zhöl blocks, 1897, New-Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982), 65a3–6, which I discuss in my *Recognizing Reality*, 373–378.

[11] Sa-paṇ, *Auto-Commentary to the Treasure of Reasonings on Valid Cognition* (*tshad ma rigs gter rang 'grel*, in the Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa sKya Sect. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968, V.167.3.1–264.2.6), 40a6.

[12] Sa-paṇ, *Auto-Commentary*, 40a2–42a5. Kay-drup shares Sa-paṇ's conception of subsequent cognition as exclusively conceptual. There is, however, a difference between the two thinkers: whereas for Sa-paṇ subsequent cognition is to be altogether excluded from the domain of realizing mental states, Kay-drup holds that subsequent cognitions realize their objects.

temology from the more classical model that Sa-paṇ attempts to retrieve in his famous *Tshad ma rigs gter*.

Cha-ba's idea of an inattentive cognition as a separate type of perception derives from his idea that valid perceptions determine their objects. Since some perceptions seem to be unable to do so, a separate category (inattentive cognition) must be created, as illustrated by the example of my distracted hearing of music. Sa-paṇ agrees that this hearing is a perception but refuses to accept that it constitutes a different type of perception. For him, perception never determines anything to begin with. Therefore, there is no need for a special category such as 'inattentive cognition' to refer to perceptions that do not determine their object. My listening consciousness is just a normal perception and hence is valid. Sa-paṇ says:

> "If inattentive cognitions were not valid, all perceptions would be non-valid because ascertainment is denied with respect to perception."[13]

Perceptions do not ascertain their objects, nor do they determine them. They just hold the object, which is then determined by judgments induced by them. For example, a mass appears to my visual consciousness. At this stage I am uninformed about the object which I see without determination. Sa-paṇ compares this stage to the seeing of a stupid person who does not understand anything.[14] This passive holding of the object is the function of perception and establishes it as valid:

> "Therefore, valid perceptions do not need to ascertain [an object] since they are non-conceptual. Perception is established as valid by its being unmistaken and free from conceptions."[15]

For Sa-paṇ (as for Dharmakīrti and other classical epistemologists), perception ascertains nothing since it reflects the reality of the object without adding anything. Ascertainment (*nges pa, niścita*) is restricted to conception which is absolutely different from perception. Therefore, it is impossible for a perception to determine an object.[16]

In creating the pseudo-category of inattentive perception, Cha-ba and others miss the simple fact that perception does not ascertain or determine anything. They see that certain perceptions induce immediate certainty, while others do not. Since the former perceptions determine their objects and the latter do not, there must be something in them that accounts for this difference. The perceptions that are unable to induce certainty must be, argue these thinkers, a different type

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[13] *gal te snang la ma nges pa / tshad ma min na mngon sum kun / tshad ma min pa 'gyur mngon sum la / nges pa nyid ni bkag phyir ro /* Sa-paṇ, *Treasure*, 4a6.

[14] Sa-paṇ, *Treasure of Reasonings on Valid Cognition* (*tshad ma rigs gter*, in the Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa sKya Sect. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968, V.155.1.1–167.1.6), 7.a.5.

[15] *des na mgnon sum tshad ma yang / rtog med phyir na nges mi dgos / mngon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba / nyid kyi tshad ma grub pa yin /* Sa-paṇ, *Treasure*, 6a2. I am reading the genitive in the last verse as an instrumental: *nyid kyis grub*.

[16] Sa-paṇ, *Auto-Commentary*, 51b4. Sa-paṇ rejects the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual ascertainment proposed by an opponent.

of perception.[17] Thus, these thinkers invent a special category (inattentive cognition), not understanding that all perceptions are inattentive, since they all equally lack ascertainment.

According to Sa-paṇ, these thinkers are under the misapprehension that valid perceptions determine (*bcad*) their objects, and that, therefore, a special category is needed for perceptions that do not determine their objects. Since perceptions do not determine anything, however, a perception unable to induce immediate certainty is no less valid than a perception which is able to do so. Hence, there is no need for a new category. To support his point, Sa-paṇ quotes Dharmakīrti:

> "**Question:** How is it that perception holds without ascertaining? **Answer:** No perception ever ascertains [anything, for] what is apprehended [by perception] is not ascertained. **Question:** But, what is [the function of perception]? **Answer:** The appearance [of the object] to it [the perception]. It is not the case that perception apprehends or does not apprehend [its object] by ascertaining or not ascertaining [the object]. Ascertaining [cognitions] are quite different. They ascertain some [aspects of the object] and do not ascertain other [aspects of the object]. Therefore, their applications are different [and this explains the fact] that they apprehend or do not apprehend [this or that aspect of the object]."[18]

Dharmakīrti distinguishes perception and ascertainment through their different functions. The former's function is to let reality appear as it is without adding or subtracting anything. Hence, perception apprehends its object in its totality. The function of conception is to determine the object appearing to the senses as being this or that. This ascertaining cognition relates to its object in a partial way by determining its object as possessing or lacking certain selected characteristics.

Ge-luk epistemologists (perhaps following Cha-ba) interpret Dharmakīrti's words as referring to two modes of cognitive operation. Perceptions operate by the power of appearance (*snang dbang gis 'jug*) and conceptions by the power of ascertainment (*nges dbang gis 'jug*). These thinkers hold that this does not mean that perception does not determine its object, but only that determination is not its main function. Similarly, real things appear to conception but, since this is not conception's main function, conception does not operate by the power of the appearance of real things (*snang dbang gis mi 'jug*).

Sa-paṇ, by contrast, takes Dharmakīrti's words ("no perception ever ascertains . . .") literally. There is no question of differentiating primary and secondary functions: holding the object is the

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[17] Some Ge-luk thinkers define inattentive cognition differently. They recognize that perception does not ascertain its object, but they still hold that a valid perception determines its object. For example Ge-shay Jam-bel-sam-pel, a follower of Paṅ-chen Sö-nam-drak-ba, defines inattentive perception as: "a cognition to which a specifically characterized phenomenon, which is its object of application, appears, but that cannot induce certainty towards that [object]" (*rang gi 'jug yul du gyur pa'i rang mtshan gsal bar snang ba yang yin de la nges pa 'dren mi nus pa'i rig pa*). E. Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1981), Tibetan Text 6b3.

[18] *da ni ji ltar ma nges pa mngon sum gyis kyang gzung yin zhe na / mgnon sum gang gis kyang nges par byed pa ma yin te / des gang zhig 'dzin pa de'ang nges pas ni ma yin no / 'o na ci yin zhe na der snang bas so / des nges pa dang ma nges pa'i dbang gis mngon sum gyis 'dzin pa dang mi 'dzin pa dag ma yin no / nges pa rnams kyis de lta ma yin te / 'ga' zhig nges kyang 'ga' zhig ma nges pas 'jug pa tha dad pas 'dzin pa dang mi 'dzin pa yin no /* Dharmakīrti, *Auto-Commentary*, D: 4216, *Ce*, 278a5–6. Quoted by Sa-paṇ, *Auto-Commentary*, 39b3–5.

sole function of perception, which contributes to our understanding of the world only indirectly by inducing ascertainment. By itself, perception is totally powerless to determine anything. Since perception does not discriminate, it is valid with respect to the object as a whole. The perception of a pot is valid with respect to the color of the pot as well as to its impermanence.[19] Perception reveals the presence of a lumpy thing, which is then conceptualized as a pot because it is different from non-pots. Viewing the pot as a pot, as impermanent, etc., is accomplished by conception, which differentiates the object by elimination. The fact that a perception is able to bring about certainty is due to the conceptual state of the person and has nothing to do with the perception itself. When one's mental states are free from the causes of error, one is able to ascertain all the aspects of the object.

Finally, if one wants a category for perceptions that do not induce immediate certainty, one does not need to create such a category, for it already exists. The distinction between internally (*rang las nges kyi tshad ma, svataḥprāmāṇya*) and externally valid cognitions (*gzhan las nges kyi tshad ma, parataḥprāmāṇya*)[20] accounts for the differences in the cognitive capacities of different valid perceptions. Whereas a perception which is able to induce immediate ascertainment is internally valid, a perception unable to do so is externally valid. In either case, the validity of the perception is identical, for it consists of the holding of the object as it is. Whether we can reach a clear judgment or not does not depend on the content of perception, for perception is without any determination. Rather, such a difference is function of our overall cognitive situation and ability to induce the appropriate conceptualization, which enables us to categorize the objects encountered in experience.

This presentation, which seems to be faithful to Dharmakīrti's ideas, raises an obvious objection which Sa-paṇ does not address explicitly. Perception of sound is said to be valid with respect to the impermanence of sound. It is also said that since impermanence is not ascertained, we need the support of a reasoning to infer it. How can an inference understand an object (sound's impermanence) already cognized by perception? Isn't inference then a subsequent cognition? Śākya Chok-den answers:

> "No, because whereas the former valid cognition [perception] holds a specifically characterized phenomenon, the latter [inference] apprehends the elimination of impermanence. Both [cognitions] operate on the same object of application (*'jug yul*) because they operate on this very sound's impermanence which is a specifically characterized phenomenon."[21]

As Dharmakīrti repeatedly emphasized, perception and inference comprehend different ob-

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[19] Sa-paṇ, *Auto-Commentary*, 51b6.

[20] See E. Steinkellner, "Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity," in *Tibetan Studies* (Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji, 1992), 245–256, and G. Dreyfus, *Ontology, Philosophy of Language and Epistemology in Buddhist Tradition* (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1991), 721–745.

[21] *ma yin te / tshad ma snga mas mi rtag pa rang mtshan bzung la / phyi mas mi rtag pa'i rang mtshan 'dzin pa'i phyir / gnyis ka yang 'jug yul ni gcig la 'jug ste / sgra mi rtag pa rang mtshan de nyid la 'jug pas so /* Śākya Chok-den, *The Ocean of Music [of] the Speech of the Seven Treatises, an Explanation of the Reasonings on Valid Cognition* (*tshad ma rigs pa'i rnam bshad sde bdun ngag gi rol mtsho*, Collected Works XIX. Thimphu [Bhutan]: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), 508, 7.

jects: whereas perception relates to real things, inference only apprehends constructs on the basis of an inherent mistake (*ngo bo nyid kyis 'khrul ba*), albeit one necessary to practical activities. A thing conceived by thought is no more than a "conventional denomination [given] to the mere conceptual elimination of the contradictory of the object (the non-x)."[22] Accordingly, the direct object apprehended by perception and the direct object of the inference of the sound as impermanent are different, despite the fact that these two cognitions related to the same real object, albeit differently. Therefore, since the inferential understanding of sound as impermanent cognizes a different object, it is a valid cognition. The mistake committed by Cha-ba and others in their explanation of perception is to forget the radical difference between perception and inference. They confuse the functions of these types of cognition and argue from a misrepresentation of perception as having a determinative capacity. Referring to these Tibetan realists, Sa-paṇ concludes, rather flippantly:

> "They confuse the functions of perception and conception. That is the extent [of it]!"[23]

Conclusions

The lessons that we can draw from this interpretive encounter are multiple and complex. It would be simplistic to conclude that one tradition (Sa-paṇ's) got Dharmakīrti right and the other (Cha-ba's) got him wrong. It is true that the former tradition offers a picture of Dharmakīrti's epistemology that is closer to the original model than the latter. But this is not the end of the story. Just to reject Cha-ba's tradition as being heterodox is to miss its importance. Cha-ba's tradition is not just an aberration due to local Tibetan conditions but is the end product of a long conceptual evolution which started among Dharmakīrti's Indian followers and continued in Tibet. Faced with the problem created by Dharmakīrti's systems, his followers were left with the task of confronting these dilemmas. They attempted to solve the problems by modifying certain concepts. In doing so, they adopted a variety of strategies which fall into two broad categories. Some attempted to solve the problems while remaining as close as possible to Dharmakīrti's original ideas. In India, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi represented this conservative tendency. They responded to objections from Hindu opponents through glossing Dharmakīrti's texts. In doing so, they did not venture very far from Dharmakīrti's own formulations. In Tibet Sa-paṇ's tradition represents a similar attempt to answer critiques without major transformations to Dharmakīrti's framework. These thinkers proposed new ideas but are careful to keep them in close relation with Dharmakīrti's own views.

Quite different was the revisionist strategy noticeable in thinkers such as Dharmottara and Śaṃkarānanda. Under pressure from the realist critics, these thinkers introduced new ideas that gradually transform the basic terms of the system. Tibetan thinkers such as Cha-ba continued this trend and further modified Dharmakīrtian ideas. Perception is for these thinkers a propositional form of knowledge whose main difference from the other form of knowledge is that it is psychologically non-conceptual. Whereas for Dharmakīrti perception is epistemologically and

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22 *rtog ngor de min rnam par bsal tsam la de'i tha snyad byed pa /* Śākya Chok-den, *Defeater*, II. 94.1.

23 *de dag gis ni mngon sum dang / rtog pa'i byed pa 'dres par zad /* Sa-paṇ, *Treasure*, 16a4–5.

psychologically free from concepts, for Tibetan realists such as Cha-ba perception takes articulated content as its object; hence it is not epistemologically beyond concepts, though it remains psychologically non-conceptual. This reinterpretation of Dharmakīrti's (and Dignāga's) theory of perception resulted in a transformation of the very meaning of the basic terms of the epistemological system.

Thus, the realist reinterpretation adopted by many Tibetan thinkers is quite different in certain respects from Dharmakīrti's view, a point modern scholars need to keep in mind. This does not mean, however, that this tradition is not a valuable resource for modern interpreters of Dharmakīrti. Thinkers such Gyel-tsap or Kay-drup present rich and well informed theoretical and exegetical discussions. Their works offer well informed explanations of Dharmakīrti's system and close glosses of his texts which often can be read against the realist biases of their authors, a sure sign of great scholarly quality.

Different is the contribution made by Sa-paṇ's tradition. Although its claims to represent completely and accurately Dharmakīrti's thought fly in the face of the historical and, hence, contingent nature of tradition, its main views remain close to those of Dharmakīrti in many respects. Despite the great historical distance between Dharmakīrti and Sa-paṇ, the latter exemplifies a tradition of inquiry that has preserved most of the basic terms of the system and attempts to struggle with difficulties while remaining within this framework. As such, Sa-paṇ's interpretations are important contributions for modern interpreters, though they cannot be assumed to reflect always Dharmakīrti's views.

Thus, the lesson that I draw from this interpretive encounter is that both make valuable contributions. In fact, I would argue that the greatest insights into the Indian originals gleaned from Tibetan sources do not come from considering individual commentators or schools in isolation. Rather they come from a broader appraisal of the overall Tibetan development of logic and epistemology. Once this contextualization has been done, the Tibetan commentarial tradition becomes indeed a valuable help in the scholarly quest for greater understanding of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition.

ŚUBHAGUPTA'S *ŚRUTIPARĪKṢĀKĀRIKĀ* (vv. 10cd–19) AND ITS DHARMAKĪRTIAN BACKGROUND

by

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1. Introduction

1.1. Among the five works[1] of (Bhadanta) Śubhagupta[2] that have been preserved down to us in only their Tibetan translation, the *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā* (ŚPK) of this philosopher (whose dates and doctrinal affiliation[3] remain unclear) seems to deserve more consideration than it has so far received.[4] Even though this very short (19 kārikās) treatise does not present as much historical and philosophical interest as the highly polemical *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (BASK) or as the *Anyāpohavicārakārikā* (AVK), it anyway seems to provide with materials towards counter-balancing the very frequent (both traditional and modern) assumption that Śubhagupta would have been a follower of Dharmakīrti in no more than name alone. My contention here will be that Śubhagupta actually was as faithful to Dharmakīrti on linguistic questions as he was critical of him (as well as of Vasubandhu and Dignāga) on matters pertaining to ontology (*bāhyārtha*, atomic theory, etc.) and at least in some important epistemological matters (*vāsanā*-theory, etc.). In other words, my aim here is to show that Haribhadra Sūri's qualification of Śubhagupta as a vārttikānusārin[5] is correct in what pertains to his theory of language.

1.2. Śubhagupta's little treatise most probably constitutes the first and maybe unique[6] Buddhist epistemological work explicitly dedicated to a critical examination of *śruti*. However, since Skt. '*śruti*' = Tib. '*thos pa*' does not appear in any of the 19 *kārikā*s of ŚPK, one should investigate some parallel Buddhist works in order to determine which meaning should be associated with ŚPK's title. The first work that comes to mind is of course Śāntarakṣita's TS, of which chapter XXIV is entitled 'Śrutiparīkṣā'. According to Kamalaśīla, TS XXIV aims at substantiating one of Śāntarakṣita's introductory *pāda*s, namely TS 5a, which runs: *svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅgaḥ*. Skt. '*svatantrā śrutiḥ*' Kamalaśīla [= TSP 14,23–24] glosses through *svataḥpramāṇabhūto vedaḥ* and *nityaṃ vacanam*. Finally, after having emphasized the Buddha's having directly experienced

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[1] For references and bibliography to these works, see Steinkellner/Much [1995: 52–55].

[2] On the name of the author, see first Hattori [1960: 400–399].

[3] See Matsumoto [1980: 290(9)–289(10)], Mimaki [1987–88: 276 nn. 10–11], Śāstrī [1967: 1] and Steinkellner/Much [1995: 52].

[4] See Miyasaka [1959] and Wakahara [1989]. As I do not read Japanese, I unfortunately have not been able to use these two articles.

[5] AJPsvop I 337,23–24: *yathoktaṃ vārttikānusāriṇā śubhaguptena* . . .

[6] But see Frauwallner [1957: 99].

(*sākṣāddarśin*) *pratītyasamutpāda*, Kamalaśīla says:[7] "*na ca apy apauruṣeyaṃ vākyam asti.*" Thus for Kamalaśīla, '*śruti*' seems to be synonymous with '*veda*'; this Veda consists in permanent/originary (*nitya*) speech (*vacana*) or sentence (*vākya*), bears upon supra-sensory objects (*atīndriyārtha*), exists independently of any human agency (*apauruṣeya*) and is endowed with intrinsic epistemic validity (*svataḥpramāṇabhūta*).[8] *Śruti* moreover directly and expressly points back to Mīmāṃsā.[9]

1.3. One should stress then that TS(P) XXIV reiterates and elaborates upon mostly Dharmakīrtian arguments as they can be found in PV I 224–330. Now both Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita are very clear in explicating the philosophical purposes of these sections: they aim to critically examine (*parīkṣ-*) how an *āgama* which would be bereft of any human authorship could possibly and satisfactorily claim to have epistemic validity, i.e. how an *apauruṣeyo vedaḥ* could pay claim to scriptural authority. In other words, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita at length criticise the Mīmāṃsā's contention that *apauruṣeyatā*, i.e. authorlessness, may guarantee the Veda's reliability (*avisaṃvāda*) and epistemic authority/validity (*prāmāṇya*). Now it is well known that Mīmāṃsā, at least from the Vṛttikāra's and Śabara's developments on the so-called *Tarkapāda*, is largely language-focused, and that most of its arguments towards establishing *vedaprāmāṇya* through the logical reason *apauruṣeyatvāt*, rely on a specific theory of language and linguistic reference. Assumptions such as *śabdanityatā*, *saṃbandhanityatā* and *saṃbandhautpattikatva*, etc., which all form the core of these conceptions and aim at substantiating and establishing the *hetu*, actually are the main targets of Dharmakīrti's PV I 224sq and Śāntarakṣita's TS XXIV. To use Kamalaśīla's own phrasing while commenting on TS 5a, Dharmakīrti as well as Śāntarakṣita criticises the Mīmāṃsaka conception of *śruti* as *nityaṃ vacanam*, and it does not seem exaggerated to read Dharmakīrti's PV I 224sq as an unexplicited and archetypical *Śrutiparīkṣā*. Thus I would argue that by *śrutiparīkṣā* one should understand *a critical examination of the Mīmāṃsaka (and partly Vaiyākaraṇa) general theory of language such as it aims at establishing* apauruṣeyatā *as a reason/criterion towards proving* vedaprāmāṇya.

1.4. Works such as Śubhagupta's ŚPK, which consist of mere stanzas in Tibetan translation and are devoid of any commentary, often cannot be understood unless one attempts a systematical research into their possible or effective sources. This process provides one with the opportunity to recover at least parts of the polemical and philosophical context according to which these enigmatical stanzas should or may be read. One actually easily convinces oneself that Dharmakīrti's PV I 224sq and PVin II 17*,28sq form the main philosophical sources Śubhagupta dealt with while composing ŚPK. Even though some *pāda*s or even stanzas remain obscure to me (e.g. ŚPK 4b, 5c, 6a and 19) or stand in need of a more thorough understanding of other works by Śubhagupta (i.e. mainly AVK, cf. ŚPK 6cd, 8cd and 9), the major part of ŚPK's *pūrva-* or

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[7] TSP 14,25.

[8] Kamalaśīla's commentary actually reflects Śāntarakṣita's own ideas as they can be grasped from TS XXIV, especially from TS 2086–2089.

[9] That the opponent is a Jaiminīya, i.e. a Mīmāṃsaka, is made clear by Kamalaśīla in TSP 14,21–22: *yathā āhur jaiminīyāḥ / tasmād atīndriyārthānāṃ sākṣāddraṣṭā na vidyate / vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati iti /* The verse quoted here may be compared to TS 2373. See also TSP 583,6.

*uttarapakṣa*s can be traced back to PV I and PVin II, and paralleled with Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's TS(P) XXIV. While retrieving each stanza's original Dharmakīrtian context, it stands obvious that Śubhagupta's ŚPK does not, despite its extreme concision, deviate from the *Śrutiparīkṣā*-type as can be delineated from PV I and TS(P) XXIV. One then also notices that there is actually no point on which Śubhagupta significantly either shifts from or disagrees with Dharmakīrti's position. Though in the form of a digest and despite its never explicitating the schools and doctrines it condemns, Śubhagupta's ŚPK too seems to intend to scrutinize the Mīmāṃsaka (and partly Vaiyākaraṇa) general theory of language such as it aims at establishing *apauruṣeyatā* as a reason/criterion towards proving *vedaprāmāṇya*.

These points I shall now try to substantiate by attempting a commented translation of the second half of ŚPK, i.e. vv. 10cd–19, using Dharmakīrti's writings to make sense of the terse *kārikā*s of Śubhagupta.[10]

2. A commented translation of ŚPK 10cd–19

> "If one accepts that the [word] makes [its object] known on the basis of [such a] consideration [as:] '[this word] is this [object]', [we answer:] Since the objects of [each] word are many [in number], which [one object] does [a word] make known?" (ŚPK 10cd–11ab)[11]

This *pūrvapakṣa* echoes a *saṃbandha*-formulation Dharmakīrti negates in PVin II,[12] just after having invalidated the causality-centered account of *yogyatā* Śubhagupta also criticised above in ŚPK 3cd–5.[13] As for Śubhagupta's answer, even though it does not coincide here with Dharmakīrti's criticism of the hypothesis through the possible objectlessness of words, it refers back to Dharmakīrti's extremely frequent emphasis on polysemy, which is considered in itself sufficient to invalidate both *svābhāvikasaṃbandha* and *svābhāvikaniyama*. But since Śubhagupta stresses polysemy in more details below in ŚPK 14, we may turn now to the important ŚPK 11cd–12:

> "[Objection:] [The objects of words] are discriminated (**vivecita*?[14]) through authoritative trea-

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[10] I am well aware that the methodological standpoint adopted here may entail some circularity: to establish Śubhagupta's indebtedness to Dharmakīrti, one has to read ŚPK, and the *only* way to understand this work as well as its arguments is to trace its contents back to Dharmakīrti's writings.

[11] ŚPK 10cd–11ab [P208a6–7/D196b6–7/C189a6–7]: */ 'di'o zhes brtags la brten nas // de ni gsal bar byed 'dod na // sgra dag* [CD *dag* : P *bdag*] *don ni du ma'i phyir // don gang gsal bar byed pa* [DP *pa* : C *ba*] *yin /*

[12] PVin II 19*,24–28: *de bzhin du gal te sgra rnams kyang don las skye ba yin na ni rung ba nges par 'gyur ba yin no // de med na ni 'di ni 'di'o zhes bya ba'i 'brel pa mi 'grub po // don dang ldan par yang mi 'gyur te /* For translation see Steinkellner [1979: 70].

[13] ŚPK 3cd–5 [P208a2–3/D196b3–4/C189a3–4]: */ gal te dbang po bzhin du de // don dang 'brel par* [DP *par* : C *phyir*] *rtog* [P *rtog* : CD *rtogs*] *byed na // dper na du ba las me'am* [DP *me'am* : C *me'i me*] */ bum pa sogs la snang ba bzhin // gzhan gsal byed par 'dod pa gang // rgyu de'am 'bras bur 'gyur grang na // sgra ni don skyed byed min zhing // don gyis skyed pa'ang ma yin no // khyad med 'dogs pa'ang mi 'dod na // ji ltar de don gsal byed yin //*

[14] I take ŚPK 11c: <*rnam phye*> to correspond to Skt.: <*vivecita*>, following the Tibetan rendering [P528a1: */ gang gis don 'di rnam phye bas /*] of PV I 319d: *yena artho 'yaṃ vivecitaḥ //* See also Karṇakagomin's gloss PVSVṬ 592,27: *vivecito vibhakto 'yam eva asya artho na ayam iti /* See Steinekellner [1979: 74 n. 242].

tises (*śāstra).[15] [Answer:] Because the [words], since they are fit (*yogya) [for referring] to all (*sarvatra) [objects whatsoever], are devoid of anything that could [semantically] restrict (*niyāmaka?) [them], aren't the [words of an authoritative treatise] [semantically] unrestricted [as to their objects]? One may [then] always suspect (*śaṅkā) words to be used [with reference] to unintended (*aniṣṭa) [objects] as well." (ŚPK 11cd–12)[16]

In answer to ŚPK 11c, Śubhagupta unambiguously affirms in ŚPK 12a that a word is fitting to refer to all objects (*sarvatra yogyaḥ*). Śubhagupta's formulation finds very close parallels in Dharmakīrti, most notably in PV I.[17] It is well-known that Dharmakīrti rejects any essential semantic restriction (*svabhāvaniyama*) to a word, for any word may refer to any object and vice versa,[18] the only basis and hence restricting factor upon a word's reference being the speaker's intention,[19] which in its turn is left unimpeded;[20] this *vivakṣā* is a key-concept which Śubhagupta too seems to accept.[21] The whole point here lies in the objects of words being of a conceptual character.[22] *To be* an object of conceptual cognition means to be *essentially* (*svabhāvataḥ*)[23] fit to

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[15] Neither have I been able to find any satisfactory parallel *pūrvapakṣa* elsewhere, nor to provide with any definite meaning for the word '*śāstra*', of which the wide range of meaning extends from 'technical authoritative teaching/treatise' (Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Piṅgala's *Chandaḥsūtra*, etc.) up to 'Scripture' (≅'*āgama*' and hence, for Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda with all its 'śāstric' components).

[16] ŚPK 11cd–12 [P208a7–8/D196b7–197a1/C189a7–b1]: */ gal te bstan bcos las rnam phye // de ni ma nges nyid min nam // de ni kun la rung ba'i phyir // nges pa pa dang bral phyir ro // sgra ni mi 'dod pa la yang // 'jug par rtag tu dogs pa* [DP *pa* : C *ba*] *yin /*

[17] PV I 326ab: [PVSV 172,4: *sa eva śabdasya*] *sarvatra yogyasyaikārthadyotane niyamaḥ kutaḥ* / PVSV 172,6: *na hi śabdasya kaścid arthaḥ svabhāvaniyataḥ sarvatra yogyatvāt /* See also Karṇakagomin [PVSVṬ 604,26–27(≅PVṬ P Nye 71b7–8)]: *na hi śabdasya kaścid arthaḥ svabhāvena nisargasiddhyā niyato 'sti / kiṃ kāraṇam / sarvatra vācye 'rthe yogyatvāc chabdasya /*

[18] See PVin II [19*,14–15 (*pūrvapakṣa*)], and for translation see Steinkellner [1979: 69].

[19] PV I 327a: *vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ*, and PVSV 172,19–20 thereon: *vivakṣayā hi śabdo 'rthe niyamyate (/) na svabhāvataḥ (/) tasya kvacid apratibandhena sarvatra tulyatvāt /* In ŚPK 7–8, Śubhagupta unambiguously claims that the ones versed in science (**paṇḍita?*) declare the so-called *saṃbandha* to consist in an *avinābhāva* which may, in its turn, be either of *tādātmya*-type (identity) or of *tadutpatti*-type (causality). In the syntactically obscure ŚPK 8ab, Śubhagupta assumes a cognitional object (**buddhyartha?*) to be the effect of a word, so that a word makes this very kind of object known. This reflects almost word for word Dharmakīrti's thought as it can be grasped in at least two passages in PVSV, i.e., PVSV 113,24–114,3 and 118,14–17. As it is well-known, verbal knowledge should be classified as an inference based on a *kāryahetu*. The *avinābhāva*-relationship makes it possible, for a listener, to infer a given speaker's intention, for the word's utterance generates, in the listener's mind, the same conceptual image as the object's representation in the speaker's mind (such a process is described by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 105,24–27); such a depiction can also be found in Śubhagupta's AVK, most notably in v. 20 [P209b2–3/D198a1], of which the Sanskrit original has been preserved down to us by Haribhadra Sūri in AJP 338,5–6: (Tib.) */ de phyir smra po snyan pa po'i // blo gnyis mtshungs snang spyod yul gcig // kho na nyid du phyi rol don // sgra yi spyod yul 'ga' yang med /* (Skt.) *vaktuḥ śrotuś ca tulyābhe buddhī tenaikagocare / tattvena bahirartho 'sti na kaścic chabdagocaraḥ //* See also PVin II 21*,1–7 and for translation see Steinkellner [1979: 72–73].

[20] PV IV 125: *tasmād avastuniyatasaṅketabalabhāvinām / yogyāḥ padārthā dharmāṇām icchayānirodhanāt //*

[21] Even though Śubhagupta does not allude to *vivakṣā/vaktur icchā* in ŚPK, he seems to accept it, for instance in AVK 13 [P209a6/D197b4–5]: *sgra yi don gsal byed pa ni // rnam par rtog* [P *rtogs*] *pas sgro btags nyid // de nyid phyir na byed po rnams // brjod 'dod sgo nas 'jug par 'dod //*

[22] On *yogyatā*, see Tillemans [1997].

[23] PV IV 111: *tadāśrayabhuvām icchānurodhād aniṣedhinām / kṛtānām akṛtānāṃ ca yogyaṃ viśvaṃ svabhāvataḥ //*

refer to any word whatsoever, and vice versa.

Basically, one may say that for Dharmakīrti the hypothesis of a *svābhāvikaniyama* would contradict such empirical data as *vivakṣā* (= *niyame hetuḥ*), *saṅketa*, *śabdasya nānārthatā* and finally *yogyatā* itself. Dharmakīrti makes it very clear in PV I and PVin II: "Wenn (das Wort auf einen Gegenstand) seinem Wesen nach festgelegt ist, dann könnte (das Wort) wieder nicht durch die (Intention) mit einem anderen (Gegenstand) verbunden werden."[24] The empirical evidence of *vivakṣā* and *yatheṣṭaṃ pravṛttiḥ* thus seems to be the root for the rejection of a *svābhāvikaniyama*. Moreover, it should be remembered that for Dharmakīrti, the aim of conventions lies in revealing the speaker's intention (*vivakṣāprakāśanāya*, PVSV 172,22). Now such a *niyama* would contradict conventionality (*sāṅketikatva*) as well since the latter relies on *vivakṣā*.[25] This Dharmakīrti assumes in PVSV: "That which is conventional in character (*sāmayika*) cannot be essentially restricted since it refers to [man's] wishes [only]."[26] Moreover, conventions are manifold for each word since words are generally polysemic [*nānārtha-*; **nānāśaktimat-*, following PV I 324ab]. This leads to the important consequence that comes to light in PV I and PVin II: "Weil es (also) nicht unmöglich ist, daß ein Wort, das von selbst vielerlei Fähigkeiten hat (Gegenstände erkennen zu lassen), (sich auch) auf andere Weise [auf einen Gegenstand bezieht], muß sich für diejenigen, die ein festlegendes (Erkenntnismittel) nicht kennen, notwendig der Zweifel einstellen."[27] Thus it appears that, since it would contradict the empirical and irrefutable facts lying at the root of *yogyatā*, the hypothesis of a *svābhāvikaniyama* has to be rejected as absurd.

In ŚPK 12cd, Śubhagupta draws a concluding remark from ŚPK 12ab, that if there is no *niyama* because words by their very nature fit for referring to any conceptual object, one should then always suspect words to be used with reference to unintended objects as well. This statement seems to imply that a speaker can use words in such arbitrary ways that he may refer to a different object than the one in reference to which the listener would have wished to use them. One should however not overlook the actual context in which Dharmakīrti develops such notions as *yogyatā*. Of central importance for Mīmāṃsakas was the fact that Vedic words, through referring to their objects independently of any human agency, lead to *successful* ritual action. I hold this very close connection between the epistemic and the pragmatic levels in the Mīmāṃsā's understanding of Vedic words' reference to find its expression through the frequent: '*abhimatārtha*'. In the paradigmatic Vedic injunction: '*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*', it was felt crucial that the words: '*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt*' should *really* refer to the well-organized beginningless *agnihotra* as actually practised by Brahmins *in order to reach heaven*. Now Dharmakīrti and his direct commentators repeatedly argue that Vedic words may always refer to *anabhimatārtha* as well. With regard to the above example, Dharmakīrti intends to show that there is strictly no means of

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[24] PV I 328ab = PVin II 22*,33–34(= v. 50ab): *svabhāvaniyame 'nyatra na yojyeta tayā punaḥ /* Steinkellner's translation in Steinkellner [1979: 77]. See also PVSV 172,26–28 thereon, and PVSVṬ 606,29–31 = PVṬ P73b3–4: *na hi rūpaprakāśane svabhāvato niyataṃ cakṣuḥ śabdaprakāśane niyoktum śakyate / niyujyate yatheṣṭaṃ śabdaḥ / tasmān na svabhāvaniyataḥ /*

[25] PV IV 116ab: *saṅketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa cecchāmātrasaṃśrayaḥ /*

[26] PVSV 173,4–5: *yaś ca sāmayikaḥ sa svabhāvaniyato 'yuktas tasya icchāvṛtteḥ /*

[27] PV I 324≅PVin II 22*,17–20 (= v. 46): *anyathā 'saṃbhavābhāvān nānāśakteḥ svayaṃ dhvaneḥ / avaśyaṃ śaṅkayā bhāvyaṃ niyāmakam apaśyatām //* Steinkellner's translation in Steinkellner [1979: 76].

knowledge (*pramā*) allowing one to certify that this injunction's meaning could not be: *khādec chvamāṃsaṃ* [*svargakāmaḥ*] ("[One who desires heaven] should eat dog-meat!").[28] I would thus incline towards understanding the **aniṣṭa* of ŚPK 12c as at least implying this important polemical reference to *anabhimatārtha*.

> "[Objection:] [But] the contextual meaning (**prakaraṇārtha*), [i.e. the meaning of a treatise's subject-matter], is established. [Answer:] If [words] were to be [semantically] restricted to the [context, i.e. through the subject-matter of a treatise], also when an object is not established in it, [i.e. in the treatise], this [word] [could] not be [semantically] restricted in any other fashion, [i.e. other than by context]."[29] (ŚPK 13)[30]

I would understand the *pūrvapakṣa* as a whole as possibly reflecting some Vaiyākaraṇa ideas pertaining to the semantic determination of words and phrases. Bhartṛhari actually seems to have endowed *prakaraṇa* or context with a prominent function among the many factors responsible for the rise of meaning, i.e., he considered context in general to be one important factor in the process of understanding the specific meaning of an *indefinite term*.[31] While discussing the precise meaning of '*siddha*' as *nityaparyāyavācin*, i.e. synonymous with '*nitya*', in the first *Āhnika* (I 8) of his *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (MBhD), Bhartṛhari already referred twice[32] to the difficult notion of *arthaprakaraṇa*, 'meaning-context (in which the word is used)'. More interesting however seem to be *Vākyapadīya* (= VP) II 314–317. Among these four *kārikā*s, the last one, i.e. VP II 317,[33] deserves special mention here: 'Even if it is held that a word having many meanings is different in each case (*bhedapakṣe*), the external form being similar, confusion arises and it is with the help of context, etc., that definiteness in meaning is arrived at'. Bhartṛhari's thought in VP II 317 actually fits quite well with the immediate environment of the *pūrvapakṣa* in ŚPK.[34]

I consider it likely that Śubhagupta's *uttarapakṣa* (= ŚPK 13bd) at least formally follows Dharmakīrti's line of argument as it is found in his answer to an important *pūrvapakṣa* in the context of *anupalabdhihetu*. Dharmakīrti's argument moreover also resorts to the notion of '*prakaraṇa*'. In PV I 199, PVSV 102,1–8 and PVin II 16*,22–17*,2, Dharmakīrti faces the likely

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[28] See PV I 318 and PVSV 167,11–14 thereon.

[29] It seems however difficult to determine whether Tib. '*gzhan du*' metrically substitutes for '*rnam pa gzhan du*', i.e. Skt. '*anyathā*', 'otherwise', or has the value of '[*don*] *gzhan du*', i.e. Skt. '*anyatra* [*arthe*]', 'to another [object]'.

[30] ŚPK 13 [P208a8/D197a1/C189b1]: */ gal te skabs kyi don 'grub* [P *'grub* : CD *grub*] *na // gal te de la nges par 'gyur // de la don ni ma grub pa'ang // de ni gzhan du ma nges nyid /*

[31] Bhartṛhari lists several of these factors in VP II 314–316.

[32] MBhD I.viii.4/20,6–7: *yadā tv arthaprakaraṇādeḥ so 'rtho vibhajyate tadā evaśabdo na śrūyate ity avadhāraṇam ekapadam ity ucyate /* MBhD I.viii.5/20,27–28: *evam iha siddhaśabdo 'tyantasiddhaśabdānuniṣpādī yaḥ sa nirdiṣṭaḥ / yathā punas tatra arthaprakaraṇād iti /* For translation see Bronkhorst [1987: 74, 75].

[33] VP II 317: *bhedapakṣe 'pi sārūpyād bhinnārthāḥ pratipattṛṣu / niyatā yānty abhivyaktiṃ śabdāḥ prakaraṇādibhiḥ //* Iyer's translation in Iyer [1977: 135–138].

[34] Note also that in ŚPK 11c, the *pūrvapakṣin* considered the *śabdārtha*s to be *discriminated* through *śāstra*, to the effect that words were then *semantically restricted* (*niyata*) to *śāstrārtha*s. Now the Sanskrit equivalent for Tib. <*rnam phye*> is probably <*vivecita*>, a word whose meaning is indeed very close to Skt. <*vibhajyate*> and <*pravibhajyante*> that appear in MBhD I.viii.4/20,6–7 and VP II 314c, and which Karṇakagomin glossed through <*vibhakta*> (see note 14 above).

rhetorical[35] argument that it may be possible to establish non-existence (*asattā*, *abhāva*) through the mere non-functioning of the three means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇatrayanivṛtti*), or through non-perception defined as the non-operation of Scripture (*āgama*, *śāstra*),[36] direct perception and inference. In his answer, Dharmakīrti first proceeds to discuss the prerequisites for any object to be the subject-matter of an authoritative treatise (*śāstrādhikāra*). For such a treatise not just to consist in incoherent chattering (*abaddhapralāpa*) and for it to present epistemic validity (*prāmāṇya*), an object should be introduced (*pra√vṛt*) with reference to some means allowing men's expectations to be realized (*puruṣārthasādhanam upāyam*). Dharmakīrti then declares that in the present *prakaraṇa*, many objects have not been taken into account (*na *nirdiṣṭa/ *viṣayīkṛta*, <PVSV 102,5 and 8; **anupanibaddha*, <PVSV 107,18), such as idiosyncratic mental states (*pratyātmaniyatāḥ puruṣāṇāṃ cetovṛttayaḥ*, PVSV 102,5–6) or things which do not show any direct relevance to the *prakaraṇa* (*prakaraṇānupayogino dravyaviśeṣāḥ*, PVSV 102,7). Since many objects are irrelevant to such compositions, treatises fail to treat of them, so that their absence in treatises never allows one to conclude to their non-existence (*tatra na śāstranivṛttir abhāvasādhanī*, PVSV 102,1–2).

However, 'context (in general)' does not seem to be the precise meaning Dharmakīrti grants to '*prakaraṇa*' in the above-mentionned *loci*. The range of meaning of these two occurences of '*prakaraṇa*' [= PVSV 102,4 and 7] extends from 'treatise' (Steinkellner's 'Abhandlung') to 'topic (under consideration)'.[37] While glossing PVSV 102,4 '*tatra prakaraṇe*', Karṇakagomin [= PVSVṬ 372,26] says: '*tatra prakaraṇa iti puruṣārthacintāprastāve*'; Karṇakagomin [= PVSVṬ 389,20–21] reiterates that very gloss while commenting on PVSV 107,18 '*aprakaraṇāpannatvāt*'; lastly, Karṇakagomin [= PVSVṬ 372,30] explains PVSV 102,7 '*prakaraṇānupayoginaḥ*' as '*puruṣārthān-upayoginaḥ*'. One may also add that the meaning of '*prakaraṇa*' seems to be very close to the one of '*adhikāra*' in PV I 199a and PVSV 102,2, i.e. 'subject-matter'. I would then be inclined to interpreting '*prakaraṇa*', besides Steinkellner's 'Abhandlung', as 'topic under consideration (in a *śāstra*)', or 'subject-matter (of a *śāstra*)'.

My interpretation of ŚPK 13 is then the following: just as the mere non-occurence of an object in an authoritative treatise does not in itself establish its non-existence, so equally, many words will fail to have any object, i.e. will become entirely meaningless, if one wishes to restrict them semantically through the general contextual meaning of a treatise's discussion, because many objects fail to be treated there since they do not show any relevance to the treatise. And a word whose object does not happen to be considered as relevant for the subject-matter of a treatise, could not be semantically restricted in any other fashion.

> "[Objection:] [The objects of Vedic words] are established through ordinary (**loka*, **laukika*) speech. [Answer:] Because through differences of place, time, etc. (**deśakālādiviśeṣa*), the objects of ordinary words are many [in number], the [ordinary speech] too is thus [semantically] unrestricted." (ŚPK 14)[38]

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[35] See Steinkellner [1979: 62 n. 186].

[36] See Steinkellner [1979: 62 n. 187].

[37] Note that Yaiṭa [1985: 214] twice translates *prakaraṇa* as 'topic'. See also Yaita [1985: 204 n. 26].

[38] ŚPK 14 [P208b1/D197a1–2/C189b1]: */ gal te 'jig rten brjod las 'grub // yul dang dus sogs bye brag gis // 'jig*

The *pūrvapakṣa* appearing in ŚPK 14a finds very close Dharmakīrtian parallels, most notably in PV I 319a and PVin II 21*,18 = v. 38a. The Mīmāṃsaka position Dharmakīrti then tries to invalidate can be well documented from Jaimini's *Sūtras*[39] onwards. The central importance Mīmāṃsā attached to establishing a strict commensurability between *vaidikavacana* and *laukikavacana* can be clearly grasped through the lengthy discussions in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*[40] and Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* on it.[41] Such a commensurability actually ensures the Veda's meaningfulness and hence trustworthiness.

In PV I 319bd–322, Dharmakīrti directs many interesting arguments against this position. The most decisive one, however, is to be found in PV I and PVin II,[42] and it also forms the main part of Śubhagupta's answer to ŚPK 14a. Since words in ordinary speech are highly polysemic and thus generate doubts as to their actual objects, Vedic words cannot be semantically restricted through worldly linguistic usage. At this point, Śubhagupta's argument does not differ from the one he introduced in ŚPK 11ab. But Śubhagupta here links up (and explains) words' polysemy in common usage with (and through) both the historical and ethno-geographical conditioning of a word's reference.[43] So far I haven't found any such statement by Dharmakīrti concerning historical variations, but some clear allusions to ethno-geographical differences can be grasped from both PV I and PVin II.

Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin introduce PVSV 152,6–8 by two distinct *pūrvapakṣas*. According to Śākyabuddhi's version,[44] commonly established usage (**lokaprasiddhi*) only reveals a word's inherent capacity (**yathāvasthitaśakti*?) and insofar as Vedic words everywhere (**sarvatra*) have a unique nature (**ekarūpa*), their objects are everywhere true. Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follows: "One also observes that as they undergo changes (*parāvartyamāna*) [with regard to their objects] through worldly people's arbitrariness, words [may refer] differently at different [places]; thus even in conformity with commonly established usage, [Vedic words] may possibly be otherwise, [i.e. erroneous]." Dharmakīrti's thought in PVSV 152,6–8 finds a relevant example in a passage of PVin II:[45] "Unter den Wörtern *'kali, māri'* usw. versteht z.B. ein

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rten sgra don du ma'i phyir // des na de yang ma nges pa /

39 MS X.iii.44/VI, 335,19: *śabdārthaś ca api lokavat /* For translation see Clooney [1990: 133]. MS I.iii.30/II, 229,2: *prayogacodanābhāvād arthaikatvam avibhāgāt /* For translation see Clooney [1990: 133].

40 See for example ŚBh I.iii.30/II, 231,6–232,3: *ya eva laukikāḥ śabdās ta eva vaidikā 'sta eva eṣāṃ arthā iti / kutaḥ / prayogacodanābhāvāt / evaṃ prayogacodanā saṃbhavati yadi ta eva śabdās ta eva arthā itarathā śabdānyatve 'rtho na pratīyeta /* For translation see Biardeau [1964: 84]. See also Śabara's very *first* statement [ŚBh I.i.1/I, 1,6–2,2]: *loke yeṣv artheṣu prasiddhāni padāni sati saṃbhave tadarthāny eva sūtreṣv iti avagantavyaṃ na adhyāhārādibhir eṣāṃ parikalpanīyo 'rthaḥ paribhāṣitavyo vā /* For translation see Clooney [1990: 132].

41 See TV I.iii.30/II, 234,1–2: *tasmāl lokavedayor abhinnāḥ śabdārthā iti siddhe* . . . ; see also TV I.iii.30/II, 243,3.

42 PV I 323–324 = PVin II 22*,5–8 and 17–20 = vv. 43 and 46: *utpāditā prasiddhyaiva śaṅkā śabdārthaniścaye / yasmān nānārthavṛttitvaṃ śabdānāṃ tatra dṛśyate // anyathā 'saṃbhavābhāvān nānāśakteḥ svayaṃ dhvaneḥ / avaśyaṃ śaṅkayā bhāvyaṃ niyāmakam apaśyatām //* For translation see Steinkellner [1979: 75–76].

43 Śubhagupta's very *kārikā* can be paralleled with Prajñākaragupta's *kārikā* IV 186, which forms part of PVA on PV IV 113: *deśakālādibhedena nānābhūtārthadarśanam / na cāpi deśakālādivyāpyartheha niścayaḥ //* The Tibetan version of this passage is located at P The 215a5–6.

44 See PVṬ P Nye 11b1–3, and compare it to PVSVṬ 541,20–21.

45 PVSV 152,6–8: *lokecchayā api parāvartyamānāḥ śabdāḥ punar anyatra anyathā dṛśyanta iti lokaprasiddhy-*

Dravide (*'gro lding ba*, **dramiḍa*) 'Trunkenheit' und 'Regenfall', und ein Mann aus Madhyadeśa 'eine bestimmte Ära' und 'Töten'."[46] According to his commentators, what Dharmakīrti wants to stress in PVSV 152,6–8 is that *lokaprasiddhi*, since it undergoes changes through ethno-geographical variations, has no more semantical fixedness than the Vedic words it is expected to restrict semantically. As Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin respectively put it, Vedic statements may then also be erroneous "since there is no constancy (**vyavasthiti*?) in common usage,"[47] or "since common usage itself is not [semantically] restricted."[48] This clearly coincides with Śubhagupta's ŚPK 14d.

> "[Question:] Doesn't the understanding (*blo gros* = **mati*?) of an object (*arthe*) arise by way of an expressive word (**vācakaśabda*)? [Answer:] True, [but] [you] should [now] proceed to examine as to how this [cognition] itself arises. [ŚPK 15] Does it [arise] because the [expressive] word [inherently] fits (**yogya*) [for referring], or rather on the basis of a convention (**samayam āśritya*)? If [there were] an [inherent] fitness (**yogyatve*), conventions [would become] useless (**nirartha*, **anartha*, etc.), [and] there would be no doubt (*saṃśaya*) as to any [word's object] [anymore]." (ŚPK 16)[49]

It should be remembered here that both Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa (of Bhartṛharian orientation at least) hold the *śabdārthasaṃbandha* to be, to put it in a schematic way, of a natural, substantial and permanent character. Now Bhartṛhari as well as Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara, admit of this relation's having to be learnt in childhood through *vṛddhavyavahāra*.[50] They thus accept that conventions in some way 'reveal' the word's natural semantic fitness (*yogyatā*) or expressive efficiency (*vācakaśakti/sāmarthya*). In other words, they seem to accept both some kind of *svābhāvikasaṃbandha* and a body of conventions (*saṅketa, samaya*).

In ŚPK 16ab, Śubhagupta reformulates this seemingly redundant position into an alternative: the opponent should now answer which of *yogyatā* or *saṅketa/samaya* best accounts for the rise of the cognition. Along the lines of Dharmakīrti's PV I 227cd+PVSV 113,14–16 and PV I 328c+PVSV 172,27–173,4, Śubhagupta reiterates in ŚPK 16c the criticism he urged in ŚPK 2d: if *yogyatā* were to be accepted, conventions would then become entirely useless.[51] In the very

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anuvidhāne 'pi saṃbhavaty eṣām anyathābhāvaḥ /

46 PVin II 20*,31–21*,1: *ka li dang ma ri zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i sgra dag la 'gro lding ba dang yul dbus pa dag gis bsnyo ba dang dus kyi khyad par kyi dang char 'bab la dang gsod pa la sogs pa dag tu rtogs pa bzhin no //* Translation in Steinkellner [1979: 72].

47 PVṬ P Nye 11b5: *grags pa nyid du rnam par gnas pa nyid med pa'i phyir ro //*

48 PVSVṬ 541,25: *prasiddher eva aniyatatvāt /*

49 ŚPK 15–16 [P208b1–2/D197a2–3/C189b2]: */ sgra brjod pa'i sgo nas ni // don la blo gros skye min nam // bden te de nyid ji lta bur // skye snyam de la bsam pa 'jug // ci de sgra de rung phyir ram // 'on te brda la brten pa las // rung ba nyid na brda don med // 'ga' la'ang the tshom mi 'gyur ro /*

50 VP III.iii.31cd: *samayād yogyatāsaṃvin mātāputrādiyogavat //* In ŚV, Saṃbandhākṣepa, vv. 38–44, Kumārila clearly distinguishes the *cause* and the *process* of verbal understanding. Whereas its cause is the word's *śakti*, the process consists of *vṛddhavyavahāra*, and it is subsidiary (*aṅgatva*) to the first. Classical seems to be the example of the eye, which is intrinsically fit for grasping jars, etc., but however stands in need of light in order to operate. See also Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* 191,3: *vṛddhavyavahārapūrvakatvād saṃbandhajñānasya*, as well as 27,4–5: *śabdārthasaṃbandhasya lokavyavahāragamyatvāt.*

51 ŚPK 2d [P208a1/D196b3/C189a3]: */ de lta yin na brda don med /*

beginning of our treatise, Śubhagupta also directed a second criticism against this very point. Following again a strictly Dharmakīrtian line of argument,[52] Śubhagupta stressed that if words were inherently fit to refer to particular objects, the cognition of the object should occur even to the mind of people who are not familiar with conventions.[53]

But to accept *yogyatā* rather than conventions raises another problem [= ŚPK 16cd]. In ŚPK 12cd, Śubhagupta emphasized that one should always suspect a word to be used even with regard to unintended objects, whereas in ŚPK 14, he stressed that in everyday linguistic usage, the absence of any *niyama* renders words polysemic and hence raises doubts as to their actual objects.[54] Now if words were inherently fit to refer to one specific object, i.e. if words were semantically restricted (*niyata*) to their proper objects through *yogyatā*, there wouldn't be any doubt whatsoever as to their respective objects since polysemy would thus be ruled out, which obviously contradicts empirical evidence.

> "[On the contrary, since] conventions depend on human beings [and since you admit that] human beings are always [morally] faulty (**doṣavat*), there is [strictly] no point in wondering: 'Has this convention been attached to a suitable (**yukta*) [object], or to another (**anyatra*) [object], [i.e. to an unsuitable object]?'" (ŚPK 17)[55]

The philosophical aim of Śabara's strong insistence on *apauruṣeyatā* and of his concomitant denial of *samaya/saṅketa* was of course to rule out human beings' moral corruption he held responsible for the frequent (but by no way constant) erroneousness of human statements, and thence to establish *vedaprāmāṇya* through *saṃbandhāpauruṣeyatā*.[56] However, since ŚPK 16cd rejected the inherent semantical fitness of words, both because it would reveal itself to be internally inconsistent with the Mīmāṃsā's acceptance of conventions and because it would contradict the empirical datum (*dṛṣṭavirodha*) of doubt, the Mīmāṃsaka now is compelled to accept that the understanding of the object arises from a mere conventional connection between words and objects.

Except for one important point, Śubhagupta's argument in ŚPK 17cd clearly joins up with Dharmakīrti's criticism in PV I 224–226+PVSV. In PVSV on PV I 225, besides arguing that *apauruṣeya* statements would be either meaningless (*ānarthakya*) or wrong (*mithyārtha*) if human beings, on whom alone any occurence of truth (*satyārthatā*) depends according to Dharmakīrti, should be ruled out (*ni√vṛt*), Dharmakīrti also strongly emphasizes, in PVSV 112,19–27, that words have no naturally given objects (*na prakṛtyarthavantaḥ*), and that the cognition of an object (*arthakhyāti*) on the basis of words is due to conventions alone. Naturally objectless words

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[52] See PV I 227ab+PVSV 113,9–12; see also TS(P) XIXa 1505cd–1507ab.

[53] ŚPK 3ab [P208a1–2/D196b3/C189a3]: */ sgra yi bdag nyid ma bzung yang // don gsal byed par 'gyur zhes te /*

[54] See PVin II 20*, 4–21*,1 and for translation see Steinkellner [1979: 72]; see also PV I 324≌PVin II 22*,17–20(= v. 46) quoted above, note 27.

[55] ŚPK 17 [P208b2–3/D197a3/C189b2–3]: */ brda ni mi la rag lus yin* [CDP *min* : corrected to *yin*] *// mi rnams rtag tu nyes dang bcas // ci brda 'di rigs la btags* [P *btags* : CD *brtags*] *sam // gzhan du yin snyam nges pa med /*

[56] See for example ŚBh I.i.5/I, 66,1–2: *tasmāt kāraṇād avagacchāmo·na kṛtvā saṃbandhaṃ vyavahārārthaṃ kenacid vedāḥ praṇītā iti /*

therefore only become related to objects through human conventionalization (*puruṣasaṃskārāt*).[57] Convention then is the only cause of an object's cognition (*arthajñānahetu*). In PV I 226+PVSV 113,4–5, Dharmakīrti relates these observations to the Mīmāṃsaka position as it is depicted in PV I 224+PVSV 112,10–12: since human beings are the basis of error and since conventions, which are the only causes of the cognition, depend on human beings, the cognitions derived from Vedic statements may then also be erroneous (*mithyātvasaṃbhava*), even if these statements should be non-human in character (*girām apauruṣeyatve 'pi*).

But while Dharmakīrti ascribes to the Mīmāṃsā the idea that men *may be* morally faulty, with the effect that their statements may also be erroneous, Śubhagupta ascribes to his opponent the much more radical assumption that men are *essentially* corrupted, so that the conventions they establish *must be* unreliable. Dharmakīrti's (but also Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's) depiction of the Mīmāṃsaka position on *doṣa* and *prāmāṇya* actually seems to better correspond with the ideas to be found in both Śabara and Kumārila.[58] It seems indeed very likely that Śubhagupta's radical approach was mainly intended to give soundness and conciseness to his argument.

It should be emphasized, however, that Śubhagupta's discussion seems to bear upon Mīmāṃsaka ideas as to *śruti*, 'revealed permanent word'. As the above quoted remarks of Śabara make it clear, two criteria at least should be satisfied in order to ascertain a human statement's epistemic validity, i.e. it should be *indriyaviṣaya* and *pratyayitāt puruṣāt*. Now (1) since the proper object of Vedic injunctions clearly resorts to *adṛṣṭa* and hence is *anindriyaviṣaya/apratyakṣa*, and (2) since, in sharp contradistinction to Naiyāyikas, Buddhists and Jainas, Mīmāṃsā vehemently rejects any *atīndriyadṛkpuruṣa*, none of the demands of *pramāṇatā* can be fulfilled. As regards Dharma, human statements cannot claim any epistemic validity.[59] Moreover, as Śabara and Kumārila also stress, these very statements' reliability can be neither verified nor nullified.[60] In this respect, therefore, Śubhagupta seems to be justified while saying that for his opponent,

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[57] PVSVṬ 408,8–9 = PVṬ P303a5: *puruṣasaṃskārāt puruṣasaṅketād arthavantaḥ /*

[58] Although they both reject any cognitive access to *adṛṣṭa* but Vedic injunction (*codanā*) and hence deny any human statement's *prāmāṇya* as to Dharma, Śabara and Kumārila appear to be much less categorical in what pertains to *laukikavacanaprāmāṇya*. Śabara for example clearly states that if *laukikavacana* originates from a competent person (*pratyāyitāt puruṣāt*) or ultimately pertains to sensory objects (*indriyaviṣaya*), it is non-erroneous (*avitatha*). If not, as it would be rooted in human fancy (*puruṣabuddhiprabhava*) alone, *laukikavacana* would be *apramāṇa* (ŚBh I.i.2/I, 17,5–7: *yat tu laukikaṃ vacanaṃ tac cet pratyayitāt puruṣād indriyaviṣayaṃ vā avitatham eva tat / atha apratyayitād anindriyaviṣayaṃ vā tāvat puruṣabuddhiprabhavam apramāṇam / aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt /* For translation see Biardeau [1964: 77–78]). As for Kumārila, he seems to admit the possibility of *āptatva* in the proper sphere of *laukikavacana* (BṬ(?) in TS 2895: *ato yad anapekṣatvād vede prāmāṇyam ucyate / tad āptena praṇīte 'pi sutarāṃ sidhyati svataḥ //* For translation see D'sa [1980: 189]); however, Kumārila says, a human statement's epistemic validity is always doubtful (BṬ(?) in TS 2894ab: *tu śaṅkyate doṣāḥ santi na santīti pauruṣeye /* For translation see D'sa [1980: 189]). One then obviously concludes Śubhagupta to be less fair than Dharmakīrti in ascribing to Mīmāṃsā the idea of a systematic corruption and untrustworthiness of human beings.

[59] See for instance ŚBh I.i.2/I, 18,2–3: *na evaṃjātīyakeṣv artheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyam upaiti jātyandhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣu /* But see TV on I.iii.1–29: statements like those of Manu have epistemic validity to the extent that they are *vedamūla*, rooted in the Veda. It should be reminded that this Mīmāṃsaka position often implies the acceptance of lost Vedic texts.

[60] See Biardeau [1964: 71–72 and 79–80], and D'sa [1980: 59–60].

most probably a Mīmāṃsaka, there would be no point in wondering whether such and such human conventions were ascribed to a suitable or to an unsuitable (supra-sensory) object.

> "Even if [their] intrinsic nature (*svarūpa) were fit [to refer to restricted objects], [the Vedic words/statements'] falsity (*vaitathya?) [would] not [be] ruled out, [since Vedic words/statements may also produce erroneous cognitions], just as a lamp, [at night], reveals a blue lotus (*nīlotpala) as [being] red." (ŚPK 18)[61]

ŚPK 18 may be easily traced back to Dharmakīrti's PV I 284+PVSV, and paralleled with Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's TS(P) 2403–2404. As is made clear in PV I 224 and its commentary, Vedic statements' *apauruṣeyatā/nityatā* serves as a *hetu* towards establishing *vedaprāmāṇya*. But one actually has to wait further until PV I 269+PVSV to see Dharmakīrti directly criticise *nityatā* in that particular context, through the so-called *vināśitvānumāna*. Though this inference contextually first aims at invalidating *śabdanityatā*, Dharmakīrti makes it quite clear, in PV I 283ab+PVSV, that this proof *ipso facto* refutes *saṃbandhanityatā* too or, as Dharmakīrti puts it, the *śabdaśaktir yogyatākhyā* he expressly ascribes to the Jaiminīyas. One may then assume with Dharmakīrti himself that through the many criticisms directed to its logical reason (i.e. *apauruṣeyatā*), an unconditioned *vedaprāmāṇya* should be abandoned in its turn.

However, Dharmakīrti then (i.e. in PV I 284+PVSV 150,11–25) tries to show that, even though one would accept *vedāpauruṣeyatā*, the Vedic statements' epistemic validity would not necessarily derive from it. According to PV I 284, Vedic statements' mere (*eva*) *apauruṣayatā* does not in itself constitute the cause of a true cognition (*yathārthajñānasādhana*), for one may easily observe that fire (*vahni*), lamps (*pradīpa*, PVSV 150,16) or moonlight (*jyotsnā*, PVSVṬ 536,19 = PVṬ P6b7), though they remain uncorrupted (*aduṣṭa*) by human vices (*puruṣāgas*) and are *apauruṣeya* as to their actual functioning at least, *may also be* the causes of erroneous cognitions (*ayathārthajñānahetu*, PVSV 150,15), since when they shine, at night, blue lotuses (*nīlotpala*, PVSV 150,16–17) appear as red. Just as fire, lamps and moonlight, then, Vedic statements may actually provide one either with true or wrong cognitions: for, during the day (*divā*, PVSVṬ 537,19 = PVṬ P7b5–6), fire, lamps and moonlight generate the true cognition of a pot, whereas at night (*rātrau*, PVSVṬ 537,19 = PVṬ P7b6), they generate the false (*vitatha*), i.e. red, cognition of a blue lotus. In that very sense, the Vedic statements' *apauruṣeyatā/nityatā* cannot be claimed to constitute a satisfactory criterion for *prāmāṇya* and *āgamatā*.

> "If [Vedic words] express (*bzla*?)[62] what is commonly acknowledged in the world (*lokaprasiddha), why don't [you] accept [that], just as some [ordinary] words [which are] expressive of different objects [in common usage] [nevertheless] lead to [the actual] understanding [of an object], [it may be] likewise in the case of [Vedic words] as well?" (ŚPK 19)[63]

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[61] ŚPK 18 [P208a3–4/D197a3–4/C189b3]: */ rang gi ngo bo rung na yang // log pa nyid ni zlog pa med // 'di ltar u tpal sngon po la // mar mes* [CD *mes* : P *me*] *dmar por gsal bar byed /*

[62] I do not read Tib. '*bzla*' in its common meaning as 'to repeat', 'to recite', which does not make much sense in that context. See Jäschke's *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, s.v. *zla ba*.

[63] ŚPK 19 [P208b4/D197a4/C189b3–4]: */ 'jig rten grags pa bzla na ni // don gzhan brjod pa'i sgra 'ga' zhig // yongs su rtog par byed pa ltar // de bzhin 'dir yang cis mi 'dod /*

ŚPK ends up on the somewhat abrupt and rhetorical v. 19 in which, just like Dharmakīrti in PV, Śubhagupta does not aim at disqualifying the Vedic revelation itself for *prāmāṇya* or *āgamatā*. Rather, after having duly criticised all the arguments and linguistic theories supposed to lend support to an *apauruṣeyatā/nityatā* account of the Vedic lore's truthfulness, Śubhagupta finally urges his opponent to accept that the Scriptures he holds as authoritative cannot claim any particular ontological or epistemological status. Since all attempts at substantiating *svābhāvikaniyama* through *saṃbandhāpauruṣeyatā* have been thoroughly dismissed, the opponent will have to accept (1) that Vedic words cannot be but polysemic, and (2) that their semantical determination can only resort to human being's intentionality and conventions. Their reliability thus will have to be submitted to the same evaluative criteria as any other human statement.

Abbreviations and Literature

AJP *Anekāntajayapatākā* and *Svopajñavyākhyā* (Haribhadra Sūri): H. R. Kāpadīā, ed. *Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri, with his own commentary and Municandra Sūri's supercommentary.* Vol. 1. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 88, 105. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1940.

AJPsvop *Anekāntajayapatākāsvopajñavyākhyā* (Haribhadra Sūri): See AJP.

AVK *Anyāpohavicārakārikā* (Śubhagupta).

BASK *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (Śubhagupta).

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Bṛhatī *Bṛhatī* (Prabhākara): A. Chinnaswami Sastri, ed. *Bṛhati by Prabhakara Misra with the commentary the Ṛjuvimala of Salikanatha Misra.* Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series 391. Benares, 1929.

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MBhD *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (Bhartṛhari): See Bronkhorst [1987].

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MS *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (Jaimini): See ŚBh.

PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti).

PV I Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.

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PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

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TWO CIRCLES OR PARALLEL LINES?*

by

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The opinion that Dharmakīrti's reflections on the authority of the Buddha in the *Pramāṇavārttika* involve a logical loop, a vicious circle, or even a benign circle, has been asserted several times by renowned Dharmakīrti scholars such as Tilmann Vetter, Masatoshi Nagatomi, Ernst Steinkellner and Richard Hayes. According to the first three scholars named the circle consists in the fact that perception and inference legitimate the authority of the Buddha, and that the authority of the Buddha, in its turn, legitimates the validity of perception and inference. This circularity was asserted for the first time, I believe, in Vetter's pioneering study *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*. Thus, Vetter says: "Er gilt als Erkenntnismittel, weil seine Autorität die Maßgeblichkeit von Wahrnehmung und Schlußfolgerung legitimiert. Denn der Buddha gibt Ziel und Anweisungen des Handelns, welche unsere Wahrnehmung und Schlußfolgerung nicht geben könnten, und auf welche nur eine flache Aufklärung verzichten würde. Daß er hierfür Autorität ist, muß erst bewiesen werden. Denn bloß auf Treu und Glauben ist man nicht Buddhist. Das ergibt einen historisch-sachlichen Zirkel, dem Dharmakīrti mit Recht nicht aus dem Weg gegangen ist."[1]

Steinkellner translates this passage as follows:[2] "He [the Buddha] is considered as a means of valid cognition, because his authority legitimates the authenticity[3] of perception and infer-

* As usual I am indebted to my best reader, Priv.-Doz. Dr. K. Preisendanz, for reading this paper with her usual thoroughness and improving it with her thoughtful comments.

[1] Cf. T. Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti* (Wien, 1964), p. 27.

[2] Cf. E. Steinkellner, "The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism," *Nanto Bukkyō* 49 (1982): 13.

[3] Steinkellner claims to give only "the gist of Vetter's explanation," but this does not seem to be the case. Even if one disregards the question whether Vetter's "Massgeblichkeit" should be rendered as "authenticity" rather than "validity," they do not seem to describe the same circle. According to Steinkellner ("Spiritual Place," p. 11) the circle consists of three elements: *pramāṇa*, *avisaṃvādana* and the Buddha's authority, which has to be justified in its turn by *pramāṇa*: "The structural scheme of these ideas of Dharmakīrti turns out to be a true circle: The decisive defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is the demand that it must stand the test of **meaningful** [my emphasis] practice (*avisaṃvādana*), and [this decisive characteristic?] connects it [*pramāṇa*?] with the Buddha as the one on whose authority one knows what meaningful practice is. The reciprocity then is brought about by the need to prove this authority of the Buddha."

More important, however, is the difference between Vetter's and Steinkellner's ideas concerning the extent of the Buddha's legitimation of perception and inference. According to Vetter, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 32, the Buddha legitimates only those perceptions and inferences that operate on areas that are beyond the normal realm of perception and inference; cf. the reason above ("For the Buddha gives a goal and guidance for action, which perception and inference cannot give"), as well as p. 32, referring to PV Pramāṇasiddhi 1ab: "Erkenntnismittel ist Wissen, das sich in (wir können ergänzen: **auf die Erlösung gerichtetem**)[my emphasis] Handeln bewährt." According to Steinkellner,

ence. For the Buddha gives a goal and guidance for action, which perception and inference cannot give, and which would be disposed of only by a superficial rationality (flache Aufklärung, lit.: shallow enlightenment). That he is an authority on this has yet to be proven. For nobody is a Buddhist simply on trust. This results in a historical-factual circle, which Dharmakīrti has rightly not avoided."

Even though Nagatomi also discerns circularity in Dharmakīrti's reasoning, his position is different from Vetter's. Unlike Vetter who maintains that "nobody is a Buddhist simply on trust" Nagatomi perceives the faith in the words of the Buddha to be decisive: "We must note, however, that the final authority by which they [viz. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] claim the validity of their *pramāṇa* system was none other than the Buddha's words which they accepted as authentic by faith. Thus, the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system and the authenticity of the Buddha's words stood, in reality, in a reciprocal relation: the structuring of the former was done within the limits of the latter, and the latter was meant to be supported by the former."[4]

What I find surprising about these statements is that their authors have not taken the trouble to point out to their readers the textual basis on which their interpretations rest. It is as though we were reading a crime story in which the scene of the crime is never mentioned. And one can well understand the puzzlement of Tom Tillemans when he says: "Frankly, I must confess that I fundamentally do not understand what is meant when Prof. Vetter says that '[the Buddha's] authority legitimates the authenticity of perception and inference'."[5] Tillemans then suggests that (p. 24) "Steinkellner, in his 1983 article [i.e., "*Tshad ma'i skyes bu*: The meaning and historical significance of the term"], may have given us some clues as to what is being meant. In his article the Buddha was characterized as 'the final source and judge of any validity and usefulness in any kind of cognition' (1983, p. 276)."

In my opinion, however, this is not what Vetter (or Nagatomi) had in mind when claiming that the Buddha is the ultimate source for the validity of the other *pramāṇa*s. I am not, of course, able to read the minds of Vetter or Nagatomi. Nevertheless, being relatively well acquainted with the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter to which both scholars refer, I think that there is only one passage they could have had in mind. The crucial statement occurs in verse 283a–c according to Vetter's enumeration[6] [= PV 283cd–284]:

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on the other hand, the Buddha legitimates all valid cognitions, not only those that are soteriologically relevant. Thus, Steinkellner and Vetter describe two different circles. Furthermore, in the discussion that followed the presentation of this paper Steinkellner kindly informed us that the circle he described is not based on the interpretation of any specific verse, but is due to meta-textual reflections. In this respect too the two circles differ. Nevertheless, I will not discuss Steinkellner's circle here because I do not know what could substantiate or refute such a hypothesis. As far as I can see, Steinkellner does not adduce any evidence to support his hypothesis; lack of textual evidence, on the other hand, would presumably not refute such meta-textual considerations. I fail to see why, according to Dharmakīrti, e.g., a cognition of water by means of perception or of fire by means of inference derives its validity from the Buddha's authority. Furthermore, how would one ever be able to ascertain whether such cognitions are true or false?

[4] Cf. M. Nagatomi, "*Mānasa-pratyakṣa*: A Conundrum in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* System," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls*, ed. M. Nagatomi *et al.* (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1980), p. 246.

[5] Cf. T. J. F. Tillemans, *Persons of Authority*, Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 5 (Stuttgart, 1993), p. 22.

[6] Cf. T. Vetter, *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika*, WSTB 12 (Wien, 1990[2]).

upadeśatathābhāvastutis tadupadeśataḥ /
pramāṇatattvasiddhyartham . . . //
"The praise [of the Buddha] by means of the teaching being so (i.e., being valid or non-deceptive) [is uttered by Dignāga] in order to establish the true characteristics (Vetter: Wahrheit) of the means of knowledge from his teachings."

As is often the case with Dharmakīrti's statements, this statement is obviously open to several interpretations. Indeed, its interpretations by Vetter and Nagatomi can be accommodated within the wording. Yet, at least three questions should have been raised by them before arriving at their conclusion that the verse implies circularity or reciprocity. First, does this interpretation fit within the immediate context of the verse? Second, was the verse interpreted in this manner by any of Dharmakīrti's commentators, and if not, why is the traditional interpretation to be rejected? Third, does Dharmakīrti actually attempt to establish the validity of perception and inference by relying on the authority of the Buddha?

As a matter of fact, the immediate context of the verse does not support Vetter's and Nagatomi's interpretation because Dharmakīrti argues here and in the following two verses that the Buddha *used* perception and inference, not that they are valid because of him. Nor does the commentators' interpretation support Vetter's or Nagatomi's hypotheses, for none of Dharmakīrti's commentators detects here the circularity perceived by Vetter or the reciprocity claimed by Nagatomi.

Vetter's interpretation of the verse (*Erkenntnisprobleme*, p. 33) is bewildering and differs radically from that of all the commentators. All the commentators interpret the praise as referring to the praise of the Buddha in Dignāga's *maṅgalaśloka.* Vetter, however, claims that the praise is directed at the teaching and is constituted by the section on the four noble truths in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter: "Das Sosein der Lehre wurde deswegen gepriesen—das heißt: die ganze Beschreibung der buddhistischen Erlösungslehre wurde deshalb unternommen—, um aus seiner Lehre die Wahrheit über die Erkenntnismittel zu erweisen." Vetter is perhaps led to this interpretation because he interprets the compound *tathābhāvastuti* as a genitive (rather than instrumental) *tatpuruṣa.* Consequently, the fact that Dignāga praises the Buddha and Dharmakīrti praises his teachings may have led Vetter to dissociate the two statements. In my opinion, however, Dharmakīrti's shift from considering the teacher as *pramāṇa* to considering his teachings as *pramāṇa* is trivial and therefore needs no further justification; this shift is obviously conditioned by the present context, because the characteristics of *pramāṇa* are not derived from the person, but from his teachings. Even if the traditional interpretation by the commentators is slightly problematic, Vetter's own interpretation, inasmuch as it lacks any justification or substantiation, remains unconvincing. In *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika* (p. 172), however, Vetter has tacitly changed his interpretation: "[Dignāga] preist [im Einleitungsvers zum Pramāṇasamuccaya] [den Erhabenen] mittels des Soseins [d.h. Erkenntnismittelseins] seines Lehrens, . . ." The translation is not accompanied by any comments, but according to the introduction (p. 16) Vetter does not seem to have changed his mind about the circularity in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter because he speaks of "Beweiszirkel" and maintains that one can rely on perception and inference because the authority (i.e., the Buddha) used them.

The commentatorial explanation of this and the following verses[7] is simple, and it agrees with a natural reading of the verse which appears immediately after the conclusion that the Buddha is a means of knowledge, and which forms, so to say, the conclusion of the whole chapter. After the Buddha has been proven to be a means of knowledge, the question arises as to why Dignāga chose to praise the Buddha precisely with the epithet *pramāṇabhūta* because there are many epithets to choose from. The answer indicates that we have to understand this crucial verse within the context of the self-understanding of the *pramāṇa* school within the Buddhist tradition, that is, as clarifying the school's relation to the teachings of the Buddha. Dignāga praises the Buddha as a means of knowledge, which amounts to praising him because his teachings are valid. If his teachings are valid, we can establish from them the true characteristics of the means of knowledge because perception and inference are used in the Buddha's teachings, as shown in the last two verses. The framework in which these statements are made is clearly apologetic, as Dharmakīrti aims at anchoring his own epistemology in the original message of the Buddha. Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, Dignāga praises the Buddha for being a teacher not only in religious matters, but also in matters of epistemology. These apologetics, however, are to be distinguished from the actual procedure by which Dharmakīrti reaches the conclusion that the Buddha is a means of knowledge. Even if the usage of perception and inference has been observed in the Buddha's teachings and serves as a model for establishing their true characteristics, one can test and independently use them to establish, among other things, the validity of the Buddha's teachings, and from it the authority of the Buddha himself. Perception and inference within this context are certainly not established from the outset just because of the Buddha's authority. Nevertheless, one is justified to claim later on, in an apologetic context, that the means which have proved so successful were already discovered by the Buddha and taught in his teachings.

Moreover, even before Dharmakīrti's time Dignāga's logic was attacked for being a heterodox or "external" science that has its source in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda. We know of several attempts to somehow anchor this new science in the Buddha's word in order to provide it with legitimacy. Uwe Frankenhauser reports one such attempt (at the beginning of Kuiji*'s Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu*) which bears a remarkable similarity to Dharmakīrti's endeavour: even though there is no *sūtra* that deals directly with *yin ming*, the method of argumentation was used by the Buddha.[8] An interesting attempt to legitimate Dignāga's logic without depriving it of its heterodox origins is found in Hōtan's *Zuigenki* 1/2b–3a: The *yin ming lun* existed since beginningless time. The Ṛṣi Akṣapāda proclaimed it at the beginning of the *kalpa*. Later on, when the Buddha appeared in the world, he considered it as the basis of his transformation.[9]

The answer to the third question has already been given by Tillemans: Dharmakīrti never attempts to establish the validity of perception and inference by appealing to the authority of the

[7] The four direct commentaries on this verse are quoted below.

[8] Cf. U. Frankenhauser, *Die Einführung der buddhistischen Logik in China.* Wiesbaden 1996, pp. 137–138.

[9] Cf. the translation in Frankenhauser, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

Buddha, neither in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, nor in any of his other works.[10] One has to conclude, therefore, that the assertions by Vetter and Nagatomi are based on nothing but the doubtful interpretation of a single verse.

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Another kind of circularity in Dharmakīrti's exposition in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter was suggested by Richard Hayes in his paper "The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists."[11] The paper examines the stance of the Buddhist epistemologists Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita on *āgama*, namely, whether they take the body of canonical writings as a source of knowledge and whether the Buddhist logicians should be characterized "as champions of reason or rather as champions of dogma" (p. 646). In other words, Hayes raises the question whether in developing their principles the Buddhist epistemologists were decisively influenced by their partisanship to canonical doctrines.

According to Hayes (p. 661), Dharmakīrti must address the following two questions in order to establish that the Buddha was a credible person: 1) How do we know that the Buddha was in possession of the truth? 2) How do we know that the Buddha did not lie to us? Hayes claims that "[i]n dealing with the first of these questions, Dharmakīrti falls into the familiar trap of circularity. We can be certain that the Buddha was in full possession of the truth, says Dharmakīrti, because it was the Buddha who taught us the four noble truths and the eightfold path to salvation. In other words, we know that the Buddha is trustworthy because it was he who taught us all the things that we Buddhists believe. The vicious circularity of Dharmakīrti's argument is disguised somewhat by the fact that it takes him some two hundred couplets to make the circle, but it is undeniable that he does eventually end up in a logical loop on this first question."

Now, strictly speaking, there is no circularity in what Hayes describes. However, if I understand what he meant to say rather than what he actually said, then he claims that, according to Dharmakīrti, the Buddha is considered to be trustworthy because he taught us the four noble truths, etc., which we consider to be true; and we consider the four noble truths, etc., to be true because the Buddha, who is trustworthy, taught them to us. However, just like Vetter and Nagatomi, Hayes fails to provide a single reference as to where Dharmakīrti says that "we" believe in the four noble truths, etc., just because the Buddha taught them to "us." And I submit that no such passage can be found in Dharmakīrti's writings. However, contrary to the circularity claimed by Vetter and Nagatomi, the circularity alleged by Hayes is not due to the misinterpretation of a single verse or even a group of verses, but to a misunderstanding of the structure and proof strategy of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter.

This misunderstanding is also seen in Hayes's answer to the second question, namely, how we know that the Buddha did not lie to us. Here again Hayes asserts a vicious circle: "... for Dharmakīrti begins by trying to show that the Buddhist doctrine is justifiable, because it was taught by a trustworthy authority. But in showing that the Buddha was trustworthy, Dharmakīrti

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[10] Cf. Tillemans, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[11] Cf. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* LII/4 (1984): 645–670.

ends up appealing to information about the Buddha's career through several rebirths. But the only source of information about the Buddha's career is the very body of scriptures the authority of which Dharmakīrti is trying to defend" (p. 662).

Now, it is wrong or at least highly misleading to say that Dharmakīrti appeals to information about the Buddha's career through several rebirths. Hayes is surely referring to the Buddha's compassion, but the Buddha's compassion is inferred (indirectly) from his teaching of the four noble truths, and not known from any canonical information about his past lives. Thus, as far as I can see, the circularities observed by Hayes have no foundation in Dharmakīrti's text. In a way it can be said that Dharmakīrti's reasoning moves from the teaching to the teacher and back to the teaching, but this does not involve a vicious circle. In fact, it does not involve a circle at all, because Dharmakīrti does not understand the Buddha's teaching to be a single whole. For him the teaching has a main or essential part (*pradhāna*) and a secondary or subordinate part. The main part, which consists of the four noble truths, is established independently of the authority of the Buddha by means of perception and inference. However, the Buddha's teaching has also a secondary part that cannot be established by means of perception and inference. The truthfulness of this part is inferred indirectly from the exceptional qualities of the Buddha. Thus, Dharmakīrti demonstrates a five-step inference from the Buddha's essential teachings to his non-essential teachings via his personal qualities: First, the essential part of the Buddha's teaching, namely, the four noble truths, is established *independently* of the Buddha's authority through perception and inference. Second, from this established main part of the teaching the Buddha's knowledge is inferred. Third, from this knowledge the Buddha's compassion is inferred. Fourth, from his knowledge and compassion taken together his authority and trustworthiness are inferred.[12] Fifth, the truth of the *non*-essential part of the Buddha's teaching is inferred from his trustworthiness. Only if one thinks of the Buddha's teaching as a homogeneous corpus and does not distinguish between the essential and non-essential parts of his teaching can one conclude, as Hayes does, that Dharmakīrti ends up in a loop from the teaching to the teacher and back to the teaching.

Furthermore, it is not the case that—to use Hayes's words—it takes Dharmakīrti some two hundred couplets to make this circle. In the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter Dharmakīrti concludes his line of argumentation with the establishment of the Buddha's authority. He does not proceed, at least not explicitly, to the final step, namely, the inference from the reliability of the teacher to the truthfulness of his teaching. I suppose that this step is not taken for two reasons: first, because it is not thematic in the context of Dignāga's *maṅgalaśloka* which deals only with the Buddha's properties, and second because it is trivial—if the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*, then it goes without

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[12] The correspondence of the different elements of this reasoning to the Buddha's epithets in Dignāga's *maṅgalaśloka* should be obvious. Dharmakīrti interprets *tāyitva* as "revealing the four noble truths,"† *sugatatva* as referring to the Buddha's knowledge and *jagaddhitaiṣitā* to compassion (*karuṇā*). The epithet *śāstṛtva* has no correspondence in the above reasoning because, according to my understanding of Dharmakīrti, it plays no direct role in the proof of the Buddha's authority (*pramāṇabhūtatva*); cf. Franco, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, WSTB 38 (Wien, 1997), p. 22.

† In fact, Dharmakīrti is willing to reduce the essential part of the Buddha's teaching even further into the fourth truth alone; cf. v. 145a: *tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktiḥ*. I hope to return to Dharmakīrti's reductionism on a different occasion.

saying that his teachings are true.

However, the fifth step of Dharmakīrti's line of reasoning is made explicit by him in the Svārthānumāna chapter v. 217:[13]

> *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ /*
> *pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā //*
> "Or because [the correctness of] what is to be avoided and what is to be appropriated, as well as [of] the means [thereof], is well established, the main content [of the Buddha's teaching] does not belie [its promise]. Therefore, [it is justified] to infer [also] in respect to other [parts of the Buddha's teaching that they do not belie their promise.]"

This verse and its interpretation by the Tibetan writers mKhas grub rje and Ngag dbang bstan dar were discussed by Tillemans, the only scholar so far to have argued strongly against the assumption of circularity in Dharmakīrti's writings. Although I want to acknowledge here my indebtedness to his important contribution, I would like to suggest a somewhat different interpretation of the purport of this verse. According to Tillemans, Dharmakīrti's method of transferring the speaker's credibility from one area to another "is not significantly different from the usual Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, as we find it for example in *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.69 and Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* thereon, where the exactitude of someone's statements on matters of medicine, incantations and such things is said to serve as grounds for inferring his trustworthiness in other areas" (*Persons of Authority*, p. 16).

This view, I believe, misses two crucial elements in Dharmakīrti's argument. Before pointing out these two elements, let me emphasize that the argument in this form is not valid: Just because someone is trustworthy in matter *x* he is not necessarily trustworthy in matter *y*. Indeed, Tillemans makes it clear that both mKhas grub rje and Ngag dbang bstan dar considered such a statement to be false (*op. cit.*, pp. 16–17). And, indeed, Dharmakīrti's argument differs on two points. First, Dharmakīrti does not simply draw an inference from trustworthiness in any part *x* to trustworthiness in any part *y*; he allows such an inference only when one moves from the main part of a teaching to its secondary part. Second, when we look at Dharmakīrti's own commentary on this verse it becomes obvious that the logical reason used in the inference is not—as in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*—the sameness of the author; Dharmakīrti includes the motivations of the speaker in his reasoning, and this is what allows the inference of trustworthiness in one area from that in another:

> "What has to be avoided, what has to be appropriated and the means [thereof] that are taught by that [trustworthy person][14] do not belie [their promise], [i.e.] are not contrary [to reality]; just as the four noble truths in the manner which will be stated [in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter]; because this very same [main content of what was taught by the Buddha, namely, the four noble truths], which serves the [ultimate] purpose of man [namely, *nirvāṇa*, and thus] is capable of application (i.e.,

[13] Cf. PVSV 109. This verse is translated twice in V. A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*, WSTB 20 (Wien, 1989), pp. 124, 142. The entire discussion of *āgama* was translated by H. Yaita; cf. next note.

[14] The discussion on *āgama* in PVSV was translated by H. Yaita in "Dharmakīrti on the Authority of the Buddhist Scriptures (*āgama*)—an annotated translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* ad v. 213–217," *Nanto Bukkyō*

repeated practice), does not belie [its promise], it is apprehended [that he or his teaching] is so (i.e., non-belying) with regard to another object too; [he does] not [say anything] in order to deceive, because [his statements] are not obstructed [by any other *pramāṇa*] and because it [would] be futile for a speaker [to make] false statements without [any] motivation."[15]

It is clear, I believe, that Dharmakīrti's logical reason for the reliability of the secondary part of the teaching would not be "because the same author stated it," but "because the same reliable person stated it." And one knows that he is reliable because one has ascertained that he has nothing to gain by telling a lie, etc., not simply because he is known to have told the truth on a different matter.

Therefore, the dGe lugs pa view that the authority of the teaching is a sufficient condition and a valid reason for the authority of the teacher in the Buddha's case is, I believe, correct, inasmuch as it represents Dharmakīrti's thought (cf. Tillemans, *op. cit.*, p. 20).[16] Tillemans' somewhat tentative suggestion that the authoritativeness of the teaching is only a necessary condition for the authoritativeness of the teacher, if accepted, will have precisely the opposite effect to what Tillemans intends.[17] Tillemans attempts to find an appropriate place for the epithets of the homage verse in the proof of the Buddha's authority.[18] However, if the authority of the teaching is only a necessary condition, this will invalidate the successive proof of the epithets, and consequently also the proof of the Buddha's authority. On the other hand, the authority of the Buddha's main teaching as a sufficient condition does not render this proof of the epithets dispensable. Rather, the Buddha's teaching is a sufficient condition for the establishment of the epithets, which are, in their turn, a sufficient condition for the establishment of his trustworthiness.

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58 (1987): 1–17. Apart from minor points of detail, our interpretation differs on the logical subject of this passage. According to Yaita the scriptures (*āgama*) are referred to by the anaphoric pronoun *tad*—whereas I think that this passage refers primarily to the reliable person, i.e., the author of the scriptures, and more specifically to the Buddha. Thus, Yaita translates this compound as a locative *tatpuruṣa* (p. 9): "which were taught in the [*āgama*]." Cf., however, PVSVṬ 395,14 . . . *tadupadiṣṭānāṃ tenāptenopadiṣṭānām* . . . This is also supported by Karṇakagomin's comment on this verse in PVSVṬ 394,27: *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya bhagavaddarśitasya* . . . ; here too Yaita interprets differently: " . . . the causes (*upāya*) [of both, all of which are the teachings of *āgama*]." The above translation also differs from the one in my *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, p. 36, which I now consider to be mistaken on some points.

[15] Cf. PVSV 109,15–19: *heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṃvādaḥ. yathā catūrṇām āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā. tasyāsya puruṣārthopayogino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare 'pi tathātvopagamaḥ, na vipralambhāy[a]<ā>nuparodhāt, niṣprayojanavitathābhidhānavaiphalyāc ca vaktuḥ.*

[16] Of course, as noted above, it is indirectly sufficient. However, the relation of being a sufficient condition is transitive. If *a* is sufficient for *b*, and *b* is sufficient for *c*, then *a* is sufficient for *c*.

[17] In the discussion that followed the presentation of this paper Prof. Tillemans has kindly told me that he no longer holds this view.

[18] On the successive proof of the Buddha's epithets culminating in the proof of his authority, cf. Franco, *op. cit.*, chapter 1.

Appendix: Dharmakīrti's commentators on *Pramāṇavārttika* II 283a–c

PVP Peking 141a5–7 = Derge 121b1–3: *bstod* (P: *ston) pa'i tshig gcig ma gtogs pa lhag ma ni tshad mar sgrub par byed pa yin no // ci'i phyir de las gzhan pa'i yon tan mnga' na yang tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba nyid bstod par mdzad pa yin zhe na /* ***ston pa de lta'i dngos bstod ni //*** *zhes bya ba smos te / tshad ma nyid du bstod pa gang yin pa* ***de de'i*** (P: *de'i sa*) ***bstan pa nyid las ni / tshad ma'i de nyid grub don yin //***

PVA 166,1–7: *tata eva bhagavato 'nenaiva guṇena stutiḥ / pramāṇabhūtatvalakṣaṇena / tad āha / . . . / kasmād upadeśasya tathābhāvaprāmāṇyalakṣaṇ[ā]<a>stutiḥ /*† ***tadupadeśataḥ pramāṇatattvasiddhir*** *yathā syād iti.*

† The text is slightly corrupt. Unfortunately the Tibetan translation seems also corrupt; cf. PVA(Tib) Peking 183a2–3 = Derge 154b6: *ci'i phyir tshad ma'i mtshan nyid de lta bu'i dngos po nye bar ston pa ce na.*

Considering Prajñākaragupta's introduction to the verse, as well as the context, one expects the Buddha, rather than his teaching, to be the object of praise. In this case one could conjecture *tathābhāvena prāmāṇyalakṣaṇena stutiḥ*. Such conjecture is corroborated by Manorathanandin's text quoted below: *tena stutiḥ*. However, Ravigupta's text does not support this conjecture (cf. below: . . . *tshad ma nyid can gyi* . . .).

PVV(R) Peking 265b3–6 = Derge 398b1–3: *'on na nye bar bstan pa bden pas* (P: *pa yis*) *bstod pa la dgos pa ci yod ce na / smras pa /* ***de yis bstan pa nyid las*** (D: *la*) ***ni // ston pa de lta'i dngos bstod pa // tshad ma'i de nyid grub don du // . . .*** *// zhes bya ba la / nye bar bstan pa de lta bu'i dngos po tshad ma'i mtshan nyid can gyi bstod pa bcom ldan 'das kyis nye bar bstan pa las ni tshad ma nyid grub pa yin no zhes bstan pa'i phyir ro //*

PVV(M) 96,26f.: *kasmāt punar anekaguṇasambhārasambhave 'pi prāmāṇyenaiva bhagavataḥ stutiḥ? ity āha*—***upadeśasya tathābhāvaḥ*** *saṃvādakatvaṃ prāmāṇyam, tena* ***stutir*** *ācāryeṇa kṛtā /* ***tasya*** *bhagavata* ***upadeśataḥ pramāṇasya tattvaṃ*** *lakṣaṇam, tat****siddhyarthaṃ*** *bhagavaddeśanāyāḥ pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, notprekṣāmātreṇety ākhyātum ity arthaḥ.*

Abbreviations

PV	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): Yusho Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 1–206.
PVA	*Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
PVA(Tib)	*Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta) (Tib.): P 5719, D 4221.
PVP	*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): P 5717, D 4217.
PVSV	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.
PVSVṬ	*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam.* Allahabad, 1943.

PVV(M) *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirti with the commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathanandin.* Bauddha Bharati Series 3. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

PVV(R) *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Ravigupta) ad PV Pramāṇasiddhi (Tib.): P 5726, D 4224.

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KAMALAŚĪLA'S INTERPRETATION OF 'NON-ERRONEOUS' IN THE DEFINITION OF DIRECT PERCEPTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS

by

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I. Introduction

Dignāga (ca. 480–540) defined direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) as the cognition which is free from conception. Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) added to it the further element 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*); i.e., "(The cognition which is) free from conception and non-erroneous is direct perception."[1] 'Non-erroneous' was added for the first time in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya.* Of course Dharmakīrti was not the first person who mentioned it in the history of Indian epistemology. It corresponds to *avyabhicārin* (non-erroneous/non-deviating) in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4[2] and, in Buddhist literature, to *avibhrānta* (non-erroneous) in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*[3] Also, the word *abhrānta* is found in Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya.*[4] Therefore Dharmakīrti's addition was the re-adoption of what had once been dropped in Dignāga's definition.[5]

I will examine in this article some special features remarkable in the chapter Pratyakṣalakṣaṇa-parīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795). It is a commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1212–1360 by his teacher Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788). They followed Dharmakīrti's philosophy as the main basis of their own philosophical investigations.

In the chapter concerned, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1311–28[6] is the section which explains the significance of 'non-erroneous'. I want to inspect Kamalaśīla's explanations in connection with other texts in order to understand what kind of theoretical changes were actually developed in the

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[1] *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam.* Alternatively, the subject and the predicate of the sentence can be reversed (i.e., "Direct perception is free from conception and non-erroneous." Funayama [1992: 46; 59f., n. 39]).

[2] NS 1.1.4: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam //.* "Perception is the cognition which is generated through the contact of the sense organ with the object, which is not expressible, which is non-erroneous and which is essentially of a determining character."

[3] YBh (Yaita [1992: 517]): *pratyakṣaṃ katamat / yad aviparokṣam anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam avibhrāntaṃ ca /.* "What is the object of perception? (It is the entity which is) not beyond the sense organ and which is neither conceived nor to be conceived." I surmise that this is one of the main sources for Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's definitions of direct perception; *anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam* in YBh corresponds to *kalpanāpoḍham,* though the expression is different, and *avibhrāntam* in YBh to *abhrāntam* in Dharmakīrti's definition.

[4] AS 152,27; Schmithausen [1965: 153f.; 1972: 154]. ASBh 152,30: *abhrāntagrahaṇam alātacakramāyā-marīcikādivyudāsārtham iti /.* "'Non-erroneous' is employed in order to negate (erroneous cognitions) such as (a vision of) a circle in a (rapidly whirling) fire-brand, a phantom and a mirage."

[5] Stcherbatsky [1932: 155].

[6] Jap. tr. in Ishibashi [1993]. Also see Jha's translation of the whole text.

eighth century. It is an attempt to shed new light on what is called by Stcherbatsky[7] 'The Philological School of Commentators'. I will make my intention clear by summarizing here the basic structure of the concerned section. Śāntarakṣita opens the section by pointing out that 'non-erroneous' is necessary in the definition in order to rule out from direct perception an erroneous cognition of 'hair-mesh' (/'hair-net') and the like (*keśoṇḍukādijñāna*) [1311]. Such a cognition is considered to be a perceptual error (*bhrānti*) caused by a sense organ (*indriya*). This idea Śāntarakṣita owes to Dharmakīrti. Much more interesting is his disciple Kamalaśīla's elucidation of 'non-erroneous': Kamalaśīla takes it to be an equivalent of 'non-deceptive' (/non-belying/consistent; *avisaṃvādin/avisaṃvādaka*) which is found in the general definition of a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). As pointed out in previous studies, this equivalency is also indicated by Vinītadeva, and his idea was severely criticized by Dharmottara. This is one of the most important features of Kamalaśīla's theory of perception. I believe that the same idea is presupposed by Śāntarakṣita, too. I will take up this topic below and discuss the origin and the significance of this peculiar interpretation (see Section IV).

After the above-mentioned introductory stanza, Śāntarakṣita introduces and criticizes the contrary idea that a cognition of 'hair-mesh', etc., is generated by the mind, and not by a sense organ [1312–13]. This idea is found in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti,[8] so Śāntarakṣita's opponents must have existed before Dharmakīrti and not been his real contemporaries. Discussions are then expanded in the succeeding part through a further objection and reply [1314–1322], but I can't see any essential difference from Dharmakīrti's intention. Hence I suppose that stanzas 1312–22 are more or less a reproduction of Dharmakīrti's arguments.

Next, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to a new point [1323–28]. The following objection is raised: A cognition of a yellow conch (*pītaśaṅkādijñāna*) for a white conch, etc., is direct perception. Such a cognition is certainly erroneous in terms of its color. However, inasmuch as it is a cognition of 'conch' when its color is disregarded, it realizes the efficacy of a real conch, so that it is a means of valid cognition as direct perception [1323]. This objection is more minutely explained in the *Pañjikā,* according to which the propounders were certain Buddhist insiders who followed only Dignāga's definition and insisted that 'non-erroneous' should not be added, because it contradicts the cognition of a yellow conch, etc. Kamalaśīla's opponents refer to a passage of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, too, and interpret the disputable word *sataimira* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 8b. I consider that the interpretation is based on the statement of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. I shall discuss this below in Section V.

Against this, Śāntarakṣita's own idea is stated in 1324–28. He never admits the validity of the cognition of a 'yellow' conch. To Śāntarakṣita what there really is is only the color (*varṇa*) of the object; the shape (*saṃsthāna*) of the object does not exist as distinct from its color. That is why there is no validity in the cognition of 'a yellow conch' insofar as the shape is no more than the secondary construction through erroneous color-cognition [1326].

In this way, the discussions of *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1311–28 and the corresponding *Pañjikā* are

[7] Stcherbatsky [1932: 39f.].
[8] PV III 294–298 and PVin I 76,26–78,5.

divided into three sections: first, the general explanation for the necessity of 'non-erroneous' [1311]; second, the refutation of the opponents' idea who attributed all perceptual errors to conceptual construction [1312–22]; and third, the criticism to those who did not admit the necessity of 'non-erroneous' with special attention to a cognition of 'a yellow conch' for a white conch. Among them, as pointed out above, the second group does not closely reflect the actual philosophical situations of Śāntarakṣita's age. Therefore, the other two groups are more important, as representing the actual philosophical circumstances in the eighth century. Namely, why did Kamalaśīla consider that 'non-erroneous' is a synonym of 'non-deceptive' and in which way was the problem of 'yellow conch' propounded and refuted?

II. Kinds of Illusion

Generally speaking, erroneous cognition is expressed by the word *bhrānti* (error; = *bhrānti-jñāna*). It is often explained by the formula 'taking non-X to be X' (*atasmiṃs tadgrahaḥ*).[9] The *Yogācārabhūmi* enumerates five kinds of *bhrānti* with illustrations:[10]

1. Error regarding the representation (*saṃjñābhrānti*); e.g., a cognition of water for a mirage of water.
2. Error regarding the number (*saṃkhyābhrānti*); e.g., a cognition of many moons for the moon by a person who suffers from *timira*-disease.[11]
3. Error regarding the shape (*saṃsthānabhrānti*); e.g., a cognition of a circular form in a rapidly whirling fire-brand.
4. Error regarding the color (*varṇabhrānti*); e.g., a cognition of yellow for a non-yellow object by a person who suffers from jaundice.[12]
5. Error regarding the movement (*karmabhrānti*); e.g., a cognition of moving trees by a person who is running fast with his fists firmly clenched.

Other texts refer to yet other examples: e.g., a cognition of silver for a white conch, and a cognition of a snake for a rope [these will correspond to *saṃjñābhrānti* in the above list]; and 'travelling on a boat' (*nauyāna*), which means that the trees on the coast seem to move in the case of a person on a fast-moving boat [*karmabhrānti*]. Yet another stock example in many texts is a cognition of hair-mesh (*keśoṇḍukajñāna*) by a person who suffers from *timira*-disease.

'A cognition of many moons for the moon' in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is essentially the same as a more popular illustration: 'a cognition of a double moon' (*dvicandrajñāna*), very often connected with *timira*-disease. However, some texts state it not as a result of sickness but as a cognition which occurs to a sound person. For instance, the *Fang bian xin lun* states, "One sees a double moon when he presses his eye with a finger."[13] An eminent Tibetan scholar Bu ston

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[9] NBh 113,3f.: *yad atasmiṃs tad iti tad vyabhicāri / yat tu tasmiṃs tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyakṣam iti /* (see also Schmithausen [1965: 154]). PVSV 49,3–7: . . . *vastūtpatter abhrāntir iti cet / na / atatpratibhāsinas tadadhyavasāyāt / maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇibhrāntidarśanena vyabhicārāc ca / bhrānter avastusaṃvāda iti cet / na / yathoktenaiva vyabhicārāt / vitathapratibhāso hi bhrāntilakṣaṇam /.* PVin II 1cd: *atasmiṃs tadgraho bhrāntir api* . . . VV 138,2: *atadātmani tādātmyapratītir bhrāntiḥ /.*

[10] Yaita [1992: 520f.; 556f].

[11] For *timira* see Tillemans [1990: vol. 1, 236 n. 156; 275 n. 370] and Kanazawa [1987: 31–41].

[12] This is essentially the same as 'a cognition of a yellow conch for a white conch' in TS(P).

[13] 方便心論 (T vol. 32: 25b): 以指按目、則覩二月． According to the *Chu san zang ji ji* (出三藏記集 ; T vol. 55: 13b), the text was translated in 472 A.D.

explains it in like manner in his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*.[14]

Further, Dharmakīrti and his followers noticed the distinction between two kinds of erroneous cognition: a perceptual error caused by a sense organ (*indriyabhrānti*) and that caused by the mind (*manobhrānti*).[15] They are paraphrasable in turn by *indriyajā bhrāntiḥ* and *mānasī bhrāntiḥ*.[16] Here, *indriya* of course signifies five kinds of sense organ (*pañcendriya*). *Mānasī bhrāntiḥ* belongs to conceptual cognition (*vikalpajñāna*).

III. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

Dignāga's definition of direct perception, *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham,* suggests the denotative identity between 'being direct perception' and 'being free from conception'. According to this, any cognition that is free from conceptual construction is direct perception; any erroneous cognition is of the conceptual character. As far as the definition of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and that of pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) are concerned, Dignāga never admitted the existence of a cognition which is free from conception but still erroneous (I call such a cognition 'sensory illusion' hereafter). In the *Nyāyamukha,* Dignāga enumerated, as pseudo-perception, cognitions such as recollection (*smārta*), inference (*anumāna*), cognition related with wish (*ābhilāṣika*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), illusory cognition (*bhrāntijñāna*) and cognition of empirical reality (*saṃvṛtisajjñāna*), and he attributed their causes to conceptual construction.[17] The same is true of the corresponding passages of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti.* However, the situation is different in the case of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 7c–8b, upon which that very commentary is made:

> *bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñānam anumānānumānikaṃ* // 7cd
> *smārtābhilāṣikaṃ ceti pratyakṣābhaṃ sataimiram* / 8ab[18]

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[14] Bu ston's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* 128,2f. (Tosaki [1990: 62 n. 20]): *mig btsir ba sogs dbang po 'gyur na 'gyur ba'i phyir te* / (a commentary on PVin I 76,30 = *indriyavikāre ca vikārāt*).

[15] The exact meaning of *manas* (the mind) is a problem in the case of the Buddhist *pramāṇa*-tradition. First of all, it would not be correct to distinguish *manas* from *manovijñāna* in the very strict sense, as Dharmakīrti sometimes uses *manas* in the sense of *manovijñāna*; see, e.g., PV III 243 and 252. A similar tendency is traced in Ratnakīrti's explanation of *manas* in the context of *mānasapratyakṣa* in SS (17,23): *atrocyate / manaḥśabdena tāvad asmākam anakṣajaṃ vijñānam evābhipretam* /... "Here we reply: First of all, the word *manas* signifies in our theory the very cognition that is not generated through any sense organ...." Further, it is considered to be true that the five sense organs (*pañcendriya*) are physically existent, but *manas* is not; see Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of *mānasapratyakṣa* in PSṬ I (P 30a6f.; cf. D 26b4f.): *dbang po la mi bltos pa'i phyir zhes ste* [/] *gzugs can gyi dbang po la bltos pa med pa nyid kyi phyir zhes pa dgongs pa'o* // *gang gi rten yid kho na yin gyi dbang po gzugs can ma yin pa de yid kyi mngon par brjod do* //. "Because (self-cognition of desire, etc.,) is not dependent on any sense organ [= PSV ad PS I 6ab: *indriyānapekṣatvāt*]. The intention of this is as follows: Because it does not depend on any sense organ that is made of substances. When the basis (*āśraya*) of (a cognition) is *manas,* and not any sense organ that is made of substances, (that cognition) is stated to be a mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*)." And last, to Dharmakīrti the mind (*manas*) could mean even the mental cognition of the present moment (PV III 243 and 520–521). This is not the same with the scheme of the Sarvāstivāda school which maintains that *manas* as an organ is actually the mind at the preceding moment as the *samanantarapratyaya,* and that *manovijñāna* is the mind at the present moment (see the *Abhidharmakośa* I 17ab and 44cd).

[16] E.g., TSP 480,19 and 481,17.

[17] T vol. 32: 3bc; Katsura [1982: 90].

[18] The verse is translated in Vetter [1964: 39]; Schmithausen [1965: 213]; Hattori [1965: 122; 1968: 28] and

In particular, *sataimira* is not commented upon in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti,* and no direct explanation is available in Dignāga's works.[19] Dignāga's silence was the starting point of all the subsequent history.

It was a principle of Dignāga's epistemology to explain all wrong cognitions as being caused by the mind.[20] Consequently even a cognition of a double moon is considered to be produced by the mind. However, such denial of sensory illusion was not consistently held throughout his writings. First, in the context of the criticism of Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi,* Dignāga admits that a sense organ is the cause of such cognitions as the representations of something blue, etc., or of a double moon, etc.[21] Second, his approval of sensory illusion is found in the *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*: "A cognition of a double moon (arises) **owing to the defect of the sense organ** (*indriyavaikalyāt*). Though it appears as that, (i.e., as a double moon), it is not the object (of the cognition)."[22] Here, Dignāga seems to consider a cognition of a double moon to be an error caused by some defect of the eyes. This is not compatible with Dignāga's epistemological principle.

In this way, two different views about the origin of perceptual error are found in Dignāga's works: one, his unique epistemology that every erroneous cognition belongs to conception, including a cognition of a double moon; and two, the rather commonplace idea that a cognition of a double moon is caused by some kind of sensory defect. These two attitudes were not fully integrated by Dignāga himself.

In the *Pramāṇavārttika* III 294a, Dharmakīrti introduces an objection: "Certain people hold an idea that the (cognition of a double moon, etc.,) is also of the conceptual character" (*mānasaṃ tad apīty eke*). It is not clear who 'certain people' were, but the passage suggests that certain Buddhists at the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti insisted on the utter negation of sensory illusion.[23]

Tosaki [1979: 382].

[19] For a detailed discussion see Franco [1986].

[20] Such an attitude is evident when Dignāga states, in connection with *'avyabhicārin'* (non-erroneous) of the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4, "Nor is there a possibility of [sense-cognition's] having an erroneous object because an erroneous cognition [necessarily] has as object an illusion produced by the mind (*manobhrāntiviṣayatvād vyabhicāriṇaḥ*)." Hattori [1968: 36, 96 n. 1.53; 122 n. 3.6f.] and Franco [1986: 90–94].

[21] I.e., *te 'pi hi paramārthato 'nyathā vidyamānā nīlādyābhāsasya dvicandrādyābhāsasya ca jñānasya kāraṇībhavanti /.* See Hattori [1968: 35; 120 n. 2.26]. The passage is cited by Dharmakīriti, Devendrabuddhi, Manorathanandin (Tosaki [1979: 389 n. 22]) and Jinendrabuddhi (PSṬ I P 33a5f.; D 29a6f.) as expressing the evidence of Dignāga's approval of sensory illusion.

[22] ĀPV ad ĀP 2b (Frauwallner [1930: 176]): ***dbang po ma tshang ba'i phyir*** *zla ba gnyis mthong ba ni der snang ba nyid yin du zin kyang de'i yul ma yin no //.*

[23] This assumption can be corroborated by a description in NP 7,18–20: *kalpanājñānam arthāntare pratyakṣābhāsam / yaj jñānaṃ ghaṭaḥ paṭa iti vā vikalpayataḥ samutpadyate tad arthasvalakṣaṇāviṣayatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam /.* "Conceptual cognition for an object other (than the cognition itself) is pseudo-perception. A cognition arises in the person who is conceiving (the object) in the form '(This is) a pot' or '(This is) a cloth'. It is pseudo-perception, because it does not have as object the particular of the thing." This is the whole explanation of pseudo-perception in this handbook of Dignāga's logic. Needless to say, it was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang, a Chinese contemporary of Dharmakīrti. Therefore, it is likely that not a few people before Dharmakīrti's time got the idea, from this text, that all errors are due to conception. Further, see van der Kuijp [1985: 85] for Glo bo mKhan chen's idea that *mānasaṃ tad apīty eke* (PV III 294a) is a reference to Īśvarasena's view.

At the same period, however, there must have been yet another Buddhist who did approve of the existence of sensory illusion. I surmise that Dharmapāla was such a person. He commented on the above-cited passage of the *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti* in the following way:

> "'Like a double moon' [ĀP 2b] means: As the second moon (as a real entity) cannot generate the cognition's form of the second moon. (Objection:) If that is the case, through which cause such a manifestation arise? (Reply:) 'Owing to the defect of the sense organ' [Vṛtti ad 2b]. When the eyes as organs lack their property 'clearness' (and become obscure) through damage such as *timira*-disease, as a result, the cognition of a double moon arises through such defective organs."[24]

This is an explanation for the process of the generation of a double-moon-cognition, where conceptual construction is not mentioned at all.

In the *Pramāṇavārttika* III 288–300, Dharmakīrti enumerated four kinds of pseudo-perception: three kinds of conceptual cognitions[25] and one perceptual error which is derived from the defects of a sense organ. This fourth type is, Dharmakīrti states, the exception (*apavāda*) in Dignāga's system of epistemology. According to Dharmakīrti, the word *timira* implies all kinds of defects of the sense organ, without specifying eye-disease;[26] its derivative form *taimira* signifies any cognition caused by the defects of the sense organ; and therefore *sataimira* means 'together with *taimira*'. Thus, Dharmakīrti interpreted the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 7c–8b to mean that "erroneously conceptualized cognition (*bhrānti*), cognition of empirical reality (*saṃvṛtisajjñāna*), inference (*anumāna*), its result (*ānumānika*), recollection (*smārta*), and cognition related with wish (*ābhilāṣika*) are pseudo-perceptions, together with (*sa-*) cognition caused by the defects of the sense organ (*taimira*)."

At this period, Dharmakīrti had already propounded a new definition of valid cognition, *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*, but followed Dignāga concerning the definition of direct perception, *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham*. He added 'non-erroneous' for the first time in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya.* The first emergence of this addition runs as follows:

> "Among them, direct perception is free from conception and non-erroneous [= PVin I 4ab]. Direct perception is the cognition which is not of the conceptual character and which is not affected by the illusions owing to the troubles (viz., the malfunctions of a sense organ)[27] caused by *timira*-disease, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, and so forth."[28]

What then is the difference between the opinion expressed in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and that in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*? In the *Pramāṇavārttika,* Dharmakīrti criticized the idea of attributing

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[24] 觀所緣論釋 (T vol. 31: 890b): 猶如二月。如第二月不能生識第二月相。若爾、何因有斯相現。根損害故。若時眼根由翳等害損其明徳、遂即從斯損害根處、見二月生。

[25] *bhrānti, saṃvṛtisajjñāna* and *anumānānumānika,* etc.

[26] PV III 293cd: *kevalaṃ tatra timiram upaghātopalakṣaṇam //.*

[27] I tentatively follow Dharmottara's commentary on *saṃkṣobha* (*'khrugs pa*) in PVinṬ I P 48a7f.: *rab rib dang myur du bskor ba dang grur zhugs pa rnams kyis bya ba'i dbang po'i 'gyur ba ni 'khrugs pa ste /.* Cf. NBṬ(Dh) 55,1–8 (in this commentary Dharmottara's interpreteation is quite different from that in PVinṬ; see also Yaita [1984: n. 34]).

[28] *tatra / pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam* [= 4ab] / *timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādy-anāhitavibhramam avikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam /* (= PVin I 40,1–5). A similar passage is found in NB I 4–6: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam // abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā // tayā rahitaṃ*

all illusions to the mind and maintained the existence of sensory illusion. As a result, he had to state that sensory illusion is the exceptional case in Dignāga's system which principally admits only conceptual illusion. Next, in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya,* Dharmakīrti modified the definition by adding 'non-erroneous'. At the same time, the notion of 'exception' was deleted from Dharmakīrti's own system, because it was no longer necessary to resort to such an escape after the change of definition. To summarize, I think that Dharmakīrti's original intention of adding 'non-erroneous' was very simple and clear. It was postulated in order to rule out sensory illusions from direct perception. 'Non-erroneous' functioned just as a subordinate condition, attached to the main condition 'free from conception'. There was not any essential change in Dharmakīrti's own epistemology itself before and after the addition of 'non-erroneous'.

IV. 'Non-erroneous': Kamalaśīla's Idea and Its Origin

Dharmakīrti's followers, as commentators, paraphrased 'non-erroneous' by 'non-deceptive'. First, I will trace an example of such a paraphrase in Kamalaśīla's statement in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā:*[29]

> "Having thus demonstrated that direct perception is 'free from conception', (the master Śāntarakṣita now) states the motif of the employment of 'non-erroneous' in the following stanza:
>
> > 'Non-erroneous' is employed in order to deny (i.e., exclude from direct perception) a cognition of 'hair-mesh' and the like. (Such a cognition) is not maintained (by us) to be a (means of) valid cognition because it is erroneous. [1311]
>
> Here, 'non-erroneous' should be understood in the sense of 'being non-deceptive', and not in the sense of 'having the form of the object as it is placed (in cognition)'. For, otherwise, the definition of direct perception which (is to) be maintained on the basis of both standpoints (viz., Sautrāntika and Yogācāra,) would be too narrow *(avyāpin)*, because the object of cognition (as being externally existent) is not established in the Yogācāra viewpoint.
>
> 'Being non-deceptive' means the efficacy to realize the attainment of the object which is appropriate for the fulfillment of a desired purpose, and not the attainment itself, because there may possibly be a hindrance (to the actual attainment) and so on.[30]
>
> (Objection:) If so, only 'non-erroneous' should be employed (in the definition of direct perception). What is 'free from conception' to be employed for?
>
> (Reply:) That is not the case, because (without that) the undesirable conclusion would follow that the inference which is (essentially) the conceptual cognition would also belong to direct perception."

I find four peculiarities in this statement: 'non-erroneous' is here a synonym of 'non-deceptive' (point A); 'non-deceptive' means 'the efficacy to realize the attainment of the object which is appropriate for the fulfillment of a desired purpose' (point B); the definition of direct perception should be applied also to the Yogācāra standpoint (point C); and 'free from conception'

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timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhitavibhramaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam //.

[29] For the text see Appendix I.

[30] The notion of 'hindrance' (impediment; *pratibandha*) comes from PV I 8 and its PVSV. 'And so on' would mean the transformation *(pariṇāma)* of the causal complex *(kāraṇasāmagrī)* which is also assumed in the same stanza.

excludes all the conceptual cognitions, and 'non-erroneous' excludes a cognition of 'hair-mesh' and the like (point D).

When compared with other texts, Kamalaśīla's statement has the closest relationship with Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.[31] He states as follows:[32]

> "'Non-erroneous' means (the cognition which) does not err. It is in the sense of 'non-reversed (cognition) with regard to the object of attainment' (*prāpaṇaviṣayaṃ praty aviparyastam ity arthaḥ*).
> (Objection:) Why are the two qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇadvaya*) stated?
> (Reply:) First of all, 'non-erroneous' is employed in order to exclude (*vyavaccheda*) the erroneous cognition of the person who suffers from *timira*-disease (and so on),[33] and 'free from conception' is employed in order to deny inference (as belonging to direct perception) (*anumānanirāsārtham*). In this way, 'being non-erroneous' is admitted with regard to the object of attainment (*prāpaṇaviṣaye*) and not with regard to the object of cognition (*na tv ālambanaviṣaye*). If 'being non-erroneous' were maintained with regard to the object of cognition, the view of the Yogācāra school (*yogācāra-mata*) would thereby be negated, for the people of the Yogācāra school maintain that all cognitions are erroneous with regard to the object of cognition (as externally existent). Consequently this would lead to the undesirable conclusion that the treatise (*prakaraṇa*; i.e., the *Nyāyabindu*) was composed by negating their view. However it is maintained (by us) that the treatise was composed in conformity with the views of the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra schools (*iṣyate ca sautrāntika-yogācāramatānusāreṇa prakaraṇārambhaḥ*) and both parties admit 'being non-erroneous', which is defined to be 'being non-deceptive', with regard to the object of attainment (*prāpaṇaviṣaye*[34] *'visaṃvādakatvalakṣaṇam abhrāntatvaṃ dvābhyām abhyupagamyate*).
> (Objection:) If that is the case, even inference would come to be direct perception, for it is also non-erroneous because it is non-deceptive.
> (Reply:) For this reason, 'free from conception' is employed in order to deny inference (as belonging to direct perception). . . ."

Vinītadeva's idea corresponds to Kamalaśīla's except for Point B among the above-stated four specific features. In other words, there is very little originality in Kamalaśīla's commentary on *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1311.

Point A: *abhrānta* = *avisaṃvādaka*

It is known very well that Vinītadeva's idea on the equivalency between *abhrānta* and *avisaṃvādaka* was severely criticized by Dharmottara.[35] One of the main arguments made by Dharmottara was that 'non-erroneous' as a synonym of 'non-deceptive' would become redun-

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[31] Vinītadeva's life should be dated to about 690–750 A.D., because his *Hetubinduṭīkā* is composed on the basis of the *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* by Śākyabuddhi (ca. 660–720), and some of Vinītadeva's statements therein are considered to be utilized in the *Hetubinduṭīkā* by Arcaṭa (ca. 710–770). Funayama [1995b: 55f.; 59f. n. 4].

[32] For the text see Appendix II.

[33] 'And so on' (*ādi*) should be added in this context.

[34] The Skt. fragment *prāmāṇyaviṣaye* (*Tātparya* <9> in Appendix II) should be emended to *prāpaṇaviṣaye* with the help of the Tibetan translation *thob par byed pa'i yul la.*

[35] E.g., Yaita [1982: 5f.] and Ishibashi [1993: 4–6]. According to Dharmottara, 'non-erroneous' should be interpreted regarding the essence of the thing. PVinṬ I P 44b1f.: *don byed nus pa'i rang bzhin la ma 'khrul pa gang yin pa de ni ma 'khrul pa yin no //.* NBṬ(Dh) I 41,5–42,2: *abhrāntam arthakriyākṣame vasturūpe 'viparyastam ucyate / arthakriyākṣamaṃ ca vasturūpaṃ saṃniveśopādhivarṇātmakam / tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad abhrāntam /.*

dant, because it is the same as the general definition of a means of valid cognition.[36] This argument is so persuasive and so logical that one may get the impression that Dharmottara's idea was the one and only correct interpretation and the preceding teachers had just talked about nonsense. However, seen from the point of view of the history of the interpretations, Vinītadeva's and hence Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the term is in a sense much closer to Dharmakīrti's original descriptions. Moreover, there is a very interesting point in Kamalaśīla's explanation. Taking it into account that Kamalaśīla knew Dharmottara's critical analysis,[37] Kamalaśīla's implicit assent to Vinītadeva's interpretation will suggest that Kamalaśīla intentionally adhered to the traditionally established interpretation of 'non-erroneous' after the activity of Dharmottara.

The equation of 'non-erroneous' with 'non-deceptive' was not Vinītadeva's invention.[38] Though it is not so clear in the statements of Dharmakīrti's disciple Devendrabuddhi and grand-disciple Śākyabuddhi, the equation of the two notions had possibly been made by the end of the seventh century. It is known from one of the *pūrvapakṣa*s on the interpretation of 'erroneousness' in Maṇḍanamiśra's *Vidhiviveka*:

> "But what is this 'erroneousness'? . . . (Buddhist opponent:) Non-erroneousness means non-deceptiveness in terms of the fulfillment of a (desired) purpose. (Maṇḍana:) If it meant the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of suffering as based on the object, then the cognition of (the object), the taking and rejecting of which are not possible,[39] would come to be erroneous."[40]

Maṇḍana was active around 700 A.D. during the period between Kumārila and Umbeka, and he knew Dharmakīrti's philosophy.[41] Therefore, it is highly probable that some followers of Dharmakīrti at this period actually construed *abhrānta* in the sense of *avisaṃvādaka.*

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[36] NBṬ(Dh) I 47,3–7: *na tv avisaṃvādakam abhrāntam iha grahītavyam / yataḥ samyagjñānam eva pratyakṣaṃ nānyat / tatra samyagjñānatvād evāvisaṃvādakatve labdhe punaravisaṃvādakagrahaṇaṃ niṣprayojanam eva / evaṃ hi vākyārthaḥ syāt / pratyakṣākhyaṃ yad avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ tat kalpanāpoḍham avisaṃvādakaṃ ceti / na cānena dviravisaṃvādakagrahaṇena kiṃcit / tasmād grāhye 'rthakriyākṣame vasturūpe yad aviparyastaṃ tad abhrāntam iha veditavyam /.* PVinṬ I P 45a5f.: *gzhan yang mngon sum ni yang dag pa'i shes pa'i dbye ba nyid yin no // de la yang dag pa'i shes pa rtog pa dang bral zhing ma 'khrul pa zhes bya ba'i ngag la / ma 'khrul pa'i sgras yang dag pa'i shes pa'i rnam grangs mi slu ba'i don nye bar len pa ni don med pa nyid do //.*

[37] I follow the conclusion of Krasser [1992].

[38] In not a few cases the sub-commentators on NBṬ(Dh) mention Vinītadeva by name as Dharmottara's target of criticism. But some references seem to be inappropriate. For example, Dharmottara criticizes the idea of taking the relation between *pratyakṣaṃ* and *kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam* to be *saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandha.* PVinṬ I P 43b5: ***ming dang ming can gyi 'brel pa*** *yang skabs su bab pa ma yin pa nyid de /.* The author of NBṬṬ attributes this *pūrvapakṣa* to Vinītadeva. NBṬṬ 17,4f.: *anena lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāvaṃ darśayatā* ***vinītadevavyākhyānaṃ saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandharūpaṃ*** *pratyuktam /.* However, such a statement is not found in NBṬ(V). In fact, it is a reference to Śākyabuddhi's PVṬ III P 222b3–5: *. . . rtog pa dang bral pa can zhes bya ba'i mtshan nyid kyis mngon sum mtshon par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir rtog* [corr.: *rtogs*] *pa dang bral pa nyid bstan nas* [**anūdya*] *mngon sum nyid ston par byed pa yin te / rtog pa dang bral pa'i shes pa ni mngon sum gyi* ***ming can*** *yin no zhes* ***ming dang ming can gyi 'brel pa*** *byed pa'i phyir ro //* (see also Funayama [1992: 59f. n. 39]). It can be safely said in this case that Vinītadeva is wrongly considered to be a target of Dharmottara in later periods.

[39] E.g., it is impossible that one sees a moon and verifies the validity of that cognition by reaching the real moon. In that case, there would be an absurd conclusion that even a cognition of a moon would be erroneous.

[40] VV 137,1–138,1: *kā punar iyaṃ bhrāntatā / . . . athārthakriyāsaṃvāditvam abhrāntatvaṃ / yady arthanibandhanau sukhaduḥkhaprāptiparihārau, upādānaparityāgāyogyavedanasya bhrāntatvaprasaṅgaḥ /.*

[41] Schmithausen [1965: 216 n. 150] and Thrasher [1979].

I conjecture that the equation of the two notions was derived from some of Dharmakīrti's statements. I am not speaking about his 'real intention' which nobody can determine exactly, but about his way of describing the issue. See, for example, the following statements:

> "A cognition which manifests itself vividly, such as of the person who is, say, asleep or awake, does not contain any conception. Any (cognition that appears) in another way in either case is conceptual. **A cognition of that (i.e., a cognition of a double moon, etc.,) is negated as invalid because it is deceptive** (***visaṃvādāt***), even though it is (proved to be) free from conception on account of that (= vivid manifestation). And the two kinds of pseudo-perception (i.e., *savikalpaka-* and *nirvikalpakapratyakṣābhāsa*) were stated for that purpose (i.e., for the purpose of negating a cognition of a double moon, etc., as direct perception)." [PV III 299–300]
> "(Objection:) Then, an undesirable conclusion would follow that a cognition in a dream, which manifests itself vividly because of its non-conceptuality, would be direct perception. (Reply:) That is not the case, because I stated **'non-erroneous'** (in the definition of direct perception). For this very reason, it is stated that pseudo-perception is of two kinds; conceptual cognition is (pseudo-perception) because it does not have the manifestation of reality, and **illusion (*upaplava*) is (pseudo-perception) because it is deceptive (*visaṃvādāt*).**" [PVin I 76, 8–14][42]

Here, Dharmakīrti introduces the viewpoint 'deceptive/non-deceptive' to the context of direct perception and pseudo-perception, and seems to use 'deceptive' in place of 'erroneous' and 'non-deceptive' in place of 'non-erroneous'.[43] Of course he did not state that the two notions were perfectly replacable. He may have meant that wrong perception's erroneousness is testified only with recourse to the criterion whether it is deceptive or not regarding 'fulfillment of a desired purpose' (*arthakriyā*) at a later moment, because direct perception can never be proven either to be correct or to be false at the very moment of that cognition. In short, it is not at all a surprise that Dharmakīrti's expressions as mentioned above came to influence the commentators to interpret 'non-erroneous' in the sense of 'non-deceptive'.[44]

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[42] PV III 299–300: *suptasya jāgrato vāpi yaiva dhīḥ sphuṭabhāsinī / sā nirvikalpobhayathāpy anyathaiva vikalpikā //299// tasmāt* ***tasyā****vikalpe 'pi* ***prāmāṇyaṃ pratiṣidhyate / visaṃvādāt*** *tadarthaṃ ca pratyakṣābhaṃ dvidhoditam //300//.* PVin I 76,8–14: *'o na ni rnam par rtog pa med pa'i phyir gsal bar snang ba'i rmi lam gyi shes pa mngon sum du 'gyur ro zhe na / ma yin te /* ***ma 'khrul pa*** *zhes bstan pa'i phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir / rnam rtog dngos mi snang phyir dang //* ***nye bar bslad pa slu ba'i phyir*** *// mngon sum ltar snang* [= v. 33 abc] *rnam pa gnyis su brjod do //.* The importance of PV III 300 and PVin I 33abc in this respect has already been pointed out in Ishibashi [1993: 4]. I follow his idea in that these two passages could have been the sources for the interpretation of 'non-erroneous' as paraphrasable by 'non-deceptive'.

[43] Note that a yogin's perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) is also discussed just in the same way, i.e., in terms of non-cenceptuality (≑ vividness of a cognition) and non-deceptiveness. PV III 285–286: *tasmād bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evābhibhāvyate / bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphuṭākalpadhīphalam // tatra* ***pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi*** *yat prāṅ-nirṇītavastuvat / tad bhāvanājaṃ pratyakṣam iṣṭaṃ śeṣā upaplavāḥ //.* PVin I 28: *bhāvanābalataḥ* ***spaṣṭaṃ*** *bhayādāv iva bhāsate /* ***yaj jñānam avisaṃvādi tat pramāṇam akalpakam*** *//* (Skt. fragment by Steinkellner [1972: 203]). In particular, the last stanza suggests the closeness between 'non-deceptive' and 'non-erroneous'.

[44] Jinendrabuddhi also seems to interpret 'non-erroneous' in the sense of 'non-deceptive'. See the text and translation of PSṬ in Section V: *gang* ***rtog pa dang bral zhing*** *'dod pa'i don la* ***mi bslu ba*** *de ni mngon sum ste /* "That cognition which is free from conception and is non-deceptive concerning a desired object is direct perception."

Point B: ***prāpaṇaśakti***

The notion of *prāpaṇaśakti* (the efficacy to realize the attainment of an object) was mentioned in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā.*[45] In explaining *pramāṇa* as non-deceptive cognition, he says in effect that the validity of cognition consists in the efficacy to realize the attainment of an object (*prāpaṇaśakti*) and not the attainment itself (*na tu prāpaṇam eva*). Subsequently, Śākyabuddhi stated that 'efficacy' (*śakti*) is significant because its attainment may not be realized owing to the possible emergence of a hindrance (*pratibandhasaṃbhavāt*).[46] Thus, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi used the notion of *prāpaṇaśakti* in the context of the general definition of *pramāṇa.* Kamalaśīla's expression *abhimatārthakriyāsamarthaprāpaṇaśakti* was made with this background, via the equation of 'non-erroneous' with 'non-deceptive' in the context of direct perception. Further, his appreciation of this notion might have been influenced by Dharmottara who emphasized it shortly before his activities.[47]

Point C: Sautrāntika-Yogācāra Problem

Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla held the common view that the definition of direct perception was made from the standpoint of both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools. The reason was their belief that Dharmakīrti composed his works not only as a Sautrāntika but also as a Yogācārin. Vinītadeva expressed this idea in his commentary on the *Nyāyabindu,* but we should not limit his idea only to this handbook, because it was criticized by Dharmottara as a problem of interpretation of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya.* Therefore, this is a problem relating to the whole work of Dharmakīrti, namely, in what sense was he a scholar of what is called the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school.

The definition of direct perception is the basis for all the epistemological discussions and in some cases Dharmakīrti shifts his position to the Yogācāra standpoint,[48] nevertheless, he does not speak about any change in the definition. This is presumably the reason for the arguments of Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla. On the other hand, Dharmottara criticized this, and propounded that the definition issues only from the Sautrāntika standpoint. Dharmottara maintains that Dharmakīrti was indeed a scholar of the Yogācāra school, but his ideas were not always expressed from that standpoint; for example, Dharmakīrti's statements, such as "Direct perception is also a means of valid cognition, because **it does not exist when its object does not exist**" (PVin I 3ab), are expressed only from the view of assuming the existence of external objects (**bāhyārthanaya*).[49] Dharmottara's claim is understandable enough, but it leads to the following question: Did

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[45] PVP II P 3a8–b2, D 3a2f. The passage is translated into Japanese in Inami [1993: 92f.].

[46] PVṬ II P 88b7–89a1, D 73a7–b2. The passage is translated into Japanese in Inami [1993: 98].

[47] For Dharmottara's theory of *prāpaṇaśakti* see Krasser [1991: vol. 1, 54, 1–5; 106, 4–6; vol. 2, 7f.; 1995: 264].

[48] E.g., PV III 320ff. and PVin I 84,1ff.

[49] DhP 44,17–20: *nanv evam abhrāntatve* ***yogācāramatam*** *asaṃgṛhītaṃ syāt / grāhyagrāhakākāratayā pravṛtteḥ sarvasyaivāsarvajñavijñānasyālambane bhrāntatvāt / tat kathaṃ pūrvavyākhyānāvajñā na kriyata iti cet / ucyate / na* ***yogācāranaye*** *lakṣaṇam idam / kiṃ tu* ***sautrāntikanaya*** *eva / na ca sarvaṃ* ***vijñānavāde*** *yojayituṃ śakyam / tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam* (NB I 12) *ityāder aśakyayojanatvāt /.* NBṬṬ 19,10f.: *nanūktaṃ* ***yogācāra****matam asaṃgṛhītaṃ syād iti / ucyate /* ***bāhyanayena*** [sic!] ***sautrāntikamatā****nusāreṇācāryeṇa lakṣaṇaṃ kṛtam ity adoṣaḥ /.* PVinṬ I P 44b8–45a3: *gzhan dag* ***mdo sde pa*** *bzhin du* ***rnal 'byor spyod pa'i*** *gzhung bsdu ba'i don du mi slu bar byed pa la ma 'khrul par shes pa de ni mi rigs so // gang gi phyir slob dpon gyis ma 'khrul pa'i sgra'i don de lta bur gyur pa yin pa*

Dharmakīrti indicate his Yogācāra position without the special definition of direct perception in that position, if *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam* is limited to the Sautrāntika standpoint? Unfortunately I have not found any concrete answer to this problem.

Point D: The Roles of Two Qualifiers

According to Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla, the qualifier 'free from conception' excludes all conceptual cognitions, and the other qualifier 'non-erroneous' excludes a cognition of 'hair-mesh', etc. This idea is also criticized by Dharmottara who maintains that the wrong ideas (*vipratipatti*) on the definition are negated by a set of two qualifiers.[50]

Kamalaśīla presents further viewpoints regarding the function of the two qualifiers. He introduces the objection that 'non-erroneous' is employed in order to exclude a cognition in a dream from direct perception, and he gives his assent to this idea.[51] It is remarkable here that a cognition in a dream is considered to be free from conception but still erroneous, just like a cognition of a double moon, etc. Similar ideas can be traced in Dharmakīrti's works and Śākyabuddhi's commentary.[52]

After the commentary of the last stanza [1360] of the chapter Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā, Kamalaśīla adds a discussion, independently of Śāntarakṣita's statement. It is an excursus on the definition of direct perception in general.[53] Kamalaśīla therein examines the opponent's idea that 'non-erroneous' is not necessary in the definition because whether an indeterminate cognition (e.g., a cognition of water) is erroneous or not cannot be determined at the very moment of cognition; for it is ascertained by the criterion 'fulfullment of a desired purpose' (e.g., quenching the perceiver's thirst) only at a later moment. This viewpoint reveals Kamalaśīla's idea about the relationships between direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), impression (*vāsanā*), cognition of ascertainment (*niścayajñāna*) and action (*pravṛtti*). It seems to be connected with the ideas of Devendra-

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ni mi bzhed [D : *gzhed* P] de */ 'khrul pa'i mtshan nyid ni phyin ci log tu snang ba yin no zhes de dang der gsungs pa'i phyir ro // dngos po mi snang ba'i phyir rnam par rtog pa ni mngon sum ltar snang ba'o //* (PVin I 33ac) *zhes gsungs na yang / mngon sum ni dngos po snang ba don byed pa'i dngos po'i rang bzhin la ma 'khrul pa yin par brjod pa yin no //.* Ibid. 45a6–b1: *gal te* ***rnal 'byor spyod pa'i*** *gzhung yang thams cad du rjes su 'jug par byed pa yin no // slob dpon gyis rjes su dpag pa nyid gzung ba la phyin ci log pa nyid yin no* (unidentified) *zhes bya ba dang / don gyi mthu stobs kyis skye bas rtog pa med pa nyid du* (PVin I 4cd) *gsungs par ci'i phyir rjes su 'jug par mi byed / de'i phyir* ***rnam rig tsam du smra ba*** *ni slob dpon bag chags brtan pa dang mi brtan pa dag gis rnam par 'jog pa mthong la / 'di ni don med na mi 'byung ba las* (Ibid. 3ab) *zhes de lta bu la sogs pa gsungs pa na /* ***phyi rol gyi don gyi tshul*** *nyid bzhed pa yin no // de'i phyir sngar bshad pa nyid ma 'khrul pa'i don yin no //.* For an exposition of the passage see Yaita [1982: 6].

[50] E.g., PVinṬ I P 44a7f.: *'dir yang mtshan nyid gzhan rnam par bcad pa ni ma yin gyi [/] 'on kyang log par rtogs pa [*vipratipatti] bsal ba'i don yin no //,* as well as NBṬ(Dh) I 44,1 and 46,6f. For this topic in detail see the previous studies in n. 35.

[51] TSP 480,12–15: *nanu ca bhavatu nāma mānasaṃ tathāpy abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam eva / na hy anenendriyajñānasyaiva* [*anena* MKS : om. Tib.] *pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṃ kartum ārabdham / kiṃ tarhi / mānasasyāpi yogijñānādeḥ* / tatra ca svapnāntikasyāpi nirvikalpakatvam asti / spaṣṭapratibhāsitvāt / na tv abhrāntatvam iti tannivṛttyartham abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktam eva / satyam etat / . . .* *The opponent here assumes yogin's perception to be mental perception. This is an idea of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, too; e.g., TSP 484,19: *yad vā yogijñānam iha mānasam.* For a previous study on this problem see Hattori [1968: 93f. n. 1.46].

[52] For Dharmakīrti see PV and PVin in n. 42; for Śākyabuddhi see Inami [1993: 102].

[53] TSP 492,16–494,20.

buddhi and Śākyabuddhi on the general definition of *pramāṇa*,[54] as well as Kamalaśīla's own discussion developed in the opening section of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. This interesting issue will need further examination.

V. The Relationship between Jinendrabuddhi and Kamalaśīla

Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* is an indispensable source for the study of the eighth century developments of the *pramāṇa* school. In a previous paper I have assumed him to be a contemporary of Śāntarakṣita.[55] The assumption that the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* was written before Kamalaśīla's composition of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* holds good in the following examinations, too. I will show further relations between Devendrabuddhi, Jinendrabuddhi and Kamalaśīla.

The *pratyakṣābhāsa*-section of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*[56] has connections with other texts. First of all, it is evident that some of its passages are identical with those of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*.[57] This means that Jinendrabuddhi composed this section of the work on the basis of Devendrabuddhi's commentary.

Second, some passages of Jinendrabuddhi on the interpretation of *sataimira* (PS I 8b) are identical with Kamalaśīla's passages. Kamalaśīla introduces the opponents' idea, which is well-known among modern scholars,[58] in the following way:

> *kecit tu svayūthyā evābhrāntagrahaṇaṃ necchanti / bhrāntasyāpi pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya pratyakṣatvāt / tathā hi /* <[a]***na tad anumānam / aliṅgajatvāt***[a]> */ pramāṇaṃ ca / avisaṃvāditvāt / ata evācāryadignāgena lakṣaṇe na kṛtam abhrāntagrahaṇam / bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñānam*[59] *anumānetyādinā* [= PS I 7c–8b] *pratyakṣābhāsanirdeśād avisaṃvādikalpanāpoḍham ity evaṃvidham iṣṭam ācāryasya lakṣaṇam /* <[b]*sataimiram iti tu* ***timiraśabdo 'yam ajñāna****paryāyaḥ*[b]> / <[c]***timiraghnaṃ ca mandānām iti yathā***[c]> / <[d]***timire bhavaṃ taimiram***[d]> / <[e]***visaṃvādakam ity*** *arthaḥ*[e]> / (TSP 482,24–483,13 ad TS 1323).[60]
>
> "On the other hand, certain Buddhist insiders do not wish to employ 'non-erroneous' (in the definition of direct perception), because (they consider that) a cognition of a yellow conch (for a white conch in reality), etc., is direct perception, even though it is erroneous. Namely, <[a]it is not inference because it is not generated from an inferential mark[a]>; it is a means of valid cognition because it is not deceptive. For this very reason, (they state,) 'non-erroneous' is not employed in the master Dignāga's definition. Because pseudo-perception is indicated by the statement 'Erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference . . .',[61] such a kind of (definition) as '(cognition which is) non-deceptive and free from conception' is maintained to be the definition of the master. <[b]On

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[54] For Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi on this topic see the translations in Inami [1993].

[55] Funayama [1995a].

[56] For a previous study on this section see Hattori [1968: 95–97 n. 1.53f.].

[57] See Appendix III.

[58] E.g., Stcherbatsky [1932: 155; 158 n. 5]; Hattori [1965: 122 n. 1; 1968: 97 n. 1.53]; Yaita [1982: 13f. n. 20 (with Jap. tr. in part)]; Tosaki [1984: 489f. n. 12 (with Jap. tr.)]; Franco [1987: 445f. n. 203]; Krasser [1991: vol. 2, 73 n. 140] and Ishibashi [1993: 6; 22f.].

[59] *bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñānam* M : *bhrānti(ḥ) saṃvṛti(ḥ) sājñānam* K : *bhrāntiḥ saṃvṛtiḥ sā jñānam* S.

[60] See below for the translation of TS 1323.

[61] I.e., PS I 7c–8b: *bhrāntisaṃvṛtisajjñānam . . . pratyakṣābham*.

the other hand, <u>sataimira</u> (of PS I 8b) means as follows: the word *timira* is a synonym of ‘ignorance’b> <cjust like (in the expression) ‘cutting off the ignorance (*timira*) of the dull’.c> <d*Taimira* means that which stems from ignorance.d>[62] <e(It should be understood) in the sense of ‘deceptive (cognition)’.e>”[63]

Note that this is a *pūrvapakṣa* for Kamalaśīla. In the subsequent discussions Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla criticize this idea. As I see it, Kamalaśīla is here referring to Jinendrabuddhi's own idea in his *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā,* so that ‘certain Buddhist insiders’ signifies Jinendrabuddhi and his followers. Now I will show this in detail.

Jinendrabuddhi presents two kinds of interpretation of the word *sataimira* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 8b. His first interpretation is that the word means the cognitions caused by the defect of a sense organ, such as *timira*-disease.[64] This is based on Dharmakīrti's interpretation in *Pramāṇavārttika* III 293[65] and the above-cited *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* by Devendrabuddhi. After this, Jinendrabuddhi introduces Dharmakīrti's notion of *avisaṃvādaka*[66] and refers to several kinds of cognition which can be controversial in terms of this notion: (a) cognition which has the manifestation of ‘hair-mesh’, etc., owing to *timira*-disease; (b) cognition of a yellow conch for a white conch by the person whose eyes are affected by jaundice; (c) cognition of the object as having the non-vivid blue form, etc., for a vivid blue entity caused either by the perceiver's eyes being affected by *timira*-disease for a long time or by his viewing the object from afar; and (d) cognition in which the trees are manifested as being possessed of movement, the movement being wrongly superimposed upon those stationary trees as a result of trouble (in a sense organ) caused by the perceiver's travelling on a boat.[67] Thus, making much of the notion of *avisaṃvādaka* in the context of direct perception, Jinendrabuddhi develops a special discussion on the cognition

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[62] Pāṇini 4.3.53: *tatra bhavaḥ //* (= *Siddhāntakaumudī* § 1428. An affix comes after a word in the 7th case in construction, in the sense of ‘who stays there’).

[63] A similar expression is found in Dharmottara's statement, too. PVinṬ I P 45b1–3 (Yaita [1984: 25]): ***kha cig** zla ba gnyis pa la sogs pa'i shes pa yang cha 'ga' zhig la mi slu ba des na tshad ma yin pa de'i phyir de bzlog pa'i don du ma 'khrul pa smos pa ni rigs pa ma yin te / de nyid kyi phyir **slob dpon phyogs kyi glang pos** kyang ma mdzad pa yin no // . . . de yang rigs pa ma yin te /.* Cf. TSop 280,10–13: *abhrāntagrahaṇenāpi śuklaśaṅkhādau pītaśaṅkhādivijñānaṃ nirasyate / saty api bhrame 'rthakriyāvisaṃvādābhāvāt / nāpi tad anumānaṃ yujyate 'liṅgajatvāt / ataḥ pratyakṣam iti /.* (This is probably based on Kamalaśīla's statement.)

[64] PSṬ I P 32a7f.; D 28b2: <u>*rab rib bcas*</u> *zhes pa 'dis dbang po la nye bar gnoḍ pa las skyes pa rab rib la sogs pa'i shes pa* [*indriyopaghātajaṃ timirādijñānam*] *mngon sum ltar snang ba bzhi pa gsungs so zhes pa'o //*, elucidated by Hattori [1968: 95 n. 1.53]. See also Appendix III.

[65] PV III 293: *apavādaś caturtho 'tra tenoktam upaghātajam / kevalaṃ tatra timiram upaghātopalakṣaṇam //.*

[66] PSṬ I P 33a7f.; D 29b1f.: *'dir brtsad par bya ste [/] 'dir bslu* [P : *slu* D] *ba med pa la 'jug par byed pa'i shes pa ni tshad mar* [D : *ni* added P] *mngon par 'dod de / 'di dag gis don yongs su bcad nas 'jug pa ni don bya ba la bslu* [P : *slu* D] *ba med pas so* zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro //* . *The citation is PVin I 30,17f. = *na hy ābhyām arthaṃ paricchidya pravartamāno 'rthakriyāṃ visaṃvādyate.*

[67] PSṬ I P 33b1–4; D 29b3–5: *de'i phyir gang 'di skra shad la sogs par snang ba rab rib la sogs pa'i shes pa ni gang gi yang dag par 'dod pa skra shad la sogs pa'i dngos po la mi* [P : om. D] *bslu* [P : slu D] *ba med cing de tshad ma nyid du mi 'gyur mod / gang 'di mig ser gyis nye bar bslad pa'i mig can gyi* [P : *gyis* D] *dung dkar po la sogs pa dung ser po la sogs par snang ba dang / gang yang yun ring du rab rib kyis mig bsgribs pa nyid kyi phyir ram thag ring ba nyid kyi phyir gsal ba'i sngon po la sogs pa rnams la mi* [corr. : *mig* PD] *gsal ba'i sngon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa dang / gang yang gru dang bzhon pa bskyod pas byas pa'i 'khrul pa shing sngong la sogs pa gnas pa rnams la yang 'gro ba'i bya ba dang ldan pa'i rkang 'thung la sogs par snang ba dang 'di lta bu'i rnam pa gzhan yang /.*

of a yellow conch (b) in the following manner:

> *. . . de'i phyir de rnams kyang yang dag par 'dod pa'i don bya ba nus pa dung la sogs pa'i dngos po tsam la gang du mi bslu ba de la tshad ma nyid du mi 'gal bar mthong zhing / smra bar*[68] *nus te / shes pa gang la rab tu zhugs pa'i skyes bus gegs med na nges par mngon par 'dod pa'i don sgrub pa de de la de'i tshad ma ste / dper na mngon par 'dod pa'i mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa*[69] *bzhin [/] ji skad bshad pa'i shes pa las rab tu zhugs pa'i skyes bu yang gegs med na nges par mngon par 'dod pa dung la sogs pa'i dngos po tsam sgrub par byed do // zhes pa rang bzhin no //* <a*'di yang* ***rjes su dpag pa ma yin te / rtags las ma skyes pa nyid kyi phyir***a> *dang rnam par rtog pa med pa nyid kyi phyir ro // tshad ma gsum pa 'dod pa yang ma yin te / de'i phyir mngon sum kho na'o zhes khas blangs*[70] *par bya'o // gang rtog pa dang bral zhing 'dod pa'i don la mi bslu ba de ni mngon sum ste / dper na mngon par 'dod pa'i mngon sum bzhin / skabs kyi shes pa'ang de lta bu'o // rang bzhin no //*
>
> *'di 'gyur mod [/] dung la sogs pa tsam gyi dngos po 'dod par byas pa la mi bslu ba'i phyir de kho na la de mngon sum nyid du 'dod kyi [/] ser po la sogs pa'i*[71] *rnam pa dang ldan pa'i khyad par la ni bslu*[72] *ba med par mi 'dod do zhes pa de lta na rab rib bcas zhes pa dmigs bsal*[73] *gyi tshig 'dis phyi dang nang gi nyer gnod kyi rkyen can dbang po nye bar bcom pa'i shes pa rtog pa dang bral ba nyid na yang mngon sum ltar snang bar gsungs pa dang / rab rib bcas zhes pa'i tshig der rab rib ni dbang po la nye bar gnod pa'i rkyen can thams cad nye bar mtshon pa tsam 'ba' zig go zhes pa 'di ltar bshad par bya ba ma yin te / dbang po la nye bar gnod pa'i shes pa yang 'ga' zhig kha cig tu mngon sum yin pa nyid kyi phyir ro // ma 'khrul pa zhes pa'i khyad par yang bya ba ma yin te / 'khrul pa yang 'ga' zhig kyang 'ga' zhig tu mngon sum nyid du 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhe na /*
>
> *de'i phyir rab rib bcas zhes pa dmigs bsal gyi*[74] *tshig 'di rnam pa gzhan du bshad par bya ste /* <b***rab rib kyi sgra 'di ni 'dir mi shes pa*** *rjod par byed pa ste*b> / <c***dper na dman rnams rab rib kyis bcom pa*** *zhes pa la sogs pa'i ngag la bzhin*[75] *no*c> // <d***rab rib la yod pa ni rab rib can ste*** d> */. . . rab rib can*[76] *de dang lhan cig 'jug go zhes pa ni rab rib bcas pa ste [/]* <e***bslu ba*** *can no* ***zhes*** *pa'i bar ro*e> *// rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i bslu ba can yang 'khrul pa la sogs pa'i sgra yis*[77] *nye bar blangs pa'i phyir / 'di rnam par rtog pa med par rtogs par bya'o // dran dang mngon par 'dod pa yang zhes pa'i yang gi sgra 'di yang bsdu ba'i don dang rim pa tha dad pa ste / rab rib bcas pa yang zhes pa 'di ltar blta bar bya'o // des na don 'dir 'gyur te [/] bslu ba'i shes pa ni mngon sum ltar snang ba'o zhes pa ste / de lta na 'khrul pa rnam par rtog pa med pa yang gang la mi bslu ba der mngon sum nyid yin la / gang la bslu ba der ni de ltar snang ba nyid do zhes pa 'di grub par 'gyur ro // . . .* (PSṬ I P 33b7–34b4; D 29b7–30b4).

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[68] *bar* P : *bar yang* D.
[69] *pa* D : om. P.
[70] *blangs* P : *blang* D.
[71] *pa'i* D : *pa* P.
[72] *bslu* P : *slu* D. D reads *slu* instead of *bslu* in all the subsequent passages.
[73] *bsal* D : *gsal* P.
[74] *gyi* P : *kyi* D.
[75] *bzhin* D : *gzhin* P.
[76] *rab rib can* corr. : *rab rib* PD; see n. 82 below.
[77] *sgra yis* P : *sgras* D.

". . . Therefore, if these (cognitions of a yellow conch, etc.,) are also non-deceptive regarding a certain (object) such as the thing just as a conch, which has the efficacy to realize the desired purpose, they are understood without contradiction to be the means of valid cognition for that (aspect of the object). (The same) can be stated as follows:

(Major premise:) If the person who acts on the basis of a cognition (of an object) necessarily attains a desired object when there is no hindrance (*pratibandha*), such a cognition is for him the means of valid cognition for that (object), just like any direct perception and inference.

(Minor premise:) The person who acts on the basis of the cognition as stated above necessarily attains a desired (object) such as the thing just as a conch when there is no hindrance.

(Conclusion: A cognition of a yellow conch, etc., is the means of valid cognition for the conch, etc.)

This is a *svabhāva(hetu* inference).

<aThis (cognition of a yellow conch) is not an inference, because it is not generated from an inferential mark (*na caitad anumānam / aliṅgajatvāt /*)a> and because it is not conceptual cognition. A third means of valid cognition is not admitted, either. Therefore, it should be admitted that the cognition is certainly direct perception.

(Major premise:) That cognition which is free from conception and is non-deceptive[78] concerning a desired object is direct perception, just like any direct perception.

(Minor premise:) So is the cognition of the present topic.

(Conclusion: A cognition of a yellow conch, etc., is direct perception.)

(This is) a *svabhāva(hetu* inference).

One may assume as follows: (A cognition of a yellow conch, etc.,) is maintained to be the means of valid cognition for the very object because (the cognition) is non-deceptive regarding the object inasmuch as it is intended to be the thing just as a conch, etc.; it is not maintained to be non-deceptive concerning (the object's) specific attribute (*viśeṣa*) such as having the form of yellow, etc. (*pītādyākāra*). Therefore, the following should not be stated: 'By the word *sataimira* (which shows) the exception (*apavāda*) (in Dignāga's system), the cognition whose sense organ becomes injured through external and internal defects as the cause (*pratyaya*) is stated to be pseudo-perception; and *timira* in the word *sataimira* implies (*upalakṣaṇa*) all the cognitions that are caused just by the defects of sense organs'.[79] (This statement of Dharmakīrti and his followers is not correct) because in any case any (indeterminate) cognition whose sense organ is defective is direct perception. Moreover, the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*) should not be added (in the definition), because in any case any (indeterminate) cognition, even though it is erroneous, is maintained to be direct perception.

(Reply:) Therefore, the word sataimira (which shows) the exception (in Dignāga's system) is explained in a different way. (Namely,) <bin this case, the word *timira* (*timiraśabdo 'yam*) designates 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*),b> <cjust like in the sentence (/expression) 'cutting off the ignorance of the dull' (*timiraghnaṃ mandānām*).c> <d*Taimira* signifies 'that which stems from ignorance' (*timire*

[78] This expression reveals that 'non-erroneous' was taken to be a synonym of 'non-deceptive' by Jinendrabuddhi.

[79] This is the exposition of Dharmakīrti's idea in PV III 293 as based on Devendrabuddhi's commentary and therefore it also corresponds to Jinendrabuddhi's first interpretation of sataimira; see the passages of PVP and PSṬ in Appendix III.

bhavaṃ taimiram)d>[80] (. . .)[81] *Sataimira* is that which occurs along with *taimira*.[82] <e(It should be understood) in the sense of 'deceptive (cognition)' (*visaṃvādīti yāvat*).e> Since deceptive (cognitions) which are connected with conceptual cognition are meant by the words 'erroneous cognition' and so forth (= PS I 7c–8b), this (= direct perception) should be understood to be free from conception. Further, (in this case,) the word 'and (*ca*)' in *smārtābhilāṣikaṃ ca-iti* (8a) means addition (*samuccaya*) and (it is interpreted to be) put in a different place; i.e., it should be taken in the sense of 'and *sataimira*' (and not in the sense of 'and *smārtābhilāṣika*'). Therefore, the following is meant here: It is established to be true that deceptive cognition is pseudo-perception, and hence even a (cognition) which is erroneous and free from conception is direct perception of (a thing) inasmuch as it is non-deceptive concerning that thing; and that (a cognition which is) deceptive concerning (a thing) is pseudo-perception. . . ."

These passages might suggest that there existed certain Buddhists, at the period between Dharmakīrti and Jinendrabuddhi, who followed only Dignāga's definition of direct perception and did not admit Dharmakīrti's idea in the *Pramāṇavārttika* nor his addition of 'non-erroneous' in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Nyāyabindu*. However, it would also be possible to assume that such a criticism is made by Jinendrabuddhi himself in the form of a hypothetical *pūrvapakṣa*. A point of criticism is directed at Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *timira* on the basis of the opponent's peculiar assumption that a cognition of a yellow conch is direct perception (!). According to this opponent as well as Jinendrabuddhi himself, a cognition of a yellow conch for a white conch is affected by jaundice, nevertheless, it is direct perception because it is non-deceptive concerning the 'conchness' of the object. This idea is incompatible with Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *timira* as implying all the kinds of defects of the sense organs,[83] because his interpretation leads to the consequence that a cognition of a yellow conch is pseudo-perception, and not direct perception, as long as it is a product of jaundice. That is why the (hypothetical) opponent insisted that Dharmakīrti's interpretation in the *Pramāṇavārttika* should be wrong.

Interestingly enough, Jinendrabuddhi does not aim at a straight refutation of this idea. Rather, he opens his second interpretation of *sataimira* under the influence of this idea. Jinendrabuddhi's own view can be summarized as follows:

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[80] See n. 62 above.

[81] The omitted passages are as follows: *ngag ni rnam par gcod pa'i 'bras bu can nyid kyi phyir ngag thams cad nges par gzung ba dang bcas pa'o* [P : *pa'i* D] *zhes pas rab rib kho na la yod pa zhes nges par gzung ba dang bcas pa'i ngag don la de phan* [**taddhita*] *du 'gyur ro // yang 'di bslu* [P : *slu* D] *ba ci zhe na / de gal te 'gyur na mi shes pa kho na la 'gyur gyi / shes pa la ma yin te / de mtha' gcig tu mi bslu* [P : *slu* D] *ba nyid kyi phyir ro // 'di ni 'jig rten na shin tu grags pa yang yin no //.* The exact meaning is not clear to me.

[82] The Tib. *rab rib de dang* . . . (= Skt. **tena timirena saha vartata iti sataimiram /*) should be emended to *rab rib can de dang* . . . (**tena taimirena* . . .), when the derivative sequence *timira* > *taimira* > *sataimira* is taken into account. Cf. Kamalaśīla's parallel wording: *timire bhavaṃ taimiram / visaṃvādakam ity arthaḥ /,* where the grammatical explanation for *sa-* is omitted. For the grammatical explanation of the compound *sataimira* see Pāṇini 2.2.28: *tena saheti tulyayoge //* (= *Siddhāntakaumudī* §848. The word *saha* 'together' is compounded with a word ending with the third case-affix and the compound is Bahuvrīhi; provided that, the companion and the person accompanied are equally affected by any action or thing, in the same manner) and Pāṇini 6.3.82: *vopasarjanasya //* (= *Siddhāntakaumudī* §849. *Sa* is optionally the substitute of *saha*, when the compound is a Bahuvrīhi).

[83] PV III 293cd: *kevalaṃ tatra timiram upaghātopalakṣaṇam //.*

1. *Sataimira* indicates the 'exception' (*apavāda*) in Dignāga's system. It is a reference to a special kind of pseudo-perception, in addition to the explicitly enumerated three kinds of pseudo-perception (viz., [a] *bhrānti*, [b] *saṃvṛtisajjñāna* and [c] *anumāna, ānumānika, smārta* and *ābhilāṣika*). However, there are two possible interpretations concerning its meaning.
2. According to one interpretation, *taimira* signifies that any cognition that is caused by the defect of a sense organ is implied in pseudo-perception. The whole stanza (PS I 7c–8b) means as follows: "Erroneous cognition (= erroneously conceptualized cognition), cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and cognition related with wish are pseudo-perceptions, together with (*sa-*) cognition caused by the defects of a sense organ (*taimira*)." [This is the same with Dharmakīrti's interpretation.]
3. According to the other interpretation, *sataimira* signifies that any deceptive cognition is pseudo-perception. It is the exception in Dignāga's system, since the notion 'deceptive/non-deceptive' was not used by him. Hence the stanza means as follows: "Erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, . . . and (*ca*) any deceptive cognition (*sataimira*) are pseudo-perceptions." [This is a modification on the basis of Dharmakīrti's notion of non-deceptiveness.]

Jinendrabuddhi's idea would not reflect the original intention of Dignāga. It is only a product of the integration of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's theories.

The supposition that Jinendrabuddhi's own idea, as seen above, is the *pūrvapakṣa* in Kamalaśīla's text would be important on several points. In the first place, there is no room to doubt Jinendrabuddhi's historical precedence to Kamalaśīla.[84] Word-for-word correspondences in the five passages <a>–<e> between their texts clearly show that Kamalaśīla is indebted to the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* and nothing else. It also reveals Kamalaśīla's criticism of Jinendrabuddhi.

As far as I know, Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* does not mention a cognition of a yellow conch as a problem in the definition of direct perception. In this respect, the cognition of a yellow conch may have been taken up as an important topic about the middle of the eighth century. It was a special problem raised in the context of direct perception when people began to interpret Dignāga's wording *sataimira* by using Dharmakīrti's notion of non-deceptiveness. Those people who maintained the validity of a cognition of a yellow conch, etc., are called by Durvekamiśra Aṃśasaṃvādavādin or 'propounders of the partial agreement/non-deceptiveness'.[85]

It should be noted here that Jinendrabuddhi's discussion on this point was constructed on the basis of the somewhat astonishing thesis that a cognition of a yellow conch is non-deceptive. Therefore, his second interpretation of *sataimira* no longer holds when this thesis is denied. This is the reason why Kamalaśīla introduced Jinendrabuddhi's commentary only as a *pūrvapakṣa*. Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara do not think such a cognition is direct perception as *pramāṇa*,[86] so that to them only Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *sataimira* is correct.

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[84] Here I mean by Kamalaśīla the author of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. The text is considered to have been composed between ca. 760–780/790. Schmithausen [1965: 216 n. 150] and Krasser [1992: 157].

[85] Tosaki [1984: 489f. n. 12] and Krasser [1991: vol. 2, 73–75].

[86] TSP 483,14–19 (ad TS 1324f.): *prāmāṇyaṃ hi bhavad dvābhyām* [MK : *dvābhyāsam* S] *ākārābhyāṃ bhavati / yathāpratibhāsam avisaṃvādād yathādhyavasāyaṃ vā / tatreha na yathāpratibhāsam avisaṃvādaḥ / pītasya pratibhāsanāt tasya tathābhūtasyāprāpteḥ* [*tathā-* MS : *yathā-* K] / *nāpi yathādhyavasāyam avisaṃvādaḥ / pītasyaiva*

Thus it is certain that the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* was written at the period between Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* and Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.* This will raise another question: Did Jinendrabuddhi precede Śāntarakṣita or vice versa? The problem of the cognition of a yellow conch is discussed in *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1323–28:

> "(*Pūrvapakṣa:*) Other people hold an opinion that a cognition of a yellow conch, etc., is the means of valid cognition (as direct perception), even though it is erroneous, because it is not deceptive in terms of the fulfillment of a purpose.[87] [1323]
> (*Uttarapakṣa:*) This is not true, (because) also in the above case there is not such a realization of the fulfillment of a purpose as representing the conceptually determined appearance (i.e., yellow). Otherwise this fallacy of over-extension would follow: Since (even) a cognition which has the manifestation of 'hair-mesh', etc., is (certainly) non-deceptive concerning light and the like, such a cognition would irresistibly come to be the means of valid cognition! (However this is not the case, of course). [1324–25] Further, it cannot be assumed that a shape exists as distinct from its color.[88] And non-deceptiveness is not found in the manifesting color (i.e., yellow). If (opponents) assume, independently of the shape (of the object), the validity of cognition on the basis of non-deceptiveness in terms of the fulfullment of a purpose, then it would be surely contradictory to all the statements (of the master Dignāga), such as 'because the ascertainment of the object conforms with that (i.e., the manifestation in cognition)'[89] and so forth.[90] Therefore, non-deceptiveness comes about, as generated through the cause which ripens the subconscious impression."[91] [1327–28]

Śāntarakṣita's idea is possibly a more developed one than that of Jinendrabuddhi, because Śāntarakṣita shares the idea in common with his younger contemporaries in not accepting a cognition of a yellow conch as direct perception, while Jinendrabuddhi accepts it. This seems to suggest that Jinendrabuddhi was an elder contemporary of Śāntarakṣita.

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viśiṣṭārthakriyākāritvenādhyavasāyāt / na ca tadrūpārthakriyāprāptir asti / na cānadhyavasitārthāvisaṃvādenāpi prāmāṇyam / atiprasaṅgāt / keśādijñāne 'pi hy anadhyavastālokādiprāpteḥ /. For Dharmottara see Yaita [1984: 23–27] and Krasser [1991: vol. 2, 73–75].

87 It would be a problem whether this *pūrvapakṣa* is a reference to Jinendrabuddhi's own idea. This point is related with another problem as to whether Jinendrabuddhi's *pūrvapakṣa* in the same context ('One may assume as follows: . . .') is a hypothetical one or based on the existence of those who maintained such a *pūrvapakṣa.* Śāntarakṣita mentions here just the validity of the cognition concerned, while Kamalaśīla positively relates it with Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of PS I 8b.

88 This is a statement from the Sautrāntika viewpoint in contrast to the view of the Sarvāstivāda school which admits the existence of both *saṃsthānarūpa* and *varṇarūpa* (Mimaki [1972: 86]).

89 PS I 9b: *tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ /.* See Hattori [1968: 103 n. 62].

90 Kamalaśīla refers to PSV ad PS I 9d as an example of 'and so forth' (TSP 483,24f.).

91 *pītaśaṅkhādibuddhīnāṃ vibhrame 'pi pramāṇatām* [K : *pramāṇatā* MS] / *arthakriyāvisaṃvādād apare saṃpracakṣate //1323// tan nādhyavasitākārapratirūpā na vidyate / tatrāpy arthakriyāvāptir anyathātiprasajyate // 1324// keśādipratibhāse ca jñāne saṃvādabhāvataḥ* [S : *saṃvādi-* K] / *ālokāder atas tasya durnivārā pramāṇatā // 1325// na varṇavyatiriktaṃ ca saṃsthānam upapadyate / bhāsamānasya varṇasya na ca saṃvāda īkṣyate* [S : *iṣyate* K (M is not clear)] *//1326// yady ākāram anādṛtya prāmāṇyaṃ ca prakalpyate / arthakriyāvisaṃvādāt tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ //1327// ityādi gaditaṃ sarvaṃ kathaṃ na vyāhataṃ bhavet / vāsanāpākahetūtthas tasmāt saṃvādasaṃbhavaḥ //1328//.*

I don't think that Jinendrabuddhi flourished far before Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788 A.D.), because both authors were possibly influenced by Arcaṭa's theory on the aim of a treatise (*prayojana*) in his *Hetubinduṭīkā*.[92] As for the date of the composition of this text, I would like to assume it to be approximately 740–750 A.D.; Arcaṭa is considered to be a master of Dharmottara (ca. 740–800) so that his life would be about 710–770 A.D. On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* is considered to have been written about 760 A.D.[93] Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* would have been composed slightly before the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

This is related with another problem as to whether our Jinendrabuddhi is identical with the grammarian Jinendrabuddhi who was also a Buddhist[94] and who was the author of the *Nyāsa*, a commentary on the *Kāśikāvṛtti*. Prof. Richard P. Hayes pointed out the possibility of such identity.[95] Prof. Nobuhiko Kobayashi pointed out that the *Nyāsa-kāra* who is mentioned in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* is the grammarian Jinendrabuddhi,[96] and that three stanzas of Bhāmaha's same work are cited (TS 911–13 on *apoha* theory) and criticized in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.[97] These convincingly demonstrate that Jinendrabuddhi the grammarian flourished first, then Bhāmaha quoted his passages, and the latter was in another context attacked by Śāntarakṣita. If I am allowed to conjecture that the *Nyāsa-kāra* is identical with the *Ṭīkā-kāra* and that the composition of the *Nyāsa* was done bofore the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Jinendrabuddhi's life would possibly be about 710–770 A.D. with some margin of error. However, this consequence is not compatible with the previous studies which place Bhāmaha before Dharmakīrti.[98] At any rate, this important issue will have to be examined further from every possible viewpoint in order to reach a final settlement.

VI. Concluding Remarks

Dharmakīrti added 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*) to Dignāga's definition of direct perception. He intended to rule out sensory illusion (*indriyabhrānti, indriyajā bhrāntiḥ*) from direct perception and enumerated it as a kind of pseudo-perception. Dignāga's inconsistent dealings with a cognition of a double moon guided this interpretation of Dharmakīrti.

In the context of direct perception, 'non-erroneous' was construed in the sense of 'non-deceptive' by Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla, and possibly by Jinendrabuddhi, too. I suppose it was a general tendency of interpretation among the people who belonged to 'Philological School'. It was Dharmottara who first criticized such an interpretation and opened a new phase of epistemology.

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[92] This is one of the conclusions of Funayama [1995a].

[93] Frauwallner [1961: 143] and Krasser [1992: 157].

[94] He is called *bodhisattvadeśīyācāryaśrījinendrabuddhipāda* in the colophone of the *Nyāsa*.

[95] Hayes [1983: 716].

[96] Kobayashi [1978].

[97] Kobayashi [1965].

[98] E.g., Tucci [1930]. Cf. According to Kobayashi [1978: 470], Jayāditya, one of the two authors of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* which Jinendrabuddhi commented upon, is stated to have died in ca. 660 A.D. by Yijing in his *Nan hai ji gui nei fa zhuan*, so that Bhāmaha flourished possibly after Dharmakīrti, though the latter's idea is not mentioned in the *Kāvyālaṃkāra*. On the ohter hand, the reliability of Yijing's statements is doubted by Brough [1973: 255f.].

Jinendrabuddhi interpreted the word *sataimira* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I 8b in the following two ways: His first interpretation is based on that of Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi, and his second interpretation was motivated by the idea of some of his predecessors' idea that a cognition of a yellow conch is direct perception. In this article, I also examined the possibility that Jinendrabuddhi flourished shortly before Śāntarakṣita.

Kamalaśīla constructed his own interpretations of 'non-erroneous' by using preceding texts: Vinītadeva's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* as being agreeable with Kamalaśīla's main standpoint, Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* as being his *pūrvapakṣa*, and probably the works of Dharmottara, to say nothing of the master Śāntarakṣita's teachings. In this respect, Kamalaśīla's statement is weak in originality. Its importance would lie in the point that it is a well-systematized theory which reflects several differenct phases and actual debates in the eighth century.

Appendix I: Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of *abhrānta* in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*

evaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvaṃ pratyakṣasya prasādhyābhrāntagrahaṇe prayojanam āha <u>keśoṇḍuke</u>[99]*tyādi /*

> *<u>keśoṇḍukā</u>*[100]*<u>divijñānanivṛttyartham idaṃ kṛtam</u> /*
> *<u>abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ tad dhi bhrāntatvān neṣyate pramā</u> //1311//*

<u>abhrāntam</u>[101] *atrāvisaṃvāditvena draṣṭavyam / na tu yathāvasthitālambanākāratayā*[102] */ anyathā hi yogācāramatenālambanāsiddher ubhayanayasamāśrayeṇeṣṭasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasyāvyāpitā syāt / avisaṃvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprāpaṇaśaktiḥ*[103] */ na tu prāpaṇam eva / pratibandhādisaṃbhavāt / yady evam abhrāntagrahaṇam evāstu / kiṃ kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇeneti cet*[104] */ na / anumānavikalpasyāpi pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt /* (TSP 479,20–480,9).

Appendix II: Vinītadeva's Interpretation of *abhrānta* in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*

'khrul ba med pa ni <u>ma khrul ba</u> ste / thob par byed pa'i yul la phyin ci ma log ces bya ba'i tha tshig go //<1***ci'i phyir bye brag gnyis smos she na***1> */* <2***smras pa***2> *[/]* <3***ma khrul ba*** *smos pa ni re zhig rab rib can gyi* ***shes pa*** *'khrul ba* ***rnam par bcad par bya ba'i phyir***3> *//* <4***<u>rtog pa dang bral ba</u> smos pa ni rjes su dpag pa bsal bar bya ba'i phyir***4> *// 'di ltar ma 'khrul ba nyid ni thob par byed pa'i yul la khas blang bar bya'i /* <5***dmigs pa'i yul la ni ma yin no***5> *// gal te dmigs pa'i yul la ma 'khrul pa nyid khas len na / des na 'dir* <6***rnal 'byor spyod pa'i lugs*** *bsal bar byas par 'gyur te*6> */ 'di ltar* <7*rnal 'byor spyod pa'i ni dmigs pa'i*

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[99] *keśoṇḍuke-* M : *keśoṇḍrake-* KS. I follow M; both mean the same.

[100] *keśoṇḍukā-* M : *keśoṇḍrakā-* KS.

[101] Cf. Tib. tr. *ma 'khrul ba nyid ni (*abhrāntatvam).*

[102] Cf. Tib. tr. *dngos po ji ltar gnas pa'i rnam pa dmigs pa nyid kyis ni ma yin te / (*vastuno yathāvasthitākārālambanatayā / *yathāvastusthitākārālambanatayā?).* Compare also a similar expression in TSP 492,20: . . . *api tu yathāvasthitam eva vastusvarūpam anūdya* . . . (Tib. *'on kyang ji lta ba bzhin du gzhag pa nyid kyi dngos po'i rang bzhin rjes su brjod nas*).

[103] *-śaktiḥ* SM(*śaktir*)T(*nus pa yin gyi /*) : *śaktikatvam* K.

[104] *cet* MK : om. S.

*shes pa thams cad ni 'khrul ba yin par 'dod de*7> */ de bas na de'i lugs bsal bar rab tu byed pa rtsom par 'gyur te /* <8***rab tu byed pa ni mdo sde pa dang / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i rjes su snyegs par rtsom par 'dod la***8> */* <9***gnyi ga yang thob par byed pa'i yul la mi bslu ba'i mtshan nyid ni ma 'khrul ba yin par khas len to***9> *//* <10***de lta yin na go / rjes su dpag pa yang mngon sum nyid du thal bar 'gyur te***10> */* <11***de yang mi bslu ba nyid du ma 'khrul bar 'dod do***11> *//* <12***de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa bsal bar bya ba'i phyir rtogs pa dang bral ba zhes bya ba smos te***12> */...* (NBṬ(V) 40,1–19)

In the following passages, words in bold letters are the original Skt. of the Tibetan words of NBṬ(V) with the same index number <1>–<12>.
DhP 42,18f: *ihāvisaṃvādakatvaṃ abhrāntatvam abhipretaṃ, tena dvicandrādijñānaṃ vyavacchinnaṃ yogācāramatam api gṛhītaṃ bhavatīti pūrvavyākhyānam...*; ibid. 44,23f.: <3*ih***ābhrānta***padaṃ* ***taimirikādijñānavyavacchedārthaṃ***3> <4***kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇaṃ tv anumānanirāsārtham***4> *iti yat pūrvakair vyākhyātaṃ...*
NBṬṬ 18,14–19, 1: *tena (= Vinītadevena) tv evaṃ vyākhyātam / abhrāntam iti yad visaṃvādi na bhavati /* <10***evaṃ saty anumānasyāpi pratyakṣa****lakṣaṇaṃ prāpnotīti*10> <12***kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇaṃ*** *tannivṛttyartham*12> */ yady evaṃ vyākhyāyate...*
Tātparya (in Malvania's gloss, DhP p. 263): <1***kimarthaṃ viśeṣaṇadvayopādānam***1>*?* <2***ucyate***2> */* <3***taimirikajñānavyavacchedārtham abhrānta****padam*3>, <4***anumānanirāsārtham*** *itarat*4> */* <5***na tv ālambanaviṣaye***5> *'nyathā* <6***yogācāramatam*** *amataṃ syāt*6> */* <7*tanmatena sarveṣāṃ svālambane bhrāntatvāt*7> */* <8***iṣyate ca sautrāntikayogācāramatānusāreṇa prakaraṇārambho***8> *yataḥ* <9*prāmāṇya[sic!]***viṣaye 'visaṃvādakatvalakṣaṇam abhrāntatvaṃ dvābhyām abhyupagamyate***9> */* <10***saty evam anumānasyāpi pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ***10> */* <11***tad api hi avisaṃvādakatvād abhrāntam iṣyate***11> */* <12***ataḥ tannirākaraṇārthaṃ kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇam***12> *iti anyavyākhyāṃ nirācikīrṣur āha—abhrāntam ity ādi /.*

Appendix III: Devendrabuddhi and Jinendrabuddhi

Some of the passage of the *pratyakṣābhāsa*-section of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* are identical with those of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*. The following two cases are such examples, where the Tibetan words in bold letters were possibly identical in Sanskrit.

1. PSṬ I P 32a7–b5, D 28b2–7: *rab rib bcas*[105] *zhes pa 'dis dbang po la nye bar gnod pa las skyes pa rab rib la sogs pa'i shes pa mngon sum ltar snang ba bzhi pa gsungs so zhes pa'o //...* ***de ltar ni*** *smig rgyu la sogs pa la chu la sogs pa'i shes pa* ***de kho na rnam par gcad***[106] ***pa'i ched du ma 'khrul ba zhes mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid la khyad par*** *nye bar byas pas so // de ni* ***dbang po la nye bar gnod pa*** *las skyes pa'i* ***shes pa bzlog pa'i don du'o zhe*** *na / ma yin te /* ***don dang phrad pa 'dzin pa kho na las don med pa las byung ba zla ba gnyis la sogs pa'i shes pa bzlog pa'i phyir ro // gzhan du na dbang po las skyes pa*** *shes pa* ***nyid brjod par bya bar 'gyur ro // rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i shes pa ni / ji ltar sngar nyams su myong ba'i brda dran pa'i stobs las*** *'jug pa dang mngon sum ma yin pa'ang yin par* ***grub pa kho na'o zhes pa'o //***

PVP I P 249b1–5, D 212b6–213a2: *dbang skyes min pa bsgrub don du*[107] *// zhes bya ba smos she*

[105] PS I 8d: *sataimiram.*
[106] *gcad* D : *bcad* P.
[107] PV III 289a: *anakṣajatvasiddhyartham.*

na / 'khrul pa bstan phyir ro[108] *// phyi rol pa 'di la 'khrul pa snang ste / smig rgyu la sogs pa dang kun rdzob tu yod pa dag la shes pa dbang po las skyes pa nyid yin par 'dod pa lta bu'o* ***// de ltar na de nyid rnam par gcad pa'i phyir mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid kyi khyad par 'khrul pa med pa can zhes*** *brjod do* ***// dbang po la***[109] ***gnod pa*** *byas pa'i* ***shes pa bzlog pa'i don du zhes bya ba*** *yang brdzun yin te* ***/ don dang phrad nas 'dzin pa nyid kyis don ma yin pa las 'byung ba zla ba gnyis pa la sogs pa'i shes pa zlog***[110] ***pa'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na dbang po las skyes pa*** *zhes bya ba* ***nyid brjod par bya bar 'gyur ro // rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa*** *yang de yin la / grub pa yin pas zhes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro // 'di lta ste / rjes dpag rjes su dpag las byung // dran byung brjod las byung ba yi*[111] ***// shes pa sngon nyams su myong ba brda dran pa'i stobs kyis 'grub par 'gyur ba nyid yin pa lta bu'o //***

2. PSṬ I P 32b7–33a2, D 29a2–4: ***mngon sum ltar snang ba bzhi pa*** *gang* ***de ni*** *'dir* ***dmigs kyis bsal bar blta bar bya'i [/] mtshan nyid kyi tshig gis***[112] ***don*** *gyis go bas* ***gsal***[113] ***ba'i dper*** *brjod pa* ***ni ma yin no // gzhan du na mtshan nyid 'khrul par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir dmigs kyis bsal ba'i tshig des phyi dang nang gi nye bar gnod pa'i rkyen gyis*** *bcom pa'i dbang po'i* ***shes pa rtog pa dang bral pa nyid*** *na'ang* ***mngon sum ltar snang bar brjod do //*** *rab rib bcas zhes pa 'dir* ***/ rab rib ni dbang po*** *nye bar bcom pa'i* ***rkyen thams cad nye bar mtshon pa*** *tsam du* ***blta bar bya'o lo //*** *gang zhig* ***zla ba gnyis la sogs pa'i shes pa dbang po las skyes pa ma yin pa*** *kho na ste [/]* ***'on kyang yid kyi kho na'o zhes smra'o //***

PVP I P 250b5f., D 213b6f.: *'dir bzhi pa ni / mngon sum ltar snang ba rnam pa bzhi po 'di la* ***mngon sum ltar snang ba bzhi pa /*** *mngon sum ltar snang rab rib bcas*[114] *// zhes*[115] *bya ba gsungs pa gang yin pa* ***de dmigs kyis dgar ba yin par***[116] ***rig par bya ba****'am mtshan nyid lhag ma yin par rig par bya'i* ***/ mtshan nyid kyi tshig*** *las* ***don*** *gyi* ***gsal ba'i dpe ni ma yin no //***
PVP I P 250b7–251a3, D 214a1–4: *'di ltar rtog pa yongs su rdzogs par byas nas 'di'i rtog pa nyid kyi rgyu ma bshad par / rab rib bcas*[117] *zhes*[118] *gsungs so // de nyid kyi phyir de ni rtog pa dang bral ba'i mngon sum ltar snang ba bstan pa yin no zhes par bya'o* ***// de lta ma yin na / mtshan nyid 'khrul pa can du 'gyur ro // de bas na dmigs kyis dgar ba'i tshig /*** *des bshad nyer gnod pa las skyes*[119] ***/ phyi dang nang gi***[120] ***gnod pa byed pa'i rkyen gyis***[121] *dbang po la*[122] *gnod pa byed pa las skyes pa'i* ***shes pa*** *thams cad* ***rtog pa dang bral pa nyid yin na yang / mngon sum ltar snang ba zhes brjod do //*** *de la rab rib 'ba' zhig ni // nyer gnod mtshon par byed pa yin //*[123] *de la rab rib dang*

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[108] PV III 289b: *(ukte dve) bhrāntidarśanāt.*
[109] *la* D : om. P.
[110] *zlog* P : *ldog* D.
[111] *ba yi* D : *ba'i* P. The citation is PS I 7d–8a: *anumānānumānikam // smārtābhilāṣikaṃ ceti /.*
[112] *gis* P : *gi* D.
[113] *gsal* P : *bsal* D.
[114] PS I 8b: *pratyakṣābhaṃ sataimiram.*
[115] *// zhes* D : *shes* P.
[116] *yin par* D : om. P.
[117] PS I 8b: *sataimiram.*
[118] *zhes* D : *ces* P.
[119] PV III 293b: *tenoktam upaghātajam.*
[120] *gi* P : *gis* D.
[121] *gyis* P : *gyi* D.
[122] *la* D : om. P.
[123] The passage is PV III 293cd: *kevalaṃ tatra timiram upaghātopalakṣaṇam //.*

bcas pa'i tshig gi ***rab rib ni dbang po*** *la gnod pa byed pa'i* ***rkyen thams cad kyis***[124] ***nye bar mtshon pa yin par blta bar bya'o //*** ***de yang yid kyi***[125] ***shes kha cig***[126] ***// zla ba gnyis la sogs pa'i shes pa*** *yang* ***dbang po las***[127] ***skyes pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyang yid kho na yin zhes*** *kha cig* ***smra'o //***

Abbreviations and Literature

AS *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Asaṅga): See ASBh.

ASBh *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: N. Tatia, ed. *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣyam*. Patna, 1976.

ĀP *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Frauwallner [1930].

ĀPV *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Frauwallner [1930].

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DhP *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): Dalsukhabhai Malvania, ed. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna, 1955.

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125 *kyi* P : *kyis* D.

126 PV III 294a: *mānasaṃ tad apīty eke.*

127 *las* D : *la* P.

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NBṬ(Dh) *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See DhP.

NBṬ(V) *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Vinītadeva) (Tib.): L. de La Vallée Poussin, ed. *Tibetan translation of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti (A treatise on Buddhist logic) with the commentary of Vinītadeva.* Bibliotheca Indica 171. 1913. Reprint, Calcutta, 1984.

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PSV — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa) (Tib.): See Hattori [1968].

PV — *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti).

PV I — Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.

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TSop *Tarkasopāna* (Vidyākaraśānti): G. Tucci, ed. *Minor Buddhist texts. Parts I & II.* Delhi, 1986. [Original edition, Rome 1956 and 1958].

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VV *Vidhiviveka* (Maṇḍanamiśra): *Vidhiviveka of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra with the commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vāchaspati Miśra.* Ed. M. L. Gosvami. Varanasi, 1984.

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1992. Yugaron no inmyō: Bonbun text to wayaku [The *hetuvidyā* of YBh: Text and Japanese translation]. *Naritasan Bukkyōkenkyūjo Kiyō* 15: 505–576.

YBh *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *hetuvidyā*-section: See Yaita [1992].

DHARMAKĪRTI'S SEMANTICS FOR THE PARTICLE *EVA* *

by

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Dharmakīrti advances the theory that the meaning of the particle *eva* is *vyavaccheda* 'exclusion'. Depending on the position of *eva* in the sentence, the exclusion is of one of three kinds: *anyayogavyavaccheda* 'exclusion from connection with something else', *ayogavyavaccheda* 'exclusion from non-connection', and *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* 'exclusion from permanent non-connection'. Dharmakīrti follows Diṅnāga in using this particle as a means to introduce quantification into the clauses of the *trairūpya* formula defining a good inferential sign. Kajiyama [1966: 57; 1973] records how later Buddhist logicians applied the theory of *vyavaccheda* to the analysis of negative statements, to the explanation of *apoha*, and to the form of statements about causal relations. My aim in this paper is to formulate Dharmakīrti's account of the truth-conditions of sentences containing *eva*.

1. Dharmakīrti's account of the meaning of *eva* as *vyavaccheda* 'exclusion'

1.1. Statement of the theory

Dharmakīrti states his theory in a number of places. At PV IV 38, he remarks:

dvividho hi vyavacchedo viyogāparayogayoḥ /
vyavacchedād . . . //
"There are two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), [exclusion] from non-connection (*viyoga*) and [exclusion] from connection to something else (*aparayoga*)."

It is at PV IV 190–192 that he offers the fullest description:

ayogaṃ yogam aparair atyantāyogam eva ca /
vyavacchinatti dharmasya nipāto vyatirecakaḥ //190//
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyābhyāṃ kriyayā ca sahoditaḥ /
vivakṣāto 'prayoge 'pi tasyārtho 'yam pratīyate //191//
vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ yataś caitro dhanurdharaḥ /
pārtho dhanurdharo nīlaṃ sarojam iti vā yathā //192//
"The restrictive particle *eva* excludes the non-connection, the connection with something else, or the permanent non-connection of the predicate-property, when attached to the predicate term, the subject term or the verb [respectively]. Even when not actually used, *eva*'s role is understood from the speaker's intention, for [any] sentence has exclusion as its result. Examples [of the three cases] are: 'Caitra is an archer', 'Pārtha is an archer', and 'A lotus is blue'."

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The contribution of *eva* to the meaning of a sentence lies in the restriction[1] it places on the relation between subject and predicate. More specifically, it is a consequence of Dharmakīrti's *anyāpoha* theory of meaning that the meaning of any sentence is an exclusion. So the effect of the insertion of *eva* is to make explicit which of several sorts of exclusion is exemplified by the sentence. The specific contribution of *eva* depends on its position in the sentence, whether it attaches to the subject, verb/copula, or (non-verbal) predicate. Dharmakīrti's examples of the three cases expand as follows:

1a. *Pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ*	"Pārtha *alone* is an archer."	*anyayogavyavaccheda*
b. *Caitro dhanurdhara eva*	"Caitra is an archer *indeed*."	*ayogavyavaccheda*
c. *nīlaṃ sarojaṃ bhavaty eva*	"A lotus is *surely* blue."	*atyantāyogavyavaccheda*

The meaning he assigns to each of these sentences is:

2a. Being-an-archer is excluded from connection with anyone other than Pārtha.
b. Being-an-archer is excluded from non-connection with Caitra.
c. Being-blue is excluded from permanent non-connection with a lotus.

A number of authors have drawn attention to the fact that, given these semantic assignments, the particle *eva* is being treated as a quantifier.[2] We may note, however, that *eva* does not behave like the standard (Aristotelian) determiners, 'all', 'some', 'no' and 'not all'. For, first, *eva* can be inserted into sentences with singular subjects: *Pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ* is well-formed, but we cannot say "all Pārtha is an archer" or "no Pārtha is an archer." In this respect, the role of *eva* resembles the cross-categorical behaviour of expressions like 'only' and 'even' in English. Second, as we shall see in more detail below, the contribution *eva* makes to the truth-conditions is sensitive to the sentential context in which it is inserted. Indeed, from the standpoint of modern theory about generalized quantifiers (e.g. Barwise and Cooper [1981], Westerståhl [1988]), the context neutrality of the Aristotelian quantifiers, their failure to distinguish between focus and scope, places them in a rather special category. Attempts to translate sentences involving *eva* directly into sentences involving the standard quantifiers of a first-order language tend to be insensitive to such questions.

Dharmakīrti's theory employs two important philosophical distinctions, both taken from the Indian logical and grammatical literature. First, he appeals to the distinction between *ayoga-vyavaccheda* and *anyayoga-vyavaccheda*, a distinction itself based on a widely accepted distinction between two types of negation—namely, *prasajyapratiṣedha* 'verbally bound' and *paryudāsa* 'nominally bound'. Second, he takes *eva* to be what the grammarians call a "manifestor" (*dyotaka*) of the sentence meaning, rather than as a 'designator' (*vācaka*), something which makes an independent semantic contribution to the sentence meaning. Attention to these two distinctions

[1] As Katsura [1986: 8–9] notes, the grammarians were the first to link the meaning of *eva* with the notion of 'restriction' (*avadhāraṇa*). See *Pāṇini-sūtra* 8.1.62, and Vyāḍi's meta-rule: *yata evakāras tato 'anyatrāvadhāraṇam* "when the restrictive particle *eva* occurs with reference to one linguistic item, the other is subject to restriction." Later analyses concern, in effect, the proper expansion of the notion of restriction. Notice too that (2b) below is not to be read as asserting that Caitra is restricted to being an archer (and to having no other properties) but as saying that being an archer is restricted to Caitra (and to no other person). See Manorathanandin's comment on PV IV 193.

[2] For references, see Gillon and Hayes [1982: 194, n. 1] and below § 5.

will lead us to a reconstruction of Dharmakīrti's theory. I am not here going to be concerned with the distinction between exclusion of *mere* non-connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) and of *permanent* non-connection (*atyantāyogavyavaccheda*), which I do not think concerns the *logical form* of *eva* sentences.[3]

1.2. *eva* as 'designator' (*vācaka*) or 'manifestor' (*dyotaka*)

Dharmakīrti is explicit about the role of *eva*: its role is to disambiguate the sentence by specifying the nature of the connection between subject and predicate. In this, he follows the grammarians, who treat most particles as *dyotaka*s, 'illuminators' or 'manifestors' of meaning, and not as words which have an independent meaning of their own. Thus Bhartṛhari:

> *nipātā dyotakāḥ kecit pṛthagarthābhidhāyinaḥ /*
> *āgamā iva ke'pi syuḥ sambhūyārthasya vācakāḥ //* (VP II 192)
> "Some *nipātas* (particles) manifest a meaning, some are expressive of a separate meaning, some, like augments (*āgamāḥ*), express a meaning together with other elements." (Iyer's translation)

Manorathanandin, commenting on PV IV 190, asserts explicitly that Dharmakīrti sides with the grammarians:

> *nanu nipāto na svayaṃ vācakaḥ, kin tu dyotakaḥ / tad asya katham ayam arthaprabhedaḥ ity āha—dyotakatvād eva nipāto viśeṣaṇena sahodito [']yogasya vyavacchedakaḥ, viśeṣyeṇa sahokto 'nyayogasya, kriyayā ca sahokto 'tyantāyogeti viśeṣaṇādipadavācya evāyogavyavacchedādis tatsahoktanipātadyotya ity arthaḥ /*
> "Now, a particle is not itself a designator (*vācaka*), but is a manifestor (*dyotaka*). How [then] can it have this [three-fold] division of meaning? A particle, precisely on account of being a manifestor, excludes [non-]connection when attached to the predicate term, connection with another when attached to the subject term, and permanent non-connection when attached to the verb. Therefore, what is designated by the predicate-term etc., namely exclusion of non-connection and so on, is just what is made manifest by the particle attached to it. This is the meaning."

What is at issue here is as follows. According to those who say that *eva* is a manifestor, the bare sentence without *eva* (viz. "S is P") is ambiguous, and the effect of the insertion of *eva* is to reveal or make manifest which meaning is the intended one. The particle *eva* functions in a way

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[3] The contrast between *atyantāyoga* 'permanent non-connection' and *ayoga* '(mere) non-connection' seems to me to be that of non-connection *at any time* "(t) ~ (Fx at t)" vs. tenseless non-connection "~ Fx." The state of affairs described as *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* is one in which the subject and predicate are connected at some time or other, though not necessarily the present time. In other words, the subject and predicate *can be* connected, where 'can' expresses a temporal and not a metaphysical modality. The state of affairs described as *ayogavyavaccheda* is one in which the subject and predicate are connected, in some tenseless sense. The distinction is therefore an instantiation of a well-known feature of the copula: that it has both a tenseless and a tensed reading. The tenseless reading is illustrated by such sentences as "birds fly," and by extension, "the tiger is an animal." In such cases, we take the extension of the subject and predicate to be the class of all their instances. Whether or not their extensions are connected is then a matter independent of time. If we were to take their extensions to be the class of their instances at a specific time, we must allow that they might be connected at some times but not others. I therefore disagree with the view that the distinction between *ayogavyavaccheda* and *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* is one of logical form (cf. Gillon and Love [1980], Gillon and Hayes [1982], Kajiyama [1973]). One may also note that in the first passage quoted from *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti distinguishes only *ayoga-* and *anyayoga-* as the types of *vyavaccheda*.

something analogous to parenthesis or the comma, which are also devices of disambiguation. According to those who say that *eva* is a designator, a bare sentence without *eva* has a certain assertoric content, and the effect of the insertion of *eva* is to add something additional to the content. This additional content is what *eva* designates. Dharmakīrti belongs to the former camp. He regards the content of a simple sentence as being just exclusion. However, there are three different possibilities for what a sentence excludes (*ayoga*, *atyantāyoga* and *anyayoga*). The effect of inserting *eva* into a sentence is to make manifest which class of states of affair the sentence is intended to exclude.

The claim that *eva* is a designator is based on the thought that the sentence "Pārtha alone is an archer" does not merely assert that nobody other than Pārtha is an archer: it asserts too that Pārtha is an archer. The clauses expressing exclusion are then to be read as giving the *contribution* of *eva* to the total sentence meaning. Let us call this the 'cumulative' account of the role of *eva*. On this account, a sentence "S is P" has a base meaning, that S is P. Inserting *eva* into the sentence adds an extra sense to the base meanings: "S *eva* P" means that S is P and nothing other than S is P. This interpretation of the role of *eva* is given explicitly by the Naiyāyikas, who argue that certain particles, *eva* included, are indeed designating expressions, which make an independent contribution to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they are embedded. The Nyāya position is conveniently summarised in the *Nyāyakośa* (sv. '*eva*'):[4]

> *vastutas tu anyayogavyavaccheda eva-kārārthaḥ / vyavacchedaś cātyantābhāvaḥ anyonyābhāvaś ca / pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ ityādau pṛthivyāṃ gandhaḥ pṛthivyanyasmin gandhābhāvaś ca iti bodhaḥ / śaṅkhaḥ pāṇḍura eva ityādau śaṅkha-tādātmyavān pāṇḍuraḥ pāṇḍurānyasmiñ śaṅkhānyonyābhāvaś ca iti bodhaḥ / pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ ityādau pārtha-tādātymavān dhanurdharaḥ pārthānyasmin dhanurdharatvavyavacchedaś ca pratīyate iti /*
> "In actual fact, the meaning of *eva* is [always] exclusion from connection with another. An exclusion is a constant absence or a mutual absence. In a case like 'in earth alone is there smell', the meaning is that there is smell in earth and absence of smell in what is other-than-earth. In a case like 'a conch-shell is white indeed', the meaning is that that which is identical to a conch-shell is white and that there is mutual absence from a conch-shell in what is other-than-white. In a case like 'Pārtha alone is an archer', it is understood that that which is identical to Pārtha is an archer and that there is exclusion from being an archer in what is other-than-Pārtha."

1.3. The distinction between *ayoga-vyavaccheda* and *anyayoga-vyavaccheda*

Dharmakīrti formulates his theory with a pair of terms which have had a wider currency, and have acquired a conventional significance, within the philosophical tradition. This is their use to express the distinction between proof (*svapakṣasādhana*) and refutation (*parapakṣadūṣaṇa*). The terms are used to express the distinction between demonstrating the truth of one's own position and refuting that of one's opponents. For example, Hemacandra entitled a pair of works on the Jaina system *Ayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā* and *Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā*. Dhruva comments that "the former [is] a defence of the Jaina system, and the latter an attack on other systems. . . . *ayogavyavaccheda* lit. exclusion of non-possession, i.e. demonstration that truth

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[4] The Nyāya view is also discussed by P. Chakravarti [1933: 175–177].

does not fail to belong to the Jaina system, that it certainly belongs to it: the constructive or positive part of Hemacandra's work. *Anyayogavyavaccheda* lit. exclusion of the position that truth might belong to other rival systems, i.e. the destructive or negative part of the undertaking" [1933: 8 (notes)]. Dhruva offers another example where the pair of terms are used with this sense in Sāyaṇa's commentary on *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, and he asserts that the terms "are of common occurrence in these senses" (p. 8).

Clearly, a great deal of further examples would be needed properly to establish the truth of this claim. However, the same conclusion as to the import of the terms can be reached on purely logical grounds. There is a clear connection between the terms and a very well-attested distinction between two kinds of negation, *prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*. For *ayoga* is a *prasajyapratiṣedha* negation, while *anyayoga* is a *paryudāsa* negation (cf. Kajiyama [1973], especially the discussion therein of Bhāvaviveka). *Ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda* exclude respectively the following two states of affair (Gillon and Hayes [1982: 199–200]):

dharmo dharmiṇā na yunakti	the predicate-property does not connect with the subject.
dharmo a-dharmiṇā yunakti	the predicate-property connects with non-subjects.

The negative particle *a-* (or *nañ*) occurs here respectively in its two recognised roles, as verbally bound (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) and as nominally bound (*paryudāsa*). This distinction is expressed in the well-known verse "exclusion (*paryudāsa*) is to be understood where the negative [is connected] with the next word; prohibition (*pratiṣedha*) is to be understood where the negative [is connected] with the verb(al) ending" (cited in Staal [1988: 116]). Staal argues that, when verbally bound, the negative particle is the sentential negation "~F(x)" (i.e. it is not the case that x is F), and, when nominally bound, it is a negative subject-term-forming operator, "F(~x)" (i.e. it is the case that a thing-other-than-x is F).[5] If that is right, then *ayogavyavaccheda* is the exclusion of its not being the case that x is connected with F, while *anyayogavyavaccheda* is the exclusion of its being the case that things other than x are connected with F. The first of these is equivalent to the positive assertion that x is connected with F, while the second makes no positive assertion about x's connection with F, but rejects a connection between things other than x and F. Thus, there is a strong link between the two sorts of negation and the two kinds of exclusion; it is less clear which of the two distinctions is logically prior.[6]

These considerations suggest that *ayogavyavaccheda* has a broadly affirmative force, linked with the assertion that the subject and predicate are connected, without making any claim about the relation between the predicate and things other than the subject. *Anyayogavyavaccheda*, on the other hand, is linked with the *denial* that the predicate is connected with things other than the

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[5] It is logically possible for the negative particle to have a third role, as a negative predicate-term-forming operator "(~F)(x)" (x is non-F). Staal observes that the Mīmāṃsakas distinguish this as a second sort of *paryudāsa* negation. The Naiyāyikas also recognise the existence of this sort of negation, and indeed use it in their analysis of *eva*. When *eva* follows the predicate, the state of affairs excluded is that:

a-dharmo dharmiṇā yunakti the predicate's negation connects with the subject.

Anyayogavyavaccheda here refers to the exclusion of S's being connected with what is other than P. See § 3.2.

[6] Kajiyama [1973: 162] interestingly suggests that Bhāvaviveka believes that *eva* should be used to explain the distinction between the two kinds of negation.

subject. It makes no explicit assertoric claim about the relation between subject and predicate. I will now apply the considerations of this section to Dharmakīrti's account of the semantics of *eva*.

2. The role of *eva* restricting the subject term: *anyayogavyavaccheda*

2.1. Dharmakīrti's account

Dharmakīrti's example of a sentence in which *eva* restricts the subject term (*viśeṣya*)[7] is:

1a. *Pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ*
b. Pārtha alone is an archer.

Dharmakīrti asserts that the content of this sentence is the exclusion (*vyavaccheda*) of connection (*yoga*) between the predicate-property (*dharma*) and what is other than (*anya*) the subject (*dharmin*). According to this analysis, sentence 1b is to be paraphrased by "nothing other than Pārtha is an archer." The particle *eva* here behaves as the generalized quantifier "nothing other than . . . is . . ." A point familiar from the recent literature on the term 'only' or 'alone' is that such a quantifier will in general be subject to contextual restrictions on its scope. If one states at a dinner party that only Susan smokes, one asserts, not that no thing other than Susan smokes, nor even that no person other than Susan smokes, but rather that no person at the party other than Susan smokes. The contextual restriction on the quantifier to some salient class of objects has indeed been noted in connection with Dharmakīrti's example 1a. Kajiyama remarks that "the speaker's intention is not that Pārtha is one of the archers, but that he is the only excellent archer (among the five brothers of the Pāṇḍava), the word 'archer' metaphorically expressing 'the best archer'" (p. 163). The sentence thus asserts that no [brother of the Pāṇḍava] other than Pārtha is an [excellent] archer. It is not to be read as asserting that Pārtha is the unique archer in the entire world.


It is clear that, in the *anyayogavyavaccheda* analysis, the contextual restriction enters via the determination of the extension of the phrase 'S-*anya*'. What counts as being 'other-than-S' depends on the linguistic context. For example, the term 'other-than-blue' (*anīla*) has as its extension *colours* (or coloured things) other than blue, but not *anything at all* which is not blue. The point is that the term-forming *paryudāsa* negation *a-* generates a contrary but not a contradictory term. Consider Jinendrabuddhi's example as discussed by Staal [1988: 116–7]: *a-kartari* as it occurs in *Pāṇini-sūtra* 3.3.19, *akartari ca kārake saṃjñāyām*. Staal reports Jinendrabuddhi's argument thus: "if this negation is interpreted as *paryudāsa* the meaning would be '(the suffix is applied) to case relationships different from the nominative' . . . [but this] interpretation should be rejected, for the nominative is a case relationship and the word *kārake* 'case relationship' would hence be superfluous, which conflicts with a well-known economy criterion." Thus, if the negation in *a-kartari* is *paryudāsa*, it would have as its extension *case relationships* other than

[7] I agree with Gillon and Hayes [1982: 197] that the terms *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* refer here to syntactic categories, while *dharma* and *dharmin* refer to semantic types. In 1a the *viśeṣya* is the name "Pārtha," while the *dharmin* is the person Pārtha. Here the *dharmin* is the referent of the *viśeṣya*. However, the pairs need not correspond in this way: it is possible for the *dharmin* to be that which is designated by the *viśeṣaṇa*. For example, Dharmakīrti defines a *sādhya* as the *dharma* qualified by the *dharmin*. See, for example, Tillemans [1992: 455].

the nominative, and not merely *anything* other than the nominative.

We can represent Dharmakīrti's analysis of the content of sentences having *eva* restricting the subject-term in a convenient Venn diagram (adapted from Lycan [1991: 135]).

Figure 1: "S *eva* P" & [S]-*anya-yoga*-[P]-*vyavaccheda*



G = the contextually determined reference class for "S" and "S-*anya*." S + = S ∩ P, the class of S which are also P. S − = S \ P, the class of S which are not P. M = (G \ S) ∩ P, the class of S-*anya* which are P.

Here G is the contextually indicated reference class, S is the subject class, P is the predicate class, and M is the class P ∩ (G \ S). According to Dharmakīrti, the content of "S *eva* P" is [S-*anya*]-*yoga*-[P]-*vyavaccheda*: exclusion of P from connection with what is other than S. The extension of 'S-*anya*' is the class G \ S, and P is excluded from connection with G \ S just in case P ∩ (G \ S) = M is empty. Thus M = ∅. In the limiting case when G is the universal domain, this is equivalent to asserting that P ⊆ S.

The major point of controversy surrounding this analysis is whether the sentence "S *eva* P" asserts more than that no G other than S is P. In particular does it in addition carry either an existential import that some S are P (S+ occupied), or a universal implication that all S are P (S– empty)? For example, does *pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ* assert merely that no brother of the Pāṇḍava other than Pārtha is an archer, or does it also assert that Pārtha is indeed an archer? Clearly, that is the implication of the statement, but what is implied need not be identical with what is explicitly stated. Manorathanandin interestingly remarks that Dharmakīrti's view is that the statement "S *eva* P" is made when it is well-known (*prasiddha*) that S is P, but there is a doubt about whether things other than S are P as well.[8] This suggests that the fact that S is P is a *presupposition* for asserting "S *eva* P." I am using the term 'presupposition' here in its technical sense. A statement presupposes a state of affairs iff the statement only has a truth-value if the state of affairs obtains. Given that the presupposition is a precondition for the statement to assert anything, it is generally held that that statement does not literally assert that the presupposition obtains. However, that the presupposition obtains will usually be conversationally implicated by the statement. In this way, one might deny that S is P is literally stated by "S *eva* P," although it is presupposed and implicated. This is rather like the sentence "No non-members will be admitted," which, although it does not state that members *will* be admitted, clearly implicates that this is so.

If we are to assess the correctness of Dharmakīrti's analysis, we must therefore ask two

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[8] PVV 402: *pārthe dhanurdharatvaṃ prasiddham eva / kin tu tādṛśam anyasyāpi kim astīti sandehe 'nyayoga-vyavacchedaphalaṃ viśeṣaṇam.* Tillemans [1992: 453 (n. 61)] sates that "the usual intention in uttering the sentence *caitro dhanurdharaḥ* is simply to assert that Caitra is not a non-archer: there can be other archers too. Thus: "Caitra is an archer." On the other hand, a speaker will utter *pārtho dhanurdharaḥ* in order to convey that Pārtha is the only excellent archer among the brothers of the Pāṇḍava. Then we would have to translate: "It is Pārtha [alone] who is the archer."

questions: (i) Does "S *eva* P" entail that there is some S which is P; and (ii) does "S *eva* P" entail that all S are P? There is no general agreement on this issue: indeed, it is the primary focus of the disagreement between Kajiyama [1973] and Gillon and Hayes [1982]. Kajiyama argues that "S *eva* P" does indeed entail that all S are P. He states that "when *eva* is stated with the qualificand, it negates the connection of the qualifier and that which is other than the qualificand, i.e. we have a universal proposition in which the class of qualificand and of qualifier are equal in extension" (p. 163). In other words, "S *eva* P" asserts that nothing other than S is P and that all S are P. That is, "S *eva* P" is true iff $M = \emptyset$ & $S- = \emptyset$.

Gillon and Hayes take issue with Kajiyama's claim, arguing that Kajiyama is misled by the fact that 1a has as its subject a proper name. Since S has just one member, we can deduce from the fact that S+ is occupied that S– is empty. That deduction is invalid when the subject is a general term. In particular, they point out that the statement *manuṣo [eva] dhanurdharaḥ* is "true not only in the special case where the class of human beings is equal in extension with the class of archers; it is also true in case the class of human beings is greater in extension than the class of archers" (p. 201). *Eva* is more akin to 'only' than to 'just' or 'exactly'. Note, further, that Gillon and Hayes do not give "S *eva* P" an existential implication in their final statement that "S *eva* P" asserts that $P \subseteq S$.

2.2. The Nyāya account

I believe that both Kajiyama and Gillon and Hayes have been influenced by the Nyāya account of the semantics of such sentences, for in that account, there are indeed implications of the sort they describe. Consider a sentence analysed in the *Nyāyakośa*:

2a. *pṛthivyām eva gandhaḥ*
b. In earth alone (there is) smell.

The Nyāya paraphrase of 2a is that smell is in earth and in nothing other than earth.[9] The second conjunct is the contribution of *eva*, while the first is the positive assertoric content of the bare sentence. The positive assertoric content of this sentence seems to be existential (cf. § 3.2): smell occurs in at least some samples of earth. So S+ is occupied and S– is unspecified. The Nyāya analysis agrees with that of Gillon and Hayes in such cases. If, however, one held that the positive assertoric content is universal (in which case S– would be empty), the Nyāya analysis would agree with Kajiyama's.

We may summarise the views on offer in Figure 2:

Figure 2: The meaning of "S *eva* P"

	M	S+	S-
Dharmakīrti	O	O	U
Nyāya	O	+	U
Kajiyama	O	?	O
Gillon-Hayes	O	?	U

(O stands for empty, + for occupied and U for not specified)

The issue which divides Dharmakīrti and the Naiyāyikas is the positive existential force of sentences containing *eva*: does the sentence *state* that some/all S are P or *presuppose* it? It is most interesting to note

[9] It is interesting to compare this analysis with a remark by Locke (*Essay* III, VII "Particles") on the English particle *but*: "*I saw BUT two Planets*: Here it shews, that the Mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other."

that exactly the same issue is the major source of dispute about the semantics of the English quantifier 'only'. Horn [1989: 248] notes that "the essential issue is: is *only* α negative in meaning and positive only by presupposition or implicature, or does it abbreviate a conjunction (*only* α = 'α and nothing {other/more} than α')?" Horn observes that this same issue was even discussed by the medievals Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood.

3. The role of *eva* attached to the predicate term


3.1. Dharmakīrti's account

Dharmakīrti's example of a sentence in which *eva* is attached to the predicate term (*viśeṣaṇa*) is:

3a. *Caitro dhanurdhara eva*
b. Caitra is an archer indeed.

He asserts that the content of this sentence is the exclusion (*vyavaccheda*) of non-connection (*ayoga*) between the predicate-property (*dharma*) and the subject (*dharmin*). According to this analysis, sentence 3b is paraphrased by "it is not the case that Caitra is not an archer." Since the negative in *ayoga* is a sentential (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) rather than a term (*paryudāsa*) negation, there is no contextual indication of a reference class here. Again, we can depict the analysis in a Venn diagram:

Figure 3: "S P *eva*" & [S]-*ayoga*-[P]-*vyavaccheda*



S + = S ∩ P, the class of S which are also P. S – = S \ P, the class of S which are not P.

According to Dharmakīrti, the content of the sentence "S P *eva*" is [S]-*ayoga*-[P]-*vyavaccheda*, P's exclusion from non-connection with S. This certainly implies at least that S+ is occupied (some S is P). Does it imply further that S– is empty (i.e. that all S are P)? Once again, the example has a proper name as its subject term, and although in that special case we can deduce that S– is empty if S+ is occupied, this deduction is not valid when the subject term is general.

Both Kajiyama and Gillon and Hayes offer arguments that "S P *eva*" entails that all S are P, i.e. that S– is empty. Kajiyama says of *ayogavyavaccheda:*

> "it negates the non-connection of the qualifier and the qualificand. That is to say, it affirms the connection between the two, and indicates that the qualifier is an attribute of the qualificand. Thus, we obtain a universal proposition in which the class of the qualifier is greater in extension than the class of the qualificand. The proposition does not mean that there is no archer other than Caitra, but that Caitra is one of the members of the class of archer" (p. 163).

There is indeed an emphasis here on the affirmative quality of *ayogavyavaccheda*, which we have stressed above, but there is also a *non sequitur*: why should affirming a connection between qualifier and qualificand imply a universal proposition rather than an existential one? It is consistent with the facts to assume that Dharmakīrti's analysis leaves the occupancy of S– unspecified.

Gillon and Hayes have a different argument that S– is empty. They say that the state of

affairs excluded here is that expressed by (retaining their labelling):

S1.2 *na dharmo [dharmiṇi] vartate*
E1.2 [The property-possessor] does not have the property.

This, they claim, can be expressed formally as $(\exists x)(Sx \& \neg Px)$, some S-possessor is a non-P-possessor. The possibility excluded in *ayogavyavaccheda*, according to Gillon and Hayes, is precisely that S– is occupied.

This seems wrong on two accounts. First, the statement S1.2 is not well paraphrased as $(\exists x)(Sx \& \neg Px)$. We have seen that the negation in S1.2 is a sentential negation not a term-negation. So a better paraphrase would be either $\neg(\exists x)(Sx \& Px)$ or else $\neg(\forall)(Sx \rightarrow Px)$—the quantity of "*dharmiṇi*" is not specified. The second reading is indeed logically equivalent to that of Gillon and Hayes, but the construction is at best ambiguous between the two. If the first reading is taken, the possibility excluded is that S+ is empty. Second, the Gillon-and-Hayes reading gives the sentence "S P *eva*" no existential implication, for it will not in general follow that S+ is occupied from the fact that S– is empty (proper name subject terms being a special case, as we have seen). Yet we have already seen that *ayogavyavaccheda* should be construed as having a generally positive sense.

I believe that Dharmakīrti's own example has proved misleading. When the subject term is a proper name, the occupancy of S+ entails the vacancy of S–. So his example *Pārtho dhanurdhara eva* does not discriminate between the two analyses. Let us consider another example from Dharmakīrti: *śabdaḥ anityaḥ* "sound is impermanent." This is the thesis in a standard proof (see PV IV 37–38; Tillemans [1992: 454]). An opponent objects that this statement implies that impermanence occurs only in sound, and hence cannot occur in the inferential example (*sapakṣa*). To this, Dharmakīrti replies that the opponent mistakes the type of *vyavaccheda* implicitly involved: he takes it to be *anyayogavyavaccheda* while in fact it is *ayogavyavaccheda.* What is excluded is the non-connection of impermanence with sound, and not the connection of impermanence with things other than sound.

But now we have another possible motivation for the Gillon & Hayes reading of "S P *eva.*" For *śabdaḥ anityaḥ eva* surely states that impermanence is connected with all sounds, and not just some sounds. Again, however, we must note that the subject term here is again singular not general. In this sentence, as in many other similar cases, we have a *mass noun*, denoting the entirety of a certain sort of stuff. For example, the sentence "gold is a metal" is grammatically singular: I am speaking of the entire mass of gold stuff, and only derivatively of each bit of gold. So, just as in the previous case, the reason why "sound is impermanent [indeed]" entails that all sounds are impermanent is that the subject term is singular. It is not because *eva* as attached to the predicate is a universal quantifier.

Dharmakīrti's view, then, is that what "S P *eva*" literally states is just that S and P are connected. As Manorathanandin observes, a statement in this form is made when there is a doubt as to whether S is P.[10] It removes the doubt by denying that they are not connected, which is

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[10] PVV 402: *caitre dhanurdharatvasandehād viśeṣaṇenāyogamātraṃ vyavacchidyate.*

equivalent to asserting that they are connected. This 'connection' between S and P entails that all S are P only when 'S' is singular.

Thus far we have three hypotheses concerning the correct analysis of "S P *eva*":


Figure 4: The meaning of "S P *eva*"

	S-	S+
Dharmakīrti	U	+
Kajiyama	O	+
Gillon-Hayes	O	U

3.2. The Nyāya account

Where are the Nyāya situated? In fact, the Nyāya analysis of such constructions is quite different. The contribution to content of *eva* in "S P *eva*" is said to be an *anyayogavyavaccheda*, not *ayogavyavaccheda*. Specifically, it is [P]-*anyayoga*-[S]-*vyavaccheda*, S's exclusion from connection with what is other than P (note the reversal of S and P here, as compared with the analysis of "S *eva* P"). Now, the phrase "P-*anya*" again introduces a contextually determined reference class. So the Venn diagram for the Nyāya analysis will be:

Figure 5: "S P *eva*" as [P]-*anyayoga*-[S]-*vyavaccheda*



G = the contextually determined reference class for "P" and "P-*anya*." P+ = P∩S, the class of P which are also S. P– = P \ S, the class of P which are not S. M = (G \ P) ∩S, the class of P-*anya* which are S.

Once again, the contribution made by *eva* is that M = ∅. What does the Nyāya consider to be positive assertoric content of "S P *eva*"? Consider another example analysed in the *Nyāya-kośa*:

4a. *śaṅkaḥ pāṇḍura eva*
b. a conch is white indeed.

According to the Nyāya analysis, what 4a states is that which is identical to a conch is white and that mutual absence of conch is in that which is other than white. The first conjunct, which describes the positive assertoric content of the bare sentence, appears to state that P \ S is empty (all S are P), while the second conjunct, which is the contribution made by *eva*, states that M is empty.

The curious feature of this analysis is that the insertion of *eva* adds nothing to the assertoric content, since $M \subseteq S$. Indeed, if G is the class of coloured objects, and if there are no colourless conches, $S = M$ and the two clauses are equivalent. This suggests that the actual assertoric content of the sentence might be weaker than 'all S are P'. Suppose we are discussing whether fruits of different sorts are sweet or bitter, and I say:

4c. *āmraphalaṃ madhuram eva*
d. a mango is sweet indeed.

This does not imply that all mangoes are sweet: there can be tasteless ones. The implication is that any mango which has a taste is sweet. This is an example where M is empty but not S. The assertoric content is rather that P+ is occupied: there are sweet mangoes. In general, it seems plausible to conjecture that the assertoric content of a bare sentence "S is P," with a subject term in the singular and non-verbal predicate in apposition, is existential rather than universal. Compare this with the analysis of indefinite or bare plural subjects in English. A widespread view is that the content of "An S is P" is existential, even if there are cases where what is conveyed pragmatically is universal (e.g. "a cat meows"). Likewise, it is sometimes maintained that "Men are mortal" literally states just that some men are mortal, even if there is an implicature that all men are mortal.

4. A comparison of the accounts

Let us restrict our attention to the limiting case where G is the universal domain. The situation in this limiting case is as in Figure 6 ($S \wedge P$ stands for $S \cap P \neq \emptyset$):

Figure 6: The meaning of *eva*

	"S *eva* P"	"S P *eva*"
Dharmakīrti	$P \subseteq S$	$S \wedge P$
Nyāya	$P \subseteq S$ & $S \wedge P$	$S \subseteq P$ & $S \wedge P$
Kajiyama	$S = P$	$S \subseteq P$ & $S \wedge P$
Gillon-Hayes	$P \subseteq S$	$S \subseteq P$

Can we decide in favour of one of these accounts over the others? One consideration concerns the attribution to *eva* of a univocal semantic role independently of its position as restricting subject or predicate. Both the Nyāya and the Gillon-Hayes accounts give *eva* a univocal role: namely, that the term to which it is attached has a wider extension than the other term (and, at least for the Nyāya, that there are objects in the intersection). On Dharmakīrti's account, sentences containing *eva* have one of two quite distinct logical forms, one based on *anyayogavyavaccheda* and the other on *ayogavyavaccheda.*

Clearly, the particle *eva* ought not be treated as an ambiguous expression. This, however, would only be an argument against Dharmakīrti if he regarded *eva* as a designator, for then we would have to say that it was ambiguous. However, Dharmakīrti's view is that the function of *eva* is to make manifest which of two distinct possible logical forms a sentence has. From this perspective, it is not a criticism to say that *eva* does not have a univocal semantic role in the two cases, since it does not have an independent semantic role at all. Any device whose function is to disambiguate between two readings must mark the two readings differently.

Another consideration has to do with the interdefinability of the two sorts of sentence involving *eva*. If the Nyāya, or the Gillon-Hayes, semantics is correct, the two uses are virtually interchangeable, for both semantics validate the following syntactic rules:

5a. S *eva* P $\vdash$ P S *eva*
b. S P *eva* $\vdash$ P *eva* S

Gillon and Hayes appeal to these transitions as part of their objection to Kajiyama (p. 202). The argument they give for the validity of the transitions is, however, fallacious. They argue that 5a must be valid, as it involves a mere reversal of the *word-order* of "S *eva*" and "P," and in Sanskrit word-order does not supervene on the underlying logical form. Likewise for 5b. The fallacy in this argument is the claim that the transition involved in 5a is just a change in word order. This is not correct, since we are using word-order in *our* notation, to indicate which term is the subject (*viśeṣya*) and which is the predicate (*viśeṣaṇa*), and again to indicate whether *eva* is attaching to the subject or the predicate. Thus, in "P S *eva*," "P" is now the subject, "S" the predicate, and *eva* is predicative not subjective. The point is clearer if we introduce a notation which does not depend on word-order. Suppose we parse each sentence into an ordered triple <subject, predicate, type of *eva*>. Then the transition in 5a is from <S, P, subjective> to <P, S, predicative>. This is not a mere transposition of word-order at all, but a combination of two substantive changes. The rules in 5 assert a non-trivial thesis, that the transposition of subject and predicate is the inverse of the transposition of the subjective and predicative uses of *eva*.

Suppose that *gaur eva sāsnādimān* and *sāsnādimān gaur eva* differ only in word-order. Then in our notion, both would be written in the same form, either "S *eva* P" or "S P *eva*," as in both cases either '*gaur*' is the subject and '*sāsnādimān*' the predicate, or vice versa. So the transition involved here would be the trivial one:

6a. S *eva* P $\vdash$ S *eva* P
b. S P *eva* $\vdash$ S P *eva*

If, however, we construe the second of these sentences to have '*sāsnādimān*' as its subject and '*gauḥ*' as its predicate, then indeed it would be written as "P S *eva*," but would not arise from a mere word-order reversal. Gillon and Hayes' argument relies on an equivocation between these two readings. Indeed, if they were right that the transitions involve a mere word-order switch, they could have no consequences at all for the semantics of *eva*, as the transition would not be between two sentences with different logical forms!

Although their argument for the syntactic implications in 5 is faulty, those implications may nevertheless be valid. Indeed, finding a set of syntactically permissible transitions may well be the right way to decide on the correct semantics for *eva*. One transition we have already considered concerns the deletion of *eva* from the sentence containing it:

7a. S *eva* P $\vdash$ S P
b. S P *eva* $\vdash$ S P

In fact, both parties will claim these transitions to be valid. For Dharmakīrti, it is the move from an unambiguous sentence to an ambiguous sentence, one which has as one of its meanings the meaning of the first sentence. For the Nyāya, the transition is valid because the sentence on the right expresses the existential implication of the sentence on the left. Indeed, the same ques-

tion arises in the analysis of 'only'. Lycan remarks that "for convenience, I have fallen in with the common view that *Only S is P* noncancellably implies *S is P*, but that claim is highly questionable" [1991: 135 n. 12]. Perhaps the implication holds in some cases but not in others; the problem is to give a criterion, and to build that criterion into the semantics.

An interesting pair of transitions which are validated by Dharmakīrti's semantics but not the Nyāya semantics is this one:

8a. S *eva* P $\vdash$ not (S-*anya* P *eva*)
b. S P *eva* $\vdash$ not (S-*anya eva* P)

This pair reflects the logical relationship between *eva* and the *prasajyapratiṣedha-* and *paryudāsa-* negations. It also corresponds to the interdefinability of the existential and universal quantifiers. For "S *eva* P" states that all P are S, which is equivalent to the proposition that it is not the case that some non-S is P.

Modern discussions of generalised quantification introduce the important notion of monotonicity. Barwise and Cooper [1981: 184] give the following tests for monotonicity. Suppose $P_1 \subseteq P_2$, and QS is a quantifier (e.g. *some men*). Then QS is monotone increasing if: QS $P_1 \rightarrow$ QS P_2, and QS is monotone decreasing if: QS $P_2 \rightarrow$ QS P_1. If it is neither, QS is nonmonotone. For example, *some men* is monotone increasing, as shown by the validity of the inference from 'some men are running' to 'some men are moving', while *no men* is monotone decreasing. Horn [1989: 248] observes that if *only* is negative in meaning and positive only by presupposition, then it will be monotone decreasing, while if it has a conjunctive meaning, then it will be nonmonotone. Clearly, an inference like "Socrates alone is running $\vdash$ Socrates alone is moving" is invalid; so *only* is not monotone increasing. The question is whether the inference "Socrates alone is moving $\vdash$ Socrates alone is running" is valid. The inference is invalid on the conjunctive account, since it does not follow that Socrates is running from his moving. However, it is valid on the purely negative account, since if no-one other than Socrates is moving, then no-one other than Socrates is running.

Returning to the particle *eva*, Dharmakīrti's position is that *eva* is a monotone decreasing quantifier. The Naiyāyikas treat it as being nonmonotone. The salient inference is:

9. S *eva* P_2 $\vdash$ S *eva* P_1

Given that there is no widespread agreement among linguists about what natural language intuitions say about the monotonicity of 'only', it is hardly surprising that there is no general concensus about the Sanskrit particle *eva*. It is, however, remarkable how clearly the issue was formulated by Dharmakīrti and other Indian logicians. Only with further study of examples in natural Sanskrit transitions following the pattern of 5, 8 or 9, will we be in a position to decide which semantics best fits the actual use of *eva*. For it is ultimately the actual use of an expression that is the tribunal in which its semantics are to be judged.

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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE SANSKRIT PARTICLE *EVA*

by

Brendan S. Gillon, Montreal

1. Introduction

Twenty-four years ago, Prof. Y. Kajiyama [1973] published an important article entitled "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy," where he brought to the attention of modern scholars Dharmakīrti's view of the meaning of the particle *eva*. Nine years later, Richard Hayes and I [1982] wrote an article where we proposed an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's view somewhat different from Prof. Kajiyama's. This year, at the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference, Jonardon Ganeri presented a paper entitled "Dharmakīrti's Semantics for the Particle *eva*," in which he interprets Dharmakīrti's view in still a different way. In this paper, I wish to do two things: first, to take advantage of some of Ganeri's thoughtful remarks to clarify the interpretation advanced by Richard Hayes and me in our paper some fifteen years ago; and second, to buttress our original interpretation by looking carefully at how the particle *eva* is actually used in Sanskrit, and especially at how it is used by Dharmakīrti in the Svārthānumāna chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*. I start with the second task.

2. Use of the Particle *eva* by Dharmakīrti

As every Sanskritist knows, the particle *eva* occurs frequently in Classical Sanskrit texts. Thus, for example, the particle is used on average once every seven lines within the first eighteen pages of Gnoli's edition of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s Svārthānumāna chapter. In spite of its frequent use in classical texts, its grammatical characterizations are disappointingly vague. At best they comprise a list of words which might be used in translating it. (Cf. Monier-Williams p. 232; Apte § 260). Careful inspection of its actual use, aided by judicious application of a few of the insights of contemporary semantic and pragmatic theory, yields, I believe, an improved appreciation of the particle's grammatical characteristics. In this section, I shall show that the particle *eva*, as used in the sentences found in the initial part of Dharmakīrti's Svārthānumāna chapter (namely, pp. 1–18 of Gnoli's edition[1]), has a number of distinct, but related senses, and that these distinct senses have different distributions within the clauses in which they occur.

The fundamental distinction in the various uses of the particle *eva* is between a use in which it affects the truth conditions of the clause in which it occurs and a use in which it affects its felicity conditions. To see the difference, let us compare a use of the English adverb *only* with one use of the English reflexive pronoun. Consider the following sentences:

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[1] See the appendix for a list of all the occurrences of the particle in these sentences.

(1.0) Devadatta went to Pāṭaliputra.
(1.1) Devadatta *himself* went to Pāṭaliputra.
(1.2) *Only* Devadatta went to Pāṭaliputra.

In the circumstances in which Devadatta and Yajñadatta both have gone to Pāṭaliputra, the first two sentences above are true, but the third is false. Indeed, the first two sentences are truth conditionally equivalent: whenever the first is true, the second is true; and, whenever the second is true, the first is true.

In spite of their equivalence, the first two sentences are not interchangeable. In particular, some settings render the use of the second sentence infelicitous, while others render its use felicitous. To narrow down in what this difference in felicity consists, consider the next pair of sentences:

(2.0) The postman delivered the letter.
(2.1) The postman *himself* delivered the letter.

In the absence of some special setting, the use of the sentence in (2.1) is infelicitous. The reason is clear: we expect a postman to deliver a letter, since a postman's job is to deliver letters.

Now consider a special setting. The person to whom the letter is delivered works in a large building. The postman normally delivers letters to the front desk and an employee working in the building distributes the letters left by the postman to their various recipients. Should the postman actually deliver the letter to an individual within the building, the sentence in (2.1) would be used in a completely felicitous way.

When the English reflexive pronoun occurs immediately after a noun phrase, it conveys this: what the noun phrase to which the reflexive pronoun is appended is true of, is being emphasized with respect to what is expressed by the balance of the clause. Often, what is being emphasized is what is unexpected. Thus, the sentence in (1.1) would be felicitous, were it unexpected of Devadatta that he had gone to Pāṭaliputra. When the English adverb *only* occurs immediately after a noun phrase, it imposes a necessary condition on the truth of the clause, namely, that everything satisfying the clause less the adverb and the noun phrase to which it is attached satisfies the noun phrase. Thus, the sentence in (1.2) would be false, should anyone distinct from Devadatta have gone to Pāṭaliputra. In other words, being identical with Devadatta is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of the sentence form "X *went to Pāṭaliputra*."

In Classical Sanskrit, the very same particle, *eva*, has both of these uses. Since the particle is said to be a particle of *niyama*, which, curiously, can mean both restriction and emphasis, let us distinguish these two uses as its restrictive sense and its emphatic sense. In its restrictive sense, *eva* occurs appended to noun phrases, but to my knowledge, it never occurs appended to a verb. In its emphatic sense, it occurs both appended to noun phrases and to verbs.[2] As a result of this overlap in the distribution of these usages, sentences such as the second one below are ambiguous.

[2] In English, to emphasize a clause's verb, one uses either the auxiliary verb *to do* or an adverb such as *indeed*.

(3.0) *Devadattaḥ Pāṭaliputram agacchat.*
Devadatta went to Pāṭaliputra.
(3.1) *Devadattaḥ* ***eva*** *Pāṭaliputram agacchat.*
Only Devadatta went to Pāṭaliputra.
Devadatta *himself* went to Pāṭaliputra.

The emphatic uses of the particle *eva* just identified are not the only ones found among the sentences assayed. The particle is found appended to a demonstrative pronoun or a demonstrative adjective, in which case it signals that what is emphasized is the fact that the thing referred to by the antecedent phrase and the thing referred to by the demonstrative pronoun or demonstrative adjective are one and the same. Such an emphasis is achieved in English by the use of the adjective *same*. Again, one can use expectations to highlight the contrast.

(4.1) The man with flowers has a wife in San Francisco.
The *same* man has another wife in Los Angeles.
(4.2) The man with flowers has a mother.
The *same* man has a father.

Since it is unexpected for one man to have two wives, the use of *same* is felicitous in (4.1). Since it is a necessity of nature for one man to have both a mother and a father, the sentence in (4.2) is not felicitous without a special setting.

Other emphatic uses of the particle *eva* arise when it occurs after *sarva*, whether it is used as an adjective or pronoun. Such an emphasis can be effected in English by the prepositional phrase *without exception*. Similarly, the particle, when used after the adjective or pronoun *anyat*, has an emphatic effect similar to the emphatic effect in English of the adverb *completely* used in front of the adjective *different*. And finally, the particle, appended to the negative adverb *na*, has the same emphatic effect as does the prepositional phrase *at all*, when used in an English clause with the adverb *not*. Notice that, in all three cases, the appearance of any of these expressions in a clause does not affect the clause's truth conditions.

Another usage is where the particle corresponds to the English adjective *mere* or the English adverb *merely*. Since this usage plays no role in the issue addressed here, I shall elaborate neither on it nor on still other uses of the particle *eva* not exhibited in the Dharmakīrti sentences surveyed for this paper.[3]

In summary, the particle *eva* has at least two senses, a restrictive sense in which it alters the truth conditions of the clause in which it appears and an emphatic sense, in which it does not alter the truth conditions but does alter the felicity conditions. When used in its restrictive sense, it may occur immediately after any noun phrase serving as one of the arguments of the clause's verb, that is, any noun phrase expressing one of the verb's *kāraka*s, or valencies. When the particle is used in a clause satisfying the schema given immediately below, it has as a necessary condition on its truth the condition stated second below.[4]

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[3] Some usages of *eva* by Dharmakīrti remain unclassified. The unclassified ones are so indicated in the appendix.

[4] Whether or not the necessary condition is also a sufficient condition will not be addressed here.

(5.1) $[_S \ldots \mathrm{NP}_i\ eva \ldots \mathrm{V} \ldots]$
(5.2) Everything which satisfies $[_S \ldots [_{NPi}\ x] \ldots \mathrm{V} \ldots]$ satisfies NP_i.

(where the subscript *i* is the number of one of the seven Sanskrit cases). Here is an illustration of what is set out in (5).

(6.0) *brāhmaṇaḥ chatram bibharti.*
A brahmin carries an umbrella.
(6.1) *brāhmaṇaḥ* ***eva*** *chatram bibharti.*
Only a brahmin carries an umbrella.
Everyone who carries an umbrella is a brahmin.
(6.2) *brāhmaṇaḥ chatram* ***eva*** *bibharti.*
A brahmin carries only an umbrella.
Everything a brahmin carries is an umbrella.

In bringing this section to an end, one should note that the restrictive use of *eva* is sometimes signalled by an elliptical reprise of the clause containing *eva* of the form:

(7.0) $[_S \ldots \mathrm{NP}_i\ eva \ldots \mathrm{V} \ldots]$ *na* $anyat_i$
(7.1) *brāhmaṇaḥ* ***eva*** *chatram bibharti, na anyaḥ.*
Only a brahmin carries an umbrella, and no one else.
(7.2) *brāhmaṇaḥ chatram* ***eva*** *bibharti, na anyat.*
A brahmin carries only an umbrella, and nothing else.

3. Dharmakīrti's Analysis of *eva*

I now turn to Dharmakīrti's analysis of the particle *eva* found in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, which I cite in full for the reader's convenience.

ayogaṃ yogam aparair atyantāyogam eva ca /
vyavacchinatti dharmasya nipāto vyatirecakaḥ // 190
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyābhyām kriyayā ca sahoditaḥ /
vivakṣāto 'prayoge 'pi tasyārtho 'yam pratīyate // 191
vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ yataś caitro dhanurdharaḥ /
pārtho dhanurdharo nīlaṃ sarojam iti vā yathā // 192

Proceeding in the way Hayes and I did in our original article, let me unpack the first verse and a half into its three component sentences:

(8.1) *viśeṣaṇena sahoditaḥ vyatirecakaḥ nipātaḥ dharmasya [dharmiṇā] ayogam vyavacchinatti.*
The limiting particle [*eva*], when stated immediately after a qualifier [expression], excludes the [predicate] property's non-connection [with a subject property possessor].
(8.2) *viśeṣyeṇa sahoditaḥ vyatirecakaḥ nipātaḥ dharmasya [dharmiṇaḥ] aparaiḥ ayogam vyavacchinatti.*
The limiting particle [*eva*], when stated immediately after a qualificand [expression], excludes the [predicate] property's connection with things other [than a subject property possessor].
(8.3) *kriyayā sahoditaḥ vyatirecakaḥ nipātaḥ dharmasya [dharmiṇaḥ] atyanta-ayogam vyavacchinatti.*
The limiting particle [*eva*], when stated immediately after an action [expression], excludes the [predicate] property's invariable non-connection [with a subject property possessor].

As Hayes and I pointed out, these sentences can be divided into three parts: the grammatical subject (i.e., the portion of each sentence up to and including the word *nipātaḥ*); the grammatical object (i.e., the portion from the word *nipātaḥ* up to but excluding the word *vyavacchinatti*); and the verb *vyavacchinatti.* The first part identifies the placement of the particle in a certain kind of clause. The second part describes a certain kinds of state of affairs. And the third part states a relation between the kind of clause of interest and a kind of state of affairs. In brief, the sentences in (8) above fit the following schema:

(9) Clauses of kind C exclude states of affairs of kind Q.

In other words, Dharmakīrti is furnishing falsehood conditions, so to speak, for certain kinds of clauses.

Which kind of clauses? The examples he gives in the last verse make it clear which kind.

(10.1) *caitraḥ dhanurdharaḥ [**eva**] [bhavati].*
Caitra is an archer.
(10.2) *pārthaḥ [**eva**] dhanurdharaḥ [bhavati].*
Only Pārtha is an archer.
(10.3) *nīlaṃ sarojam [bhavati] [**eva**].*
Some lotus is indeed blue.

Here too a schema can be abstracted:

(11) NP_{1s} ___ NP_{1p} ___ COPULA ___

where NP_{1s} is the nominative case subject noun phrase and NP_{1p} is the nominative case predicate noun phrase. It is important to stress that the linear order of the constituents NP_{1s}, NP_{1p}, and COPULA in the schema is irrelevant.[5] What is important is that, once an order is settled on for these constituents, the placement of the particle *eva* is crucial.

In light of the clausal schema given above, one can clearly state what Dharmakīrti means by the words *viśeṣaṇa* (literally, qualifier), *viśeṣya* (literally, qualificand), and *kriyā* (literally, action). They are, as Hayes and I pointed out, metalinguistic expressions. The first word, translated above as 'qualifier expression', designates predicate expressions, that is, expressions which can substitute for NP_{1p} in (11). The second, translated as 'qualificand expression', designates subject expressions, that is, expressions which can substitute for NP_{1s} in (11). The third, translated as 'action expressions', designates verbs.

We can also see more clearly what Dharmakīrti means by the word *dharma* (literally, property). The property is the one in a state of affairs associated with a predicate expression, that is, a predicate expression's connotation. Here, I shall translate '*dharma*' as 'the property associated with the predicate', or more compactly as, 'the predicate property'. It is obvious that a term must be supplied to make sense of the relational expressions *ayoga* (*non-connection*), *apara* (*other*),

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[5] The reader interested in the nature of word order in Sanskrit prose in general might consult Gillon [1996], while the reader interested in the nature of word order in the Svārthānumāna chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* in particular might consult Gillon [1991].

and *atyantāyoga* (*invariable non-connection*). The term we supplied is *dharmin*, which I translate here as 'possessor of the property associated with the subject', or more briefly as, 'subject property possessor'. This term is intended to designate the set of things in a state of affairs of which the subject expression is true, that is, a subject expression's denotation.

Before turning to a detailed examination of the sentences in (8), let me comment on some features of the translation. First, I replaced the supplied words 'connoted' and 'denoted' in our original translation with 'predicate' and 'subject'. These supplied words perform the same function as 'connoted' and 'denoted—namely, to distinguish the property designated by Dharmakīrti's word *dharma* from the property designated by the word *dharma* in the supplied word *dharmin*. This change permits me to convey what Hayes and I said in the original without having to reconstitute the lengthy footnote in which we explained how we intended 'denoted' and 'connoted' to be understood. Second, I have retained the use of the definite article in our translation of Dharmakīrti's word *dharma*, for its reference is fixed. That is, once one is given a clause of the intended form, the predicate property and the subject property are fixed, much as the value of a parameter in logic is fixed by the context of a proof, and hence the word *dharma* behaves like a proper name. What does not behave like a proper name is the supplied word *dharmin*. So, I have replaced the definite article in these places with the indefinite article.

I now proceed through the sentences in (8) in inverse order. The sentence in (8.3) provides falsehood conditions for clauses of the form:

(12) NP_{1s} NP_{1p} COPULA *eva.*

What are the conditions under which clauses of this form are false? Let me turn the object noun phrase into a simple clause, by dissolving compounds and denominalizing the nominalized verb, as Hayes and I did in our original article.

(13) *atyantam na dharmaḥ [dharmiṇaḥ] yunakti.*
Never is the predicate property connected [with a subject property possessor].

Taking expressions of the following two forms

(14.1) $[_{NP1}$ X$]$ $[_{NP3}$ Y$]$ *yunakti*
X *connects with* Y
(14.2) $[_{NP1}$ X$]$ $[_{NP7}$ Y$]$ *vartate*
X *occurs in* Y

to be synonymous, I restate the sentence in (13) as follows:

(15) *atyantam na dharmaḥ [dharmiṇi] vartate.*
Never does the predicate property occur in a subject property possessor.

Using 'S' to stand for the subject property and 'P' for the predicate property and letting 'Sx' read as "x has the subject property" and 'Px' as "x has the predicate property," one can restate the

above in classical quantificational logic as follows:[6]

(16) $\neg\exists x\,(Sx \wedge Px)$
It is not so that some S-possessors are P-possessors.

It is important to bear in mind that this rendition into classical quantificational logic does not reflect the syntactic structure of any of the Sanskrit sentences given above. Thus, for example, none of the Sanskrit sentences contains a conjunction, but the formula does.

Recall that the sentences in (8) state falsehood conditions. Thus, the formula in (16) provides the falsehood conditions for clauses of the form given in (12). The truth conditions for such clauses, then, are these:

(17) $\exists x\,(Sx \wedge Px)$
Some S-possessors are P-possessors.

These very same truth conditions are the truth conditions for the clauses just like the ones specified in (12), but without the particle *eva*. We observed in the previous section that such an equivalence is characteristic of the emphatic use of the particle *eva*. We also observed that the particle *eva*, when appended to a verb, has only its emphatic sense.

Next, I turn to the sentence in (8.2), proceeding as before, *mutatis mutandis*. The kind of clause addressed in (8.2) has the form:

(18) NP_{1s} *eva* NP_{1p} COPULA.

Its falsehood conditions can be rendered as follows:

(19) *dharmaḥ [dharmiṇaḥ] aparaiḥ yunakti.*
The predicate property is connected with what is other than [a subject property possessor].

which I take to be the same as

(20) *dharmaḥ [dharmiṇaḥ] aparasmin vartate.*
The predicate property occurs in what is other than [a subject property possessor].

This can be expressed in classical quantificational logic as follows:

(21) $\exists x\,(\neg Sx \wedge Px)$
Some non-S-possessors are P-possessors.

Recalling that the conditions in (21) are the falsehood conditions for clauses of the form in (18), we see that the truth conditions for such clauses are:

(22) $\forall x\,(Px \rightarrow Sx)$
Every P-possessor is an S-possessor.

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[6] The formula originally used by Hayes and me has been changed to a logically equivalent one. The change reflects the use of the indefinite article in the translation 'a subject property possessor'.

Notice that these very same truth conditions follow from the schema and its truth conditions, given in (5), and the fact that the schema in (18) is a special case of the schema in (5.1). In other words, Dharmakīrti has stated in (8.2) the truth conditions for simple copular clauses where the particle *eva* is applied to the subject noun phrase in its restrictive sense.

Finally, I come to the sentence in (8.1). It states that clauses of the form

(23) NP_{1s} NP_{1p} *eva* COPULA.

have the falsehood conditions

(24) *dharmaḥ [dharmiṇā] na yunakti.*
The predicate property is not connected with [a subject property possessor].

which is roughly synonymous with

(25) *dharmaḥ [dharmiṇi] na vartate.*
The predicate property does not occur in [a subject property possessor].

The rendition of this into classical quantificational logic is:

(26) $\exists x\,(Sx \wedge \neg Px)$
Some S-possessors are not P-possessors.

Recalling again that the conditions in (26) are the falsehood conditions for clauses of the form in (23), we see that the truth conditions for such clauses are:

(27) $\forall x\,(Sx \rightarrow Px)$
Every S-possessor is a P-possessor.

These very same truth conditions follow from the schema and its truth conditions, given in (5), and the fact that the schema in (23) is a special case of the schema in (5.1). That is, Dharmakīrti has stated in (8.1) the truth conditions for simple copular clauses when the particle *eva* is applied to the predicate noun phrase in its restrictive sense.

Ganeri takes exception to the treatment Richard and I gave to the sentence in (8.1). To appreciate his point of view, the reader should look carefully again at (25). The English translation is ambiguous. On one construal, the one adopted by Hayes and me, it says that the predicate property does not occur in some subject property possessor; and on another, given second below, it says that the predicate property does not occur in any subject property possessor.

(28.1) $\exists x\,(Sx \wedge \neg Px)$
Some S-possessors are not P-possessors.

(28.2) $\neg\exists x\,(Sx \wedge Px)$
It is not so that some S-possessors are P-possessors.

The question arises: which of the construals corresponds to the Sanskrit sentence—the one in which the negation has narrow scope, as in (28.1), or the one in which the negation has wide scope, as in (28.2)?

Hayes and I provided no justification for our choice. Indeed, Ganeri believes that we made the wrong choice. He points out that the truth conditions, corresponding to the falsehood condi-

tions just given, are

(29.1) $\forall x (Sx \rightarrow Px)$
Every S-possessor is a P-possessor.
(29.2) $\exists x (Sx \wedge Px)$
Some S-possessors are P-possessors.

He states that two compounds corresponding to two of the very phrases being translated, namely, *ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda*, occur as titles of a pair of works by the Jain Hemacandra. He then cites the following interesting remark by the latter text's contemporary editor, A. B. Dhruva. I cite Ganeri's citation of Dhruva in full:

> the former [is] a defence of the Jaina system, and the latter an attack on other systems. . . . *ayogavyavaccheda*, lit. exclusion of non-possession, i.e. demonstration that truth does not fail to belong to the Jaina system, that it certainly belongs to it: the constructive or positive part of Hemacandra's work. *anyayogavyavaccheda* lit. exclusion of the position that truth might belong to other rival systems, i.e. the destructive or negative part of the undertaking.

It is this positive sense of the expression *ayogavyavaccheda*, Ganeri holds, which justifies choosing the truth conditions in (29.2) over the ones in (29.1).

But, it seems that just the opposite follows: taking the terms implicit to the compound to be Jain doctrine and truth, one obtains, in accordance with the analysis corresponding to the truth conditions in (29.1), that every Jain doctrine is true, whereas one obtains, in accordance with the analysis corresponding to the truth conditions in (29.2), that some Jain doctrine is true. Surely, from the point of view of the Jain author, the former analysis of the compound more desirable than the latter.

Be the analysis of the compound as it may, Ganeri's challenge remains: what evidence is there that the falsehood conditions given in (8.1) correspond to the falsehood conditions of (28.1), and not those of (28.2)? The answer comes when we consider the results of the analysis of the sentences in (8) globally. Observe that on the analysis of (8.3) advocated by Hayes and me, each of the three different placements of the particle *eva* in a simple copular clause has distinct falsehood conditions and those distinct conditions are given by Dharmakīrti with distinct Sanskrit expressions.

(30)	CLAUSE FORM	FALSEHOOD CONDITIONS	SANSKRIT
(8.1)	NP_{1s} NP_{1p} *eva* COPULA	$\exists x (Sx \wedge \neg Px)$	*ayogam*
(8.2)	NP_{1s} *eva* NP_{1p} COPULA	$\exists x (\neg Sx \wedge Px)$	*yogam aparaiḥ*
(8.3)	NP_{1s} NP_{1p} COPULA *eva*	$\neg\exists x (Sx \wedge Px)$	*atyanta-ayogam*

On the alternative view, though there are three different placements of the particle *eva* in a simple copular clause, two of the placements—namely, the one in (8.1) and the one in (8.3)—yield clauses with the very same falsehood conditions, yet Dharmakīrti gives the falsehood conditions with a simple *ayoga* in the first case and with *atyanta-ayoga* in the second.

(31)	CLAUSE FORM	FALSEHOOD CONDITIONS	SANSKRIT
(8.1)	NP_{1s} NP_{1p} *eva* COPULA	$\neg\exists x (Sx \wedge Px)$	*ayogam*
(8.2)	NP_{1s} *eva* NP_{1p} COPULA	$\exists x (\neg Sx \wedge Px)$	*yogam aparaiḥ*

(8.3) $NP_{1s}\ NP_{1p}$ COPULA *eva* $\neg\exists x\,(Sx \wedge Px)$ *atyanta-ayogam*

But surely the word *atyanta* is being used to distinguish the falsehood conditions in (8.3) from those in (8.1). In particular, *atyanta* compels the negative prefix in (8.3) to be construed to have wider scope than the implicit term *dharmiṇaḥ*, in contrast to what obtains in (8.1) where the implicit term has wider scope than the negative prefix.

Appendix

This appendix comprises a list of the occurrences of the particle *eva* in the first eighteen pages of Gnoli's edition of the Svārthānumāna chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. The occurrences are identified by page and line of the Gnoli edition. Thus, '2.5' refers to page two, line five. In addition, I have indicated where the relevant material is glossed by Karṇkagomin. Thus, 'K 17.1' refers to the first line of the seventeenth page of Sankṛtyāyana's edition. (The symbol 'ø' indicates an unexpressed copula.)

eva: RESTRICTIVE
(Gloss: *only*, *alone*)

2.5 [$_{NP7}$ *sajātīye eva*]
K 14.7 no gloss

2.13 [$_{NP7}$ *tatra eva*]
K 17.1 gloss: *na anyatra*

3.16 [$_{NP3}$ *taiḥ eva dharmaiḥ*] . . . *ye*
K 27.22: no gloss

4.2 [$_{NP7}$ *tat-mātra-anurodhini eva*] *na*
Dhk. glosses *na anya-āyatte*

4.21 [$_{VP}$[$_{NP1}$ *evam-vidha-anupalabdhiḥ eva*] ø]
K 33.7 gloss: *na anyā*

5.22 [$_{NP1s}$ *kāraṇa-anupalabdhiḥ eva*]
K 39.1 no gloss

8.18 [$_{NP1s}$ *samagrāṇi eva kāraṇāni*]
K 50.18 gloss unclear

9.3 [$_{NP1}$ *rāga-ādīnām eva kāryam*]
K 51.13 no gloss

10.5 [$_{NP1s}$ *nāntarīyakam eva kāryam*]
K 55.4 no gloss

16.17 [$_{NP1s}$ *anupalabdhaḥ eva ātmanaḥ*]
K 73.15 no gloss

16.30 [$_{NP6}$ *śākya-ādi-mat-viśeṣasya eva kasya-cit*]
K 74.22 no gloss

17.7 [$_{NP5}$ *svabhāva-pratibandhāt eva*]
K 75.13 glossed as *tasmāt eva*

17.12 [$_{NP5}$ *svabhāva-pratibandhāt eva*]
K 76.1 no gloss

18.4 [$_{AC}$ *tasmin sati eva*]
K 77.14 no gloss

eva: EMPHATIC with verbs (overt or covert)
(Gloss: *indeed, in fact, do*)

1.5 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *an-arthī*] ø eva]
K 3.8 no gloss

1.10 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *trividhā*] *ø eva*]
K 9.20 no gloss

5.17 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *siddhā*] *ø eva*]
K 38.16ff. no gloss

6.14 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *gamikā*] *ø eva*]
K 41.15 no gloss

9.14 [$_{VP}$ *bhavati eva*]
K 54.1 no gloss

12.3 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *siddhaḥ*] *ø eva*]
K 59.11 no gloss

12.6 [$_{VP}$ *na asti eva*]
K 59.19 no gloss

13.17 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *a-nivaritaḥ*] *ø eva*]
K 64.6 no gloss

15.2 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *yuktaḥ*] *ø eva*]
K 67.4 no gloss

16.23 [$_{VP}$ *asti*] *ø eva*]
K 74.6 no gloss

18.9 [$_{VP}$ [$_{AP1}$ *prasiddhau*] *ø eva*]
K 78.7 no gloss

eva: EMPHATIC with nouns
(Gloss: reflexive pronoun)

7.1 [$_{NP1s}$ *kāryam eva*]
K44.3 no gloss

7.16 [$_{NP1s}$ *hetuḥ eva*]
K48.3 no gloss

9.4 [$_{NP1s}$ *saḥ eva*]
K 51.17 no gloss

9.11 [$_{NP1s}$ *saḥ eva*]
K 52.18 no gloss

9.17 [$_{NP6}$ *para-arthasya eva*]
K 53.16 no gloss

10.4 [$_{NP1s}$ *saḥ eva*]
K54.22 no gloss

11.1 [$_{NP2}$ *tam eva*]
K 57.17 no gloss

14.13 [$_{NP1s}$ *tat-lakṣaṇam eva*]
K 66.1 unclear whether or not there is a gloss

17.2 [$_{NP6}$ *svabhāvasya eva*]
K 75.2 no gloss
18.11 [$_{NP1s}$ *hetuḥ eva hi kevalaḥ*]
K 78.8 no gloss

eva: SINGULARITY
(Gloss: *the very same*)

8.1 [$_{NP1s}$ *sā eva*]
K 48.13 no gloss
13.17 [$_{NP1s}$ *yaḥ eva*]
passage from Dignāga K 64.7
16.10 [$_{NP1s}$ *saḥ eva anupalabdhiḥ*]
K 72.13 no gloss
16.24 [$_{NP1s}$ *saḥ eva bhāvaḥ*]
K 74.13 no gloss
17.13 [$_{NP1s}$ *saḥ eva avinā-bhāvaḥ*]
K 76.5 glosses *saḥ eva svabhāva-pratibandhaḥ avinābhāva-ākhyaḥ*

eva: STRICT MEANING

2.23 *sarvaḥ eva ayam*
From Dignāga: K 24.1 *yatra api . . . tatra api*
12.8 *na eva pratyeṣyati*
K 60.5 no gloss
16.25 *anyat eva*
K 74.13 no gloss

eva: SUFFICIENCY
(Gloss: *mere*)

3.3 [$_{NP1s}$ *an-artha-pratilambhaḥ eva*] *syāt*
K 14.19: *artha-pratilambhaḥ eva na syāt*
3.7 [$_{VP}$ [$_{NP1}$ *artha-vyabhicāraḥ eva*] ø]
K 25.12 no gloss
4.10 [$_{VP}$ [$_{NP1}$ *upalabdhiḥ eva*] ø]
missing commentary
5.16 [$_{VP}$ [$_{NP1}$ *anya-anupalabdhiḥ eva*] *ucyate*]
K 37.16 no gloss
6.29 [$_{VP}$ [$_{NP1}$ *svabhāva-bhūtaḥ eva*] *anumīyate*]
K 44.1 no gloss
12.9 [$_{NP2}$ *anupalambham eva*]
K 54.6 *na adhikam viśeṣam*
13.15 [$_{AC}$ *anupalambhe eva ø*]
K 64.1 glosses *anupalambhe eva sati*
14.4 [$_{NP6}$ *vyāvṛtteḥ eva*]
K 65.1 *eva* glossed by *mātra*

17.11 [$_S$ *iti eva*]
K 75.19 no gloss

eva: UNCLASSIFIED

2.13 [$_{NP1}$ *vyāpakasya tatra bhāvaḥ eva*]
K 16.22 no gloss

2.18 [$_{AP1}$ *upalabhya-sattvaḥ eva*] *syāt*
K 22.1 no gloss

6.7 [$_{NP6}$ *dṛśya-ātmanām eva*]
K40.20 no gloss

6.17 [$_{NP3}$ *hetu-siddhyā eva*]
K 42.12 no gloss

6.18 [$_{ADV}$ *prāg eva*]
K 42.12 no gloss

7.5 [$_{NP1s}$ *samagrāṇi iti eva kāraṇa-dravyāṇi*]
K 44.9 no gloss

8.14 [$_{NP1s}$ *bhūta-pariṇāmaḥ eva*]
K 50.8 no gloss, however K claims that *eva* should be after the predicate

12.22 [$_{VP}$ [$_{NP1}$ *vyatirekaḥ tu siddhaḥ eva*] ø]
K 62.4 no gloss

17.6 [$_{NP1}$ *kāryam eva*] *na syāt*
K 75.8 no gloss

18.2 [$_{NP5}$ *sva-kāraṇāt eva*]
K 77.9 glosses *tasmāt eva*

18.24 [$_S$ . . . *iti eva*] *na syāt*
K 82.12 no gloss

18.25 [$_{NP5}$ *tataḥ eva*]
K 82.15 no gloss

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ON THE DETERMINATION OF CAUSALITY*

by

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In the Lokāyataparīkṣā of *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, Kamalaśīla referred to the method of the determination of causality when he denied the causal relation between body and mind.

[1] *pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ / sa cānvayād vyatirekād vā viśiṣṭād eva niścīyate, na darśanādarśanamātreṇa /* (TSP 640,7–8)
"Causality is established by perception (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perception (*anupalambha*). It is determined by the specified *anvaya* or *vyatireka*, not by mere perception (*darśana*) and non-perception (*adarśana*)."

The theory that causality was determined through *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha* was referred to in the later Buddhist and non-Buddhist works. As is well known, it was Dharmakīrti's theory. Kamalaśīla and other Post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians were deeply influenced by him in this matter. The purpose of this paper is to examine Dharmakīrti's method for determining causality.

I

One of the significant differences between Dignāga's logic and Dharmakīrti's may be that Dharmakīrti introduced the theory of three kinds of *hetus*. According to Dignāga, if *hetu* (A) has the three characteristics of a correct *hetu*, we can infer *sādhya* (B) from A. But, Dharmakīrti restricted the correct *hetu* to three kinds, namely, *kārya*, *svabhāva*, and *anupalabdhi*. If *hetu* (A) is *kārya* or *svabhāva*—*anupalabdhi* is included in *svabhāva*—we can infer B from A. The basis of this view is the theory of *svabhāvapratibandha*. As Professor Katsura pointed out, Dignāga never discussed how the logically inevitable relation (*vyāpti/avinābhāva/niyama*) was related to reality and how it could have universal applicability. Dharmakīrti solved these problems by introducing the theory of *svabhāvapratibandha*.[1] It was also an answer to the puzzling problem as to what is the basis of the logically inevitable relation.

According to him, the logically inevitable relation between *sādhya* and *hetu* is guaranteed by the essential connection between them.

[2] *svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rthaṃ na vyabhicarati /* (PVSV 2,19–20 = PVin II 10,14–15. Cf. NB II 19)

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*This paper is a revised English version of Japanese paper "Dharmakīrti ni okeru ingakankei no kettei" [Dharmakīrti on the Determination of Causality]. *Tetsugaku* (The Journal of Hiroshima Philosophical Society) 39 (1987): 131–147.

[1] Katsura [1986a: 99–105; 1986b: (26)–(27)]

"For when there is an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) [of A to B], A does not deviate from B."

Namely, when there is an essential connection of A to B, there is a logically inevitable relation between A and B, and B can be inferred from A. Such an essential connection is twofold, namely, causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva/tadutpatti*) and identity (*svabhāva/tādātmya*). Only if A is an effect or an essence of B, can we infer B from A. Otherwise, inference never occurs. For example, we cannot infer a horse from a cow.

This standpoint is clear from the following famous verse:

[3] *kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt //* (PV I 31 = PVin II 37,23–26)
"The restriction of the logically inevitable relation (*avinābhāvaniyama*) is established by causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) or essence (*svabhāva*) which restricts, not by perception (*darśana*) [of *hetu* in the similar] nor by non-perception (*adarśana*) [of *hetu* in the dissimilar]."

As is well known, Kumārila insisted that *vyāpti* was established by repeated perceptions (*bhūyodarśana*).[2] And, Īśvarasena was said to maintain that *vyatireka* was established by a mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*).[3] In contrast to them, Dharmakīrti regarded *svabhāvapratibandha* as the basis of the logically inevitable connection.[4]

Among the two *svabhāvapratibandhas*, causality was explained by him as follows:

[4] *kāryasyāpi svabhāvapratibandhaḥ / tatsvabhāvasya tadutpatter iti /* (PVSV 3,3–4 = PVin II 11,6–7)
"An effect also has an essential connection [with its cause] because the essence of the [effect] is produced from the [cause]."

[5] *kāraṇaṃ nivartamānaṃ kāryaṃ nivartayati / anyathā tat tasya kāryam eva na syāt / siddhas tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ niyamayati /* (PVSV 17,5–7. Cf. PVin II 46,3–6)
"When there is not a cause (B), there is not [its] effect (A). Otherwise, A cannot be B's effect. But, causality, [once] established, restricts the essence [of an effect (A) to its cause (B)]."

For example, fire is a cause of smoke because the essence of smoke is produced from fire. If a causal relation between fire and smoke is established, then the logically inevitable connection, namely, wherever there is not fire, there is not smoke, is also established. In the case of *kāryahetu*, the logically inevitable connection is guaranteed by causality.

A question now arises: how can we find causality? If A is a cause of B in reality, we can infer B from A. But, how can the causal relation between A and B be determined? On this problem, Dharmakīrti maintained as follows:

[6] *tasmāt sakṛd api darśanādarśanābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddher bhavati tatas tatpratipattiḥ / nānyathā /* (PVSV 24,3–5)

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[2] *Ślokavārttika*, Anumāna, v. 12a–b: *bhūyodarśanagamyā ca vyāptiḥ*

[3] PVSV 10,13–16,7. (cf. PVin II 39,17–45,25.) See Ernst Steinkellner, "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 10 (1966).

[4] See Steinkellner [1997].

"Therefore, causality is determined through perception and non-perception even when they occur only once. And thus they (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) are understood from the [determination of causality]. [They, i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, are] not [understood] in any other manner."

Let us recall Kumārila's insistence that *vyāpti* is known through repeated perceptions. According to him, if we observe co-occurrence of A and B many times, we can establish the inevitable relation between A and B. On the contrary, Dharmakīrti insisted that causality, the basis of the inevitable relation, could be determined by only one observational cycle. His reason for the above insistence was that if A is not an effect of B, A is never produced from B.

[7] *sakṛd api tathādarśanāt kāryaḥ siddhaḥ / akāryatve akāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt /* (PVSV 22,6–7. Cf. PVin II 34,3–5)
"It is established that A is an effect [of B] through observation of this sort, even if it occurs only once. For if A were not an effect [of B], A would never be produced from non-cause B."

Thus, *vyāpti* cannot be determined directly by the observational cycle which consists of perception and/or non-perception because of the uncertainty, although causality can doubtlessly be determined in this way. What is a difference between them? To this question, the commentator answered that causality is not observed by a mere perception and/or non-perception, but by a specific perception and/or non-perception.[5] The words "*darśana*" and "*adarśana*" in the above quotation ([6]) are a little ambiguous.[6] Dharmakīrti, in his later works, used the words "*pratyakṣa*" and "*anupalambha*" instead of them, and his followers continued this new wording.[7]

Now, we are arrived at the famous sentence often quoted in Buddhist and non-Buddhist works. We can find it in the *Hetubindu.*

[8] *pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ /* (HB 4,2)
"Causality is determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha.*"

In the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, he explained as follows:

[9] *prasiddhe hetuphalate pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ //* (SP 16cd)
"Cause and effect nature are determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha.*"

Moreover, in the *Vādanyāya*, on the same topic, Dharmakīrti stated as follows:

[10] *tasya tena saha kāryakāraṇabhāvaprasādhanaṃ bhāvābhāvasādhanapramāṇābhyām /* (VN 3,19–4,2)
"A causal relation between A and B is determined by the *pramāṇa* which establishes existence and the *pramāṇa* which establishes non-existence."

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[5] PVSVṬ 88,13–16: *nanu yathā darśanādarśanayor niyamaniścayaṃ prati vyabhicāras tathā kāryakāraṇabhāvaniścaye 'pi syād iti / tad ayuktaṃ / viśiṣṭābhyām eva darśanādarśanābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvaniścayābhyupagamāt /*

[6] In PV IV, Dharmakīrti used the words "*dṛṣṭi*" and "*adṛṣṭi.*" PV IV 246: *nāntarīyakatā sā ca sādhanaṃ samapekṣate / kārye dṛṣṭir adṛṣṭiś ca kāryakāraṇatā hi te //* PV IV 268ab: *kāryakāraṇatā yadvat sādhyate dṛṣṭy-adṛṣṭitaḥ /*

[7] PVSVṬ 106,28 = PVṬ 55a6: ***darśanādarśanābhyām** iti yathoktabhyāṃ pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ /*

Even without the help of commentaries, it is clear that here the two *pramāṇa*s mean *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha* respectively.[8]

According to Dharmakīrti, causality is not an actual relation between A and B as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school admits, but their existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*). It is nothing but the fact that only when B exists, A exists, and when B does not exist, A never exists. Such A and B are called effect and cause, respectively.

[11] *idam eva hi kāraṇasya kāraṇatvaṃ yad arthāntarabhāve svabhāvopadhānaṃ / kāryasya api tadbhāva eva bhāvaḥ /* (PVSV 19,6–8)[9]
"The causal nature of a cause is the proximate existence of its essence to the essence of another thing (= effect). And [the effect nature] of an effect is that it exists only when [cause] exists."

[12] *na ca kāryatā nāmānyā bhāvābhāvaviśeṣābhyām /* (PVSV 141,4)[10]
"The effect nature is nothing but a specific existence and non-existence."

[13] *kārye dṛṣṭir adṛṣṭiś ca kāryakāraṇatā hi te //* (PV IV 246cd)
"In the case of *kārya[hetu]*, perception (*dṛṣṭi*) and non-perception (*adṛṣṭi*) [are means of establishing an inevitable relation (*nāntarīyakatā*)] for they are causality."

[14] *bhāve bhāvini tadbhāvo bhāva eva ca bhāvitā /*
. . . hetuphalate . . . // (SP 16)
"The causal nature is that existence of [a thing (B) regarded as cause] is followed by existence of [a thing (A) regarded as effect], and the effect nature is that [A] exists only when B exists. . . ."

[15] *. . . tadbhāve bhāvas tadabhāve 'bhāvas ca . . . kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ . . . /* (HB 4,10–11)[11]
"Causality is that A exists when B exists and A does not exist when B does not exist."[12]

From this point of view, one may say that Dharmakīrti's idea of causality is equivalent to that

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[8] VNV 15,18–19: *bhāvābhāvasādhanapramāṇe ca pratyakṣānupalambhe* yathākramam /* (*VNV: *-lambho*) Cf. PVSV 141,4–6: (*na ca kāryatā nāmānyā bhāvābhāvaviśeṣābhyām /*) *sa ca bhāvaḥ pratyakṣo 'bhāvo 'py anupalabdhilakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣasāmarthyasiddha iti . . . /*

[9] Cf. PPañc 199,6–7: *idam eva kāryasya kāryatvaṃ, yat tasmin saty eva bhāvo 'sati ca tasminn abhāva eva /*

[10] Cf. PVṬ 316b1–2: *rgyur mngon par 'dod pa yod na dngos po snga na yod pa ma yin pa nyid du 'byung ba dang / de med na mi 'byung ba zhes bya ba de ni* ***yod pa dang med pa'i khyad par*** *yin no //* ***de dag las 'bras bu gzhan nyid med do*** *//* PVSVṬ 509,12–13: *kāraṇābhimatasya bhāva eva bhāvaḥ tadabhāve cābhāva ity etau* ***bhāvābhāvaviśeṣau / tābhyāṃ nānyā kāryatā*** *bhāvasya /*

[11] Cf. HBṬ 46,19–22: *ya eva hi kāraṇābhimatasya* ***bhāve*** *bhāva eva kāryatvenābhimatasya* ***bhāvaḥ, tadabhāve*** *kāraṇatvābhimatasyābhāve abhāva eva kāryatvenābhimatasy****ābhāvaś ca****, sa eva kāryakāraṇabhāvo nānyaḥ /*

[12] Supplementary materials are as follows:

PVSV 136,17–18: *yat khalu rūpaṃ yata evopalabhyate tasya tadupalabdhināntarīyakām upalabdhim evāśritya lokaḥ kāryatāṃ prajñāpayati /*

PV II 49: *sattopakāriṇī yasya nityaṃ tadanubandhataḥ / sa hetuḥ saptamī tasmād utpādād iti cocyate //*

PV IV 268: *kāryakāraṇatā yadvat sādhyate dṛṣṭyadṛṣṭitaḥ / kāryādiśabdā hi tayor vyavahārāya kalpitāḥ //*

SP 14: *darśanādarśane muktvā kāryabuddher asambhavāt / kāryādiśrutir apy atra lāghavārthaṃ niveśitā //*

Refuting the causal relation between body and mind in PV II, Dharmakīrti regarded not only existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāva*) but also change (*vikāra, vikriyā*) as a mark of causality. On this point, see Inami [1986]. cf. PV II 183: *saty eva yasmin yajjanma vikāre vāpi vikriyā / tat tasya kāraṇaṃ prāhuḥ . . .*

of *vyāpti*. He regarded causality as a basis of *vyāpti* as we have seen. On the other hand, he seems to have insisted that our idea of causality is conventional and causality is nothing but *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.[13] In fact, the later Buddhists regarded causality as equivalent to *vyāpti* in the case of *kāryahetu*.[14] Professor Katsura understood the word *svabhāvapratibandha* as having two meanings, namely, (1) a universal connection between *hetu* and *sādhya* in the universe of discourse, and (2) an essential connection between two items in actual reality.[15] And he, in another paper, maintained that the ontological nature of *svabhāvapratibandha* (2) was identified with causality and identity, and that the conceptual nature of it (1) was derived from causality and identity.[16] Causality also seems to have the same two aspects as *svabhāvapratibandha* has. One is causality as ontological basis of *vyāpti* and another is as equivalent to *vyāpti*.

Thus, Dharmakīrti regarded causality as a combination of existence and non-existence, and insisted that it was determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha*.

The next question to be examined is how to determine causality by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha*. In the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, Dharmakīrti explained the matter as follows:

[16] *yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ yad upalabhyate, tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya kāryam* / (PVSV 22,2–3 = PVin II 33,33–34,2. Kajiyama [1963: Appendix 1, 2])
"If a thing (A), which was not perceived in spite of having its conditions [to be perceived], is perceived when other things (B, C, D, . . .) are perceived, and if A is not perceived when even one thing (B) among them disappears, then A is the effect of B."

What is immediately apparent in this quotation is that his method for the determination of causality is based on *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the Indian traditional method of finding relation. But, it must be noted that he added the phrase "which was not perceived in spite of having its conditions to be perceived (*tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ*)." Causality is nothing but the existence and non-existence, and, among them, non-existence is not established by a mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*), but by *dṛśyānupalabdhi*. Dharmakīrti often insisted in his works that non-existence was not established by *adarśanamātra*, but by *dṛśyānupalabdhi*.[17] The theory was applied to this case.

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[13] *Anvaya* and *vyatireka* mean the fact that A exists when B exists and the fact that A does not exist when B does not exist, respectively. At the same time, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* mean the cognition of the former fact and that of the latter fact, respectively. In the formar sense, restriction (*niyama*) was intended by Dignāga. Namely, *anvaya* means that A exists *only* when B exists, and *vyatireka* means that A *never* exists when B does not exist. These correspond to the second and the third characteristic of correct *hetu*. Then, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are equivalent to *vyāpti*. Followers of Dignāga succeeded his usage. As for the latter sense, Dignāga did not mention to how to know *vyāpti*. Dharmakīrti's explanations of the determination of causality is an attempt to present it.

[14] NBṬ 164,9–10 (ad NB III 21): *mahānasādau hi pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvātmāvinābhāvo niścitaḥ* / VC 161,1: . . . *dahanādinā dhūmāder vyāprir adhyakṣānupalabdhisādhanatadutpattilakṣaṇeti* . . . / VC 177,12–13: *tasmād bhede tadutpattipratītis vyāptipratītiḥ / sā ca pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām eva* / VNir 106,1: . . . *dahanādinā dhūmāder arthāntarasya vyāpris tadutpattilakṣaṇā* /

[15] Katsura [1986b: (27)–(28)].

[16] Katsura [1992: (40)].

[17] E.g., HB 21,18–19: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya anupalabdhir abhāvahetur abhāvavyavahārahetur vā* /

According to commentators, the following three possibilities were excluded by adding the phrase "*tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ*":[18]

1. a possibility that A has been there before B appears
2. a possibility that A comes from another place
3. a possibility that A's cause is other than B

If he had said only that A is perceived when B is perceived, it would be applicable even to the above three cases. Dharmakīrti, adding the phrase "*tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham*" to simple *anvaya*, clarified that A did not exist before B existed.

Let us summarize the method of the determination of causality explained in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. That A is an effect of B is determined by the following process:

[Table 1]	non-perception of A which has its conditions to be perceived
	perception of B, C, D, . . .
	perception of A
	non-perception of B
	non-perception of A

In the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, the similar explanation was given.

[17] *paśyan ekam adṛṣṭasya darśane tadadarśane /*
apaśyan kāryam anveti vināpy ākhyātṛbhir janaḥ // (SP 13. Kajiyama [1963: Appendix 3])
"If one observes that A, which was not perceived [in spite of having its conditions to be perceived],[19] is perceived when B is perceived, and/or that A is not perceived when B is not perceived,

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[18] PVṬ D50a6–b1: ***de'i msthan nyid*** (PVSV 22,2: **tallakṣaṇam**) *ni dmigs pa'i (mi rtag pa'i* (D); *dmigs pa'i* (P)*) mtshan nyid de* [A]*rgyur 'dod pa rnams nye ba'i sngon rol na mi dmigs pa las so*[A] *//* [B]*dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid kyir gyur pa mi dmigs pa 'dis ni de na me nye ba'i sngon rol na yang yod pa dang yul gzhan nas 'ongs pa dang me nye ba'i sngon rol na re lde dang rtsig pa la sogs pa gang dag yod pa de dag rgyu nyid yin pa dgag ste /*[B] *de dag rgyu nyid yin na ni / me nye ba'i sgon rol na yang du ba dmigs par 'gyur ro //* [C]*me nye ba'i sgon rol na yang yul de na yod pa'am / yul gzhan nas 'ongs pa'am / gzhan gyi rgyu can yin pa'i rnam pa 'di tsam gyis na du ba mes bskyed par bya ba ma yin par 'gyur na / de dag thams cad ni ji skad bshad pa'i mi dmigs pas bsal to /*[C] (Parallel texts: [A] TBV 57,20–21: *kāraṇābhimatānāṃ sannidhānāt prāganupalabdhaṃ . . .* [B] AJP 177,4–6(= UtpSV 53,3–4): *etena copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhena tatra tasya svahetoḥ sannidhānāt* [UtpSV: *svahetusannidhānāt*] *prāg api sattvam anyato deśād āgamanaṃ prāgavasthitakaṭakuṭyādi*[UtpSV: *-kuḍyādi-*]*hetutvaṃ cāpākṛtam . . .* [C] TBV 57,21–23: *etāvadbhiḥ prakāraiḥ dhūmo 'gnijanyo na syāt yady agnisannidhānāt prāg api tatra deśe syāt, anyato vāgacchet, tadanyahetuko vā bhavet / tad etat sarvam anupalambhapurassareṇa pratyakṣeṇa nirastam /*); HBṬ 45,18–21: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya cānupalambhenā*[1]*gnyādisāmagrīsannidhānāt prāg anyata āgamanaṃ, taddeśakālasannihitāt kaṭakuṭyāder utpattiḥ, taddeśe ca sannidhānam*[2] *iti, tritayam apākriyate /* ([1]HBṬ: *cānupalambhe nā-;* [2]HBṬ: *cāsannidhānam*); TSP 640,8–14: *tatrānvayāt kāryaniścaye karttavye yeṣām upalambhe saty upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ pūrvam anupalabdhaṃ sad upalabhyata ity evam āśrayaṇīyam / anyathā hi yady upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam anupalabdham ity evaṃ nāpekṣeta, tadā tatra kāryasya prāg api sattvam, anyato vā deśād āgamanaṃ sambhāvyeta*[1], *ye ca*[2] *kāraṇāt prāg avasthitāḥ kuṭyādayas teṣāṃ kāraṇatā na niṣiddhā syāt / upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhopadarśane tu sā niṣiddhā bhavati / tatra tasyā vyabhicārāt /* ([1]TSP: *apagamanam;* [2]TSP: *yena*); KS 317,14–15: *sa ca bhāvas tridhā saṃbhāvyate / tatraiva deśe sthitiḥ, anyata āgamanam, tadviviktakalāpād evotpattir iti /*; PVinṬ(Bu) 137b4–5: *rgyur 'dod pa rnams nye ba'i sngon rol na yod na snang rung de'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa'i mi dmigs pa 'dis ni rgyu nye ba'i sngon nas yul de na yod pa dang yul gzhan nas 'ongs pa dang gzhan gyi rgyu can yin pa sel lo //*

[19] SPV 273,24–25: . . . *rig bya'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa 'bras bu zhes bya ba* ***ma mthong ba mthong ba ni*** */ . . .*

then he, without anyone [explicitly] saying so, understands that A is the effect of B."

This explanation differs from that of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [16] only in one point. In the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* the second cognition is not perception of B, C, D, . . . (several items), but just perception of B (a single item). In other points, however, both theories are quite similar.

In the later works, Dharmakīrti explained the same topic as follows:

[18] *yathedam asyopalambhe upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ prāg anupalabdham upalabhyate, satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣv asyābhāve na bhavati /* (HB 4,8–11. Kajiyama [1963: Appendix 4])
"[Causality is determined] in the following manner: A, which was not perceived before in spite of having the conditions to be perceived, is perceived when B is perceived, and/or A does not exist when B does not exist even though the other causes may be present."

[19] *yathedam asmin sati bhavati, satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu tadabhāve na bhavatīti /* (VN 4,2–3)[20]
"[Causality is determined] in the following manner: A exists when B exists, and/or, A does not exist when B does not exist even though the other efficient causes of A may be present."

We notice that the latter explanation ([19]) does not have the phrase *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam anupalabdham* which guarantees that A did not exist before its cause. Following the commentator, however, we should interpret the explanation by adding this phrase.[21]

Moreover, we should not overlook that Dharmakīrti added the new phrase "*satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣv*" ([18]), or "*satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu*" ([19]) to the *vyatireka* part of the method.[22] What these words mean is implied by the word "*tatraikābhāve*" in the PVSV ([16]). He seems to have intended to make it more clear in the above texts. Dharmakīrti himself explained the significance of the phrase as follows:

[20] *evaṃ hy asyāsandigdhaṃ tatkāryatvaṃ samarthitaṃ bhavati / anyathā kevalaṃ tadabhāve na bhavatīty upadarśane 'nyasyāpi tatrābhāve sandigdham asya sāmarthyam / anyat tatra samartham, tadabhāvāt tan na bhūtam / etannivṛttau punar nivṛttir yādṛcchāsaṃvādaḥ / mātṛvivāhocitadeśajanmanaḥ piṇḍakharjūrasya deśāntareṣu mātṛvivāhābhāve 'bhāvavat /* (VN 4,3–10)[23]

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[20] Śālikanātha explains Buddhist view of the determination of causality as follows: *kāryakāraṇabhāvāvagamaḥ pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ sarvatra sambhavati / saty evāgnau dhūma upalabhyate, asaty agnau satsv api taditarakāraṇeṣu nopalabhyata iti* . . . (PPañc 199,4–6.)

[21] VNV 15,20–23: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sad anupalabdhaṃ prāg iti vākyaśeṣaḥ kāryaḥ / anyathā dahanasya tatra dhūme vyāpāra eva na kathitaḥ syāt dahanasannidhānāt prāg apy etad āsīd ity āśaṅkāsambhavāt / yathoktānupalambhagrahaṇe tu naiveyam avatarati / ata eva ca pramāṇaviniścayādāv apy evam evābhihitam iti /*

[22] Considering only the fact that this phrase was not mentioned in SP and SPV, we may suppose that Dharmakīrti wrote SP and SPV before HB and VN.

[23] Cf. TSP 640,15–23: *vyatirekād api kāryaniścaye—satsu tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu yasyaikasyābhāve na bhavatīty evam āśrayaṇīyam, anyathā hi kevalaṃ tadabhāve na bhavatīty upadarśane sandigdham atra tasya sāmarthyaṃ syāt, anyasyāpi tatra samarthasyābhāvāt, tataś caivam api sambhāvyeta—anyad eva tatra samartham asti, tadabhāvāt tannivṛttaḥ / yat punar etannivṛttau satyām asya nivṛttir upalabhyate sā yādṛcchāsaṃvādaḥ / mātṛvivāhocitadeśajanmanaḥ piṇḍakharjūrasyānyatra deśe mātṛvivāhābhāve saty abhāvavat / tasmāt samartheṣu iti viśeṣaṇīyam / evaṃ hi tasyaiva kāraṇatvaṃ niścīyate; tadvyatirekasyaivānuvidhānāt / na hy anupakāriṇo vyatirekaḥ kenacid anuvidhīyate; atiprasaṅgāt /*

"For, thus, [if the phrase '*satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu*' is stated,] it is determined beyond doubt that A is the effect of B. Otherwise, if it was merely shown that A did not exist when B did not exist (*tadabhāve na bhavati*), B's efficiency would be put into doubt also when things (C) other [than B] did not exist there. Then, there might be another efficient cause (C) [for A], and A might be non-existent because of C's non-existence. It can, moreover, be coincidental (*yādṛcchā-saṃvāda*) that A does not exist when B does not exist. For example, it might be that the *piṇḍakharjūra* (a kind of the date-tree?) grows in the country where the custom of incest (*mātṛvivāha*)[24] is practiced, while it does not grow in other countries where the custom is not practiced. [It is a mere coincidence, and there is no causal relation between the tree *piṇḍakharjūra* and the custom of incest.]"

It is clear from this passage that Dharmakīrti added the phrase in order to exclude a mere coincidence.[25] According to the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*, causality is determined by the following process:

[Table 2] non-perception of A which has its conditions to be perceived
perception of B
perception of A
non-perception of B when other causes (C, D, . . .) exist
non-perception of A

This is how to determine causality by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha*.[26]

Thus, his method of determination of causality is different from the simple *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Adding the phrase such as "*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam anupalabdham*" to the *anvaya* part of the method, and the phrase such as "*satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu*" to the *vyatireka* part of the method, he intended to exclude a possibility of a mere coincidence, and warned that we had to determine causality on the basis of careful observation. As we have seen, Kamalaśīla called such a method of Dharmakīrti *viśiṣṭa-anvaya* and *viśiṣṭa-vyatireka*.[27]

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[24] PVSVṬ 456,26: *mṛte pitari putreṇa mātṛvivāhaḥ kārya iti* / DhP 15,17–18: *pārasīkaśāstreṇa hi mṛte pitari mātā prathamam agrajena putreṇa pariṇetavyā, tadanu tadanujenety upadiśyate* /

[25] Śāntarakṣika referred to the maxim *kākatārīya–nyāya* in his commentary to VN. (See VNV 17,15.)

It is noted that Vasubandhu had mentioned a similar phrase. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Ed. P. Pradhan. Second ed. Patna 1975) 461,8–12: *tatredam anumānam / sati kāraṇe kāraṇāntarasyābhāve kāryasyābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punarbhavas tadyathāṅkurasya / saty eva cābhāsaprāpte viṣaye manaskāre ca kāraṇe viṣayagrahaṇasyābhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ punaś ca bhāvo 'ndhabadhirādīnām anandhābadhirādīnāṃ ca / atas tatrāpi kāraṇāntarasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca niścīyate / yac ca tatkāraṇāntaraṃ tad indriyam ity etad anumānam* /

[26] Strictly speaking, causality can be determined by the determinate cognition which occurs after *pratyakṣas* and *anupalambhas*, because, by them, *bhāva* and *abhāva* can be known directly, not "*bhāva eva bhāvaḥ*" nor "*abhāve 'bhāva eva.*" Such a determinate cognition might be identified with *adhyavasāya* in Dharmakīrti's system of knowledge. Otherwise, on considering two kinds of *pramāṇa*, it might be included in *anumāna*. I shall take up this problem later. See chapter III of the present paper. It should be noted here that Dharmakīrti may have regarded it as a kind of *anumāna* in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. See PVSV 141,6–7: *tata eva puruṣakāryatā buddhīnām anumeyānvayavyatirekaliṅgatvād asyāḥ* /

[27] See TSP 80,21–25 ad TS 113–114: *na cāpi vyatirekamātram asmābhiḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaniścaya-hetutvenābhyupagatam, kiṃ tarhi? viśiṣṭam eva / tathā hi—yeṣu satsu samartheṣu hetuṣu yasyaikasyābhāvād yan na bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iti varṇyate, na tu yasyābhāve yan na bhavatīti vyatirekamātram; anyathā mātṛvivāhocitadeśajanmanaḥ piṇḍakharjūrasya mātṛvivāhābhāve saty abhāvaprasaṅgāt* /

II

Dharmakīrti's view of the method for determining causality exerted a strong influence on post-Dharmakīrti Buddhists. They, however, interpreted the view in different manners, as Professor Kajiyama has shown.[28] Since Dharmakīrti had not mentioned how many cognitions were required for determining causality, some interpreted him to mean that three cognitions were required and others interpreted him as requiring five cognitions.[29]

Later, Jñānaśrīmitra described these two interpretations as follows:

[21] *pratyakṣānupalambhena trividhenāpi sidhyati /*
kāryakāraṇayor ātmā pañcakeneti kecana // (KS v. 1)
Kajiyama translates: "The nature of an effect and a cause is established even by threefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception; some others, however, demand five." (Kajiyama [1963: 5,2–4])

Some regarded five cognitions, which Dharmakīrti had mentioned when he had explained the method of the determination of causality, as one set. Causality was thought to be determined through a series of five cognitions. Dharmottara, commenting on the passage of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ([16]), stated as follows:

[22] *. . . de ltar mi dmigs pa gnyis dang dmigs pa gcig ni 'bras bu'i yul can yin la / rgyu'i yul can yang dmigs pa dang mi dmigs pa gnyis yin no // de la dmigs pa dang mi dmigs pa lnga po gang dag yin pa de dag thams cad mdor bsdus nas rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po sgrub par byed pa'i mngon sum dang mi dmigs par bshad pa yin no //* (PVinṬ(Dh) D257a4–5. Kajiyama [1963: Appendix 15])
". . . Thus, the two non-perceptions and the one perception have the effect as their object, and the other two [cognitions, namely, the one] non-perception and the [one] perception have the cause as their object. There are five [cognitions which consist of two] perceptions and [three] non-perceptions, and all of them put together were meant by the words '*pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha* establishing causality'."

From this passage, it is clear that Dharmottara thought that causality was determined through a series of the following five cognitions:

[Table 3]
1. non-perception of A
2. perception of B
3. perception of A
4. non-perception of B
5. non-perception of A

Ratnakīrti used the term "*viśiṣṭānvayavyatirekagrahaṇapravaṇaviśiṣṭapratyakṣānupalambha.*" E.g., VNir 106,1–2: . . . *dahanādinā dhūmāder arthāntarasya vyāptis tadutpattilakṣaṇā / sā ca viśiṣṭānvayavyatirekagrahaṇapravaṇaviśiṣṭapratyakṣānupalambhasādhaneti nyāyaḥ /*

[28] Kajiyama [1963]. Cf. Stcherbatsky [1930: I, 263–264]; Bagchi [1953: 144–150]; Mikogami [1984].

[29] Bu ston also payed attention to these different interpretations. PVinṬ(Bu) 137b6–138a3: *dang po rgyu 'bras gnyis ka'i yul can ni 'bras bu'i yul can gyi mi dmigs pa dang / de nas rgyu'i yul can gyi dmigs pa dang / de nas 'bras bu'i yul can gyi dmigs pa dang / de nas rgyu'i yul can gyi mi dmigs pa dang / de nas 'bras bu'i yul can gyi mi dmigs pa ste lngas rgyu 'bras su grub pa yin no //. . . Śā kya blo ni / mi dmigs pa sngon du 'gro ba'i mngon sum gnyis*

A similar interpretation can be found in the commentary of Jñānaśrībhadra, and mentioned in the several non-Buddhist works.[30]

On the other hand, the interpretation that three cognitions were required was explained by Jñānaśrīmitra as follows:

[23] *pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāva iti nyāyaḥ / tatra sāmānyena prākpravṛttānupalambhasahāyam ubhayaviṣayaṃ krami pratyakṣadvayam / yadi vā sāmānyenobhayagrāhipratyakṣasahāyaṃ kramikam anupalambhadvayam iti trividham eva tatsādhanam ity eke /* (KS 317,3–5) Kajiyama translates: "It is a rule that a causal relation is proved by perception and non-perception. Concerning this rule, some say that what proves it is threefold cognition, i.e., either two successive perceptions (Nos. 2 & 3) which respectively have (a cause and an effect) as their object and which are accompanied by a prior non-perception (No. 1) grasping both (of the objects) jointly, or two successive non-perceptions (Nos. 4 & 5) accompanied by a (prior) perception grasping both (of the objects) jointly (No. 2–3)." (Kajiyama [1963: 5])

One who required three cognitions understood that two kinds of method had been meant by Dharmakīrti.

[Table 4] I. 1. non-perception of A and B
2. perception of B
3. perception of A
II. 1. perception of A and B
2. non-perception of B
3. non-perception of A

This interpretation seems to have been based on the understanding of Śākyabuddhi. Commenting on the passage of PVSV ([16]), he stated as follows:

[24] *mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa de dag kyang phan tshun grogs byed na bsgrub pa yin gyi 'ba' zhig ni ma yin te / res 'ga' ni mi dmigs pa sngon du 'gro ba'i mngon sum bsgrub pa yin la / res 'ga' ni mngon sum sngon du 'gro ba'i mi dmigs pa'o // de la re zhig dang po* ***de'i mtshan nyid kyir gyur pa*** *zhes bya ba la sogs pas smos so // . . . da ni mngon sum sngon du 'gro ba mi dmigs pa* ***de las gcig*** *ces bya la sogs pa smos te / . . .* (PVṬ D50a4–b4)[31]

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dang / mngon sum sngon du 'gro ba'i mi dmigs pa gnyis te / de gnyis gang gcig gis grub par 'dod do //

[30] Pañcakavādin: Dharmottara, Jñānaśrībhadra (Kajiyama [1963: App. 16]), Durvekamiśra (Kajiyama [1963: App. 17]), Vidyākaraśānti (*Tarkasopāna* 290,10–12). It seems that Jayanta referred to Pañcakavādin's theory. (*Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā* D Ne13b5–6)

Pañcakavādin's theory was referred in the following non-Buddhist works: *Syādvādaratnākara* (Bagchi [1953: 146–147]; Kajiyama [1963: App. 18]), *Jainatarkabhāṣā* (Kajiyama [1963: App. 18]), *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (Kajiyama [1963: App. 19]), *Nyāyakumudacandra* (Mikogami [1984: App. 2, 3]), *Nyāyakandalī* (Stcherbatsky [1930: 262ff.]; Mikogami [1984: App. 1]), *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (Ed. Paṇḍit Madhusūdan Kaul Shāstrī, 3 vols, (Bombay, 1938–43): vol. II, 345, 365.)

Mikogami [1984] pointed out that the first of five cognitions was understood as non-perception of A and B in the *Nyāyakumudacandra*, and that another set of five cognitions were mentioned there. (Another set: 1. perception of A and B, 2. non-perception of B, 3. non-perception of A, 4. perception of B, 5. perception of A). Jñānaśrībhadra also seems to have understood the first cognition as non-perception of A and B. (See Kajiyama [1963: App. 16].)

[31] The Sanskrit text which corresponds to the first half of this quotation can be reconstructed from parallel

"The *pratyakṣa* and the *anupalambha*, when they accompany each other, are the means of establishing [causality], but each of them alone cannot [be the means]. [Namely,] in some cases, causality is established by the perception preceded by non-perception, while, in other cases, by the non-perception preceded by perception. Among them, the former is meant by the phrase '*yeṣām* . . . ' [in the first half of Dharmakīrti's explanation ([16])]. . . . Now, [in the second half of the explanation, Dharmakīrti] explains non-perception preceded by perception by the phrase '*tatraikābhāve* . . .'"

A similar interpretation is found in the *Hetubinduṭīkā*, where Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, distinguishing between the two methods, called them *pratyakṣānupalambhasādhana* and *anupalambhapratyakṣasādhana*, respectively.[32]

Jñānaśrīmitra's explanation [23] seems to have been based on the view of predecessors such as Śākyabuddhi.[33] However, we should not overlook the fact that they did not clearly mention the objects of the cognitions and the number of such cognitions.[34]

It seems natural to understand that Dharmakīrti intended one series of cognitions. It is hard to imagine that he intended two sets. Although he, of course, did not mention the number, he seems to have explicitly put forth only one method. Especially, we cannot divide the passage [16] in the PVSV into two parts referring to the two alternative methods. For not only cause (B) but also other things (C, D, E, . . .) are grasped by the first perception.

There might, however, be some reason that forced some followers of Dharmakīrti to interpret the matter as having advanced two methods. The following explanation of Jñānaśrīmitra may be relevant:

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passages as follows: **etau ca pratyakṣānupalambhau parasparasahāyau sādhanam / kadācid anupalambhapurassaraṃ pratyakṣam (sādhanam) / kadācit (ca) pratyakṣapurassaro 'nupalambhaḥ /* Cf. TBV 57,17–20: *na cāsau darśanādarśanamātragamyaḥ kintu viśiṣṭāt pratyakṣānupalambhākhyāt pramāṇāt / pratyakṣam eva pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣānupalambhaśabdābhidheyam, tad eva kāryakāraṇābhimatapadārthaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣam, tadviviktānyavastuviṣayam anupalambhaśabdābhidheyam; kadācid anupalambhapūrvakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tadbhāvasādhakam, kadācit pratyakṣapuraḥsaro 'nupalambhaḥ /* AJP II 176,8–177,7 (UtpSV 53,1–5): (*iha ca*) *pratyakṣam eva pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣānupalambhaśabdābhyām ucyate /* (*tathāhi*) *kāryakāraṇābhimatapadārthākāraṃ pratyakṣaṃ tadviviktavastvākāram anupalambha iti / etau ca pratyakṣānupalambhau parasparasahāyau sādhanam / kadācid upalambhapurassaraṃ pratyakṣam* (*yathā "ha* [UtpSV: *yadāha*] *nyāyavādī—"yeṣām anupalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham upalabhyate" ityādi // etena copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhena tatra tasya svahetoḥ sannidhānāt* [UtpSV: *svahetusannidhānāt*] *prāg api sattvam anyato deśād āgamanaṃ prāgavasthitakaṭakuṭyādi*[UtpSV: *-kuḍyādi-*]*hetutvaṃ cāpākṛtam iti / tathā*) *kadācit pratyakṣapurassaro 'nupalambhaḥ,* (*yathoktam—"tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate tat tasya kāryam" iti /*)

[32] HBṬ 49,5–10: *tathā cāyam api tadbhāve bhāvaḥ tadabhāve 'bhāvaś ca kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ kiṃsādhanaḥ / ity āha—**pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ** pratyakṣapūrvako 'nupalambhaḥ tadviviktānyapadārthagrāhipratyakṣātmakaḥ sādhanam asyeti **pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ** / yas tv anupalambhasāpekṣeṇa pratyakṣeṇa sādhyata iti prāguktaḥ so 'nupalambhapūrvakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ sādhanam asyeti anupalambhapratyakṣasādhana iti vaktavyaḥ /* (See Kajiyama [1963: App. 7].)

[33] Bu ston interpreted Śākyabuddhi's view as *trikavāda*. See note 29.

[34] According to Kajiyama [1963], *trikavāda* was referred by the following Buddhists: Śākyabuddhi (App. 5), Karṇakagomin (App. 6), Arcaṭa (App. 7), Manorathanandin (App. 8), Jñānaśrīmitra (App. 10–11), Ratnakīrti (App. 12–13), Mokṣākaragupta (App. 14). And it was reported that *trikavāda* was found in the *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* (App. 9). Mikogami [1984], however, regards the same explanation in the *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* as a *pañcakavāda*. (See Mikogami [1984: 24–25].)

[25] *prāgadṛṣṭau kramāt paśyan vetti hetuphalasthitim /*
dṛṣṭau vā kramaśo 'paśyann anyathā tv anavasthitiḥ // (KS v. 8)[35]
Kajiyama translates: "Perceiving successively the (two things) which were not seen before, or perceiving successively the disappearance of the two things which were seen before, we came to know the definite relation of a cause and an effect; otherwise, it would require an infinite series (of cognitions)." (Kajiyama [1963: 8])

Jñānaśrīmitra also insisted upon two alternative methods, each consisting of three cognitions. If one doubted the determination based on such method and required other cognitions, e.g., other two non-perceptions in addition to the set <I>, then he should doubt the adequacy of the series of five cognitions, too, and then the number of perceptions and non-perceptions would become endless. Therefore, only three cognitions are required. In the case of the set <I>, *anvaya* is determined by the last two perceptions, and *vyatireka* is determined by the first non-perception. There is no need for any further cognitions.

As we have seen, Dharmakīrti had insisted that causality could be determined by only one observational cycle, i.e., one series of perceptions and non-perceptions. At that time, he may have noticed that observational cycles would be endless if one required further and further such cycles. The Trikavādins' interpretation was intended to be a refinement upon Dharmakīrti's basic standpoint. Dharmakīrti had put forth one observational cycle, and this was understood as two alternative cycles by the Trikavādins. For they reasoned that, otherwise, the second and the third non-perceptions in the explanation of Dharmakīrti (see Table 1 and 2.) would be useless, i.e., *vyatireka* could be determined even by the first non-perception, and there would be no need of further non-perceptions, such as the non-perception of B (4) and the non-perception of A (5) spoken about in Table 3. Therefore, they thought causality was determined by either one of the two observational cycles mentioned in Table 4. Can such a simplified method like that of the Trikavādins, however, determine causality beyond all doubt? This *trikapañcaka*-problem seems to reflect Dharmakīrti's dilemma. On the one hand, he strove for simplicity by saying that just one observational cycle was sufficient to determine causality, but, on the other hand, faced with the problem of excluding mere coincidence, he had to complicate his account by adding rather elaborate provisoes so that what is meant by "observation" is to be understood in a very specific and qualified sense.

III

Let us turn to a final post-Dharmakīrti aspect of the problem as to how to determine causality. Can causality be truly determined through Dharmakīrti's method? Some Buddhists as well as non-Buddhists criticized Dharmakīrti's theory, offering various arguments on this problem. Here, however, we can only consider some aspects of the discussion.

In his commentary to the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* ([16]), Karṇakagomin mentioned the following objection:

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[35] This verse was quoted by Vibhūticandra. See PVV(M), p. 300, footnote 1.

[26] *(anyas tv āha /) bhavatv agnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvas* tathāpi na tayor ekena jñānena grahaṇam bhinnakālatvāt / nāpy anena pūrvakeṇa hi nirvikalpakena pūrvakam vastumātraṃ gṛhītaṃ na tu kāraṇarūpaṃ kāryasya bhāvitvenāpratyakṣatvāt / uttareṇāpy uttaram vastumātraṃ gṛhyate na tu kāryarūpaṃ kāraṇasyātītatvenāgrahāt / nāpi savikalpakena tatrāpy asya codyasya tulyatvāt / tenedam asmād utpannam iti na kenacid gṛhītam ata eva na smaraṇenāpi gṛhyate 'nubhavābhāvād iti /* (PVSVṬ 97,20–24. *PVSVṬ: *-bhāvatas*)

"Suppose that there were a causal relation between fire and smoke. But, both of them are not grasped by a single cognition because they differ in time. [This is for the following reason:] Only the prior entity (B) itself is grasped by the prior [perception] which does not have any conceptions. But, the causal nature [of B] is not [grasped by it] for effect (A), which will appear later, is not perceived [then]. Similarly, only the subsequent entity (A) itself is grasped by the subsequent [perception]. But, the effect nature [of A] is not [grasped by it] for cause (B), which was in the past, is not grasped [then]. Moreover, [the causal nature and the effect nature] are not grasped by conceptual [cognition] for there is the same problem. Therefore, it is not grasped by any [cognitions] that A is produced from B. Then, it is not grasped even by recollection (*smaraṇa*) for there were not any direct experiences before."

This objection seems to show that any perceptions in themselves cannot be means for cognizing causality (or *anvaya*) because they grasp only their own objects. Neither when B is perceived, nor when A is perceived, is it perceived that A is the effect of B. Causality is not directly experienced, so that recollection of it cannot occur. This is an objection to the *pratyakṣa* part of Dharmakīrti's method. A similar objection was stated by Bhāsarvajña in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.[36]

In addition, Bhāsarvajña stated the objection to the *anupalambha* part of the Dharmakīrtian method as follows:

[27] *athaitadabhāve na bhavatīti anupalambhataḥ pratīyate, ko 'yam anupalambhaḥ? pratyakṣam? anumānaṃ vā? na tāvat pratyakṣam, tasya kṣaṇāntarāsaṃsṛṣṭavastuviṣayatvāt / tena ca yathā nānvayavyatirekagrahaṇaṃ tathoktam / nāpy anumānam evānupalambhaḥ, kasmāt? anumānasyānvayavyatirekagrahaṇapūrvakatvāt / tad yadi tenaivānvayavyatirekagrahaṇam, tadetaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ syāt / athānupalambhāntareṇa, tatrāpy anvayavyatirekagrahaṇam anyenānupalambhāntareṇety anavasthā syāt /* (NBhūṣ 515,20–25)[37]

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[36] NBhūṣ 514,2–10: *tadbhāve bhāvāt tadabhāve cābhāvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavastheti cet, na; ekakṣaṇamātravedinā tadbhāve bhāvasyādhigantum aśakyatvāt / krameṇa dvayor api vedanam iti cet, kasya krameṇa vedanam? na hi kṣaṇadvayānugāmitvam ekasya kasyacid asti, yasya krameṇa vedanaṃ syāt / dvayos tu kramotpannayor apītaretarasvarūpāsaṃvedanān na sambandhagrahaṇam / vikalpāt sambandhapratītir*[1] *iti cet, vikalpaḥ khalu katarat pramāṇam? na hi pratyakṣānumānavyatiriktaṃ*[2] *pramāṇaṃ tavāsti / na cāyaṃ vikalpo 'numānaṃ, trirūpaliṅgapūrvakatvābhāvāt / nāpi pratyakṣam, kalpanāpoḍhatvābhāvāt / pratyakṣagṛhītānusandhātṛtvam apy asya nāsti, pratyakṣeṇa grahaṇāsambhavāt /* ([1]NBhūṣ: *sambandhāpratītir* [2]NBhūṣ: *pratyakṣānumānaṃ vyatiriktaṃ*)

[37] Cf. PPañc 199,13–200,2: *agnau sati dhūma iti tāvatpratyakṣeṇāvagamyatām; asati tv agnau dhūmo nāstīty atra kiṃ pramāṇam? nanv anupalabdhiliṅgakānumānam eva / anupalabdhāv api tarhy avinābhāvaḥ paryeṣitavyaḥ / sa tāvan na tādātmyena, tanmātrānubandhasiddhyā hi tādātmyaṃ sidhyati / tanmātrānubandhasiddhir api viparyaye bādhakapramāṇapravṛttyāyattā / anupalabdhir eva ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / sarvatra niṣedhānām anupalabdhisādhanakatvāt / bādhakapramāṇabhūtānupalabdhāv api coktena nyāyenānupalabdhyantarāpekṣāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt / nāpi tadutpattyā anupalabdhāv avinābhāvasiddhiḥ / kāryakāraṇabhāvasya vipakṣānupalabdhisāpekṣatvenā 'navasthāprasaṅgād eva, tad evaṃ tadutpatter avinābhāvāvasāyo durlabhaḥ /*

"If one (Buddhist) says that [*vyatireka*, i.e.,] A does not exist when B does not exist, is understood by *anupalambha*, [we shall point out the following:] What is this *anupalambha*? Is this perception (*pratyakṣa*), or inference (*anumāna*)? First of all, it is not perception for the object of perception is an entity which is not mixed with other moments. And now, as explained earlier, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are not grasped by perception. Nor is it inference. Why? Because inference is preceded by the knowledge of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Therefore, if *anvaya* and *vyatireka* were known by the same [*anupalambha*], then the fault of mutual dependence would occur. Even if [they were known] by another *anupalambha*, it also would need the knowledge of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* by yet another *anupalambha*, therefore, the fault of endlessness would occur."

Thus, Bhāsarvajña, who stated that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* could not be determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha*, criticized Dharmakīrti's method of determining causality. Moreover, Bhāsarvajña stated that even if the *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha* were understood as respectively the affirmative and negative conceptual judgements coming immediately after perceptions, causality could not determined by them.[38]

For Buddhists, there are only two *pramāṇa*s, namely, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Among them, *pratyakṣa*, which reveals only the present object, does not reveal causality because causality needs two objects differing in time. *Anumāna* is also not the means of determination of causality, for, if it were, the faults of mutual dependence or endlessness would occur.

How can Buddhists rebut these objections? Karṇakagomin formulated an answer to the objection ([26]) as follows:

[28] *atrocyate / . . . tena hetoḥ sakāśāt svarūpalābha eva kāryatvaṃ / kāraṇasyāpi kāryaṃ prati prāgbhāva eva kāraṇatvaṃ / sa cātmalābhaḥ prāgbhāvaś ca bhāvasyābhinnatvāt pratyakṣagṛhīta eva ceti kathaṃ na pratyakṣagrāhyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ / . . . tasmāt pūrvottarabhāva eva tayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ / tena pūrvake vastuni gṛhyamāṇe kāryaṃ praty ānantaryaṃ kāraṇātmakaṃ gṛhītam eva / uttareṇa ca jñānenottaraṃ vastu kāraṇānantaraṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ kāryātmakam eva gṛhyate (/) tadānantaryasya tadabhinnasvabhāvatvāt / ata evāsmād anantaram idaṃ bhavatīti smaraṇam api bhavaty ānantaryasyānubhūtatvād iti /* (PVSVṬ 97,25–98,9)

"The following is an answer to this: . . . Therefore, the effect nature is that the existence [of effect] occurs [immediately] after cause, and the causal nature is that cause exists [immediately] before effect. The occurrence [immediately after cause] and the existence before [effect], which are not different from existences [of the effect and cause], are grasped by perception. Thus, why isn't causality apprehended by perception? . . . Therefore, causality is nothing but antecedence and subsequence (*pūrvottarabhāva*) of the two [entities]. When an antecedent entity (B) is perceived [by an antecedent perception], then the immediate proximity (*ānantarya*) [of B] to the effect (A), namely the causal nature, is grasped [by the same perception]. And, when a subsequent entity (A) is grasped by a subsequent perception immediately after the cause (B), the effect nature is grasped [by the same perception]. For the immediate proximity of something is not different from its existence. And, therefore, there can also be the recollection that A exists immediately after B, because the immediate proximity has been directly experienced before."

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[38] NBhūṣ 516,5–8: *nāpi pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvinau vidhipratiṣedhavikalpau pratyakṣānupalambhaśabdavācyau, tayor apramāṇatvāt / na hy anumānād anyo 'pi vikalpaḥ pramāṇaṃ tvayeṣyate / nāpi pramāṇapṛṣṭhabhāvitvena pramāṇopacāraḥ, taddhetoḥ pratyakṣasya kāryakāraṇabhāvagrāhakatvena pratiṣiddhatvāt /*

It must be noted that causality was regarded as *pūrvottarabhāva*, or as *ānantarya*.[39] For the *uttarapakṣa*, therefore, causality can be perceived by perception, and can be recollected by memory.

It is interesting that a parallel passage to this [28] was quoted in the *Utpādādisiddhisvopajñavṛtti*, and was attributed to Kalyāṇacandra there.[40] More than sixty years ago, E. Frauwallner focused upon some passages attributed to Kalyāṇacandra in Jaina works, and he pointed out that parallel passages to them were found in the *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* of Śākyabuddhi.[41] Nowadays, we can find these passages in Karṇakagomin's commentary as well as in that of Śākyabuddhi. But, as for the present passage, the parallel passage is not actually found in Śākyabuddhi's commentary, but only in Karṇakagomin's.

Next, let us take up the following objection from Karṇakagomin's commentary:

[29] *aviddhakarṇas tv āha / "avinābhāvitvaṃ ekaṃ dṛṣṭvā dvitīyādidarśane sati sidhyati / na ca kṣaṇikavādino draṣṭur avasthānam asti / na cānyenānubhūte 'rthe 'nyasyāvinābhāvitvasmaraṇam asty atiprasaṅgād" iti /* (PVSVṬ 98,10–12)
"On the other hand, Aviddhakarṇa[42] has said as follows: If, after seeing one [instane of co-occurrence of A and B], one sees the second [instance] and so forth, then inevitability (*avinābhāvitva*) is established. For the kṣaṇikavādin, however, the cognizer (*draṣṭṛ*) does not continue to exist. And, one cannot recollect the inevitability with reference to the objects perceived by another. For, otherwise, there would be the fault of absurdity."

According to the objector, in the theory of momentary existence, nothing can continue to exist. Therefore, the cognizer who continues to exist, e.g., *ātman*, is not admitted. Then, cognitions which occur in succession would remain separate and would not be integrated. We could not know *anvaya* and *avinābhāva*. The objector, who wants to prove the existence of *ātman*, pointed out here that *avinābhāva* could not be determined unless there was an *ātman*. As is well

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[39] Cf. TSP 224,8–10 (ad TS 528): *tasmād ānantaryamātram eva kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavasthānibandhanam, na vyāpāra iti sthitam etat /* TSP 224,17–20 (ad TS 530): *na hi vayam ānantaryamātraṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvādhigatinibandhanaṃ brūmaḥ, kiṃ tarhi? yan niyatam / tathā hi—yasyaivānantaraṃ yad bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iṣyate / na ca dhūmo gavāder evānantaraṃ bhavati, asaty api gavādau tasya bhāvāt /*

[40] UtpSV 95,11–96,7: *etena yad uktaṃ kalyāṇacandre—"yathā kāryasya tāvad anutpattyavasthāyām asattvād eva na kāraṇasambandhitvaṃ, niṣpannāvasthāyām apy evaṃ, nirapekṣatvāt, tathā kāraṇam api kāryaniṣpattyavasthāyāṃ kāryāsambandhy eva, nāpy anayoḥ kāryakāraṇasambandho, bhinnakālatvāt, kevalam asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ceti kalpito 'yaṃ vyapadeśaḥ, tena svahetoḥ sakāśāt svarūpalābha eva bhāvasya kāryatvaṃ, kāraṇasyāpi kāryaṃ prati prāgabhāva eva kāraṇatvaṃ, kāryakāraṇagatasya sa cātmalābhaḥ prāgbhāvaś ca bhāvasyābhinnatvāt pratyakṣagṛhīta eveti, kathaṃ na pratyakṣagrāhyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ?, kevalaṃ kāryadarśane satīdam asya kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ceti vyavahriyate, yato nākāryakāraṇayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ saṃbhavati, nāpi kāryakāraṇabhāvayogāt tayoḥ kāryakāraṇatā bhinnā kartuṃ śakyate, virodhāt, nāpi bhinnā, tayoḥ svarūpeṇākāryakāraṇatāprasaṅgāt, svarūpeṇa kāryakāraṇayor api kiṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvenārthāntareṇa kalpitena?, svarūpeṇaiva kāryakāraṇarūpatvāt, tasmāt pūrvottarabhāva eva tayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ, tena pūrvake vastuni gṛhyamāṇe kāryaṃ praty ānantaryaṃ kāraṇātmakaṃ gṛhītam eva, uttareṇa ca jñānenottaraṃ vastu kāraṇānantaraṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ kāryātmakam eva gṛhyate, tadānantaryasya tadabhinnasvabhāvatvāt, ata eva cāsmād anantaram idaṃ bhavatīti smaraṇam api bhavati, ānantaryasyānubhūtatvād" ityādi, tad apy apākṛtam, . . .* (Cf. TBV 59,8–14.) Candrasena quoted this passage after his refutation of Dharmakīrti's HB and Arcaṭa's HBṬ.

[41] Frauwallner [1933: 239ff.; 1937: 74]. Cf. Steinkellner [1981: 284].

[42] Aviddhakarṇa was regarded as a Naiyāyika. See Karl H. Potter, ed., *The Traditions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, vol. 2 of *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi, 1977), 338–340.

known, in order to prove their position, ātmavādins often stated that *smṛti* and *pratyabhijñā* could not occur unless *ātman* existed. In the same manner, here the determination of *avinābhāva* was denied.

This objection applies to the determination of causality. In the *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, Ratnakīrti mentioned a similar objection as follows:

[30] *pratikṣaṇaṃ bhede saty anubhāvitur vinaṣṭatve 'nyasya kāryakāraṇabhāvagrahaṇādyanupapatter iti kathaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaśaṅkāpi /* (SSD 116,15–16)[43]
"If [things] were different at every moment, then [one] cogniser would perish and another [cogniser] would grasp causality, etc. It is not right. Therefore, why does the suspicion that all things perish at every moment arise?"

According to Buddhists, the determination of causality is based on cognitions occurring in succession. But, in the theory of momentary existence, they would remain separated and would not be integrated. Then, causality could not be determined. A similar objection to the Buddhists is mentioned in the *Tattvasaṃgraha(-pañjikā)*.[44] In these texts, the objection was attributed to the Mīmāṃsakas.[45]

To the objection ([29]), Karṇakagomin stated the following answer:

[31] *tad ayuktaṃ / prathamāder arthakṣaṇasya prathamādijñānakṣaṇena grahaṇād ekasantatipatitānāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvena smaraṇasambhavāc ca / . . .* (PVSVṬ 98,13–15)
"That is not right. This is for the following reasons: The first moment of the object and so forth are grasped by the first moment of cognition and so forth. And, as [the moments of cognition] which belong to the same continuity (*ekasantati*) are causally related, there can be recollection."

Thus, Karṇakagomin sought to solve the problem by introducing the concept of *santāna*. Ratnakīrti also answered the objection ([30]) in the same manner.[46]

[32] *prāgbhāvivastuniścayajñānasyopādeyabhūtena tadarpitasaṃskāragarbheṇa paścādbhāvivastujñānenāsmin satīdaṃ bhavatīti niścayo janyate / tathā prāgbhāvivastvapekṣayā kevalabhūtalaniścāyakajñānopādeyabhūtena tadarpitasaṃskāragarbheṇa paścādbhāvivastvapekṣayā kevalabhūtalaniścāyakajñānenāsminn asatīdaṃ na bhavatīti vyatirekaniścayo janyate /* (SSD 125,17–20)
"The determination [of *anvaya*] that A exists when B exists is produced from the [determinate] cognition of a subsequent entity (A), which is an effect (*upādeya*) of the determinate cognition of a prior entity (B) and contains an impression (*saṃskāra*) of it. Similarly, the determination of

[43] See Mimaki [1972: (130)–(131)]; Mimaki [1972: (130)–(131); 1976: 41–45, 110–111].

[44] TS 492: *ko vā vyavasthitaḥ kartā sandhatte kramavadgatim / asya dṛṣṭāv idaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ nāsyādṛṣṭau tu lakṣyate //* TSP 212,12ff.: *bhavatu nāmopalambho vastunaḥ, tathāpi pūrvottarayoḥ kṣaṇayoḥ pratisandhātur ekasya kasyacid abhāvāt sambandho na siddhyatīti darśayann āha—ko vetyādi / . . . yadi hi kaścid "asyāgner upalambhād idaṃ dhūmādy upalabdham asyānupalabdhau nopalabhyate" ity evaṃ kramavatī gatim ekakartṛtvena pratisandadhīta, tadā syāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ, sa ca nāsti pratisandhātā tvanmateneti na kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddhyed ity arthaḥ /*

[45] The Jainas also presented a similar objection to justify Jaina theory of *ātman*. See UtpSV 95,10–11: *tataḥ pṛthakkāryakāraṇasvarūpagrāhiṇā pramāṇenāyam adhigaṃtum aśakya ity ubhayagrāhiṇā pariṇamanasvabhāvam anugatam ekam ātmadravyam astīti jainānām upapadyate kāryakāraṇavyavasthā, na pareṣām iti /*

[46] See Mimaki [1972: (131); 1976: 164–167].

vyatireka that A does not exist when B does not exist is produced from the determinate cognition of mere surface of the earth acquired with regard to a subsequent entity (A), which is an effect of the determinate cognition of mere surface of the earth acquired with regard to a prior entity (B) and contains an impression of it."

This is the same as Karṇakagomin's explanation that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are determined by two cognitions which are causally related and belong to the same *santāna*. We should note that cognitions are interpreted as determinate cognitions (*niścayajñāna*). Because *niścaya* is conceptual, it cannot be a *pratyakṣa*. It seems to mean a perceptual judgement (*adhyavasāya*) coming immediately after perception.[47] The determination of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are produced from the subsequent perceptual judgement, which is conditioned by the prior perceptual judgement.

Thus, Dharmakīrti's theory that causality is determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha* was interpreted by later Buddhists in various ways. Some regarded causality as *pūrvottarabhāva* (or *ānantarya*) and insisted that it was apprehended by perception. Others, by introducing the theory of *santāna*, interpreted causality as being determined by *niścaya*s. Of course, these interpretations may be deduced from Dharmakīrti's epistemology. But, he had not explicitly presented such positions on the determination of causality.

There were some Buddhists who criticized Dharmakīrti's theory of the determination of causality. Denying causality itself, some later Mādhyamikas maintained that causality could not determined by *pratyakṣa* nor by *anupalambha*. For example, Jñānagarbha stated that object could not be grasped by *nirākāra*-cognition nor by *sākāra*-cognition, so that causality could not be determined by *pratyakṣa* nor by *anupalambha*.[48] Kamalaśīla, in his *Madhyamakāloka*, criticized Dharmakīrti's theory from several points of view, a subject which has been investigated by Professor Moriyama.[49]

Whether causality itself was true or not was discussed by post-Dharmakīrti Buddhists in connection with the interpretation of *arthakriyā*. For them, one of the most important problems was how to interpret *Pramāṇavārttika* III 3–4. As Professor Matsumoto has explained, commentators, in fact, developed heated arguments focused on these two *kārikā*s.[50]

Some commentators on PV III 3–4 discussed not only the problem as to whether causality itself was true but also the problem as to whether we could truly know causality. Let us examine their explanations.[51]

Dharmakīrti had stated the objection that causality was only conventionally admitted (PV III

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[47] See Katsura [1989] and Oki [1990].

[48] *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* 164,18–165,13.

[49] Seitetsu Moriyama, "Kamalaśīla no Mujishōseironshō to Dharmakīrti no Ingaron—Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi no wayakukenkyū (3)—," *Bukkyodaigaku Kenkyū Kiyō* 71 (1987): 19–73. do., "Kōkichūganha no gakukei to Dharmakīrti no Ingaron—Catuṣkotyutpādapratiṣedhahetu—." *Bukkyōdaigaku Kenkyū Kiyō* 73 (1989): 1–47.

[50] Shirō Mastumoto, "Bukkyōronrigakuha no Nitaisetsu (I)–(III)." *Nanto Bukkyō* 45–47 (1980–81).

[51] Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi did not deal with the problem of the determination of causality in their commentaries to PV III 3–4.

4c–d: *matā sā cet saṃvṛtyā*). Manorathanandin formulated it as follows:

[33] *kāryakāraṇabhāvo hi vyavahāramātrataḥ siddhaḥ, na paramārthataḥ / na tāvat pratyakṣaṃ tadgrahaṇasamartham; bījāṅkuragrāhiṇoḥ pratyakṣayoḥ svaviṣayamātravyavasthāpanāt kenānvayavyatirekagrahaṇam /* (PVV(M) 113,4–6)
"For causality is established merely conventionally, not ultimately. First of all, perception cannot grasp causality. By the two perceptions which grasp the seed and the sprout respectively, only their own objects are determined. Therefore, how can *anvaya* and *vyatireka* be grasped ?"

As we have seen, a similar criticism was mentioned by Karṇakagomin and Bhāsarvajña, and an answer to it was presented by Kalyāṇacandra. Kalyāṇacandra, who regarded causality as *pūrvottarabhāva* (or *ānantarya*), insisted that causality was apprehended by perception. In the following passage, Manorathanandin examined a similar position and refuted it. According to him, *pūrvatva* and *aparatva* are relative. Therefore, two things occurring successively need to be grasped together. But, as perception grasps only one of them at a time, perception does not grasp *pūrvatva* or *aparatva*.[52]

Also, Manorathanandin denied the theory that causality was determined by recollection as follows:

[34] *nāpi pratyakṣabalabhāvi smaraṇaṃ tadgrahaṇapravaṇam / na hi tat svatantraṃ pramāṇam, kin tu pramāṇavyāpāravyavasthāpakam / yadi yathānubhavaṃ pravartate, nānyathā / na ca kārya-kāraṇabhāvānubhavo bhūta ity uktam / ataḥ smaraṇatvam apy asya nāsti; anubhūtavikalpanasya smaraṇatvāt / tato vikalpamātram etat, na tato vastuvyavastheti saṃvṛtyaivāvicāritaramaṇīyayā kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavahāraḥ, na paramārthataḥ /* (PVV(M) 113,27–114,4)
"Causality cannot be grasped by the recollection produced from perception, for recollection is not an independent *pramāṇa*, but one which establishes the function of a [previous] *pramāṇa* (i.e., *pratyakṣa*). One recollects [only] what he directly cognized before, but not others . But, it is not said that causality was directly cognized before. Therefore, this is not recollection for a conception of something directly cognized before constitutes a recollection. Hence, this is a mere conception. No real entity is established by it. Thus, the praxis of causality is purely conventional, namely, one that only satisfies us so long as it is not analyzed. It is not ultimate."

It is explained in the second half of the above passage that recollection cannot occur because causality was not directly cognized before. The same explanation was stated by Karṇakagomin ([26]), as we have seen. In the first half of the above passage, on the other hand, it seems that Manorathanandin criticized the theory of *adhyavasāya*. Ratnakīrti explained the method of determination of causality by using the concept of *niścaya*, as we have seen. ([32]) A similar theory was criticized by Manorathanandin here. According to him, causality was not determined by the recollection produced from perception because it was not *pramāṇa*.[53] Thus, he explained

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[52] PVV(M) 113,10–13: *kramagrahaṇam eva kāryakāraṇabhāvagrahaṇam iti cet*[1] */ tat ghaṭakulālayor api asti*[2] */ na ca kramo 'pi kenacic chakyagrahaṇaḥ; pratiyogyavedanāt / pūrvāparagrahaṇam ata eva nāsti; svajñānena varta-mānatāgrahaṇāc ca / kāryakāle ca kāraṇaṃ pūrvam ucyate, tadā ca tad eva nāsti / tad etan mṛtasyārogyam /* ([1]PVV(M): -grahaṇam [2]PVV(M): *tat tu ghaṭakulālayor api astīti cet*)

[53] In Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge, there seem to be two approachs to *adhyavasāya*. Dharmakīrti, who clearly differentiated *adhyavasāya* from *pratyakṣa*, did not regard the former as a *pramāṇa*. His reason was that it

that causality is not determined by any cognition.

Prajñākaragupta is another commentator who discussed the problem as to whether we can truly know causality. It seems that Manorathanandin borrowed the above explanations from Prajñākaragupta. In the commentary to PV III 4, Prajñākaragupta explained in detail that causality could not be determined by any cognition. For example, he criticized the theory that causality was determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha* as follows:

[35] *anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇatāgatiḥ*(1) /
pramāṇañ ca(2) *na tatrāsti pratyakṣam anumā tathā* // 146 //
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām anvayavyatirekayoḥ /
gatir yady anumānāt syād itaretarasaṃśrayaḥ // 147 //

anvayavyatirekayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa kevalenāgrahaṇāt / pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāva ucyate / tad etad asaṅgataṃ / itaretarāśrayadoṣaprasaṅgāt(3) */ pratyakṣeṇānvayo na gṛhyate / etatsadbhāve bhavaty etad iti naivamprakāravyāpāram*(4) *pratyakṣaṃ / dvayagrahaṇamātravyāpārāt* / (PVA 183,16–20. (1)PVA: *kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatiḥ* (2)PVA: *pramāṇañ ja* (3)PVA: *-doṣa prasaṅgāt* (4)PVA: *-vyāpāraḥ*)[54]

"[If one says that] causality is known through *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, [it is not right]. There is no *pramāṇa* which establishes them. *Pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* cannot establish them. (146)
One might say that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are known through *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha*. But, if [these were known] through *anumāna*, the fault of mutual dependence would occur. (147)"

For *anvaya* and *vyatireka* cannot be grasped only through *pratyakṣa*, causality is said to be determined by *pratyakṣa* and *anupalambha*. This is not right, for [if it were,] the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśrayadoṣa*) would occur. *Anvaya* is not grasped by *pratyakṣa*. *Pratyakṣa* does not have a function of knowing that A exists when B exists, for it has a function of just grasping two individual things."

[36] *athaitadabhāve na bhavatīty anupalambhataḥ pratīyate / tathā sati punar itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ / tathā hi /*

pratyakṣād aparaḥ(1) *kim vā 'nupalambhaḥ paras tathā*(2) /
pratyakṣād aparatve hi nāmamātram asādhanam // 148 //

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cannot reveal a new object. (PV II 3ab: *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtam*; HB 3,10–12: *adhigate tu svalakṣaṇe tatsāmarthyajanmā vikalpas tadanukārī kāryatas tadviṣyatvāt smṛtir eva na pramāṇam / anadhigavasturūpānadhigateḥ / etc.*) At the same time, Dharmakīrti insisted that *adhyavasāya* plays an important role in human action. When one perceives an object, he cannot act toward it without *adhyavasāya*. (HB 25,17–19: *tasmād ayam analaṃ paśyann apy analo ayaṃ na salilam ity anadhyavasyan na tiṣṭhen na api pratiṣṭheta iti dustaraṃ vyasanaṃ pratipannaḥ syāt* / etc.) See Katsura [1989] and Oki [1990]. It is clear that these two approachs, i.e., negative and affirmative approach, to *adhyavasāya* reflect Dharmakīrti's two definitions of *pramāṇa*, i.e., *ajñātārthaprakāśa* and *avisaṃvādin*. Later, Dharmottara maintained that *pratyakṣa* was of a determining nature (*adhyavasāyātmaka*). *Pratyakṣa* can be *pramāṇa* just because *adhyavasāya* occurs immediately after it. Dharmottara, in his theory of *pramāṇa*, seems to have attached greater importance to the second approach mentioned above. According to him, in this sence, a determinate cognition can be a *pramāṇa*. On this point, see Krasser [1995].

[54] Cf. NBhūṣ 518, 10–11: *tathā hi—anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇatāgatiḥ pramāṇaṃ ca na tatrāsti pratyakṣam anumānam api vā** / (*NBhūṣ: *pratyakṣānumānam api vā*); PVṬ(R) 10b6–7: *'di ltar rgyu 'bras kyi dngos po rjes su 'gro ldog dag gis rtogs pa ste / yod pa dang med pa yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pas grub par khas len na / mngon sum gyis ni 'di las 'di 'byung ngo zhes rjes su 'gro ba myong ba ma yin te / mdun na gnas pa'i dngos po gnyis mngon du mi byed pa'i phyir 'di'i rjes la 'di dag skye'o zhes mngon sum gyis khong du chud pa ma yin no* //

avatāro bhaven naivānumānatvaprakalpane /
anvayavyatirekābhyām pratibandhe 'numā yataḥ // 149 //

yadi pratyakṣam evānupalambhaḥ sa eva pratyakṣe udito doṣaḥ / athānumānaṃ / tad anvaya-vyatirekapravarttitapratibandham ity(3) *anumānābhāve nānvayavyatirekagrahaṇaṃ / tadabhāve ca nānumānāvatāraḥ / anavasthā cānumānānām bhavet /* (PVA 183,28–184,2. (1)PVA: *pratyakṣādayaḥ paraḥ* (2)PVA: *tathāḥ* (3)PVA: *-pratibandha itīty*)[55]

"One might say that [*vyatireka*, namely,] that A does not exist when B does not exist, is known through *anupalambha*. But, if it were, the fault of mutual dependence [would] occur. That is to say:

Is *anupalambha* the same as perception, or other than perception? If [*anupalambha*] is the same as perception, it is in name only, and does not establish [causality]. (148)
If you think *anupalambha* is inference, [inference] would never occur for there is inference when there is an inevitable connection determined by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. (149)

If *anupalambha* is nothing but perception, the same fault as mentioned in the case of perception would occur. If [*anupalambha*] is inference, [the following faults occur:] Inference is based on an inevitable connection (*pratibandha*) established by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Therefore, there is no apprehension of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* without inference, and there is no inference without that [apprehension of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*]. Moreover, inferences would be endless."

Thus, Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin in their commentaries to PV III 4, explained that causality could not be determined by any means. In that context, they analyzed the methods for determining causality, and made it clear that they were flawed. Even the *pratyakṣa-anupalambha* method was denied. It also could satisfy us only so long as it was not analyzed. In this way, they understood Dharmakīrti's method of the determination of causality as conventional. Answering to the objection, Dharmakīrti had said, "Let it be as you wish!" (PV III 4d: *astu yathā tathā*). According to Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti, who had answered in this way, had regarded his method of the determination of causality as purely conventional.[56] In his works, Dharmakīrti sometimes manifested that he dealt with *pramāṇa* within

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[55] Cf. PVṬ(R) 11a5–b1: *ldog pa yang mi dmigs pas grub pa ni ma yin te / ci ste mi dmigs pa mngon sum yin nam / rjes su dpag par brtag grang na / de la gal te mi dmigs pa rjes su dpag pa yin pa de lta na ni mi dmigs pa de yang ldog pa la ltos shing ldog pa yang mi dmigs pa la ltos pa'i phyir gcig la gcig brten par 'gyur ro // 'on te mi dmigs pa'i ldog pa rjes su dpag pa gzhan gyis sgrub na / de'i tshe rjes su dpag pa de'i ldog pa yang rjes su dpag pa gzhan gyis sgrub pa nyid kyi phyir rjes su dpag pa de nyid mtha' med par 'gyur ro // 'on te mngon sum nyid rjes su dpag pa* [*sic*] *yin na ni de lta na ming tsam tha dad par byas par 'gyur pas mngon sum ni yul dang dus thams cad du ldog pa sgrub pa ma yin te / de dag la mi 'jug pa'i phyir ro //*

[56] PVA 183,11–15: *pramāṇavastutattvavyavasthitim antareṇa yadadhimuktimātram anādivyavahārabhāvanātas tatsaṃvṛtimātram eva / avicārapratītyartho* hi saṃvṛtyarthaḥ / yathaiva hi kvacid devadattādāv adṛṣṭe 'pi dṛṣṭābhimānaḥ / sa parāmarśān nivartate / tathā cāsau na paramārthataḥ / tathā sakalo 'pi lokavyavahāra evam eveti / saṃvṛtimātrakaṃ sakalaṃ / pramāṇam antareṇa hi pratītyabhimānamātraṃ saṃvṛtiḥ /* (*PVA: *api ca na pratītyartho*); PVA 184,29–32: *evam eva lokavyavahāro 'nākulaḥ / na*[1] *lokavyavahāre paramārtha upayujyate, lokavyavahāra-pralopaprasaṅgāt / adhimuktivibhāgamātreṇa siddhiḥ / svapnaniyatavyavahāravat / anādivāsanāniyama evāvaśiṣyate lokavyavahārahetuyonir, anyathā sālambananirālambanajñānādivibhāga*[2] *eva na sidhyet /* ([1]PVA: *-'nākulo* [2]PVA: *-nirālambanañ cānādivibhāga*); PVV(M) 114,3–4: *saṃvṛtyaivāvicāritaramaṇīyayā kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavahāraḥ, na paramārthataḥ /*; PVV(M) 114,6–8: *sāṃvṛtam api kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavahāram* āśritya sādhyasādhanādi-vyavahārasaṃvādasampratyayāt samāpto lokavyavahāraḥ / sāṃvyavahārikañ ca pramāṇaṃ tāvataiva sustham /*

the range of convention (*sāṃvyavahārika*).[57] It seems that his method of the determination of causality is not beyond the range.

As mentioned above, Bhāsarvajña criticized Dharmakīrti's theory of the determination of causality in detail. It seems that Bhāsarvajña's severe criticism on it was based on Prajñākaragupta's explanations in many points.[58] Bhāsarvajña explained that causality could not be determined by any means for Buddhists, by using Prajñākaragupta's arguments for the position that the determination of causality was not ultimate, but conventional. Then, Bhāsarvajña quoted Prajñākaragupta's words and criticized his views.[59] Finally, Bhāsarvajña denied the theory that the determination of causality was conventional. The controversy on this problem is interesting, but cannot be discussed here for lack of space. I only want to point out the fact that Bhāsarvajña's criticism of Prajñākaragupta's view was criticized in turn by Jñānaśrīmitra. Jñānaśrīmitra, in the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*, quoted sentences from the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, and criticized Bhāsarvajña's arguments.[60]

Abbreviations and Literature

AJP *Anekāntajayapatākā* (Haribhadra): H. R. Kāpadīā, ed. *Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri with his own commentary and Municandra Sūri's supercommentary*. 2 vols. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 88, 105. Baroda, 1940, 1947.

(*PVV(M): *kāryakāraṇabhāvam*) cf. NBhūṣ 518,3–5: *nanu yady api paramārthataḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvapratipattir nāsti saṃvṛttyā tv asty eva tāvataivānumānaṃ pravartate / paramārthato hi śūnyataivā 'vaśiṣyate / na tatra vyavahārahetuḥ pramāṇavṛttis tasmāt saṃvṛttyaiva kāryakāraṇabhāvapratipattiḥ /*

[57] For example, PVin I 100,20–25: *'di ni kun tu tha snyad pa'i tshad ma'i rang bzhin brjod pa yin te / 'di la yang pha rol rmongs pas 'jig rten slu bar byed pa'i phyir ro // bsam pa las byung ba nyid kyi shes rab goms par byas pas rnam par 'khrul pas dben zhing dri ma med la log pa med pa don dam pa'i tshad ma mngon sum du byed do // de'i yang cha tsam bstan pa yin no //* (cf. NBhūṣ 57,16–19: *sāṃvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam / atrāpi pare vimūḍhā visaṃvādayanti lokam iti / cintāmayīm eva prajñām anuśīlayante vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇam abhimukhīkurvanti /*); PV I 85–86: *dharmadharmivyavasthānaṃ bhedo 'bhedaś ca yādṛśaḥ / asamīkṣitatattvārtho yathā loke pratīyate // taṃ tathā eva samāśritya sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ / paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate //*; PVSV 51,3–5: *sarveṣāṃ viplave'pi pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthā, ā āśrayaparāvṛtter arthakriyāyogyābhimatasaṃvādanāt / mithyātve 'pi praśamānukūlatvān mātṛsaṃjñādivat /* See Steinkellner [1982], Lindtner [1984], Inami [1989], and Vetter [1992].

[58] The following parallel portions are found:

NBhūṣ	PVA
515,8–18	183,21–27
518,6–11	183,12–16
518,13–519,1	184,4–21
519,1–3	184,29–31

[59] KA 5,15–16: *etena yad asthānābhiniveśinā nyāyabhūṣaṇakāreṇa bhāṣyakārīyaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvadūṣaṇaprabandham utthāpya varṇitaṃ, tat sarvaṃ nirupayogam iti pratipāditam /* See Tadashi Tani, "Jñānaśrīmitra Shunkantekishōmetsu (Setsunametsu) Kṣaṇabhaṅga no shō Shiyaku [1]" [A Trial Translation of Jñānaśrīmitra's Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya (Chapter of Momentary Destruction) [1]; summary in English]. *Kōchi Kōgyō Kōtōsenmongakkō Gakujutsu Kiyō* 32 (1990).

[60] The sentences from NBhūṣ 519,8–27 where Bhāsarvajña criticised Prajñākaragupta's view are quoted by Jñānaśrīmitra. (KA 6,1–6; 8,1–3; 8,15–16; 9,4–5; 9,16–10,1; 10,10–12; 10,14–16.) See Inami [1998].

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DhP *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): Dalsukhabhai Malvania, ed. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955.

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HB *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I, tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 252. Band, 1. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 4. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1967.

HBṬ *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa): Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, eds. *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra.* Baroda, 1949.

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JNA Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist philosophical works of Jñānaśrīmitra.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna, 1959. 2nd ed. Patna, 1987.

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NBhūṣ *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*. Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇāsī, 1968.

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PVin *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti).

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Tarkasopāna *Tarkasopāna* (Vidyākaraśānti): In *Minor Buddhist Texts*, ed. Giuseppe Tucci, part 1, 275–310. Rome, 1956.

TBV *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* (Abhayadevasūri): Sukhalāla Saṃghavi and Becaradāsa Dośi, eds. *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*. 5 vols. Ahmedabad, 1924–31. Reprint (5 vols. in 2), Kyoto, 1984.

TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Swāmi Dvarikadas Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi, 1981–82.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

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VNir *Vyāptinirṇaya* (Ratnakīrti): In RNA, 106–111.

VNV *Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā* (Śāntarakṣita): Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Āchārya Dharmakīrti with the commentary Vipañcitārthā of Āchārya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the commentary of Āchārya Prabhācandra*. Bauddha Bharati Series 8. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1972.

ON THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUBJECT (*DHARMIN*) OF THE INFERENCE NEGATING INVARIABLE ENTITIES IN DHARMAKĪRTIAN LOGIC

by

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Since Nāgārjuna expounded the theory that things are devoid of intrinsic nature, it has been accepted as a fundamental principle in the later development of Buddhist theory. It is well known that Śāntarakṣita (8th century) elaborates this theory and formulates a proof negating the intrinsic nature of things which are postulated by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools by means of the "reason that they are devoid of both the nature of oneness and that of manifoldness" (*ekāneka-svabhāvena viyogāt*).[1] The proof negating the possession of the intrinsic nature of things implies that things are in reality not existent. Against this proof one supposes at least two objections regarding the subject (*dharmin*) and the thesis (*pakṣa*) of the inference. Firstly, when the proponent formulates an inference with respect to the subject which is to be negated, he is confronted with the objection that, if the existence of the subject itself were negated, the proponent's own thesis, which is proposed with respect to the non-existent subject, would also be annulled. This objection is described logically as the fallacy of the thesis that the proponent's own thesis is annulled (*pakṣabādhā*). In addition, viewed from the angle of the reason, it is a contradictory (*viruddha*) reason, because it proves the opposite of the proponent's thesis. Secondly, one may raise the objection that if the proponent does not assume the existence of the subject, he can not propose his reason with respect to the subject which is in reality not existent. This objection points out the non-establishment (*asiddhatā*) of the presence of the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). These counterarguments against any inference which negates the properties of any entity postulated by the opponent and hence aims at the derivation of the non-existence of the entity as subject are fundamental and unavoidable problems for the proponent of this kind of inference.[2]

The Buddhist logicians become conscious of these problems and try to solve them. In the following I would like to analyze their views on the refutation of these objections and make clear the differences in their views.

I. Rejection of the objection against the validity of *prasaṅga*

In order to avoid these logical fallacies of the annulment of the thesis and the non-establish-

[1] Cf. MA 1: *niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //* (cited in BCAP 270,8–9; cf. Ichigō [1985a: 22, note 1]). This verse is translated in Ichigō [1985a: CXXXV].

[2] These problems are treated in Tillemans [1982: 112ff.; 1984: 365ff.] on the basis of the Tibetan interpretaions and in Kobayashi [1987] mainly on the basis of Kamalaśīla's view in the *Madhyamakāloka.*

ment of the reason one may regard this proof negating the properties of an entity as a proof in the form of *prasaṅga*.[3] Namely, *prasaṅga* is the argument which derives an inconsistency within the doctrinal system by means of the reason which the opponent alone insists upon and the proponent himself does not accept, therefore, in the case of *prasaṅga* the presence of the reason in the subject is not necessary, and as for the consequence of *prasaṅga*, it is contradictory and hence is to be negated, accordingly, there are no fallacies, even if the unestablished reason is used and the derived thesis is negated.

The essential problems, however, still remain unsolved, because the validity of the derivation of consequence in *prasaṅga* is not yet proved and for the sake of this proof one must address the similar problems of why the unestablished reason and the negation of the thesis do not fall into the fallacies of the reason and the thesis. In Buddhist logic Dharmakīrti handles these problems with a view to proving the validity of *prasaṅga*. In the third chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (= PVin III) he presupposes the following counterargument against *prasaṅga*:

> "Even if it is so [namely, even if the proponent formulates *prasaṅga* in order to show that the reason and the consequence of *prasaṅga* cannot be present in the subject], [for the proponent] the reason [of *prasaṅga*] would not be established (*asiddha*) [as present in the subject], because he stands on [a view that what] he himself accepts (*svābhyupagama*) is different [from the provisional acceptance of the subject and the reason of *prasaṅga*]; or [if the proponent accepts the opponent's view in order to establish the presence of the reason in the subject, then this] acceptance [of the opponent's doctrine] etc. would annul the thesis [which he derives in *prasaṅga*]" (PVin III 286a8–b1: *de lta na yang rang gis khas blangs pa gzhan du gnas pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma grub pa dang / dam bcas pa la khas blangs pa la sogs pas gnod pa ma yin nam zhe na . . .*).[4]

To these objections Dharmakīrti answers:

> "It is not [correct], because, when [by means of *prasaṅga* the proponent] examines (*parīkṣā*) [the truth of the opponent's traditional doctrines], he does not [*a priori*] accept any [traditional doctrines as a ground for the negation of the reason or the thesis of *prasaṅga*]" (PVin III 286b1: *ma yin te / brtag pa'i dus na 'ga' yang khas blangs pa med pa'i phyir ro //*).[5]

As *prasaṅga* is formulated for the purpose of the examination of traditional doctrines, no doctrine can be a base for the negation of other doctrines. Therefore, an opponent's doctrine which is not established to be true cannot be the base to determine that the derivation of the consequence is annulled simply because it is contrary to the opponent's doctrine. In the same way the reason in *prasaṅga* is not to be regarded as fallacious, although it is not accepted by the proponent, because in the process of derivation the proponent provisionally takes the opponent's

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[3] The view to regard the inference negating the intrinsic nature as *prasaṅga* and to avoid the fallacy of reason etc., for example, is mentioned as an objection and refuted in MĀ 189b1–3.

[4] This passage is translated in Tani [1987: 13] and Iwata [1997: 212]. As for the concrete interpretation of this objection see Iwata [1997: 212f., notes 21–23].

[5] Cf. NBhūṣ 232,23 and 234,11: *nāpi parīkṣākāle kasyacid abhyupagamaḥ* (Tani [1987: 12, note 20]). Kamalaśīla applies the same view to the refutation of the objection that the reason of the inference negating invariable entities could not be present in the subject because the subject is not existent, cf. MĀ 191a8ff.

position and hence does not use his own doctrine, thus it cannot be the base to determine the fallacy of the reason.

Within the argument of the validity of *prasaṅga* the logical fallacies of the reason and the thesis are removed by Dharmakīrti's answer, but when the proponent transforms *prasaṅga* into the contrapositive form (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*) which is an autonomous (*svatantra*) inference, namely, the inference by which he proves his own thesis, the same fallacies come into question, because in this case, in contrast with *prasaṅga*, the proponent must show concretely that the reason is present in the non-existent subject and the thesis is not annulled even if the existence of the subject itself is negated.

II. Rejection of the objection of the *pakṣabādhā*

Now, the question we have to ask is how these fallacies of the reason and the thesis are removed in the case of autonomous inference. Let us begin with Dharmakīrti's refutation of the fallacy of the thesis. Although he does not allude to this problem within the description of *prasaṅga*, he treats the objection of the fallacy of the thesis from another point of view, namely, in the context of the definition of the thesis. He presupposes the objection that the proponent annuls his own thesis if he negates the subject itself. According to the opponent's view this is a fallacious thesis, because the negation of the proponent's own thesis is contrary to the definition of the thesis, which Dignāga defines as follows:

> "[Thesis is the proposition which satisfies the following conditions: it] is to be indicated necessarily as its original form (i.e. the form which is to be proved) [and it] is intended [to be proved] by [the proponent] himself. [Further, the presence of properties accepted by the proponent] in his own subject (i.e. the locus of those properties which he intends) is not rejected by means of the matter perceived directly, inference, [words of] reliable [persons] and well known [common cognition]" (PS III 2: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi //*).[6]

The opponent raises the objection that the annulment of the thesis is contrary to the item of the definition that the presence of properties accepted by the proponent in the subject is not rejected (*anirākṛta*).

In PV IV 136–148 Dharmakīrti refutes this objection from the point of view of the definition of the thesis itself. His argument is summarized as follows: The thesis which is to be proved by inference consists of both the subject (*dharmin*) as the possessor of a property and the property (*dharma*) to be proved which is intended by the proponent. If this intended property were negated by perception, inference and so on, then the proponent would deny his own thesis. In contrast with this, in the case of the inference, when the proponent negates the property which is postulated only by the opponent and hence not accepted by the proponent himself, he falls into no

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[6] In the present translation Dharmakīrti's interpretation is taken into consideration. This Sanskrit is reconstructed in NC 126 (cf. PVA 546,1, PVV 373,7f.). PS III 2 is cited in MĀ 188b6–7 (but it is omitted in Derge edition [D 172b7]). To the definition of the thesis see Kitagawa [1965: 128f.], Katsura [1977: 109], Ono [1986: 109ff.], Kobayashi [1987: 45] and Inami [1991: 70].

fallacy of the thesis, even if he negates the existence of the subject of inference.[7]

Making use of an example, Dharmakīrti describes his own view on the difference between the fallacious and the non-fallacious thesis. According to the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas the ether is the cause for the production of sounds and has a new force '*apūrva*' (non-prior) which enables the successive production of sounds. Dharmakīrti criticizes this theory by means of the following inference:[8]

> "For example, [the proponent] formulates [the following inference]: the ether [, time] and so on do not possess as their own nature an [invariable] non-prior [force] which is not to be brought about by other [cooperating causes] (= thesis), because they are not the cause for [producing] sounds etc. [as

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[7] Dharmakīrti states his view in the following verses: "In all cases [of refutation and proof, if,] with respect to [the subject] possessing such a property which is intended by the proponent as his own [consequence] to be proved, [there were an annulling cognition, then he] would [fall into the fallacy that he] annuls [his own thesis]. [However, the fallacy does] not [arise] when [the proponent negates the existence of] the subject [qualified] by the property which is different [from the intended property]" (PV IV 136: *sarvatra vādino dharmo yaḥ svasādhyatayepsitaḥ / taddharmavati bādhā syān nānyadharmeṇa dharmiṇi //*). "Both [the totality of the subject and the property] are [the thesis] to be proved. Therefore in the case where the annulment of [the existence of] the subject negates the property to be proved [by the proponent], [then there is the fallacy that he] annuls [his own thesis]. This is pointed out by this [term '*svadharmiṇi*' (the locus of the property which the proponent himself intends) inserted in the definition of the thesis]" (PV IV 143: *dvayasyāpi hi sādhyatve sādhyadharmoparodhi yat / bādhanaṃ dharmiṇas tatra bādhety etena varṇitam //*). PV IV 136 = MĀ 189a1–2, PV IV 143 = MĀ 189a4–5, cf. Tillemans [1984: 376, note 44]. PV IV 136–137ab and 141–143 are cited in MĀ, cf. Kobayashi [1987: 45]. PV IV 136–137ab, 140bcd and 143–144ab are translated in Kobayashi [1987: 46–48].

For example, if the Buddhist proponent who holds that sound is audible (*śrāvaṇa*) would deny the existence of the sound qualified by the property 'audibility', then he would commit the fallacy of the negation of his own thesis. On the contrary, when, under the condition postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, that sound is the attribute of the ether (*ākāśaguṇa*) which is an eternal entity, the Buddhist proponent negates the existence of the sound qualified by the property "being the attribute of the ether," then there is no fallacy of the annulment of his own thesis "sound is not the attribute of the ether," cf. PVV 406,14–16: *yathā śrāvaṇatvavati śabde bādhite bādhā pakṣasya,* ***na*** *tu vādīṣṭād dharmād* ***anyena dharmeṇa*** *dharmavati* ***dharmiṇi*** *bādhite bādhā pakṣasya syād iti dharmigrahaṇaprayojanam, yathākāśaguṇatvavati śabde bādhite na pakṣabādhā.*

[8] Before he formulates the inference for the negation of the new force of the ether, he presupposes the following derivation of contradiction by means of a *prasaṅga*. If the new force were an invariable force in the sense that it could not be made by any other cooperating (*sahakārin*) causes, or expressed from the angle of the ether, if it possesses an invariable unitary new force as its own nature, then it is ready to produce sounds at all times, because it exists unchangeably as the cause for their production. This leads to the contradiction that the ether would produce all sounds simultaneously, cf. PVṬ 331a5–6: ***cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir*** *zhes bya ba ni sgra'i rgyu nam mkha' de gal te rtag par 'gyur ba de'i tshe rgyu rtag tu nye ba'i phyir cig car sgra rnams skye bar 'gyur na* (*de ltar yang ma yin no //*); PVA 550,8: *yady anutpādyarūpaṃ bhavet, sakṛd eva svakāryaṃ śabdādikaṃ kuryāt* (in the Tibetan translation [PVA(Tib) 235b7: *sgra la sogs pa'i 'bras bu cig car . . .*] the rendering of the Skt. *sva* in the expression of *svakārya* is omitted); and PVV407,20f. The consequence of this *prasaṅga* contradicts conventional fact and can be negated. This contradiction is derived by the false premise for the argument, namely, the insistence of the Vaiśeṣikas that the ether possesses a new force which is not brought about by other causes. Therefore this premise can be also negated. The logical derivation of the negation of the premise is the contrapositive formulation from the *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*). By means of this logical process Dharmakīrti derives the consequence he intends in the following way: as the consequence of the *prasaṅga* "the ether would be the cause for producing all sounds simultaneously" is negated, the proposition "the ether is not the cause for producing all sounds simultaneously" becomes true. What is not the cause for the simultaneous production of sounds does not possess a new force which is not brought about by other causes. Accordingly, the ether does not possess such a new force.

effects] simultaneously" (PV IV 141abc: *yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ na khādikam / sakṛc chabdādyahetutvād ity ukte . . . //*).[9]

This inference is resolved into the following logical elements:

subject: 'the ether' etc.,
reason: the negation of 'being the cause for producing sounds etc. simultaneously',
consequence: the negation of 'possessing an invariable new force'.

In this inference the Buddhist proponent negates the property of the ether 'possession of an invariable new force which is not to be brought about by other causes' which is postulated by the opponent.

Here Dharmakīrti presupposes the following argument against this inference:

"In the same way (namely, as it is established that the existence of the property of the ether etc. is negated) [it could] also [be proved] that the ether etc., the subject [of the inference] which is in essence the [invariable] entity, does not exist" (PV IV 142ab: *tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api /*).[10]

According to the commentaries, this objection indicates the fallacy of the annulment of the thesis: This reason of the inference proves the negation of existence of the ether itself.[11] On the ground of the non-existence of the ether as subject of the inference, the thesis itself, which is proposed by the proponent with respect to this non-existent subject, namely, "the ether does not possess an invariable new force" can also be negated, in consequence, the fallacy of the annulment of the thesis arises. Dharmakīrti refutes this objection in the following way.

"[Although the mere subject 'the ether' etc. is annulled, the fallacy] does not occur at all [that the proponent would] annul [the thesis] to be proved which he intends in such a way [namely, he does not annul the thesis 'the ether etc. does not possess as its own nature an invariable non-prior force'[12]] " (PV IV 142cd: *naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana vidyate //*).[13]

According to Dharmakīrti's interpretation in PV IV 136 and 143 the refutation of the above objection can be explained as follows: the thesis consists of both the subject and the property of

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[9] *anutpādyāpūrva-* PVV PV-k(S); *anutpādyā pūrva-* PVA. PV IV 141abc = MĀ 189a2–3. PV IV 141 and 142 are translated in Tillemans [1984: 376, note 45].

[10] PV IV 142 = MĀ 189a4.

[11] The existence of a thing is ascertained by its capability of effectively functioning (*arthakriyāsamartha*). In other words whatever is incapable of effectively functioning does not exist. That the ether is incapable of effectively functioning is also implied. Namely, just as the ether cannot produce sounds simultaneously, it cannot produce them successively, because it is eternal and unchangeable, cf. PVṬ 331b2–3. In this sense the reason of the inference 'negation of the simultaneous production of sounds' implies the negation of both simultaneous and successive production of sounds, namely, the incapability of effectively functioning. Since the ether is incapable of the effectively functioning, it does not exist as an entity (cf. PVV 407,22–23: *tathā* ***vastusvabhāvo dharmī vyomādir asann ity api*** *syāt. arthakriyā-asamarthasya vastutvābhāvāt*).

[12] Cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 121b7 (ad PV IV 142cd): ***'dod pa'i bsgrub*** *par* ***bya*** *ba* ***(iṣṭasya sādhyasya)*** *sngar med pa'i rang bzhin bskyed par byar med pa nyid (anutpādyāpūrvarūpatā-) dgag pa* ***la ni gnod pa (bādhā) 'ga' yang med pa nyid*** *do //.*

[13] *kācana* PVA PVV; *kvacana* PV-k(S).

the subject, therefore the annulment of the thesis does not arise through the negation of only the subject. In other words, if the proponent negates the subject qualified by the property which the proponent himself accepts, then the fallacy of the negation of the thesis arises. In the above-mentioned inference, however, only the property which is postulated by the opponent to be present in the ether is negated, but not the property which is intended by the Buddhist proponent. As long as the subject, the ether, qualified by the property which the opponent alone accepts is negated, there is no fallacy of the thesis, even if the proponent disproves the existence of the ether.

III. Refutation of the objection of the *āśrayāsiddhatā*

Although Dharmakīrti's argument against the objection is clear, it might not be sound enough to persuade the opponent, because he does not show positively how the reason or the property to be proved can be present in the subject from the standpoint of the proponent. Namely, as the proponent negates the existence of the subject of inference, there remains still the problem of how the reason or the property to be proved can be present in the non-existent locus as subject. Dharmakīrti does not go into this issue concretely. However, his followers try to remove this difficulty of the presence of properties in the non-existent locus as subject. Let us analyze their views.

Devendrabuddhi

Devendrabuddhi explains that in the above-mentioned inference of which the subject is the ether there is no fallacy with respect to the thesis or the presence of the reason in the subject:

> "Even if [by means of an inference the proponent] negates such a subject [e.g. the ether, which is accepted to be existent only by the opponent], [the fallacy of the thesis does] not [occur] at all that [the proponent would] annul [the thesis] to be proved [which he] intends in such a way, namely, [the thesis which he] intends to be [in the form of] the mere exclusion (*vyavacchedamātra*) [of the property postulated by the opponent]. Also, [when] the reason [of the inference] has the exclusion as its own nature [namely, the exclusion of the property of the ether 'being the cause for producing sounds etc. simultaneously', then there] is no [fallacy] that [the reason] is not established (*asiddha*) [as present in the subject, although this subject is not existent]" (PVP 354b1–2 [ad PV IV 142]: *de lta bur gyur pa'i chos can bsal ba na yang / **de ltar bsgrub byar 'dod pa la*** [(1] *rnam par gcod pa tsam du 'dod pa la*[1)] ***gnod pa ci yang med pa yin*** *pa'am / gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo ma grub pa nyid ma yin no //.* [(1 ... 1)] om. in D).

According to Devendrabuddhi's interpretation, although the ether which the Vaiśeṣikas insist to be existent is devoid of an intrinsic nature and hence non-existent from the Buddhist standpoint, the reason can be present in such a non-existent ether, because the Buddhist's reason also consists of the mere negation of the property 'being the cause for the simultaneous production of sounds'.[14] On account of the above-mentioned passage Devendrabuddhi's view on the presence of the reason in the non-existent subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) is described as follows: When the reason is formulated in the negative form, namely, in the form of the mere exclusion of a

[14] Cf. Kobayashi [1987: 48]. Manorathanandin also advocates the same interpretation: "Even if [the existence of] the subject (i.e., the ether) is annulled [by the proponent] in this way, neither [the fallacy] arises at all [that he

property, then the presence of this reason in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) can be fulfilled, even if the subject is not existent for the proponent.

In short, his view is based on the idea that not existence as the reason, but only non-existence as the reason can be present in the non-existent subject.

Devendrabuddhi's thought is fundamentally the same as that of Dharmottara, who in the formulation of the contrapositive inference from *prasaṅga* tries to establish the presence of reason in the non-existent subject. With a view to negating the invariable entity 'the universal' (*sāmānya*) proposed by the Vaiśeṣikas etc. Dharmottara formulates a *prasaṅga* and by the use of the 'non-cognition of a pervading (property)' (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) as reason transforms it into an autonomous contrapositive inference. In order to establish the presence of the reason even in the subject 'the universal' which is not existent for the Buddhist proponent, he introduces the restriction to the reason that it must consist of the mere negation of a property. According to his opinion the reason, which consists of the non-existence in conformity with the non-existence of the subject, can be present in the non-existent subject: "This non-existence of a pervading [property] (i.e. the mere negation [*med pa tsam*][15] of a pervading property) is necessarily established [as present] even in [the subject which, like] the universal (*sāmānya*) etc., [is] not existent [for the proponent]" (PVinṬ(Dh) 7b5: *khyab par byed pa med pa de ni spyi la sogs pa med pa la yang grub pa nyid do //*).[16] It is, however, remarkable that Dharmottara's view is closely akin to that of Devendrabuddhi, since in regard to their epistemological standpoints Dharmottara's view often differs from that of Devendrabuddhi.[17]

Since the exclusion of a property as the reason is accepted by Devendrabuddhi to be present in the non-existent subject, the same logic can be applied to the thesis which consists of the non-existent subject and the consequence to be proved, as it is indicated in the above-mentioned passage (cf. PVP 354b1–2). Namely, it is possible for the consequence to be present in the non-existent subject, the ether, because the consequence is also formulated by the mere exclusion, i.e. the mere negation of 'possessing an [invariable] new force'. Accordingly, the Buddhist proponent does not fall into the fallacy that he would annul the thesis itself which he formulates on the basis of the same subject,

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would] annul the intended [thesis] to be proved, nor [the fallacy that] the reason is not established [as present in the subject], because, in spite of the non-existence [of the ether as subject], the [mere] exclusion [of the production of effects], namely, 'the negation of the production of effects' [as reason] is established [as present in the non-existent ether as subject]" (PVV 407,24–26: ***evaṃ dharmibādhane 'pīṣṭasya sādhyasya kācana bādhā na vidyate****, hetor vāsiddhiḥ, asaty api kāryānutpādasya vyavacchedasya siddheḥ*).

[15] Cf. PVinṬ(Dh) 9a6, 12a4 and Iwata [1993: 55, note 57].

[16] To the view of Dharmottara cf. Tani [1987: 10–11, note 25] and Iwata [1993: 54ff.].

[17] Dharmakīrti proposes an inference in order to prove that cognition possesses the forms of the object: "The blue [as object] and its cognition are 'non-different' because they are necessarily perceived together" (*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* / PVin I 55ab). With respect to the consequence of this inference 'non-difference of the blue and its cognition' Devendrabuddhi advocates their identity. Dharmottara criticizes this view on the ground that 'non-difference' does not mean identity, but the mere negation of the difference between the object and its cognition, because the nature of the object and that of the cognition are not completely the same, since the object can be proved to be unreal by an examination and hence negated, while the cognition itself cannot be negated. As for the different views on this interpretation see Iwata [1991 I: II A 4 (pp. 110ff.)].

"because, even if [he] negates the subject which is an [invariable] entity [for the opponent], [the intended consequence] to be proved [can] be established [as present in the non-existent subject], as long as [this consequence] has the exclusion as its own nature" (PVP 354b3 [ad PV IV 142]: *chos can dngos por gyur pa bsal ba na yang bsgrub par bya ba rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo grub pa'i phyir ro //*).

Śākyabuddhi

The main point of Devendrabuddhi's argument is that he applies the concept of the 'mere exclusion' to the reason in order to fulfill the *pakṣadharmatā* with respect to the non-existent subject. Śākyabuddhi essentially follows this idea[18] and explains the mere exclusion by means of the term 'non-affirming negation' (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), the negation which does not affirm any counterpart of the negated matter.

"[In the inference negating the invariable force of the ether] the reason 'because [the ether etc.] is not the cause for [producing] sounds etc. simultaneously' has as its nature the mere exclusion [of 'being the cause for producing sounds etc. simultaneously']. [That is, the reason] has the non-affirming negation as its distinctive characteristic. [Therefore] it is not [the reason which is] not established [as present in the subject as the ether], because even if the subject [which is] a [factual] entity does not exist, there is no [cognition which would] annul [the presence of] the mere exclusion [as the reason in] the subject [accepted on the level] of verbal convention (*vyavahāra*)" (PVṬ 331b5–6: ***cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir*** *zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa tsam gyi ngo bo med par dgag pa tsam gyi mtshan nyid ma grub pa nyid ma yin te / dngos por gyur pa'i chos can med na yang tha snyad pa'i chos can rnam par gcod pa tsam la gnod pa med pa'i phyir ro //*).

Presupposing the non-existence of the ether as the subject of inference in conformity with the starting point of the argument of Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi states that the reason formulated by the mere exclusion can be present in the subject which is conventionally accepted. His acceptance of the subject on the level of verbal convention implies that for him the subject is not completely non-existent. Accordingly, on the one hand he takes the position that the subject postulated by the opponent does not exist as a real entity and follows Devendrabuddhi's view that in the non-existent subject only the reason formulated by the mere negation can be present, while on the other hand he suggests that the subject is existent on the level of verbal convention so that it can be the locus in which the reason resides.

Dharmottara's opinion about the latter interpretation differs slightly. He also advocates that the reason should consist of the mere negation when the subject is not existent for the proponent, but applying the mere negation to the reason, he does not regard the conventional existence of the subject as necessary.

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[18] "[In the inference the property to be proved is only the exclusion of a matter, similarly] the reason, too, [consists of] the mere negation [of the simultaneous production of sounds], but not [of the affirmation that the ether] produces [sounds as] effects successively, because [if the reason were formulated in such an affirmative way, then it would] not [be] established [as present] in [the subject as] the ether etc., which is not a [factual] entity [for the Buddhist proponent]" (PVṬ 331a7–8 [ad PV IV 141]: *gtan tshigs kyang rnam par gcod pa tsam yin gyi rim gyis 'bras bu byed pa ma yin te nam* (D; *na* P) *mkha' la sogs pa* (*par* P D) *dngos por gyur pa ma yin pa la ma grub pa'i phyir ro //*).

Prajñākaragupta

Prajñākaragupta's position regarding the possibility of formulating *prasaṅgaviparyaya* from *prasaṅga* has already been made clear elsewhere.[19] In his interpretation of the formulation of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, by which he negates the properties attributed to the universal (*sāmānya*) by the opponent, he takes into consideration the alternative case that the subject 'the universal' is reduced to an empirical thing, the visible (*rūpa*), sound etc.,[20] and thus is accepted as empirically existent. However, he emphasizes that the proponent can formulate an autonomous inference only with respect to this subject which is empirically existent for him;[21] in contrast, in the case of the non-existent subject, he can formulate only *prasaṅga*. For this reason, Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara's interpretation of the mere negation as the reason of the autonomous inference on the ground that the mere negation is a non-existence and this non-existence as the reason has no relation to the subject; hence, it cannot derive its consequence.[22]

Prajñākaragupta's view can be reconfirmed indirectly by his interpretation of PV IV 141abc, which is also relevant to the present discussion. Namely, he mentions neither the reason which consists of the mere negation nor the case where the reason is present in the non-existent subject: Moreover, for him the proposition that the subject is not an entity does not mean that the subject is completely non-existent, but rather that it is existent in a conceptual construction (*vikalpa*). On account of this existence of the subject, he refutes the objection of the fallacy of the thesis: there is no fallacy of the annulment of the thesis when with respect to the ether the proponent formulates the inference which negates the 'possession of the invariable new force',

> "because with respect to the subject which resides in the conceptual construction[23] [the proponent] proves the [consequence] to be proved.[24] However, for that [namely, for the consequence, the reason or the proponent[25]], [the ether] which is a [real] entity is not the subject [of the inference]" (PVA 550,12–13: *vikalpaparinişṭhite dharmiṇi*[26] *sādhyasādhanād vastubhūtas tu dharmī na tasya*).

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[19] Cf. Iwata [1993: 63ff.].

[20] Cf. PVA 483,25f. and Iwata [1993: 70, 130].

[21] Cf. PVA 482,30–31 and Iwata [1993: 70–73].

[22] Cf. PVA 483,5ff.; also Tani [1987: 13–14, note 25] and Iwata [1993: 123f.].

[23] Prajñākaragupta's view that the subject is existent in the conceptual construction is also mentioned in PVA 551,2–3: *na tu tadasaṃbaddha*(+*para*+)*parikalpitadharmibādhane* "[If the property intended by the proponent would be negated when the subject of inference is annulled, then the fallacy of the annulment of the thesis would arise] but [this fallacy does] not [arise], when the subject, which is not connected with that (i.e. the property intended by the proponent) and is conceptually constructed by the opponent, is annulled." (+ +) The Tibetan translation (PVA(Tib) 237a2) does not have *gzhan gyis*, but PVAṬ(Ya) has it in the *pratīka*, cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 124a2: *gzhan gyis kun brtags pa'i chos can*...

[24] In other words, although the opponent (e.g. the Vaiśeṣikas) insists on the real existence of the subject (e.g. the ether), from the standpoint of the Buddhist proponent it is not connected with the property to be proved by the proponent himself and is only conceptually constructed as an entity by the opponent. Therefore, no fallacy of the annulment of the thesis arises even if this kind of thesis is annulled by the inference, cf. PVA 551,2–3 (see note 23).

[25] Cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 122a2: *de'i zhes bya ba ni sgrub par byed pa'i'am* (D; *pa'am* P) */ bsgrub par bya ba'am / rgol ba'i'o //.*

[26] The Tibetan translation has *chos chos can*, cf. PVA(Tib) 236a3–4: *rnam par rtog pa la gnas pa'i chos chos can la bsgrub bya sgrub pa'i phyir te /.* This passage is translated in Kobayashi [1987: 49].

Yamāri interprets that Prajñākaragupta mentions the existence of the subject in the conceptual construction in order to avoid the fallacy of the non-establishment of the locus as subject (*āśrayāsiddhatā*).[27] According to Yamāri's commentary, the subject existent in the conceptual construction means the form (*ākāra*) in the conceptual construction.[28] Consequently, Prajñākaragupta holds that not the invariable entity (*vastu*), which is for the Buddhist proponent in reality not existent, but only the form which is existent in the conceptual construction is the subject of the autonomous inference. As it will be shown in the next paragraph, Prajñākaragupta's view approximates the view of Śāntarakṣita, who does not negate the entity which has the appearance as its characteristic (*snang ba'i ngang can gyi dngos po*) in order to establish the *pakṣadharmatā* in the inference of the negation of the intrinsic nature of things.

Further, Prajñākaragupta shows another interpretation of the ether, namely, the ether which is regarded as an empirically existent thing,[29] for example, the space as a hole of the throat (*galavila*) which is devoid of light (*āloka*), or the light which is not connected with impenetrable things, so that he can prove this kind of ether is transient (*anitya*).[30] His view on the subject established as empirically existent is also implied in the following passage:

> "The subject, namely, is by its own nature certainly established [as qualified by the property intended by the proponent[31] (in other words, established as empirically existent)], because the unestablished[32] subject is of no use in the proof of the property to be proved" (PVA 551,5: *dharmī hi svarūpeṇa siddha evāprasiddhasya dharmiṇaḥ sādhyadharmasādhana upayogābhāvāt*).

From this it is reasonable to think that Prajñākaragupta advocates that the subject of autonomous inference is existent as a form in the conceptual construction or as an empirical thing, and hence does not consider the case of the non-existence of the subject in the present inference just as in his description of the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*-argument. Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, on the contrary, also treat the case of the non-existence of the subject and advocate the reason which consists of mere negation, while Dharmottara further insists on the validity of this kind of reason in comparison with false reasons.[33]

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

Śākyabuddhi's suggestion that the subject is in the conventional sense existent even in the inference negating the intrinsic nature of an entity is expressed clearly by Śāntarakṣita in his

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[27] Cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 122a1–2: *gzhi ma grub pa'i nyes pa ci ltar ma yin zhe na / **rnam par rtog pa la gnas pa'i** zhes bya ba'o //.*

[28] Cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 122a5 (ad PVA 550,16): *rnam par rtog pa'i rnam pa chos can du nye bar bstan nas /*; also Kobayashi [1987: 49].

[29] The two interpretations of the subject, i.e. the subject which is the form conceptually constructed and the subject which is an empirically existent thing for the proponent, are mentioned by Yamāri, cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 122a5–6 (ad PVA 550,16): *de ltar rnam par rtog pa'i rnam pa chos can du nye bar bstan nas / da ni rnam 'grel gnyis pa de nyid rnam par 'grel pas dngos por gyur pa'i chos can ston par byed pa ni **yang na (atha vā)** zhes bya ba'o //.*

[30] Cf. PVA 550,20ff., 550,27ff.

[31] Cf. PVAṬ(Ya) 124a5 (ad PVA 551,5–6): *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyi **khyad par can nyid du** grub pa'i chos can **de sgrub par 'dod pa yin gyi** . . .*

[32] Cf. PVA(Tib) 237a3: *ma grub pa'i chos can la (bsgrub bya'i chos grub pa ni . . .).*

[33] Cf. Iwata [1993: 49–57].

Madhyamakālaṃkāra(vṛtti) and Kamalaśīla in his *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*. To the objection that, if all things were devoid of intrinsic nature, the verbal designations of the reason and the property to be proved could not be established, because both are also not existent, Śāntarakṣita answers:

> "All the activities of the verbal designations of the inferring [reason] and [the consequence] to be inferred are carried out on the basis of the subjects, [e.g.] place, sound etc., which characteristically appear (*pratibhāsa*) [commonly] in the eye-cognition, ear-cognition etc. of [all persons, i.e. from] wise men to women and children, with the exception of the different subjects which are brought forward (i.e. proposed) on the ground of mutually opposed doctrines (*siddhānta*). If they were not [carried out on the basis of the commonly occurring subject], the locus (*āśraya*) of the reasons, 'smoke', 'existence' etc., for all [the consequences] intended to be proved, 'fire', 'impermanence' etc.,[34] could not be established, because the subject to be proved, [e.g.] the entity of the [unitary] whole (*avayavin*) [different from its parts], the entity of [the sound which is] the attribute of the ether etc., is not established [as existent for the Buddhist proponent]" (MAV 73b7–74a2: *rjes su dpag pa dang rjes su dpag par bya ba'i tha snyad thams cad ni phan tshun* (D; *tshun ni* P) *mi mthun pa'i* (P; *pas* D) (+*grub pa'i*+) (D; om P) *mthas bskyed pa chos can tha dad pa* (D; *pa'i* P) *yongs su btang ste / mkhas pa dang bud med dang byis pa'i bar gyi mig dang rna ba la sogs pa'i shes pa la snang ba'i ngang can gyi phyogs sgra la sogs pa'i chos can la brten nas 'jug go*[35] *// de lta min na du ba dang yod pa la sogs pa'i me dang mi rtag pa nyid la sogs pa bsgrub par 'dod pa thams cad kyi gtan tshigs kyi gzhi 'grub par mi 'gyur te / bsgrub* (P; *sgrub* D) *pa'i chos can yan lag can dang / nam mkha'i yon tan la sogs pa'i ngo bo rnams ma grub pa'i phyir ro //*).[36]

Śāntarakṣita forms a clear view that the verbal designations of the 'reason', the 'property to be proved' etc. are used on the basis of the subject which appears commonly in the cognition of the disputants. In other words, in order to establish the locus on which the reason etc. resides, he does not negate the subject which characteristically appears in the eye-cognition etc.,[37] although he does not accept its ultimate existence, because, when one examines its reality by means of wisdom and correct cognition, it no longer appears.[38] Thus, in the field of inference he assumes

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[34] *bsgrub* is difficult to reconstruct into Skt. Provided that *bsgrub* is a corruption of *sgrub*, the passage can be translated as follows: ". . . the locus of all the reasons, 'smoke', 'existence' etc., which are intended as the proving [factor] (*sādhana*) for [the consequences], 'fire', 'impermanence' etc., could not be established . . ."

[35] Cf. AAĀ 638,13–15: *sarva evānumānānumeyavyavahāraḥ parasparaparāhatasiddhāntāhitadharmabheda-parityāgenābālajanapratītaṃ dharmiṇam āśritya pravartate*; also Ichigō [1985a: 256, note 1].

[36] Translated in Ichigō [1985a: 173]. MAV is translated into Japanese in Ichigō [1985b: 119ff.].

[37] "I do not negate the entity which has the appearance as its characteristic. Therefore, there is no confusion regarding the establishment of [the relation between] the [consequence] to be proved and the proving [reason]" (MA 78: *bdag ni snang ba'i ngang can gyi* (D; *gyis* P) *// dngos po dgag par mi byed de // de lta bas na sgrub pa dang // bsgrub bya gzhag* (D; *bzhag* P) *pa 'khrugs pa med //*), translated in Ichigō [1985a: CXLIII].

[38] Cf. MAV 74a3–4. According to Kamalaśīla's interpretation, even if the ultimate (*pāramārthika*) intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) superimposed on the subject is negated, the subject's essence 'appearance' is not negated, "since, on the ground that the double moon, a knot of hair etc. appear [in the cognition of a patient suffering from an eye disease] although they are untrue, the appearance [of a thing] is not [necessarily] pervaded by [its] possession of an ultimate intrinsic nature; [if this pervasion were true, then] on account of the [pervasion the appearance] could be denied when the ultimate intrinsic nature is denied" (MAP 131a1–2 ≅ AAĀ 639,3–5: *na hi pāramārthikasvabhāvatvena*

the existence of the locus of the reason etc. on the level of appearance in cognition.[39] Therefore, he can apply the reason and the property to be proved to this subject which appears, namely, to the locus existent on the level of appearance, so that he can avoid the fallacy of the non-establishment of the locus of the reason etc. In consequence, the Buddhist proposition that all things do not possess any intrinsic nature cannot be annulled.[40]

Although in this way the non-establishment of the presence of the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) can be avoided, another problem arises: when in the inference of the non-existence of things the proponent derives the consequence which consists of the mere negation of one property postulated by the opponent through the reason which consists of the mere negation of another property, then the question again arises of how the non-existence as the reason or the consequence can be present in the subject.

Although neither Śāntarakṣita in MA(V) nor Kamalaśīla in MAP allude to the answer to this question, Kamalaśīla takes it up for discussion in his *Madhyamakāloka*. In the case of the inference of which the consequence is formulated in the affirmative form, he assumes the existence of the subject, i.e. the locus for the reason and the consequence, on the level of verbal convention.[41] When, however, the Buddhist proponent takes as the subject of inference the invariable ether, the primordial matter (*prakṛti*) etc., which he does not hold to be existent, and derives the consequence which denies these entities' properties postulated by the opponent, then, according to Kamalaśīla's opinion, the presupposition of the existence of the subject itself is not necessary even on the level of verbal convention and without this existence of the subject no logical fallacies with respect to the reason arise.

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pratibhāso vyāpto yena tannivṛttau nivartet, alīkasyāpi dvicandrakeśoṇḍukāder bhāsanāt, cf. Ichigō [1985a: 255, note 3].) Cf. also MĀ 191a5–6.

[39] Kamalaśīla interprets that the inference negating the intrinsic nature does not entail the negation of the subject itself in the following way: "[The Buddhist proponent] proves the negation (*niṣedha*) of the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) which is superimposed (*samāropita*) as true also on this subject which appears (*pratibhāsamāna*). However, he does not negate the subject's own essence (*dharmisvarūpa*) . . ." (MAP 130b8: *chos can snang ba 'di la yang rang bzhin yang dag par sgro btags pa dgag pa sgrub par byed kyi / chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo 'gog par ni ma yin pas . . .*), cf. AAĀ 638,27–639,1: *pratibhāsamāne dharmiṇi samāropitatāttvikabhāvaniṣedhaḥ sādhyate, na tu dharmisvarūpaniṣedha iti . . .* ; also Ichigō [1985a: 255, note 2].

[40] "Consequently, since the matter which appears is not negated, the activity of the verbal designations of the [property] to be proved and the proving [reason], which are not [the objects of] the attachment [which arises from the assumption of the disputant's doctrines], [can] be carried out [with respect to the subject appearing in the cognition of the disputants]. Therefore, there is not at all the annulment of [the Buddhist proponent's] proposition that all things do not possess any intrinsic nature" (MAV 74a4–5: *de lta bas na snang ba'i don ma bkag pa nyid kyis mngon par zhen pa med pa'i bsgrub* (D; *sgrub* P) *pa dang / sgrub pa'i tha snyad 'jug pas chos thams cad rang bzhin med par smra ba la gnod pa ci yang med do //*).

[41] "Further, also in the [case of] drawing an inference etc. by means of verbal convention (*vyavahāra*), the subject [of the thesis] etc. which is a [factual] entity by means of verbal convention certainly needs [to be assumed], provided that [he] intends to prove the property of an entity, e.g. the impermanence etc., as that which possesses [factual] existence as its nature. In this case it is not established that, without any such locus (*āśraya*) [of the inference], only the [property] to be proved, [the reason] and so on reside" (MĀ 187b7–188a1: *gzhan yang tha snyad kyi sgo nas rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa 'jug pa la yang gang la mi rtag pa la sogs pa dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo boṛ* (P; *bo* D) *sgrub par 'dod pa de la ni gdon mi za bar tha snyad kyi sgo nas dngos por gyur pa'i* (D; *ba'i* P) *chos can la sogs pa dgos te / de la de lta bu'i gzhi med par bsgrub par bya ba la sogs pa 'ba' zhig gnas par grub pa ni med do //*), translated in Kobayashi [1987: 42].

"When [the proponent] does not intend to prove the property of an entity as that which possesses [factual] existence as its nature but intends to propose only the proof of the exclusion (*vyavaccheda*) of a property superimposed (*samāropita*) [erroneously by the opponent], then neither allusion to the fallacy of the non-establishment [of the reason in the subject] etc. nor the subject which is the [factual] entity on the [level of] verbal convention need [be assumed], because it (i.e. the superimposed property) is not the property of that (i.e. the entity accepted by the proponent); and depending on this, [the entity accepted by the proponent] cannot be the subject (i.e. the locus) of that (i.e. the superimposed property). Further, [this is so] because there is no obstacle to the proof of the matter (i.e. the consequence) intended [by the proponent] through the reason which is invariably connected with [the property] to be proved, even if that (i.e. the subject insisted by the opponent) is not established [as existent in reality]" (MĀ 188a3–6: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi /* (P; *kyi* D) *'on kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad* (D; *bcad* P) *pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i* (D; *pa'i /* P) *nyes pa brjod pa*[42] *tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de la ltos* (D; *bltos* P) *nas kyang de'i chos can nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na mi* (P; *de mi* D) *'byung ba'i gtan tshigs mngon par 'dod pa'i don grub ('grub*[43] *?) pa la gags (gegs?) byed pa med pa'i phyir ro //*).[44]

With the intention of showing this, Kamalaśīla formulates the same inference as Dharmakīrti negating the invariable nature of the ether.[45] Against the objection that the negation of the intrinsic property of the ether implies the negation of the ether itself and the negation of the ether as the subject means the annulment of the thesis which the proponent himself derives with respect to this subject, Kamalaśīla argues:

"There is no [correct cognition] at all which annuls the [consequence] to be proved, which is according to the intention [of the proponent] the mere exclusion [of the properties postulated by the opponent]" (MĀ 188b4–5: *bsgrub par bya ba rnam par bcad pa tsam du 'dod pa la ni gnod pa ci yang med la /*).

Insofar as the proponent negates the subject which is connected with other properties postulated only by the opponent and derives the mere negation of these properties as consequence, he does not fall into the fallacy that the thesis derived by the inference is annulled (cf. MĀ 188b5–6). As Kamalaśīla's argument is in conformity with PV IV 136 which he cites in MĀ (189a1–2), it is clear that his answer is based on the view of Dharmakīrti. However, in the above passage Kamalaśīla points out an important view which not Dharmakīrti but his commentators mention, namely, the view that the consequence as the mere exclusion of a property can be present in the non-existent subject. In order to fulfill the presence of the reason in the non-existent subject he also makes use of this idea:

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[42] I have tentatively read as follows: both *nyes pa brjod pa* and (*yang, ca*?) *tha snyad du dngos por gyur pa'i chos can* are the subject for the predicate *mi dgos te*; or, there might be a corruption in the Tibetan translation *nyes pa brjod pa*.

[43] Cf. MĀ 188a6: *rgol ba'i mngon par 'dod pa'i don 'grub pa la gnod pa byed pa* . . . and MĀ 188a3.

[44] Translated in Tillemans [1984: 375, note 40] and Kobayashi [1987: 44f.].

[45] Cf. MĀ 188b1–2; also Kobayashi [1987: 47].

"[There is] also no [fallacy that] the reason is not established as long as it possesses the mere exclusion [of a property] as its nature, because even if the subject is not a [factual] entity, those too (i.e. the reason and the property to be proved which consist of mere exclusion) [can be] established [as present in the subject]" (MĀ 188b5: *gtan tshigs rnam par bcad pa tsam gyi ngo bo ma grub pa nyid kyang ma yin te / chos can dngos por gyur pa ma yin yang de gnyis grub pa'i phyir ro //*).[46]

Kamalaśīla's argument in MĀ to validate the presence of the reason in the non-existent subject by the application of the mere negation to the reason is already advocated, as we have seen before, by Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Dharmottara.

In spite of this argument to accept the presence of the reason in the non-existent subject, Kamalaśla does not deny the appearance of the subject, both the well-known object of the visible (*rūpa*) etc. and the primordial matter (*pradhāna*) etc., in the cognition of the disputants, in order to avoid the non-establishment of the locus for the reason.[47] Accordingly, his view might be akin to that of Śākyabuddhi who advocates the presence of the reason consisting of the mere negation in the non-existent subject, while admitting the existence of the subject on the level of verbal convention.[48]

The problem of how the Buddhist reason can be present in the subject, i.e. the locus postulated by the opponent, arises from the standpoint that the subject is not existent for the Buddhist proponent, in other words, in the case of the existent subject there is no such problem. Therefore, when the Buddhist proponent can avoid this fallacy in the case of the non-existent subject, in principle he can formulate an autonomous inference. Namely, the view of Dharmakīrti's followers that the reason consisting of mere negation can be present even in the non-existent subject and hence is free from the fallacy of the non-establishment of the locus implies the possibility to formulate an autonomous inference with respect to any subject. Dharmottara's and Kamalaśīla's descriptions formulating an autonomous inference with respect to the non-existent subject indicate that they allow for this possibility, while in Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's interpretations this point is not clear because of their brief descriptions. On the contrary, Prajñākaragupta's view that the existence of the subject is necessary for the formulation of an autonomous inference leads to the limitation of the formulation of an autonomous inference to only the subject which is existent on the level of verbal convention, conceptual construction etc.; otherwise one can formulate nothing but *prasaṅga*. According to Prajñākaragupta's view the disputants would have to determine the mode of existence of the subject before they formulate an inference. However,

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[46] Translated in Kobayashi [1987: 47].

[47] Cf. MĀ 191a4–6: *de la ji ltar brtags pa'i chos can (e.g. pradhāna*(1*)*) la dngos po'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags pa (samāropita) la sogs pa bkag tu* (D; *du* P) *zin kyang rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag la snang ba'i (*pratibhāsa) phyir ma grub pa nyid (asiddhatā) la sogs pa'i nyes pa (doṣa) mi 'jug pa, de bzhin du gzugs (rūpa) la sogs pa yang gnag rdzi'i chung ma yan chad kyi skye bo la snang ba'i phyir ji ltar ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur /* (2**snang ba ni gang gis na de log* (1*na ldog*1) (D; (1 ... 1) om P) *par 'gyur ba bden pa'i ngo bo nyid (*satyarūpatva) kyis khyab pa (*vyāpta) yang ma yin te* (D; *ste* P) */ brdzun pa (alīka) yang snang ba'i phyir ro**2) *//.* (1*) Cf. MĀ 191a2–3: *gtso bo la sogs pa dgag par kun brtags pa'i chos can kho na la bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa'i sems pa rgyas par byed pa de bzhin du . . .* (2* ... *2) Cf. MAP 131a1–2 ≅ AAĀ 639,3–5 (see note 38).

[48] This does not mean, however, that their epistemological positions are also same, since in the epistemological field Śākyabuddhi's view is refuted by Śāntarakṣita (cf. Iwata [1991 I: 143; 1991 II: 108, note 80]) and Kamalaśīla (cf. Iwata [1991 I: 134–137; 1991 II: 103f., note 61].)

when they try to determine it, they could never enter into the inference itself, because their views on the existence of things are quite different so that no common universe of discourse can be found. Therefore, from the logical point of view, the position of Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla is more refined than that of Prajñākaragupta and Śāntarakṣita in the sense that the former position makes it possible to formulate the inference negating the intrinsic nature of things postulated by the opponent, without being worried about the problem of how the subject exists.

Summary

One of the essential counterarguments against the Buddhist inference which aims at the negation of the intrinsic nature of invariable entities postulated by the opponent, e.g. the ether, the universal etc., is that the negation of the intrinsic nature of an entity implies the non-existence of the entity and the latter implies the negation of the proponent's own thesis which the proponent proposes with respect to the non-existent entity as the subject of inference. In his interpretation of the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*), Dharmakrti in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) solves this problem as follows: if the proponent were to negate his own subject (*svadharmin*), namely, the subject qualified by the property which he himself accepts, then he would fall into the fallacy that he denies his own thesis, but when he negates the subject qualified by the properties on which the opponent alone insists, then the fallacy of the annulment of the thesis does not arise (cf. PV IV 136).

In spite of this solution in conformity with the definition of the thesis, in the case of the subject which is not existent for the proponent one still encounters the problems which arise from the ascertainment of the validity of the reason, namely, the problems of how the proponent can show that the reason is present in the non-existent subject and that the derived thesis is not rejected. Although Dharmakīrti removes the fallacies of the reason and the thesis within the description of the validity of the derivation of impossible consequence (*prasaṅga*), he does not discuss the above-mentioned problems in detail. Further, in an example of the inference negating the property of the ether postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, Dharmakīrti formulates the reason and the consequence by means of the negation of properties, but he does not show an interest in the question of how the reason can be present in the non-existence as the subject. In contrast to Dharmakīrti, his followers go into the issues and propose different views. In this paper I have analyzed them from the angle of the subject (*dharmin*) which is postulated as a real and invariable entity only by the opponent and hence is to be negated by the Buddhist proponent.

In the case of an autonomous inference negating properties of an entity postulated by the opponent, the views of Dharmakīrti's followers on the treatment of the subject are divided into three types:

(1) Devendrabuddhi and Dharmottara consider that the existence of the subject as the locus of the reason and the consequence is not necessarily presupposed for the derivation of the proponent's own thesis.

(2) Prajñākaragupta considers that the existence of the subject on a certain level is necessary.

(3) Śākyabuddhi advocates, on the one hand, following Devendrabuddhi's view, that even under the condition of the non-existence of the subject an autonomous inference can be formulated, while on the other hand he accepts the existence of the subject on the level of verbal convention (*vyavahāra*).

Devendrabuddhi is the first advocate who admits the non-existence of the subject, namely, he proposes the view that even in the non-existent subject the reason can be present when it consists of the mere negation (*vyavacchedamātra*) of a property. Śākyabuddhi interprets clearly that the reason which can reside in the non-existent subject is formulated by means of the non-affirming negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*).


As far as the acceptance of the presence of the reason formulated by mere negation in the non-existent subject is concerned, according to the result of the analysis of *prasaṅga*-argument, it is well known that Dharmottara advocates this view in order to establish the presence of the reason in the non-existent subject. Namely, it is for him an important ground for the formulation of an autonomous *prasaṅgaviparyaya* from *prasaṅga* when the subject is not existent for the proponent. Thus, Dharmottara is an advocate of the non-existent subject, as are both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi.

Although Śākyabuddhi shares with Devendrabuddhi the view not to presuppose the existence of the subject as the locus of the reason, he suggests that the mere exclusion as the reason is present in the subject which is accepted on the level of verbal convention. This is also advocated by Kamalaśīla.

In opposition to Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta explicitly advocates that for the sake of the formulation of an autonomous *prasaṅgaviparyaya* from *prasaṅga* the subject must be existent for the proponent, because even if the reason consists of the mere negation on which Dharmottara insists, pure non-existence as the reason can not have any relation with the subject. Prajñākaragupta's view is also ascertained indirectly within his interpretation of the subject of Dharmakīrti's inference negating the property of the ether.

Śāntarakṣita states in his *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (MA) and his autocommentary (MAV) that the verbal designations of the reason, the property to be proved etc. are based on the subject which appears commonly in the cognition of the disputants, while he does not make reference to the problem of how the non-establishment of the reason can be avoided in the case of the non-existent subject in MA(V). Thus, he, as well as Kamalaśīla in MAP, mainly advocates the existent subject. On the contrary, as Kobayashi [1987] has already pointed out, Kamalaśīla treats this problem in his later work *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ). In this work, he advocates that when the Buddhist proves the negation of a property superimposed erroneously by the opponent, then it is not necessary to assume the existence of the subject even on the level of verbal convention because he proposes that in this case the reason consisting of mere negation can be present in the non-existent subject. Consequently, it is reasonable to think that Kamalaśīla's position in his MĀ with respect to the subject of the autonomous inference is different from that of Prajñākaragupta, while it is the same with that of Dharmottara. However, Kamalaśīla in his MĀ does not negate the common appearance of the subject of the autonomous inference negating the intrinsic nature of an entity in the cognition of the disputants in order to avoid the non-establishment of the locus for the reason.

The interpretations of the subject of the autonomous inference which negates properties of an entity postulated by the opponent within the Dharmakīrtian tradition will be schematized in the following way:



Abbreviations and Literature

AAĀ *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* (Haribhadra): Unrai Wogihara, ed. *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā.* Reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store Ltd., 1973.

BCAP *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (Prajñākaramati): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Ārya Śāntideva with the commentary Pañjikā of Shrī Prajñākaramati and Hindi translation.* Varanasi, 1988.

D Derge edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.

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MA *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (Śāntarakṣita) (Tib.): See MAV.

MAP *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla) (Tib.): P 5286. See Ichigō [1985a].

MAV *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (Śāntarakṣita) (Tib.): P 5285. See Ichigō [1985a].

MĀ *Madhyamakāloka* (Kamalaśīla) (Tib.): P 5287.

NBhūṣ *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇasī, 1968.

NC *Nayacakra* (Mallavādi): Muni Jambūvijaya, ed. *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa, with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa.* Part 1. Bhavnagar, 1966.

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P Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.

PS III *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga), chapter 3 (Parārthānumāna) (Tib.): See Kitagawa [1965].

PV IV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 4 (Parārthānumāna): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 164–206.

PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

PVA(Tib) *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (Tib.): P 5719.

PVAṬ(Ya) *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā* (Yamāri): P 5723.

PVin I, III *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa), chapter 3 (Parārthānumāna) (Tib.): P 5710.

PVinṬ(Dh) *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) (Tib.): P 5727.

PV-k(S) *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā. Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24 (1938), parts 1–2.

PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): P 5717(b).

PVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi) (Tib.): P 5718.

PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirti with the commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathanandin.* Bauddha Bharati Series 3. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

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WZKS *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*

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ON *ANYATHĀNUPAPATTI* AND *AVĪTA*/*ĀVĪTA*

by

Kyo Kano, Kobe

0. *Nyāyāvatāra*

At the present state of research, it appears that the term *antarvyāpti* is used for the first time in the history of the Indian logico-epistemological tradition in the *Nyāyāvatāra* (NA), attributed to the Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara.[1] The *Nyāyāvatāra*, a short manual composed of only 32 verses, is important not only in the specific context of the history of the Jaina epistemology but also in the Indian epistemological tradition in general.[2] Its importance rests on the following characteristics:

1) It is the first Jaina work that deals with epistemology and logic in a systematic manner under the influence of other epistemological traditions.
2) It appears to be the first epistemological work that mentions the term *antarvyāpti*.
3) The term *anyathānupapannatva* is used in order to account for the characteristic feature (*lakṣaṇa*) of a valid logical reason (*hetu*).

During the initial stages of the Jaina epistemological tradition, a theory of knowledge was not developed as an independent subject. With the *pramāṇavāda* having prevailed in Indian

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[1] At the outset it should be emphasized that the first occurrence of the term *antarvyāpti* in the NA does not necessarily mean that it is an original idea of Siddhasena Divākara or the author of the NA. We must make a distinction between the notion of *antarvyāpti* and the usage of the term *antarvyāpti*. This problem is of course associated with the chronology relating to the NA and Siddhasena.

The authorship of the *Nyāyāvatāra* and the dates of Siddhasena Divākara are not yet settled and need to be re-examined. See Dhaky [1995]. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. A. Wayman who gave me information on Dhaky's paper at the time of the conference and also to Prof. E. Steinkellner who kindly sent me a copy of the paper.

[2] Regarding the *Nyāyāvatāra*, the following editions (A) and studies (B) are available:

(A) Texts

1) Vidyābhūṣaṇa, S. C., ed. *Nyāyāvatāra: The Earliest Jaina Work on Pure Logic.* Calcutta, 1909.
2) Vaidya, P. L., ed. *Nyāyāvatāra with Siddharṣi's Ṭīkā and Devabhadra's Ṭippana.* Bombay, 1928.
3) Malvaniya, D., ed. *Nyāyāvatāravārttika-Vṛtti.* S. J. Series No. 20. Bombay, 1949.
4) Upadhye, A. N., ed. *Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and Other Works.* Bombay, 1971.

(B) Studies

1) Vidyābhūṣaṇa, S. C. See (A)-1).
2) Kanakura, Enshō. "Jaina no ronrigaku" [Logic in Jainism]. Chap. 7 in *Indo-seishinbunka no kenkyū* [A Study of Spiritual Culture in India]. Tokyo: Baifūkan, 1944.
3) Mookerjee, S. "A Critical and Comparative Study of Jaina Logic and Epistemology on the Basis of the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara." *Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin* 1 (1971).

There are two commentaries on the NA: 1) the *Vivṛti* of Siddharṣi Gaṇi (NAV), and 2) the *Ṭippana* of Devabhadrasūri. My argument is mainly based on the former.

philosophy, Jaina philosophers had to establish their own *pramāṇa*-system to compete with other philosophical schools. Under the influence of other epistemological traditions, the *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first work to construct a Jaina theory of knowledge under the heading of *pramāṇa*. Given this background, the aim of the present paper is to show the relationship between the Jaina concept of *anyathānupapatti* and the idea of *avīta* attributed to the early Sāṃkhya scholars and others. Both terms are deeply connected with the development of the theory of inference during the early stages of Indian philosophy.

1. *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti*

The *Nyāyāvatāra* begins with a definition of *pramāṇa*. Except for verses 29, 30 and 31, which explain the traditional theories of *naya*, *syādvāda* and the soul (*jīva*) respectively, all other verses are devoted to the theory of *pramāṇa*. For example, verse 17 describes *hetu* as follows:

> *hetos tathopapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathāpi vā /*
> *dvividho 'nyatareṇāpi sādhyasiddhir bhaved iti //* (NA 17)
> "Logical reason is to be formulated in two ways, either by *tathopapatti* or by *anyathā*[*-anupapatti*]. What is to be proved (*sādhya*) can be proved by either [method]."[3]

In addition, verses 13 and 22ab also mention *hetu*.

> *sādhyāvinābhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam /*
> *parārtham anumānaṃ tat pakṣādivacanātmakam //* (NA 13)
> "*Parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others) is a verbal expression which makes [the opponent] realize a logical reason that is inseparably connected to what is to be proved, and it consists of statements of *pakṣa* (thesis) and so forth."
>
> *anyathānupapannatvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam /* (NA 22ab)
> "It is said that *anyathānupapannatva* is the characteristic feature of the valid logical reason."

In these verses the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* tries to characterize the valid logical reason from the viewpoint of the relation between the reason and what is to be proved (*sādhya*), not from the relation between the reason and examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) as is the case with Dignāga or Nyāya. In Dignāga's system, the valid logical reason is characterized by its presence in similar instances (*sapakṣa*) as well as its absence in dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). In the Nyāya system also, the logical reason is defined on the basis of its similarity to (*sādharmyāt*) or dissimilarity from (*vaidharmyāt*) other examples.[4] In both cases, examples play a decisive role. In contrast to these two systems, the *Nyāyāvatāra* does not refer to examples when it characterizes the logical reason, merely stating that examples are adduced only for the recollection of the invariable relationship (*saṃbandhasmaraṇa*) between the reason and what is to be proved.[5]

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[3] The word *iti* may mean that this statement is a citation from the work of an earlier logician in the Jaina or another tradition. This problem is connected to the interpretation of verse 22ab below.

[4] NS 1.1.34: *udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ*; 35: *tathā vaidharmyāt*.

[5] NA 18: *sādhyasādhanayor vyāptir yatra niścīyatetarām /*
sādharmyeṇa sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ saṃbandhasmaraṇān mataḥ //
NAV 50,23–25: . . . *yathāgnir atra, dhūmasya tathaivopapatteḥ mahānasādivad iti. ayaṃ cāvismṛtapratibandhe*

Regarding universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) there arise two questions: How is it grasped (*grahaṇa*)? And how is it recollected (*smaraṇa*)? The exemplification is intimately related with these two aspects of universal concomitance. To the first question, Siddharṣi Gaṇi, the author of the commentary on the *Nyāyāvatāra* (*Nyāyāvatāravivṛti*, NAV), answers that it has to be grasped by a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).[6] It cannot be comprehended merely by observing similar or dissimilar instances (*dṛṣṭāntamātreṇa*). For Siddharṣi Gaṇi, who is an Antarvyāptivādin, examples play no role in grasping the universal concomitance, but they are essential to recollecting it, which is his answer to the second question.

2. Interpretations of *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti*

It is not yet clear what the terms *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti* mean. Siddharṣi Gaṇi and many other Jaina logicians after Siddhasena all alike interpret them as *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, respectively. He gives the following explanations of the terms *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti*:

> *tathaiva sādhyasadbhāve evopapattir vidyamānatā, tayā tathopapattyā, yathā—agnir atra, dhūmasya tathaivopapatter iti. . . . anyathā sādhyavyatireke anupapattir avidyamānataiva tayā vā anyathānupapattyā hetoḥ prayogaḥ syāt, yathā—agnir atra, dhūmasyānyathānupapatter iti.* (NAV 50,3–7)
>
> "Only in such a case (*tathaiva*), i.e., only in the case where what is to be proved is present, [a logical reason] is present (*upapatti* = *vidyamānatā*). For instance, here is fire, because only in such a case [i.e., only if here is fire] smoke is here. . . . Otherwise (*anyathā*), i.e., if what is to be proved is absent (*sādhyavyatireke*), [a logical reason] is not present (*anupapatti* = *avidyamānatā*). For instance, here is fire, because otherwise [i.e., if fire is absent] smoke is not here."

The above formulations clearly show that Siddharṣi Gaṇi understands *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti* as equivalent with *anvaya* (joint presence) and *vyatireka* (joint absence), respectively.[7] Furthermore, he states that it is not necessary to formulate the logical reason in both ways and that either of them is enough for the proof.[8] Thus it is clear that he regards these two formulations as logically equivalent, which is true of the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra*.[9]

3. *vīta* and *avīta/āvīta*

In the early Indian logico-epistemological tradition there is another classification of the proof-formulation, i.e., *vīta* and *avīta/āvīta*, which was supposedly popular among the early Sāṃkhya

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prativādini na prayoktavya ity āha saṃbandhasmaraṇāt iti . . .

[6] This *pramāṇa* is, for instance, *ūha* according to Akalaṅka. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* II 5: *upalambhānupalambhanimittaṃ vyāptijñānam ūhaḥ.*

[7] *Anyathānupapatti* literally means 'otherwise, A is not possible'. The same expression is used in the definition of *arthāpatti*. Śabarasvāmin's *Bhāṣya* (Frauwallner [1968:32,6–7]): *arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā. . . .*

[8] NAV 50,7ff.: *ete ca dve apy ekasmin sādhye prayoktavye iti yo manyeta, tacchikṣaṇārtham āha—anyatareṇāpi . . .*

[9] Cf. NA 18. See note 5. From this point of view, it follows that someone, perhaps a Jaina logician, who insists that *anyathānupapannatva* is the sole characteristic of a logical reason (NA 22ab), makes much account of *vyatireka.*

logicians and which is often referred to by the compound *vītāvīta*.[10]

Passages referring to *vīta* and *avīta* are listed at the end of this paper in the Appendix. They can be classified into three groups. The first group contains the early Sāṃkhya theory of inference. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* [Appendix (1), (2)] and *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* [(3)], which contain fragments of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and *Yuktidīpikā* [(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9)], belong to the first group. The second group consists of the passages from the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara [(10), (11), (12), (13)]. All the materials after Dharmakīrti, viz. *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* [(14)], *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* [(15), (16)], and Vācaspati's works, viz. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* [(17)], *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* [(18), (19)] and *Nyāyakaṇikā* [(20)], belong to the third group.

Before examining the characteristics of *vīta* and *avīta*, it is necessary to make clear what is classified into *vīta* and *avīta*. In the first group, we can find two kinds of the usage of these terms. In some cases the terms appear to express a proof-formulation (*vākya*) or reasoning as a whole. For instance, "inference for others is of two kinds: *vīta* and *avīta*" [(1)], "*vīta* has ten members" [(9)] and "a verbal statement (*vākyabhāva*) of *vīta* has five members" [(3)]. In other cases, however, they express the logical reason in a proof-formulation. For instance, "The logical reasons *vīta* and *avīta* also . . ." [(4)][11] and "when a logical reason is employed in its original form (*svarūpeṇa*) in order to prove what is to be proved, the reason is *vīta* . . ." [(6)].[12] These two kinds of usages are found in the second and third groups as well. In some cases, however, they are used with some ambiguity.[13]

So far as the characteristics of *vīta* and *avīta* are concerned, the following features can be determined from the materials given in the Appendix.

< *vīta* >

a) It is formulated independently of the opponent's view (*parapakṣam avyapekṣya*).
b) It is used in its original form (*svarūpeṇa*).
c) It has five or ten members (*pañcaprabheda, pañcapradeśa, daśāvayava*).
d) It is affirmative (*vi-√dhā*).
e) It expresses the logical reason that has positive concomitance (*anvaya*).

< *avīta* >

A) It negates the opponent's view (*parapakṣapratiṣedha*).
B) It negates hypothetically supposed properties (*prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛtti*).
C) It is a method of elimination (*pariśeṣa*).

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[10] It is open to question whether the compound consists of *vīta* and *avīta* or *vīta* and *āvīta*. What is the difference between *avīta* and *āvīta*? So far as we know, the term *āvīta* is found only in the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, a commentary on the *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram*, which contains, according to Frauwallner, some fragments of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, one of the most important works of pre-Dignāga logic in the early Sāṃkhya. This problem is beyond the scope of this paper. I use the expressions *vīta* and *avīta* in this paper.

On these two terms, *vīta* and *avīta*, there are two epoch-making studies. One is by Hadano Hakuyū (Hadano [1944]) and the other by Erich Frauwallner (Frauwallner [1958]). My discussion is based on these two studies.

[11] This passage is as stated as an opponent's view.

[12] The meaning of *svarūpeṇa* is not clear. It probably means that the logical reason is used in the affirmative style, not in the negative or the *prasaṅga* style.

[13] For instance, *avītaprayoga* [(5)] can be interpreted as a *karmadhāraya* compound meaning 'the formulation

D) It is an argument based on *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*).

E) It has five members.

F) It expresses the logical reason that has negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).[14]

The table on the next page shows which elements are found in each passage.

With reference to *vīta*, there is no significant difference among the descriptions of the first group. The only remarkable difference occurs in YD [(9)], which states that *vīta* has ten members[15]. As to *avīta*, while some passages in the first group clearly state that it is *pariśeṣa*, others only say that it negates the hypothetically supposed properties (*prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛtti*).[16]

In the second and third groups, it is to be noted that in some passages *vīta* and *avīta* are interpreted as *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, and in those instances the terms express not a proof-formulation as a whole but a logical reason employed in it. In the *Nyāyavārttika*, after presenting a *prasaṅga*-style formulation in order to prove the existence of *ātman*, Uddyotakara calls it *avīta*: "*so 'yam avītaḥ*" [(10)]. Moreover, he regards the logical reason in that proof as (*kevala*)*vyatirekin*, one of the sixteen kinds of logical reasons. This, however, raises the question of whether the understanding of *vīta* and *avīta* as *anvaya* and *vyatireka* should be attributed to the Naiyāyikas or to some early Sāṃkhya philosophers.[17]

In this connection, we should not overlook the description by Bhāsarvajña [(15)]. With reference to *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.34 (*udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ*) and 1.1.35 (*tathā vaidharmyāt*), he gives the following two alternative interpretations: the terms *sādharmyāt* and *vaidharmyāt* imply the meanings of *vīta* and *avīta*, respectively; or they intend to define *anvayin* and *vyatirekin* as a *hetu*. This implies that at least for Bhāsarvajña *vīta* and *avīta* cannot be equivalent with *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. It is possible that the former interpretation reflects the old trend of the Naiyāyikas and the latter the new one, as is often the case with Bhāsarvajña.

In addition, it is to be noted that according to Uddyotakara both *vīta* and *avīta* have five members [(13)]. Moreover, Vācaspati in his commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* presents four kinds of proof-formulations, all of which consist of five members, in order to prove non-difference (*abheda*) between cause and effect (i.e., *satkāryavāda*) and he regards these proof-formulations as *avīta*. It is clear from the table that *avīta* originally, at least in the first group, did not consist of five members as *vīta* did.[18] It is possible that with the development of the idea of the positive and

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[of a logical reason] as *avīta*' or as that of *tatpuruṣa* meaning 'the formulation of the logical reason *avīta*'.

[14] Some of these features are almost identical, such as B and C of *avīta*. They are distinguished only in terms of expression.

[15] Cf. NBh [ad NS 1.1.32] 44,4–5: *daśāvayavān eke naiyāyikā vākye sañcakṣate. jijñāsā saṃśayaḥ śakyaprāptiḥ prayojanaṃ saṃśayavyudāsa iti. . . .*

[16] The definition of *pariśeṣa* is given in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* as follows: *prasaktapratiṣedhe 'nyatrāprasaṅgāc chiṣyamāṇe saṃpratyayaḥ* NBh [ad NS 1.1.5] 17,6–7.

[17] In the YD [(7)], the relation between *vyatireka* and *avīta* is implied in the context of a negative example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*).

[18] The problem of whether *avīta* originally had five members is related to its characteristic. Probably *avīta* was originally an auxiliary logical method, which should be applied only after *vīta* is formed (just as in the Nyāya system *tarka* is applied after the five-member proof-formulation is presented). This character of *avīta* is stated in the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*. Frauwallner [1958: 92,23–24]: . . . *iti purastād vītasya prayogaṃ nyāyyaṃ manyante, paścād āvītasyeti.*

	passages		usage	*vīta*					*avīta*					
				[a] *svarūpa*	[b] *parapakṣa-avyapekṣa*	[c] *vi-√dhā*	[d] *pañca-avayava*	[e] *anvaya / anvayin*	[A] *parapakṣa-pratiṣedha*	[B] *prasaṅgidhar-māntaranivṛtti*	[C] *pariśeṣa*	[D] *prasaṅga*	[E] *pañca-avayava*	[F] *vyatireka / vyatirekin*
1	PSV	Frauwallner p.87	F				○							
2	〃	Frauwallner p.90	F						○		○	△		
3	NAA	Frauwallner p.92	F	○	○		○				○			
4	YD	p.71	R											
5	〃	p.84	(A)							○				
6	〃	pp.88-89	R	○	○				○	○	○	△		
7	〃	pp.90-91	F							○				
8	〃	p.92	F				○							
9	〃	p.97	F				*daśāvayava*		○		○			
10	NV	pp.538-539	(A)	○		○			○			○		○
11	〃	p.539	(A)					○						○
12	〃	p.540	R											
13	〃	p.576	(A)				○						○	
14	TSP	p.26	(A)				○							
15	NBhūṣ	p.308	R	○					○					
								○						○
16	〃	p.562	(A)				○							
17	NVTṬ	p.547	(A)			○								
18	STK	p.24	F			○		○	○					○
19	〃	pp.45-46	F										○	
20	NK	p.23	F											

F: formulation, R: logical reason, (A): ambiguous ○: stated △: not clearly stated but implied.

negative concomitance, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati tried to remodel the original formulation of *avīta* into a new one consisting of the five members.

From what has been examined above it can be concluded that *vīta* and *avīta* originally stand for the styles of the proof-formulation, and that in some cases *vīta* and *avīta* represent logical reasons employed in the proof. In the history of Indian logic, the *vītāvīta* of the early Sāṃkhya is supposed to be the first classification of the formulation of inference. The *vītāvīta* classification was made from a formal point of view, although it is primitive and is somewhat ambiguous. With the development of Indian logic, the terms *vīta* and *avīta* have come to be interpreted as equivalent to *anvaya* and *vyatireka.*

4. The development of the *avīta* formulation

In order to examine the development of the *avīta* proof-formulation, let us consider the following three passages.

[A] *yathā na cet paramāṇupuruṣeśvarakarmadaivakālasvabhāvayadṛcchābhyo jagad utpattiḥ sambhavati pariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti*... (YD [6])
"For instance, if it is impossible for the universe to originate from atoms, the conscious being, the God, the fruits of acts, fate, time, the essential nature or by accident, then by elimination [it is deduced that the universe originates] from the primordial matter."

[B] *yadā nedam ato 'nyathā saṃbhavati, asti cedam, tasmāt pariśeṣato hetur evāyam ity*... (NAA [3])
"When A is impossible in any way other than B (*ato 'nyathā*), and in fact there is A, then consequently, by elimination, B is precisely the cause of A."

[C] *na paṭas tantubhyo bhidyate taddharmatvāt, iha yad yato bhidyate tat tasya dharmo na bhavati, yathā gaur aśvasya; dharmaś ca paṭas tantūnām, tasmān nārthāntaram.* (STK [19])
"Cloth is not distinguished from threads because it is their property (*dharma*). In the world, if X is distinguished from Y, X is not the property of Y (*taddharma*), just like a cow [is not the property] of a horse. [In fact,] cloth is the property of threads. Therefore, it is nothing but [the threads]."

These three passages are all concerned with the principal doctrines of Sāṃkhya and use the negative reasoning. In [A] the primordial matter (*pradhāna*) is proved to be the cause of the universe. In [B] *avīta* is formulated in a general way. [B], supposed to be a fragment of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, can be regarded as expressing the notion of 'invariable causal relation' (*avinābhāva*).[19] In [C] the *Satkāryavāda* is proved.

In [A] many alternative possibilities other than what is to be proved are enumerated; therefore, the method of *pariśeṣa* (elimination) can be applied. [B] may be regarded as a generalized form of [A], where whatever is to be eliminated is summed up as *anyathā.* It is to be noted that [A] and [B] do not consist of five members and that the logical reason is not stated.[20] In [C], on the other hand, we find five members, as is the case with *vītaprayoga*, and the logical reason is clearly stated. Moreover, both *sādhya* and *hetu* are presented in the alternative form of B or non-

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[19] It is to be noted here that in [A] and [B], we find *sambhavati* as a term expressive of logical possibilities.

[20] On this point Dignāga criticizes *avīta* that it is not a proof but only a refutation (*sun 'byin, dūṣaṇa*; PS III 17).

B (*na bhidyate* or *bhidyate*) and A or non-A (*tasya dharmo bhavati* or *tasya dharmo na bhavati*).

[A]			[B]		[C]	
C (*paramāṇu*)						
D (*puruṣa*)	→	non-A	*anyathā* → non-A	non-B	→	non-A
E (*Īśvara*)			(*na sambhavati*)	(*bhidyate*)		(*na taddharmaḥ*)
etc.						
B	→	A	B (*idam*) → A	A	→	B
(*pradhāna*)		(*jagadutpattiḥ*)		(*taddharmaḥ*)		(*na bhidyate*)

The shift of formulation: <if not D, E, F . . . > → <if in any way other than B> (*ato 'nyathā*) → <if non-B>, can be accounted for as a process of simplification of the formulation. Moreover, we can regard the formulation [C] as a kind of *viparyaya*; Vācaspati presents it as a contraposition, that is, he states not "B → A" but "A → B" as the conclusion. This process of the development of the formulation is probably closely related to the fact that *vīta* and *avīta* came to be interpreted as *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.

5. *upapatti* and *sambhava*

Generally speaking, if we make an assertion that A is B, A must not have a possibility of being other than B. This applies to every case, whatever the predicate B may be. The admission of such a possibility leads us to the acceptance of the views of opponents. On the contrary, if we would like to deny the assertion of the opponents, we must deny the possibilities asserted by them in order to lead them to our own conclusion.

The verbal root *upa√pad* means that something happens, or that there happens a case; it expresses a possibility that something happens. Hence in the logical context, it means 'logical possibility', i.e., the possibility of applying the predicate B to the subject A. Thus, Uddyotakara and the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* interpret *upapatti* as *sambhava* (possibility).[21] It follows from these facts that *upapatti* was considered by Indian logicians to be an equivalent to *sambhava*.[22]

6. Concluding remarks (*anyathānupapatti* and *avīta*)

yadā nedam ato 'nyathā sambhavati, asti cedam, tasmāt pariśeṣato hetur evāyam ity. . . (NAA [3])[23]

This typical formulation of *avīta* contains the two important elements, viz. *anyathā* and *na sambhavati*. If *upapatti* is equivalent to *sambhava* as discussed above, "*anyathā na sambhavati*"

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[21] In his sub-commentary on NS 1.1.40, which defines *tarka*, Uddyotakara interprets the term *upapatti* (of *pramāṇopapattitaḥ* in the sūtra) as *sambhava*. Vātsyāyana suggests the same interpretation: *vimṛśyamānayor dharmayor ekaṃ kāraṇopapattyānujānāti, saṃbhavaty asmin kāraṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ hetur iti kāraṇopapattyā syād evam etan netarad iti*. . . . (NBh 536ff.). In the *Yuktidīpikā* also, we can find the same interpretation in the author's comment of an anonymous verse: *upapattiḥ sambhava ity anarthāntaram* . . . (YD 3,13–14).

[22] *Saṃbhava* itself was, on the other hand, regarded among some philosophical groups as one of the *pramāṇas*, along with *arthāpatti*, etc., and specifically as a counterposition to the four *pramāṇavāda* of Naiyāyikas as is stated in NS 2.2.1.

[23] On the importance of this passage as a general expression of indirect proof, see Katsura [1986].

will amount to *anyathānupapatti*. Thus there is a literal correspondence between *anyathānupapatti* and *avīta*, which reveals the close relation between the two ideas. This correspondence is also seen in the writings of Akalaṅka, a Jaina logician. Instead of *anyathānupapatti*, Akalaṅka uses the modified expression *anyathāsaṃbhava* when he quotes a well-known verse attributed to Pātrakesarisvāmin, which represents the position of Jaina logicians on the characteristic feature of a logical reason as opposed to the three characteristics advocated by Buddhists.

anyathāsaṃbhavo jñāto yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṃ / (*Pramāṇasaṃgraha* 29ab)[24]

Śāntarakṣita also uses the term *anyathāsambhava* along with *anyathānupapatti* when he criticizes the theory of the sole characteristic feature (*ekalakṣaṇa*) of the logical reason attributed to Pātrasvāmin.[25]

It follows from these facts that the characteristic feature of the valid logical reason *anyathānupapatti* given in NA, is nothing but a Jaina version of *avīta*. The interpretation of *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti* as *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the NAV or in later Jaina texts can be easily explained by this hypothesis. That is, the Jaina philosophers' interpretation of *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti* corresponds with the interpretation of *vīta* and *avīta* as *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, as attested by the later Naiyāyikas.[26]

Appendix [Materials for *vīta* and *avīta/āvīta*]

1) *ser skya ba rnams na re gzhan rtogs pa'i don gyi rjes su dpag pa ni* ***rnam par ldan pa*** *dang* ***bsal te 'ongs pa****'[i] khyad par gyis rnam pa gnyis so // de la* ***rnam par ldan pa*** *ni dam bca' ba la sogs pa'i khyad par gyis ngag gi rang bzhin lnga'i phyogs so zhes zer ro* / (PSV, Frauwallner [1958: 87,28–32])
2) *kun gyi rjes thogs ma las* ***bsal te 'ongs pa*** *'grub bo zhes pa / gzhan gyi 'dod pa so sor bkag nas rang gi phyogs yongs su gzun ba'i bya ba ni* ***bsal te 'ongs pa****'o zhes grag go* // (PSV, Frauwallner [1958: 90,10–13])
3) *teṣāṃ* ***vītāvītānāṃ*** *lakṣaṇaṃ tadyathā . . . tasya prayogopacāraviśeṣād dvaividhyaṃ,* ***vīta <āvīta>*** *iti sāmānyena, viśeṣeṇa tu: svarūpād* ***vīta****siddhiḥ. yadā hetuḥ parapakṣam avyapekṣya svenaiva rūpeṇa kāryasiddhāv apadiśyate, tadā* ***vītā****khyo bhavati. pariśeṣād* ***āvīta****siddhiḥ. yadā nedam ato 'nyathā saṃbhavati, asti cedam, tasmāt pariśeṣato hetur evāyam ity avadhārya kāryasiddhāv apadiśyate, tad****āvītā****khyo bhavatīti. prayogalakṣaṇaṃ tv asya parapakṣapratiṣedhena svapakṣaparigrahakriy****āvīta*** *iti. <tatra>* ***vītasya*** *vākyabhāvaḥ pañcapradeśaḥ, pratijñā hetur dṛṣṭānta upasaṃhāro nigamanam iti. . . .* (Frauwallner [1958: 92,10–21]; NAA 313,8–314,4)
4) *. . . kasmāt.* ***vītāvītayor*** *api tatprasaṅgāt.* ***vītāvītāv*** *api hetū parapratipādanārtham upadīyamānau śabdavyāpāram apekṣete, . . .* (YD 71,15–17)
5) ***vītāvītābhyāṃ*** *hetubhūtābhyām abhipretārthasiddhir iti vakṣyāmaḥ. prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttimukhena* *c****āvīta****prayogaḥ.* (YD 84,19–21)

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[24] Cf. PVSVṬ 9,9–10: *anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṃ // iti . . .*

[25] TS 1363, 1364, 1366.

[26] For instance, PNT 3.29, 30. See Uno [1996: 318–319]. It is possible that the term *anyathānupapatti*, which means in the context of inference 'otherwise [i.e., if what is to be proved is absent, the logical reason] cannot be present', was formed on the basis of the expression of *avīta* in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*.

6) *tasya prayogamātrabhedād dvaividhyaṃ* ***vīta avīta*** *iti. tayor lakṣaṇam āmananti.*
yadā hetuḥ svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhau prayujyate /
sa vīto 'rthāntar<a>kṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣataḥ //
. . . tatra yadā hetuḥ parapakṣam <an>apekṣya yathārthena svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate tadā ***vītā****khyo bhavati. yadā tu svasādhyād arthāntarabhūtānāṃ prasaṅgināṃ kṣepam apohaṃ kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate tad****āvītā****khyo bhavati tadyathā na cet paramāṇupuruṣeśvarakarmadaivakālasvabhāvayadṛcchābhyo jagadutpattiḥ sambhavati pariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti tadā punar* ***avītā****khyo bhavati. tatra yadā* ***vīto*** *hetuḥ . . .* (YD 88,21–89,13)

7) *vyatirekas tv* ***avītasya*** *prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttirūpatvād antarbhūta iti na tadarthaṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta ucyate.* (YD 90,23–91,2)

8) *tad dhi liṅgaṃ* ***vītāvītatveneṣṭam****, tena dvidhā bhinnam. tatrāpi* ***vītaḥ*** *pañcaprabheda ity ataḥ . . .* (YD 92,25–26)

9) *tasmāt sūktaṃ daśāvayavo* ***vītaḥ****. . . .* ***avītasya*** *hi lakṣaṇaṃ pariśeṣataḥ sādhyānugrahaḥ. tatrānvayādinā svarūpeṇādhigate pradhānalakṣaṇe dharmiṇi parapakṣapratiṣedhamātreṇopasaṃhāre kriyamāṇe pariśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ bādhyate. kasmāt. iha pratiṣedhamātram ādāv ucyate. tena yathā hetuvirodhāt paramāṇvādibhyo na vyaktam utpadyate tathā hetvabhāvāt pradhānād api notpadyata iti śakyaṃ kalpayitum. atas tadvyavacchedo 'pi <n>****āvītād*** *gamyate. . . .* (YD 97,5–12)

10) *udāharaṇaṃ tu nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti. yad ubhayapakṣasaṃpratipannam aprāṇādimat, tat sarvaṃ nirātmakaṃ dṛṣṭam. na cedam aprāṇādimad bhavati. tasmān nedaṃ nirātmakam iti. so 'yam* ***avītaḥ*** *parapakṣapratiṣedhāya bhavatīti. . . . tatra svarūpeṇārthaparicchedakatvaṃ* ***vīta****dharmaḥ.* ***avīta****dharmaḥ punaḥ parapakṣapratiṣedhenaiva pravartata iti. ekasya vidhīyamāno 'rthaḥ, itarasya pratiṣidhyamānaḥ.* (NV 538,21–539,3)

11) *. . . tasmāt yathānvayino*† *'nvayasaṃbandhāvyabhicāraḥ pratipādakaḥ, tathā vyatirekiṇo 'pi viparyayasaṃbandhāvyabhicāra iti. etena yathā* ***vīta****hetor avyabhicāriṇa ekasya dharmasya darśanād itaradharmānumānam, evam* ***avīta****hetāv api ekadharmanivṛttidarśanād itaradharmanivṛttyanumānam iti.* (NV 539,13–14) † Text: *ānyayino.*

12) *evam anayor* ***vītāvīta****hetvoḥ pṛthagarthapratipādakatvasya ākumāraṃ prasiddheḥ, yad uktaṃ* ***vītāvītau*** *na pṛthakpratipattihetū iti tat saṃmūḍhenoktam.* (NV 540,9–11)

13) *te ete* ***vītāvīta****vākhye pañcāvayave na punar ekam anvayivyatireki ceti.* (NV 576,11)

14) *tatra pradhānāstitvasādhane pañcamī* ***vīta****prayogāḥ parair uktāḥ.* (TSP 26,11)

15) *sādharmyād iti* ***vītasya*** *lakṣaṇaṃ vaidharmyād ity* ***avītasye****ty ato dvividha eva hetuḥ—svarūpeṇa hy arthasādhakatvaṃ* ***vītasya*** *lakṣaṇam, parapakṣaniṣedhena* ***'vītasye****ti. athavā sādharmyād ity anvayinaḥ, vaidharmyād iti vyatirekiṇaḥ, samuccitaṃ cānvayavyatirekiṇa iti.* (NBhūṣ 308,2–5) [*udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ.* (NS 1.1.34) *tathā vaidharmyāt.* (NS 1.1.35)]

16) *tac ca pañcabhyo* ***vītebhyo*** *niścīyate, tathā hi—vivādagocarāpannā bhedā ekakāraṇapūrvakā, anvitatvād, ghaṭaśarāvādivat. yat tad ekaṃ kāraṇaṃ tat pradhānam.* (NBhūṣ 562,17–20)

17) *anvayivyatirekiṇas tadvivekasya ca tantrāntaraprasiddhena nāmnā tantrāntaraprasiddhatāṃ darśayati. so 'yam* ***avīta*** *iti. vividhena prakāreṇa itaḥ prāpto* ***vītaḥ****, pakṣavyāpakatve sati sapakṣavyāptyā[-]avyāptyā ca, tasmād anyo* ***'vīta*** *iti.* (NVTṬ 547,8–10)

18) *tat sāmānyato lakṣitam anumānaṃ viśeṣatas trividham—pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyato dṛṣṭañ ca. tatra prathamaṃ tāvad dvividhaṃ* ***vītam avītañ*** *ca. anvayamukhena pravartamānaṃ vidhāyakaṃ* ***vītam****. vyatirekamukhena pravartamānaṃ niṣedhakam* ***avītam****. tatr****āvītaṃ*** *śeṣavat.* (STK 24,2–5)

19) *kāryasya kāraṇābhedasādhakāni ca pramāṇāni—na paṭas tantubhyo bhidyate taddharmatvāt, iha yad yato bhidyate tat tasya dharmo na bhavati, yathā gaur aśvasya; dharmaś ca paṭas tantūnām, tasmān nārthāntaram. . . . tāny etāny* ***avītāni*** *abhedasādhanāni.* (STK 45,4–46,4)

20) *api ca kāraṇaṃ nāma kāryopahitamaryādaṃ yadi tadabhāve nā 'rhati bhavitum, na hi yad yadupahita-*

maryādaṃ tat tadabhāve bhavati; yathā kuṇḍalopahitasīmā kuṇḍalī na kuṇḍalā 'bhāve. tasmāt kāraṇabhāvāt tatra kāryaṃ sat. tad idaṃ satkāryasādhanam ***avītapañcakam*** *ācakhyuḥ sāṅkhyāḥ.* (NK 23,3–6)

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NAA *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (Siṃhasūri): Muni Jambūvijayajī, ed. *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa, with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa.* Part 1. Bhavnagar, 1966.

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NAV *Nyāyāvatāravivṛti* (Siddharṣi Gaṇi): See NA and fn. 2 (A)-1).

NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): G. Jhā, ed. *Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Poona Oriental Series 58. 1939.

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NS *Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama).

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NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (Vācaspatimiśra): See NV.

PNT *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* (Devasūri): Motilal Lāghājī, ed. *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka of Devasūri, with the auto-commentary Syādvādaratnākara of Devasūri.* 5 vols. Poona, 1927–1931.

PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib.): P 5700 (vol. 130).

PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Frauwallner [1958].

PVSVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam.* Allahabad, 1943. Reprint, under the title of *Karṇakagomin's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti,* Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.

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STK *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* (Vācaspatimiśra): Ramesh Chandra, ed. *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī.* Calcutta Sanskrit Series 15. 1935.

TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Swāmi Dvarikadas Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla.* 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi, 1981–82.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

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YD *Yuktidīpikā*: A. Wezler and S. Motegi, eds. *Yuktidīpikā.* Vol. 1. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44. Stuttgart, 1998.

KAMALAŚĪLA'S INTERPRETATION OF *ANUPALABDHI* IN THE *MADHYAMAKĀLOKA**

by

Ryusei Keira, Lausanne

It is well known that in order to prove the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) of all things, Kamalaśīla has applied Dharmakīrti's and his commentators' theory of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). In his *Madhyamakāloka* (hereafter MĀ), when Kamalaśīla proves the absence of intrinsic nature of all things by means of yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), he applies Dharmakīrti's theory of non-apprehension (*an-upalabdhi*). This is because since this yogic perception causes yogins to make a negative judgment of absence of real nature, Kamalaśīla had to explain the establishment of this yogic perception from the standpoint of non-apprehension and offer the Mādhyamika interpretation of it.

This paper compares Kamalaśīla's interpretation of non-apprehension with that of Dharmakīrti and deals with the following two points: one is Kamalaśīla's non-acceptance of the establishment of another entity (*anya-bhāva*), like a place being free of a pot, and the other is his regarding the negation in the term 'non-apprehension'(*an-upalabdhi*) as an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*).

As already noted by scholars, Dharmakīrti regards the negative particle (*an-*) of the word 'non-apprehension' (*an-upalabdhi*) as implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and he considers the non-apprehension of something X as a perception other than that of X (*anya-upalabdhi*) and as of something other than X (*anya-bhāva*).[1] However, this theory of *anupalabdhi* does not make it possible for Kamalaśīla to prove the absence of intrinsic nature of all things. This is because, although according to Dharmakīrti the absence of something X is never understood without the establishment of something other than X, the Mādhyamikas can not accept such other things. In the MĀ, an opponent makes the following objection in reliance upon Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi*: MĀ C134b4–6, D134b3–4, N136a4–6, P144b3–5:

> *gzhan yang don gzhan gyis dben pa'i phyogs la sogs pa 'ga' zhig 'dzin na ni de las gzhan pas stong pa nyid mngon sum gyis rtogs par bya ba yin par 'gyur na / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du smra ba rnams la ni gang 'ga' zhig mngon sum du dmigs pas chos thams cad dben par*[2]

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[1] HB*21,20–*22,2: *atropalabdher upalabhamānadharmatve tajjñānam upalabdhiḥ. tasmād anyopalabdhir anupalabdhiḥ, vivakṣitopalabdher anyatvād abhakṣyāsparśanīyavat paryudāsavṛttyā. upalabhyamānadharmatve svaviṣayavijñānajananayogyatālakṣaṇo viṣayasvabhāva upalabdhiḥ, yogyatāyā bhāvarūpatvāt. tasmād anyopalabdhiyogyataivānupalabdhiḥ pūrvavat.*

See Steinkellner [1967: 60,17–30, Anm. 6], and Katsura [1992].

[2] NP: *pa.* CD: *par.*

rtogs par 'gyur ba chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid kyis dben pa'i dngos po ni cung zad kyang med de / de yang chos thams cad kyi nang du 'dus pa'i phyir ro // 'on te nang du ma 'dus na ni rang gis[3] *dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro //*[4, 5]

"Moreover, if [one] grasps a certain place as being free of another object, then the voidness of that which is other than it [i.e. place] will be apprehended by means of direct perception. However, for those who accept the absence of intrinsic nature of all things, there is no [such] entity which is lacking intrinsic nature of all things and by direct apprehension of which [one] would understand the calmness of all things. This is because that [i.e. entity] is also included in all things. Or, if [that were] not to be included, your own thesis would be undermined."

This opponent says that if the absence of intrinsic nature of all things were understood through the apprehension of some other entity, then since no such entity is established for the Mādhyamikas who accept the totality of things as being without intrinsic nature, they could not prove the absence of intrinsic nature. This is because such an other entity should be included in the totality. On the other hand, if such an entity existed outside the totality of things, it would follow that the Mādhyamikas could not prove the totality as being without intrinsic nature, but instead they could only prove this fact of a finite or limited number of things.

To this opponent's objection, Kamalaśīla replies that the Mādhyamikas do not accept any other entity like a place being free of a pot in reliance upon the theory of voidness explained in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.[6] Let me cite Kamalaśīla's reply. MĀ C169b1–5, D169b6–170a3, N177a1–7, P185a4–185b2:

gang yang don gzhan gyis dben pa'i phyogs la sogs pa 'ga' zhig mngon sum gyis bzung nas[7] *de las gzhan pas*[8] *stong pa mngon sum gyis rtogs par bya bar 'gyur zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / tshul 'di ni gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid yin gyi / mtshan nyid stong pa nyid ni ma yin no // mtshan nyid stong pa nyid kyis ni don dam par chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par*

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[3] D: *gis*. CNP: *gi*.

[4] DPN add //, C om. //.

[5] TĀ D258a3–4, P292b2–5: *gzhan yang gzhan gyis dben pa yi // phyogs la sogs pa 'dzin na ni // de las gzhan pas dben pa nyid // mngon sum dag gis rtogs pa yin // dngos po gang zhig rnam brtags na // dngos po kun gyis* (P: *gyi*) *dben pa nyid // mngon sum nyid du rtogs 'gyur ba // dngos po med par smra ba la'ang // thams cad nang du de 'dus phyir // chos rnams kun gyi dngos po yis // dben pa ci yang yod pa min // de lta ma yin dam bcas nyams //* "Moreover, if [one] grasps a certain place as being free of another object, then the voidness of that which is other than it [i.e. place] will be understood by means of direct perception. [Therefore,] if some entity was observed, the calmness of all real natures would be completely directly understood. [However,] for those who accept the absence of real nature, since that [i.e. some entity] is included in all things, there is nothing at all being void of real nature of all things. Otherwise, [your own] thesis would be undermined."

[6] In this argument, Kamalaśīla quotes following sentence of *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*: *blo gros chen po gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid 'di ni thams cad kyi tha chad pa yin pas de ni khyod kyis spang par bya'o* (MĀ D170a3–4, P185b2). "Oh Mahāmati! You should abandon this voidness of one thing by another since it is the worst of all." *eṣā ca mahāmate itaretaraśūnyatā sarvajaghanyā sā ca tvayā parivarjayitavyā //* (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* ed. by B. Nanjo, Kyoto, 1923: 75,18–19). 「大乘入楞伽經」 T vol. 16, 599a14–15: 大慧。此彼彼空空中最麁。汝應遠離。

The term 'thams cad' (*sarva*, 空中) means the seven kinds of *śūnyatās*. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 74 5–8: *tatra mahāmate saṃkṣepeṇa saptavidhā śūnyatā yad uta lakṣaṇaśūnyatā bhāvasvabhāvaśūnyatāpracaritaśūnyatā pracaritaśūnyatā sarvadharmanirabhilāpyaśūnyatā paramārthāryajñānamahāśūnyatetaretaraśūnyatā ca saptamī //.*

[7] NP add /. CD om. /.

[8] CD: *pa*. NP: *pas*.

'dod de / don dam par de dag gi rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid ji ltar rnam par gzhag[9] *pa stong pa'i phyir ro // dngos po rnams kyi gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid gang yin pa de ni don dam pa ma yin gyi /*[10] *'on kyang tha snyad kyi bden ba la brten pa yin no // 'di ltar dngos po thams cad don dam par skye ba med par ro gcig pa'i phyir tha dad pa med pa*[11] *yin mod kyi / 'on kyang byis pa rnams la rmi lam la sogs pa'i gnas skabs bzhin du phan tshun tha dad par snang ngo // de'i phyir de la grags pa'i ngo bor*[12] *de dag la don gzhan gyis dben pa'i dngos po'i 'dzin pa'i sgo nas gcig gis gcig stong pa nyid 'di rnam par gzhag*[13] *gi // don dam par ma yin te / yang dag par na*[14] *rmi lam dang / sgyu ma lta bu'i dngos po rnams la ngo bo nyid phan tshun tha dad pa med do // de nyid kyi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis 'di ni don dam pa la brten pa ma yin pa nyid kyis*[15] *thams cad kyi tha chad yin pa'i phyir spang bar bya ba kho nar gsungs te /*[16]

"It is not correct either to say: '[Once one] has perceptually apprehended a certain place as being free of another object, then something void of that which is other than it [i.e. place] will be understood by direct perception . . . and so forth'. This theory [of voidness] corresponds to the voidness of one thing by another (*itaretara-śūnyatā*), and not to the voidness concerning characters (*lakṣaṇa-śūnyatā*). Due to the voidness concerning characters, we accept that all things are ultimately without any nature. This is because ultimately their particular and universal characters as they are established are void. The voidness of one thing by another of entities is founded not on the ultimate [truth], but on the conventional truth. That is, although all things are not different [from each other] on account of being of the same flavor in that [they] are ultimately unproduced, [they] appear mutually different to the infantile like the state of dreams and so on. Therefore, in this case, for them [i.e. the infantile], this voidness of one thing by another where they grasp an entity as being free of something else is established as a [conventionally] acknowledged nature, but it is not ultimately established. The entities which are really like dreams and illusions do not have any mutually distinct natures. Therefore, the Illustrious One (*bhagavat*) has said that this [voidness of one

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[9] NP: *bzhag*. CD: *gzhag*.

[10] P om. /. CDN add /.

[11] CDNP add *ma*. By judging the context, however, we should delete this word.

[12] D: *ngo bor*. CP: *ngor*. N: illegible.

[13] NP: *bzhag*. CD: *gzhag*.

[14] NP: *ni*. CD: *na*.

[15] NP add /. CD om. /.

[16] TĀ D259a3–6, P293b7–294a3: *kha cig tu ni dngos po 'ga' // don gzhan gyis ni dben pa dag // 'dzin pa yod na stong pa nyid // mngon sum rtogs pa gang yin pa // dngos po rnams kyis* (P: *kyi*) *gcig la gcig // stong pa nyid de yod par 'dod // chos rnams de yis stong pa can // mtshan nyid stong pa nyid ma yin // rang dang spyi yi mtshan nyid du // ji ltar gzhag* (P: *bzhag*) *pa de dag ni // yang dag yod pa ma yin pas // des na chos kun nges* (P: *dngos*) *med 'dod // gcig la gcig gis* (P: *gi*) *stong pa nyid // brtags pa yin gyi yang dag min // sgyu ma la sogs mtshungs pa la // gzhan gyis dben pa yang dag med // rmi lam bzhin du dngos po kun // phan tshun dben pa bzhin du snang // de yi dbang gis 'di dag gi //* (P: */*) *gcig la gcig gis* (P: *gi*) *stong pa nyid // brtags yin de'i phyir rang byung gis // tha chad spangs* (P: *spang*) *pa kho nar gsungs* (P: *gsung*) *//* "Let's suppose that in a certain place, [one] grasps some entity being free of another object. In this case, when the voidness is understood by means of direct perception, it is accepted that there is the voidness of one things by another of entities. It is not the voidness concering characters, which is void of these things. Since particular and universal characters as they are established do not really exist, therefore all things are acknowledged as being without real nature. The voidness of one thing by another is imagined, but not real. For what is like illusion and so forth, there is really nothing void of another. Just like the state of dreams, all things appear just as something mutually void. In reliance upon this [fact], the voidness of one things by another is imagined for them [i.e. the infantile]. Therefore the Buddha (*svayambhū*) has said that the worst [voidness should] be completely abandoned."

thing by another] should be completely abandoned since [this] is the worst of all due to not being founded on the ultimate reality."

Kamalaśīla criticizes the interpretation of *anupalabdhi* which accepts the establishment of an *anya-bhāva* like a place which would be one thing void of another. This is conventionally established for the infantile but should be completely abandoned on account of being the worst interpretation of voidness. Due to the voidness concerning characters, the Mādhyamikas accept all things as ultimately lacking intrinsic nature. In that case, since all things are of the same flavor because of being ultimately unproduced, they are not really different from each other and do not have any mutually distinct nature. Therefore nothing else is ultimately established, and the absence of something else is not really established either with reference to what is like an illusion.

Next, although Kamalaśīla does not accept the establishment of any other entity, he accepts the negation in the term '*anupalabdhi*' as having the form of an implicative negation. When some opponent objects that since the objects of direct perception are real entities and unreal things without their nature can not produce the perceptual cognition of them, the Mādhyamikas can not prove the absence of intrinsic nature by means of direct perception,[17] Kamalaśīla makes the following reply: MĀ C168a3–168b4, D168a7–169a1, N175a6–176a1, P183b2–184a4:

> *gang yang mngon sum gyi yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang ma grub pa yin te / 'di ltar tshu rol mthong ba rnams kyi mngon sum gang yin pa de ni rab rib can gyi mngon sum bzhin du gzugs*[18] *la sogs pa brdzun pa'i yul can yin pa nyid kyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa pa'i yul can nyid du rigs pa ma yin no // de lta ma yin na thams cad de kho na nyid mthong bar thal bar 'gyur ro // sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' rnal 'byor pa chen po rnams kyi ye shes gang yin pa de yang dngos po'i yul can du rab tu ma grub ste / de dag gis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa*[19] *pa 'ga' yang ma gzigs pa'i phyir te / 'phags pa byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod las / ji skad du /*
>
>> *des chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis med pa dang / 'gag pa med pa dang / rang bzhin gyis nye bar zhi ba dang / shin tu ma skyes pa dang / ma byung ba dang / kun tu ma*[20] *byung ba dang / shin tu yongs su mya ngan las 'das par yang mthong la / des gang gis mthong ba de yang mi mthong rnam par mi mthong ste / 'di ni yang dag pa'i*[21] *mthong ba dang ji lta ba bzhin gyi mthong ba yin no // yang chos thams cad ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba gang zhe na / gang 'di mthong ba med pa yin no*

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[17] MĀ D134a7–134b2, P144a8–144b2: *'di ltar re zhig mngon sum gyis ni dngos po ma lus pa dben par rtogs par mi 'gyur te / de'i yul ni dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro // dngos po med pa ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ji ltar yang rang gi ngo bo nye bar ston pas rnam par shes pa skyed par byed pa nyid du rigs pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // ji ste skyed par byed pa nyid yin na ni dngos po nyid du thal bar 'gyur te / dngos po'i mtshan nyid ni don byed nus pa yin pa'i phyir ro //* "That is, firstly, we cannot understand the calmness of all things by means of direct perception. This is because the objects of it [i.e. direct perception] are real entities. [And] this is because it is not correct that an unreal thing produces the cognition [of it] by revealing its form somehow as being without [its] own nature. If [it] were to produce [the cognition], it would follow that it is a real entity. This is because the real entity is defined as the capacity of practical efficacity." Cf. BSGT 111b2–b3.

[18] P: *gthugs*. CDN: *gzugs*.

[19] N om. *pa*. CDP add *pa*.

[20] D: *du*. CNP: *tu*.

[21] NP: *pa*. CD: *pa'i*.

zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o // 'phags pa chos yang dag par sdud pa las kyang /[22]
chos thams cad mthong ba med pa ni mthong ba dam pa yin no
zhes gsungs so // de'i phyir mngon sum gyi yul ni yang dag pa pa'i dngos po yin par ma grub po // gang yang dngos po med pa ni ji ltar yang rnam par shes pa skyed par byed pa nyid du mi rung ba'i phyir ro zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / kho bo cag kyang dngos po med pa[23] *ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa lta bu ni gang yang mngon sum gyi shes pa skyed par byed pa nyid du khas mi len to //*
'on kyang rnal 'byor pa chen po chos thams cad smig rgyu dang sgra brnyan lta bur ji lta ba bzhin du sgom par byed pa rnams kyis / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa'i rab kyi mtha' las byung ba'i ting nge 'dzin thob pa'i phyir mthu phul du[24] *byung ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang ldan pas rnal 'byor pa de dag la gang gis na rnal 'byor pa rnams kyis mngon sum kho nar chos ma lus pa bdag med pa rtogs par 'gyur pa chos ma lus pa bdag med pa'i de kho na nyid gsal rab tu mngon sum du byed pa'i ye shes de lta bu nye bar skye ste / de nyid mthong ba med ces bya'i / med par dgag pa'i ngo bo ni ma yin no //*[25]

"It is not established either to say: 'This is because the objects of perception are real entities (*vastu*)'. That is, it is not correct that the profane person's perception has as its object the true nature of things, due to the fact that it [always] has as its objects deceptive visible things (*rūpa*) and so forth just like the perception of the people suffering from eye diseases (*taimirika*). Otherwise, it would follow absurdly that everybody would perceive the truth. No cognition of great yogins who are Buddhas or Bodhisattvas is also established as having real entities as its objects. This is because they never see any real nature of entities.

In the *Ārya Bodhisattvapiṭaka,* it is said:

> Therefore all things are seen to be naturally non-existent, unceased, naturally tranquil, completely unproduced, unborn, absolutely unborn and completely extinguished. Therefore he who sees does not see and does not observe. This is the correct vision and the vision [of things] as they are. Then if it is said: 'what is the perception of all things as they are?', it is absence of vision.[26]

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[22] NP om. /. CD add /.

[23] NP: *pa'i*. CD: *pa*.

[24] NP: *tu*. CD: *du*.

[25] TĀ D258b4–6, P293a5–8: *rab rib can bzhin gzugs la sogs // bdzun pa rnams ni mthong pa'i phyir // yang dag pa yi dngos po'i don // mngon sum 'ga' yang grub pa med // yang dag don bsgoms rab mtha' las // byung pa'i ye she yang dag pa'i // don gyi yul can* (P: *cin*) *yin 'dod kyi // dmigs pa'i stobs kyis byung ba min // de dag kho na don dam pa // mthong ba gang yin mthong med yin // 'gro ba'i chos rnams shes rab kyi // thams cad ji bzhin mthong ba min // chos kun snang med gang yin te* (P: *de*) *// 'jig rten 'das pa'i 'das pa yi // ye shes de nyid chos rnams la // mthong ba med par nye bar brjod //* "Due to the fact that deceptive visible things are seen just as [seen by] the people suffering from eye diseases, perceptual objects which are real entities are not established at all. It is acknowledged that the wisdom which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon true state of affairs has reality as its objects, but it is not so that it [i.e. the wisdom] is produced by the force of objects. [If it is said:] 'what is the ultimate seeing of these very [objects]?' it is absence of vision. It is not that conventional things are just as seen by means of perfect wisdom. It is explained that just the transcendent wisdom where nothing appears sees nothing." Cf. BSGT 111b6–112a2.

[26] *Ārya Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* 『大寶積經』「菩薩藏會」T vol. 11, 297c20–29.
觀一切法自性息滅。若如是觀。名如理觀。若觀諸法自性寂靜。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟空寂。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法入平等性。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟無生。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟不生。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟不起。是則名爲如理正觀。若觀諸法畢竟寂滅。是則名爲如理正觀。舍利子。是菩薩摩訶作是觀時。亦不見有能觀之者。應如是觀。

In the *Ārya Dharmasaṅgīti*, it is also said:

Seeing nothing, this is the supreme seeing.[27]

Therefore it is not established that the objects of perception are real entities.

It is not correct either to say: 'This is because it is impossible that unreal things somehow produce the cognition'. We too do not accept that unreal things like rabbit's horns and so forth will produce a perceptual cognition. However, the great yogins who correctly meditate on all things as being like mirages and echoes, obtain the concentration (*samādhi*) which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation upon the true state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*),[28] and therefore have inconceivable supreme powers. Thus this type of wisdom (*ye shes de lta bu*), which clearly realizes (*mngon sum du byed pa*) the truth of all things being selfless, arises in these yogins, so that (*yena*) the yogins understand completely directly (*mngon sum kho nar*) that all things are selfless. It is precisely this that is termed "non-seeing (*adarśana*)" [in the sūtra], but [the negation in "non-seeing"] does not have the form of a non-implicative negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*)."

Kamalaśīla rejects the opponent's objection because the profane persons' perception does not have the true nature of things as its object and because the great yogins like Buddha and Bodhisattva never see any real nature of things. Their non-seeing of real nature does not mean that they hold things to be actually like rabbit's horns which do not appear even conventionally. When they meditate on all things as being like mirages and so forth and from the ultimate limit of this meditation, nothing appears to yogins' minds, the great yogins do not see any real nature, and just this non-seeing of it is considered the supreme seeing, the correct vision or the vision of things as they are. This type of yogic perception or the wisdom which arises from the ultimate limit of meditation on the true state of affairs, viz. the selflessness of all things, is established as having as its object the truth of all things being selfless, with the result that the great yogins directly understand that all things are selfless. In this case, Kamalaśīla states that the negation in the term "non-seeing" does not have the form of a non-implicative negation, and he regards the non-seeing of real nature or self (*ātman*) of all things as the supreme seeing. Therefore it is evident from his statement that he takes that negation as having the form of an implicative negation.

As was mentioned earlier, Dharmakīrti also regarded the non-apprehension of X as a perception other than that of X. Since Kamalaśīla takes seeing nothing as the supreme seeing and since this supreme seeing is surely different from the seeing of things, we can know he also holds that the implicative negation of apprehension should be considered to imply a different perception (*anya-upalabdhi*). Kamlaśīla does not accept the establishment of *anya-bhāva*, but accepts that of *anya-upalabdhi*. In this case, however, following problem will be still left: when no *anya-bhāva* is established, what does this supreme seeing which is *anya-upalabdhi* directly under-

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[27] *Ārya Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* 『佛説法集經』 T vol. 17, 637b21. . . . 名爲不見。世尊。是名正見正法。

This sentence is found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 264,1–2: *adarśanaṃ bhagavan sarvadharmānām, darśanaṃ samyag-darśanam iti.* This sentence is also quoted in the *Bhāvanākrama* I 212,17a3–4, the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti* D4b1, the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* D78a7, the *Śālistamba-ṭīkā* P183a4, the *Prajñāpradīpa* D247b3, etc. Cf. AAĀ 640,23–25: *tad evaṃ kasyacit pāramarthikasya* (sic!) *bhāvasya prajñā-cakṣuṣā 'darśanam eva paramaṃ tattva-darśanam abhipretaṃ . . .*

[28] NB I 11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti* /.

stand? Kamalaśīla's reply is that in that case, the wisdom which clearly realizes the truth of selflessness arises in great yogins' minds. That is, this supreme seeing sees the truth of selflessness. Since the great yogins like Buddha and Bodhisattva previously know what the truth is, when nothing appears to their minds and there is no vision of things at all, they understand this absence of vision as the truth of selflessness because of their eliminating all cover of obscurity by the light of perfect wisdom (*tattvajñānāloka*) obtained from the meditation upon the real state of affairs.[29]

This sentence of *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* to the effect that seeing nothing is the supreme seeing is very often quoted in the Mādhyamika texts.[30] However, it seems that Kamalaśīla is the first Mādhyamika philosopher who has clearly said that the negation in the term "non-seeing" has the form of an implicative negation. In his *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti*, Jñānagarbha also quotes this sentence of this *sūtra* in order to explain that nothing appears ultimately even to the wisdom of the omniscient Buddha (*sarvajñajñāna*).[31] Interestingly, Śāntarakṣita says in his *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga-pañjikā* that the negation in the term "non-seeing" in the *sūtra* has the form of a non-implicative negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*).[32] Here, however, we can not immediately say that this shows a difference between Kamalaśīla's interpretation and that of Śāntarakṣita. This is because Jñānagarbha's and Śāntarakṣita's purpose in quoting this sūtra was different from that of Kamalaśīla. In the MĀ, Kamalaśīla quotes this *sūtra* in order to explain how the perception of the absence of nature is established, but not just in order to show that nothing appears ultimately. However, with reference to the interpretation of this sūtra, further study will be required.

In conclusion, we see that in many respects Kamalaśīla's interpretation of *anupalabdhi* is very different from that of Dharmakīrti. The major similarity with Dharmakīrti's account is that both construe *anupalabdhi* as an implicative negation, implying the existence of a different perception (*anya-upalabdhi*). But the major difference is that Kamalaśila, as a Mādhyamika, does not accept the Dharmakīrtian idea of *anupalabdhi* as being a perception of some other real entity (*anya-bhāva*). Kamalaśīla's interpretation is thus unique and interesting in its own right.

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[29] MĀ D168a6–7, P183a8–183b2: *rnal 'byor pa dam pa bskal pa mi nyung bar bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs dpags tu med pa bsags pas mtha' dag 'byor par byed pa'i thabs thob pa / yang dag pa'i don bsgoms pa las byung ba'i yang dag pa'i ye shes kyi snang bas sgrib pa'i mun pa mtha' dag bstsal ba* (P: *bsal ba*) *rnams kyi mngon sum gyis chos thams cad bdag med par rtogs so*... "The selflessness of all things will be understood by means of the perception of the supreme yogins who have acquired the power which makes them able to realize everything by accumulating immeasurable asssemblage of both merit and widsom (*puṇya-jñāna-saṃbhāra*) for several *kalpas* and who have eliminated all cover of obscurity by the light of perfect widsom (*tattvajñānāloka*) obtained from the meditation upon the real state of affairs (*bhūtārtha*)."

[30] See fn. 27.

[31] *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti* D4a7–4b1: *don dam pa ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin du rnam par gnas pa med de / thams cad mkhyen pa'i mkhyen pa nyid la yang mi snang ba'i phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir mdo sde las 'ga' yang mthong ba med pa ni de kho na mthong ba zhes gsungs so /.*

[32] *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-pañjikā* D18b: *'ga' yang zhes bya ba ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo la bya'o // mthong ba med pa zhes bya ba ni med par dgag pa yin no /.*

Abbreviations and Literature

AAĀ *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* (Haribhadra): Unrai Wogihara, ed. *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitā vyākhyā.* Commentary on Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā together with the text commented on. Tokyo, 1932.

BSGT *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (dBus pa blo gsal): Katsumi Mimaki. *BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA'.* Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyujo, Université de Kyoto, 1982.

HB *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I, tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 252. Band, 1. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 4. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1967.

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MĀ *Madhyamakāloka* (Kamalaśīla) (Tib.): C (dBu ma, Sa, 133b6–242a4), D (dBu ma, Sa 133b4–244a7), N (dBu ma, Sa, 135a4–267b5), P (dBu ma, Sa 143b2–275a4).

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T J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds. *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō.* 85 vols. Tokyo: Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai.

TĀ *Tattvāloka* (Kamalaśīla) (Tib.): D (dBu ma Sa 244b1–273a4), P (dBu ma Sa275a4–312a5).

LEVELS OF (IM)PERCEPTIBILITY: DHARMOTTARA'S VIEWS ON THE *DṚŚYA* IN *DṚŚYĀNUPALABDHI*

by

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1. Generic '(im)perceptibility' and situation-specific absences

Dharmakīrti's third logical reason, 'non-cognition' (*anupalabdhi*), can establish the absence (*abhāva*) of an object, or the treatment of an object as absent (*abhāvavyavahāra*), only under the condition that the object in question is *dṛśya*, as opposed to *adṛśya*. In the available secondary literature, *dṛśya* and *adṛśya* are understood to mean 'perceptible' and 'imperceptible' respectively. As far as the latter category is concerned, the 'imperceptibility' of an object is commonly understood as its natural condition, which is given independent of time, place or cognizing subject; an interpretation which seems to be favoured by the examples of 'distant objects' (*viprakṛṣṭa*) which are given in post-Dharmakīrtian texts: the Mount Meru, the future emperor Śaṅkha, and *piśāca*-demons.[1] As the common consensus goes, such objects cannot be perceived by anybody, at any time, or in any place, due to their generic nature, or due to an inherent lack in certain qualities[2]—qualities, whose presence, in turn, characterizes 'perceptibles'. By implication, 'perceptibility' is then equally understood as a natural condition of things.

It is, however, doubtful whether such a generic 'perceptibility' is in fact useful for the types of inferences in which a *dṛśyānupalabdhi* is used. For such inferences are habitually restricted to particular property-possessors or places, as is evidenced by the occurrence of linguistic markers such as *atra*, *iha* etc. in the thesis, for example, *iha ghaṭo nāsti*, 'here, a pot is absent'. Considering that, in all likelihood, additional restrictions to a specific point in time t1 and to a specific

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[1] See NB II 27, PVSV 165,15. The three types of distant objects are not exemplified in Dharmakīrti's texts, though the Cakravartin Śaṅkha, considered as *kālaviprakṛṣṭa* in later texts, is mentioned as an example for a future object in VN 6,5f. (see Much [1991: 14, esp. n. 75]). For later exemplifications, see VNV 20,16f.: *merurāmasurādirūpavat*; TBh 30,17–19: . . . *deśaviprakṛṣṭe sumervādau kālaviprakṛṣṭe bhaviṣyacchaṅkhacakravartyādau svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭe piśācādāv* . . . ; DhṬ 65,3: . . . *meruśrīharṣapiśācādayo* . . .

[2] This interpretation goes back as far as Stcherbatsky [1930$_1$: 384–387], where the *viprakṛṣṭas* are termed as "inaccessible": "This means that a metaphysical object is beyond time, beyond space and beyond sensible reality"; see also Kajiyama [1974: 268] ("*honrai chikaku dekinai mono*"); Steinkellner [1992: 403] (" . . . non-perception of something totally imperceptible"), Katsura [1992: 229] (" . . . a ghost which is by nature beyond our ordinary perception . . ."), and Tillemans [1995: 131]: " . . . if the entity is not perceptible (*adṛśya*), that is, if it is the type of thing, like a spirit (*piśāca*), which is not empirically accessible to ordinary beings, then merely not apprehending it does not prove its absence at all." In a similar vein, Franco [1987: 494], who characterizes imperceptibles as "something which is never perceived." See also Kellner [1997: n. 165], where *viprakṛṣṭa* is interpreted as "fundamentally not perceptible" ("grundsätzlich nicht wahrnehmbar").

cognizer c apply, the thesis *iha ghaṭo nāsti* can be explicated as 'in a particular place p1, at a particular point in time t1, and for a particular cognizer c, an object o1[3] does not exist'. Inferences based on the reason of *dṛśyānupalabdhi* consequently target a spatio-temporally specific non-occurrence of certain objects for specific cognizers—a 'situational' non-occurrence. Clearly, a situationally-unspecific notion of 'perceptibility', in the sense that the object in question can be perceived by somebody, somewhere, and at some point in time, is not restrictive enough to rule out precisely those scenarios which the qualifier *dṛśya* is said to exclude: That objects are established as absent for the wrong reason, for example, due to damage of the cognizer's sense-faculties.

This problem, whether it is in fact a genuine problem of Buddhist *anupalabdhi*-theories, or whether it is merely a misapprehension on the part of contemporary scholarship, can be addressed in two fundamentally different ways: On the one hand, one could hold onto a notion of a situationally-unspecific 'perceptibility', and stipulate additional conditions for its specification, so that a general notion of 'perceptibility' becomes situational if these conditions are instantiated. This could be achieved, for instance, by requiring that all causes which are, in addition to the object itself, necessary for the production of perception, have to be instantiated in a given situation S1: An object which is 'perceptible' in general is 'perceptible' in a particular situation S1 if, and only if, all other causes which are necessary for its perception exist in S1. Alternatively, one could define 'perceptibility' in a situation-specific manner from the start, so that 'perceptibility' itself already means 'perceptibility of an object o1 in situation S1'. Generally speaking, these two approaches differ in that the former is based on the realization of a latent potentiality, whereas the latter entails the givenness of an actual capacity.

An even more precise understanding of this difference between latency or actuality can be gained if this difference is considered on the background of two alternative perspectives on cognition, both of which, often intertwined, are manifest in numerous Buddhist epistemological theories: A causal approach, which examines the causes that are necessary for the production of cognitions, and a phenomenal approach, which focuses on the types of objects which appear in cognitions. As far as 'perceptibility' in the context of non-cognition is concerned, it is likely that neither a purely causal, nor a purely phenomenal approach is satisfactory. This is the case because a causal capacity—situation-specific or situation-independent—to produce a perceptual cognition is not restricted to 'perceptible' objects. It is equally present in all the other causes which contribute to the production of a perception. Conversely, while a purely phenomenal approach is capable of accounting for what kinds of objects can, in principle, appear in cognitions, it is hardly capable of explaining, amongst other things, why a particular instance of perception takes place in a particular setting, and not in another. But precisely this is what is neces-

[3] Theoretically, the thesis 'an object o1 does not exist' can account for two alternative propositions: (1) 'An individual object o1 does not exist', for example, 'a blue, rusty pot, which I have used to boil water yesterday, does not exist here and now'. (2) 'A member of the set of o1s does not exist', for example, 'no member of the class of pots presently exists'. It seems that both alternatives are covered by the concept of a *dṛśyānupalabdhihetu*. Due to limitations of space, it is not possible to adequately deal with the whole range of implications of this twofold distinction within the scope of the present paper.

sary if the non-occurrence of a perception in a certain situation is to be explained through the absence of the object o1, and nothing else. Consequently, what is most probably called for in the present context is a combined causal-phenomenal approach: the capacity of objects to produce their own cognition, wherein the causal perspective provides the notions of 'capacity' and 'production', and the phenomenal perspective accounts for the element of appearance within cognition. Objects are then differentiated from the other causes of perception on phenomenal grounds, in that they are causally capable of producing their own perception, while the other causes are merely capable of producing a perception.

In what follows, I will argue that Dharmottara's views represent such a combined causal-phenomenal approach, as well as a situational approach, to '(im)perceptibility'. Because of the many problematic issues involved, it is also necessary to take a closer look at the relevant technical terms *dṛśyatva*, *adṛśyatva*, *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpti* (short *up.i.*), and *viprakarṣa*; terms which will, for the time being, be given in their original Sanskrit form. The expressions 'perceptibility' and 'imperceptibility', always given in inverted commas, will be specified whenever necessary, but are, once more, not intended to be equivalents to *dṛśyatva/adṛśyatva*. The conclusions apply specifically to Dharmottara's *anupalabdhi*-theory, and are not intended to be representative of the whole range of post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist viewpoints, or to represent a somehow 'authentic' Dharmakīrtian thought. Passages from Dharmakīrti's texts are given and translated according to Dharmottara's premises.

2. Teminological observations: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpti* and *viprakṛṣṭa*

Two technical terms are closely connected with the pair *dṛśyatva* and *adṛśyatva*: Objects which are *dṛśya* are referred to as *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta* (short *up.a.*), which is commonly translated as "[an object which] meets the conditions for perception" and the like;[4] objects which are *adṛśya* are often identified with the category of 'distant' objects, i.e. '[objects which are] distant in place, time or kind' (*deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*).[5] The motives for the exclusion of these 'distant objects' from the domain of a *dṛśyānupalabdhi* can be gleaned from, amongst others, the following passage NB II 47–48:

> *viprakṛṣṭaviṣayā punar anupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumānanivṛttilakṣaṇā saṃśayahetuḥ // pramāṇanivṛttāv apy arthābhāvāsiddher iti //*
> "On the other hand, [that type of] non-cognition which has something distant as its object [and] which is characterized as the absence of perception or inference, is a doubtful reason, because the

[4] Steinkellner [1979: 44]: "... die Bedingungen für Beobachtung erfüllt," also Steinkellner [1967: 157f.]; Preisendanz [1994b: 421]; Katsura [1992: 228]: "when all conditions for perception, e.g. enough light, attention, etc., are present"; Hayes [1986]: "to meet the conditions of perceptibility"; Franco [1987: 458, 497]: "to fulfil the conditions for perception"; Kajiyama [1974: 267]: "... *ninshiki sareru tame no jōken wo sonaete iru*..."; also Tillemans [1995: 135], Kellner [1997: 105].

[5] The expression *svabhāva* in *svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa* refers to different kinds of beings: *piśāca*s are of a different kind than ordinary cognizers and can therefore not be perceived by them. This "kind" is apparently understood in relation to the disposition of the cognizer's sense-faculty: An ordinary cognizer cannot perceive a *piśāca*; a *piśāca* can perceive a fellow *piśāca* (DhP 107,30, VNV 19,27f.); and a Yogin can also perceive a *piśāca* (RNA 146,18f.).

absence of the [respective] thing is unestablished even when the absence of the [respective] means of valid cognition is given."[6]

In related passages, the problematic character of 'distant' objects is explained through the fact that their existence does not inevitably and immediately produce a cognition.[7] An important clue to the reasons of this non-fulfilment is given with the expression *viprakṛṣṭaviṣayā 'nupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣanivṛttilakṣaṇā* . . . : "[That type of] non-cognition which has something distant as its object [and] which is characterized as an absence of perception . . ." If it were by definition impossible for a 'distant' object to ever produce a perception, the mention of the "absence of perception" in this passage would be unnecessary. But the very fact that the author feels obliged to include the "absence of perception" amongst the problematic cases of non-cognition suggests that at least some types of distant objects produce some type of perception. In a related passage in PVin II, which is frequently taken up in later texts of the school,[8] distant objects are described as perceived within distant situations, so that, for example, an object in a distant place can be perceived by a cognizer c who happens to be in that place, or a *piśāca* can be perceived by a fellow *piśāca*. The non-fulfilment of said causal requirement can therefore only be meaningfully understood in the sense that the existence of distant objects cannot inevitably and immediately produce their perception in a given situation S1, but may very well do so in a second situation S2.

In another passage of the same text, the technical term *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpti* is explained as follows (NB II 13–14):

upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyaṃ svabhāvaviśeṣaś ca / yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ // "*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpti* is the entirety of the additional causal factors[9] for a [perceptual] cognition and a distinct entity.[10] A distinct entity is an entity which, [when] it exists, is necessarily

[6] See also VN 5,21–23, 10,9–20; as well as NB II 27: *viprakṛṣṭeṣu . . . abhāvaniścayābhāvāt*, parallel of PVin II 16,10f. (k. 32cd in Steinkellner's edition): *bskal pa rnams la ni // med par nges pa yod ma yin //*

[7] See PVin II 16,12–17,7, plus the parallel (for 16,26–17,7) in PVSV 102,2–11, where Dharmakīrti adds scriptural authority (*āgama*) as yet another *pramāṇa* whose absence cannot ensure that of its object. Both qualifications, "inevitably and immediately," are required, because it is conceivable that effects arise only after a considerable amount of time, e.g. when a rat becomes ill from poison (PVin II 17,8–27, PVSV 103,2–14).

[8] PVin II 16,14–22, for Dharmottara's comments, see PVinṬ II P 257b2f./D215a6–215b1. See also DhṬ 65,3–7 (also quoted in Stcherbatsky [1930$_2$: 65, n. 1]), DhP 107,29–31, VNV 19,27f., and Tātparya fol.61bf. (given in Yaita [1997: 65]); see also RNA 146,18f., translated in Kajiyama [1965: 409]. The argument starts out with an objection, in which the opponent indicates that distant objects are perceived by distant cognizers, and therefore fall within the range of *up.i.*, which is why the qualifier *up.i.* becomes meaningless if it is actually intended to exclude them. Dharmakīrti replies by restricting non-cognition to one particular cognizer, which implies that whatever may or may not be perceived in situations which are in some way 'distant' from this cognizer is dismissed as irrelevant, as beyond determination. Later texts understand this restriction to one cognizer also to apply to *up.i.*, esp. Dharmottara (see passage 1 in the present paper).

[9] In order to avoid terminological confusions, I have chosen to translate *pratyaya* as "causal factor" (see also Gillon [1986: 84], and Franco [1987: 497]) rather than as "condition," because 'condition' is often used in standard translations of *up.i.* (see above, n. 4) in the sense of a requirement which needs to be met (and not in the sense of a factor which is causally relevant to the production of an effect).

[10] *svabhāva* is here translated rather loosely, as "entity" in the meaning of "thing," because the more specific terminological aspects of *svabhāva* are not relevant for the present discussion. Dharmottara explains *viśeṣa* as

perceived, when the additional causal factors for the [perceptual] cognition are given."[11]

The commentarial literature contains two analyses of the compound *up.i.* which differ in their interpretations of *lakṣaṇa*. Both understand *lakṣaṇa* to refer to causal factors which are necessary for the production of a perception. In the analysis given by Śākyabuddhi, these *lakṣaṇa*s are identified as all causal factors other than the object itself (= *pratyayāntara*); for instance, in the case of a visual perception, light, the unimpaired sense of vision, and the cognizer's attention (*manaskāra*). In the analysis given by Śāntarakṣita and Dharmottara, the *lakṣaṇa* is understood as the complete causal complex which produces a perception (*janikā sāmagrī*), that is, it involves both the 'additional causal factors' and the 'distinct entity'.[12]

From early on, both interpretations of *lakṣaṇa* were subjected to a type of criticism which focuses on problems with causality:[13] If *up.i.* means that an object has "attained" (*prāpta*) the additional causal factors for its cognition, the question arises as to why these so-called "causes" do not actually produce a perception as their effect, for, after all, it is the nature of causal factors to produce an effect. If these causal factors do not have such a nature, they cannot be 'causal factors' to begin with. The same problem arises in the second interpretation, in which *lakṣaṇa* is understood as the <u>complete</u> causal complex of a perception. In this case, since the complete

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viśiṣṭa. See NBṬ 103,5: *svabhāva eva viśiṣyate tadanyasmād iti viśeṣa viśiṣṭa ity arthaḥ*, NBṬ 103,6: . . . *viśiṣṭaḥ svabhāvaḥ* . . . , also VN 5,3f., where the *svabhāvaviśeṣa* is additionally specified as *yad anātmarūpapratibhāsavivekena pratipattṛpratyakṣapratibhāsarūpam*.

[11] Related passages in Dharmakīrti's texts are PVSV 101,18f.: *na hy asti sambhavo yad upalabdhiyogyaḥ sakaleṣv anyeṣu kāraṇeṣu san nopalabhyeta*, VN 5,1–5, and the example for *anupalabdhi* given in PVSV 2,17–19: *pradeśaviśeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ / yadi syād upalabhyasattva eva syān nānyathā / tenopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasattvasya ity uktaṃ bhavati* (with the parallel, up to *nānyathā*, in PVin II 10,7–10, translated in Steinkellner [1979: 44]).

[12] For the first analysis, see PVṬ 9a6f. This has a close parallel in PVSVṬ 21,22–24 (passages in round brackets are found in the margin of the manuscript): *upalabdher (lakṣaṇāni karaṇāni cakṣurādīny anyā)pratibaddha-sāmarthyāny* {corrected with PVṬ, PVSVṬ reads (. . . *anya)pratibaddhasāmarthyādy*} *upalabdhilakṣaṇāni / tāni prāptaḥ* <*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaḥ*> */ svābhāsajñānajananayogyaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ /* <u>*svajñānajananasāmagry-antarbhūto 'rtha*</u> *ity arthaḥ*; however, the underlined passage sounds conspicuously 'Dharmottara-ish', as can be seen from the *locus classicus* for the second analysis in NBṬ 101,7f.: *upalabdhir jñānaṃ / tasyā lakṣaṇaṃ janikā sāmagrī / tayā hy upalabdhir lakṣyate / tatprāpto 'rtho* <u>*janakatvena sāmagryantarbhāvāt*</u>; see also VNV 19,21–24; VNV 20,12f. Arcaṭa does not expressly analyze the compound, but most probably subscribes to the second analysis, as he explains the *lakṣaṇa*s according to the Buddhist model of the four *pratyaya*s which include the object as *ālambanapratyaya* (HBṬ 167,25–168,1, with HBṬĀ 381,24–382,1).

[13] See e.g. AJP II 178,6–179,7: *na, upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhāsiddheḥ / upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptir hy upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyam / teṣām upalambhajananasvabhāvatve jananasvabhāvatve* (? possible duplication) *kathaṃ tadanupalambhaḥ / atatsvabhāvatve vā tatpratyayāntaratvaṃ kathaṃ // syād etat sahārthena tajjananasvabhāvāni, yathāha svabhāvaviśeṣaś ca yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati* {= NB II 13–14} */ etad apy asāram, ittham apy ubhayasya upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptiśabdenābhidhānāt tadbhāve cānupalambhāyogāt /* TUS 94,17–25: . . . *dṛśyaśabdena kim apadiśyate? upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto 'rtho 'bhidhīyate. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptiś ca pratyayāntarasākalyaṃ svabhāvaviśeṣaś ca. etac ced vidyate, katham anupalambhaḥ? upalabdhikārakasākalye saty upalabdhyā bhavitavyaṃ, nānupalabdhyā tatsvabhāvanibandhanatvāt tadupalabdheḥ. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya yady anupalambho, 'nupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya tarhy upalambhaḥ syād, aniṣṭaṃ caitat* (quoted and translated in Franco [1987: 496f.]). NAVV 68,3–5: *nanv anupalabdheḥ kiṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ yenaivam ucyate / kim atra praṣṭavyam / niṣidhyamānasya dṛśyatvam / tan na, tadānīm asan na dṛśyate / kathaṃ tathā vyapadiśyate / adṛśyamāno 'pi darśanayogyaś cet* </> *tadyogyatvaṃ darśanābhāvāt katham avasitam /*

causal complex is given, the effect must by definition be produced immediately. Under both interpretations, therefore, an object which is *up.a.* must be perceived, and cannot be non-existent.

First of all, this criticism shows that the expression *-prāpta* or *-prāpti* is taken in a rather literal sense, so that the object physically "attains" or reaches the causes (complete or additional) for its perception.[14] More importantly, the critical remarks concentrate on causal aspects, and exhibit a view of causality in which the givenness of a causal capacity necessarily entails its immediate exercise, which can be explicated as the following principle:

> PNEC = Principle of necessary exercise of causal capacity:
> If an entity x has the nature to produce an entity y, x inevitably and immediately produces y at every point in time t, and in every place p, where x exists.

Applied to the specific case of perception, PNEC can be reformulated as:

> PNPP = Principle of necessary production of a perception:
> If something has the nature to produce a perception, it inevitably and immediately produces the perception in every situation S where it exists.

Considering the two alternative interpretations of *up.i.*, two sub-types of PNPP can be introduced: PNPPC, where 'something' refers to the 'sufficient cause' or 'complete causal complex', and PNPPA, where it denotes a subset of the members of the causal complex. If Claus Oetke is right in claiming that a principle equivalent to PNEC is in fact a part of Dharmakīrti's theory of causality,[15] Dharmakīrti's followers can certainly be expected to endorse it, and also its application to perception, PNPP. It is then justifiable to detect, based on Dharmottara's compound-analysis of *up.i.*, a formulation of PNPPC in NB II 13–14, so that *up.i.* equals "[the fact that] the [complete] causal factors for a [perceptual] cognition have been attained [so that the perception is immediately and inevitably produced]," where "attainment" refers to an actually given state of affairs, so that the object is, as the opponents claim, actually perceived. In addition to showing that *up.i.* thus targets a given instance of perception rather than a mere 'perceptibility', the application of PNEC in the explanation of *up.i.* also renders it highly unlikely that any notion of 'perceptibility' in which *up.i.* is utilized can significantly involve a latent potentiality, or a situationally-unspecified possession of certain phenomenal properties.[16]

3. Situational perceptibility—Dharmottara's interpretation of *up.i.*

This leaves two main issues for the remaining enquiry: Firstly, in what way *up.i.* is related to a notion of 'perceptibility' (and what type of 'perceptibility' this is); and secondly, the presence of additional phenomenal aspects in the explication of *up.i.* Dharmottara's specific views of *up.i.*

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[14] In the case of the complete causal complex, this "attainment" means that the object comes to be included in the causal complex (*sāmagryantarbhāva*, see the passages given above in n. 12).

[15] A principle which is analogous to PNEC is Oetke's theorem TH4, see Oetke [1993: 91f.]. For a general outline of Dharmakīrtis theory of causality on its historical background, see also Katsura [1983], and esp. section *b* in HB (of particular relevance is *b12215*).

[16] The earliest attested occurrence of the technical term *up.i.* is in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, where it features in the analysis of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 4.1.6 (see Marui [1984], Hayes [1986], Preisendanz [1994a: 871; 1994b: n. 171]). For the difference between Uddyotakara's and Dharmottara's interpretations as to whether or not the *lakṣaṇas*

can be gathered from the following passage:

Passage 1
NBṬ 104,5–105,4: *ekapratipattrapekṣam idam pratyakṣalakṣaṇam / tathā ca sati draṣṭuṃ pravṛttasya ekasya draṣṭur dṛśyamāna ubhayavān bhāvaḥ / adṛśyamānās tu deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭāḥ svabhāvaviśeṣarahitāḥ pratyayāntarasākalyavantas tu / yair hi pratyayair sa draṣṭā paśyati te sannihitāḥ / ataś ca sannihitā yad draṣṭuṃ pravṛttaḥ saḥ / draṣṭum apravṛttasya tu yogyadeśasthā 'pi draṣṭuṃ te na śakyāḥ pratyayāntaravaikalyavantaḥ; svabhāvaviśeṣayuktās tu / dūradeśakālās tu ubhayavikalāḥ / tad evaṃ paśyataḥ kasyacin na pratyayāntaravikalo nāma, svabhāvaviśeṣavikalas tu bhavet / apaśyatas tu draṣṭum aśakyo*[17] *yogyadeśasthaḥ pratyayāntaravikalaḥ / anye tu ubhayavikalā iti //*
"This definition of *pratyakṣa*[18] [in NB II 14] is given with regards to one [particular] cognizer. And that being the case, [1a] for one [particular] perceiver who is [currently] engaged in a perception, a thing (*bhāva*) possesses both [the entirety of the additional causal factors and being[19] a distinct entity], [because this thing] is actually perceived. [1b] [Things which are] not [currently] perceived [by this particular perceiver] are devoid of [being] a distinct entity, [because] they are distant in place, time or kind, but possess the entirety of the additional causal factors. For those causal factors through which this perceiver perceives [a thing], these are in proximity. And they are in proximity, because this [perceiver] is [actually] engaged in a perception. [2a] On the other hand, for [a perceiver] who is not [currently] engaged in a perception, [things] which exist in a suitable place cannot be perceived either, [because] they lack the entirety of the additional causal factors. However, [such things] possess [being] a distinct entity. [2b] Yet, [objects] which are far away in place or time lack both [the entirety of the additional causal factors and being a distinct entity]. [To summarize:] Therefore, in this way, for somebody who [currently] perceives [a thing], there is no lack of the additional causal factors for anything, but there may be a lack of [being] a distinct entity [for something]. Yet, for one who does not [currently] perceive [a thing], [a thing] which is in a suitable place [and] cannot (!) be perceived lacks additional causal factors. Other [things], however, lack both."[20]

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are necessary or sufficient causes for the production of a perception, see Kellner [1998]. A Nyāya interpretation of *up.i.* is refuted in HBṬ 167,23–169,11 and DhP 103,21–24. It seems that no phenomenal aspects are connected with Uddyotakara's use of the term.

[17] The printed text reads *draṣṭuṃ śakyo*. The conjecture of *draṣṭum aśakyo* is based on the fact that this sentence serves to summarize the previous part ... *yogyadeśasthā 'pi draṣṭuṃ te na śakyāḥ pratyayāntaravaikalyavantaḥ* ...

[18] *pratyakṣa* is left untranslated, because it is used as a semantic equivalent of *dṛśya*. This becomes clear from the first out of two alternative interpretations for *pratyakṣalakṣaṇa* given by Durveka Miśra, according to which *pratyakṣa* refers to *svabhāvaviśeṣa* in NB II 14. See DhP 104,17–19. See also DhṬ 66,7f.: ... *evam ekapuruṣāpekṣayā bhāvā dṛśyādṛśyasvabhāvā bhavanti* ... The second alternative, which produces only a different meaning for *pratyakṣa* (as *upalabdhi*), but leaves everything else unchanged, is given in DhP 105,29–106,18.

[19] Note that NB II 13–14 make statements about the givenness or instantiation of all the additional causal factors and the distinct entity, whereas passage 1 examines whether or not for a putative object, it can be claimed that all additional causal factors are given, and that this object is a distinct entity. The combination of the two terms *pratyayāntarasākalya* and *svabhāvaviśeṣa* with *-vikala*, "lack of," "lacking," yields therefore the slightly different translations "[the thing] lacks the entirety of the additional causal factors" for *pratyayāntarasākalyavikala*, and "[the thing] lacks [being] a distinct enity" for *svabhāvaviśeṣavikala*.

[20] For the syntactical structure of this passage, I have largely relied on DhP 104,21–106,18, see also, though less specific, DhṬ 65,3–66,8.

In this typology of objects, reminiscent of a *catuṣkoṭi*-style permutation, two types of cognizers are distinguished: [1] Those who are, at the point in time under consideration t1, actually engaged in a perception, and [2] those who are not. For a cognizer c who perceives an object o1 at t1 (and in a particular place p1), o1 is qualified by both these marks, and is therefore *up.a.* [= 1a]. Other objects o2, o3, o4 etc., which are not perceived by c at t1, are qualified by the entirety of the additional causal factors, but are not distinct entities [= 1b]. Such objects are 'distant' (*viprakṛṣṭa*). It is worth noting that the entirety of the additional causal factors is actually given for such distant objects, which once more indicates that it is possible for them to produce a perception in general, but not in the given situation, for the reason that they are simply too far away to form a causal complex with the presently given additional causal factors.

The two remaining categories [2a] and [2b] concern a cognizer who is not currently engaged in a perception, which is why the additional causal factors are absent in either case, for, as was pointed out in the preceding explanation of category [1b], the additional causal factors are given if, and only if, they are currently involved in bringing about an actual perception. This can be understood as a more or less straightforward expression of PNPPA, that is, the principle that, if the additional causal factors have the nature of producing a perception, they inevitably and immediately produce such a perception in every situation S where they exist.

Passage 1 confirms two observations from Dharmottara's text which were previously made based on NB II 47–48 and on opponents' criticism: Firstly, the situation-specific character of at least some types of 'distance' (*viprakarṣa*), so that objects which are distant with reference to S1 may nonetheless be perceived in S2. Secondly, the reference of *up.i.* to an actually given instance of perception. In addition, the expressions *pratyakṣa*, *dṛśyamāna* or *adṛśyamānāḥ* in Passage 1, which are all related to *pratyakṣa eva bhavati*, "... is necessarily perceived," in NB II 14, can easily be read as demonstrating a phenomenal perspective on the given perception. What is meant is not merely that the perception is given or produced out of certain causes, amongst which is the object, but, more specifically, that the respective object appears within it. Under this assumption, Dharmottara's interpretation of *up.i.* combines a causal analysis of a given instance of perception which is based on PNPPC, with a phenomenal criterion—viz. the appearence of the object in cognition—in order to analytically 'extract' the object out of the complete causal complex. This 'extraction' is essential, considering that a cognizer who carries out an inference is fundamentally interested in determining the non-occurrence of an object, not of a sense-faculty. The following passage specifies how this causal-phenomenal concept of the necessary appearance of an object in perception (based on the presence of the complete causal complex) is utilized in the explanation of 'perceptibility':

Passage 2
NBṬ 101,10–102,3: *atha yo yatra nāsti sa kathaṃ tatra dṛśyaḥ / dṛśyatvasamāropād asann api dṛśya ucyate / yaś caivaṃ sambhāvyate yady asāv atra bhaved dṛśya bhaved iti / sa tatrāvidyamāno 'pi dṛśyaḥ samāropyaḥ / kaś caivaṃ sambhāvyaḥ / yasya samagrāṇi svālambanadarśanakāraṇāni bhavanti / kadā ca tāni samagrāṇi gamyate / yadā ekajñānasaṃsargivastvantaropalambhaḥ / ekendriyajñānagrāhyaṃ locanādipraṇidhānābhimukhaṃ vastudvayam anyonyāpekṣam ekajñānasaṃsargi kathyate / tayor hi sator naikaniyatā bhavati pratipattiḥ / yogyatāyā dvayor apy aviśiṣṭatvāt /* [cf. HB 22,4–6] *tasmād ekajñānasaṃsargiṇi dṛśyamāne saty ekasminn itarat samagradarśanasāmagrīkaṃ yadi bhaved dṛsyam eva bhaved iti sambhāvitaṃ dṛśyatvam āropyate /*

"[Objection:] How can [an object] which does not exist in a certain place be *dṛśya* there? [Answer:] [An object] is called *dṛśya* [in a certain place], even though it does not exist [there], because *dṛśyatva* is superimposed [on it]. And [an object for] which the assumption [is made] that, if this [object] existed here, it would have to be perceived, [on] such [an object], *dṛśyatva* is superimposed, even though [the object] does not exist there. — But [for] what object can such an assumption be made? — [For an object] for which the [additional] causes for a perception with itself as an objective basis are present in entirety (*samagrāṇi*). — But when are these [additional causes] understood as [present] in entirety? — When another real [entity], which is associated in one cognition (*ekajñānasaṃsargin*), is [perceptually] cognized. Two real [entities] which can be apprehended by a cognition [that arises from] the same sense-faculty, [and at which] the attention of the visual [or another] sense-faculty is [equally] directed, are called 'associated in one cognition' with respect to each other. For *if both [such objects] exist, there is no cognition which is limited to [only] one [of them], because the capacity of both [of them] is non-different* [cf. HB 22,4–6]. Therefore, when one [such object] which is associated in one cognition is [actually] perceived, the other [object], which [thus] possesses a complete assembly of [additional] causes for [its] perception, [is assumed as:] 'if [the other object] existed [here], it would have to be perceived', [and in this manner] *dṛśyatva* is superimposed [on the other object].[21]

The introductory question points out a factual problem which derives from PNPPC, and which is already implied in the criticism voiced against *up.i.* that was mentioned above: If *dṛśyatva* is a causal capacity in the sense that the presence of the causes of a perception involves the immediate and inevitable production of the perception, how can an object which is *dṛśya* be non-existent?[22] Dharmottara's answer introduces a concept which has become strongly associated with his theory in later texts: The 'superimposition' of *dṛśyatva* (*dṛśyatvasamāropa*),[23] which takes the form of the 'assumption' (*sambhavana*) that 'if the object existed here [and now], it would have to be perceived';[24] an 'assumption' which is only made at a point in time when all

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[21] For the syntax and the meaning of some problematic expressions, I have again largely relied on DhP 101,21–102,21, see also (again less specific) DhṬ 63,8–64,2.

[22] This question is routinely given after explanations of *up.i.*, e.g. PVSVṬ 21,26f.: *kathaṃ punar yo yatra nāsti sa tatropalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto bhavati / upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvaṃ hi jñānaviṣayatvaṃ tasmiṃś ca sati kuto nāstitvaṃ* (parallel to PVinṬ II D197b4f.), also TBh 29,12., TSop 289,3f. In all these cases, the answer involves the concept of *dṛśyatvasamāropa*, or an equivalent notion.

[23] See also NBṬ 120,1f. and PVinṬ II D197b7–198a5 / P234a8–b6; an alternative expression for the same concept is *dṛśyatvābhyupagama*, see NBṬ 132,9–133,6. TBh 29,13f., TSop 289,4–6 (see also the parallel in BT 96,17–19).

[24] It has been claimed in connection with this conditional that inferences based on *dṛśyānupalabdhi* are "counterfactual inferences" (see Gillon [1986: 86], who specifically refers to Dharmottara for this claim). But first of all, the conditional in question quite clearly constitutes an explanation or specification of *dṛśyatva*, and does not stand for the whole inference. Even so, inferences based on non-cognition cannot be 'counterfactual' in the sense that the antedecent of this conditional is either known or implied to be false. For this would mean that the clause 'if the object existed . . .' is already known to be false at the time when the inference is carried out—that is, the absence of the object is already known, which would no doubt render the inference superfluous in the sense of *siddhasādhana* (establishing something which is already established). From Dharmottara's explanations, the conditional in question emerges as most probably hypothetical in the sense that the acceptability or truth of the antecedent 'if the object existed . . .' is not yet determined (which is why one needs an inference in first place). It therefore serves to introduce a known state of affairs ('the existence of the object inevitably and immediately produces its perception') into the present situation, to the effect that the cognizer can state: "I am not sure whether a pot exists or not, but, as I have seen

additional causal factors are actually instantiated. Such an instantiation is given when a second object with identical additional causal factors is actually perceived, for—this is implied from PNPPA—it is only when such causal factors are involved in the actual production of an effect that they are actually given. The two objects in question, the one which is determined to be absent, and the other which is actually perceived, consequently require identical additional causal factors for their perception. Two such objects are technically termed "associated in one cognition" (*ekajñānasaṃsargin*), so that, if both exist in the same situation, the perception of only one of them is impossible.

While passage 1 contains a causal-phenomenal specification of *up.i.* directed towards an object that is actually perceived in a certain situation S1, passage 2 specifically refers to that situation where an object is determined to be absent. Given that *up.a.* is commonly used for objects which are determined to be absent, it logically follows that the two passages target two different situations S1 and S2, so that the object o1 which is perceived in S1 is precisely the one[25] that is determined to be absent in S2. The object o1 can be said to be 'perceptible' in S2 in the sense that the perceivedness of o1, instantiated in S1, is superimposed on it in S2. From this, it follows that *dṛśyatva* represents a causal-phenomenal perceivedness, in that the object appears in perception because all necessary and jointly sufficient causes for perception (including the object) are given. 'Perceptibility' is represented by the notion of *dṛśyatvasamāropa*, in the sense that it is possible for a certain object to appear in a perception, in a specific situation.[26] Dharmottara's approach to defining 'perceptibility' therefore involves the stipulation of two differenct situations S1 and S2, and can be summarized as follows:

> Given are two situations S1 and S2, where the two different objects o1 and o2 are perceived, so that: S2 temporally follows upon S1; S2 and S1 may, but do not have to, occur in different places (= p1 is identical with p2 or different from p2); S2 and S1 contain the same cognizer c[27]—The object o1 is 'perceptible' = assumed as *dṛśya* in S2 (target of the technical term *dṛśyatvasamāropa* / *dṛśyatvābhyupagama*) iff
> [a] there is a perception of o1 by c in S1 (target of the technical term *up.i./up.a.*)
> [b] there is a perception of o2 by c in S2, and o1 and o2 require identical additional causal factors for the production of their perception (target of the technical term *ekajñānasaṃsargitva*)

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a pot before, I know that wherever such an object exists in the proximity of a set of additional causal factors, it inevitably and immediately produces its perception."

[25] Or, in case of inferences where the absence of a member of a class of objects is determined in S2: The object which is determined as absent in S2 is of the same type as the one which is perceived in S1 (e.g. two pots), but does not have to be numerically identical with it.

[26] This is most poignantly expressed in NAVV 68,5f., where the Buddhist answers the previous objection (see above in n. 12) by emphasizing that *dṛśyatva* is nothing which is given in reality (*vāstava*), but only something which is 'superimposed': *atroktaṃ vyākhyātṛbhiḥ dṛśyatvaṃ samāropitaṃ tatra, na tu vāstavam / ataḥ samāropita-dṛśyatvābhiprāyeṇānupalabdheḥ pūrvoktaḥ viśeṣaṇam /*

[27] The temporally successive character of S1 and S2 is clearly expressed in PVSVṬ 21,28–22,5: *yāvatyāṃ (sāmagryāṃ satyāṃ pūrvaṃ prati)panno bhāvas tāvatyām eva sāmagryāṃ satyāṃ yadi syāt pūrvakālavad upalabhyetety evam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvaṃ buddhyā parāmṛśya bhāvasyāpratibhāsanān nāstīti niṣedhaḥ kriyate / na tv adṛśyasya / pratibhāsaparāmarśopāyābhāvāt / sarvadā 'pratipannatvāt /* (the passage in brackets is given in the margin of the manuscript) Śāntarakṣita brings out a spatial difference (or a difference in terms of *dharmins*), cf.

While this model may presuppose the existence of a latent and situationally-unspecific potential power of objects to produce perceptions, or of generic phenomenal properties of objects at some stage, it does not essentially depend on them for its functionality. As least as far as Dharmottara is concerned, it can therefore be concluded that the prevailing assumption of a situationally-unspecific 'perceptibility' is besides the point, insofar as, while it may be true for Dharmottara's views in some areas, it fails to account for the characteristic features of 'perceptibility' in the context of non-cognition. The prevailing bias towards a non-situational approach has, in addition, managed to obfuscate other characteristic features of Dharmottara's theory of non-cognition. The remaining section of the present paper is devoted to pointing out one of the ramifications of Dharmottara's notion of 'perceptibility', that is, the way in which the different sub-types of non-cognition are differentiated.

4. Ramifications of situational perceptibility: The sub-division of *anupalabdhi*-types

Given that the fulfilment of both criteria [a] and [b] in the above definition is necessary for objects to be perceptible—in the sense that the perception of such objects is assumed to necessarily arise in a given situation S2 under the condition of their existence[28]—, it is only logical to distinguish two ways in which objects can be imperceptible:

[-a] Lack of fulfilment of criterion [a]: There is no situation S1 in which o1 has been perceived by cognizer c. This might be due to a fundamental causal-phenomenal deficiency, in that the object in question can, by nature, not produce a perception in which it appears. Or, alternatively, this can be simply because the putative object has not yet produced its perception for cognizer c, in that it has never come close enough to the necessary additional causal factors to form a complete causal complex with them. From a causal viewpoint, such imperceptibles can be objects which fall completely outside the scope of PNPPC, or objects which have not yet been determined to fall within or without the scope of PNPPC. These two theoretically different ways of not fulfilling criterion [a] cannot, however, be distinguished without additional assumptions. For all that can be known is that cognizer c has not perceived o1 before; why this was the case remains unknown. If it is deemed desirable that utterly imperceptible objects can be differentiated from objects whose perception is simply not yet a part of the perceptual history of individual cognizers, additional specifications will have to be made.[29]

VNV 19,25: *katham evaṃvidhasyānupalabdhir iti cet? nocyate tasya tatraiveti, api tv anyatra tajjātīyasya.* Dharmottara's views on the differences between S1 and S2 cannot be determined with utter certainty. The necessary difference in time can be taken for granted, as well as the possible (but not necessary) difference in place; the non-difference in cognizers is conjectured based on the assumption that the perception in S1 fulfils the purpose of providing a certain kind of information to the cognizer in question, notably that about which causes are necessary for the production of a perception of o1. In this case, a cognizer-difference between S1 and S2 becomes highly unlikely.

[28] From here onwards, the term 'perceptible', whenever it is used without inverted commas, will be used specifically in this Dharmottarian sense.

[29] The problem is in fact symmetrical to the one which formed the starting-point of the present inquiry, where a non-situational 'perceptibility' was found to be insufficiently restrictive for a situational determination of absence. Conversely, a situational 'perceptibility' is too restrictive for a situationally-independent understanding of 'imperceptibles'. Just as one possible approach to the conundrum of 'perceptibility' (though not the one taken by Dharmottara) involves the additional stipulation of conditions for a specification of the situationally-unspecific

[-b] Lack of fulfilment of criterion [b]: Cognizer c has perceived the object in question before, but the perception which takes place in S2 arises from different additional causal factors than the one which took place in S1. For example, let o2 be a fire, visually perceived in S2, and o1 be cold temperature, an object of a tactile perception. The additional causal factors required for tactile and visual perceptions are not identical, so that the existence of the tangible object in S2 cannot be assumed to inevitably and immediately produce its tangible perception there and then. From a causal viewpoint, such imperceptible objects fall within the scope of PNPPC, because PPNPC was instantiated for them in S1, but in the currently given situation S2, PNPPC cannot be superimposed on them, because the necessary additional causal factors are not instantiated.

While [-a] is beyond repair, in that no determination of absence through any kind of non-cognition is possible, there is still hope for cases of type [-b]. For the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of criterion [b] is precisely what distinguishes the numerous other sub-types of non-cognition, such as the "non-cognition of a cause" (*kāraṇānupalabdhi*) etc., from the "non-cognition of a thing itself" (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*). For 9 out of the 11 sub-types of non-cognition enumerated in NB, Dharmottara mechanically repeats that the sub-type in question is to be applied "when the object is *adṛśya*" in the sense that criterion [b] is not fulfilled. When the object is perceptible in the sense that both [a] and [b] are fulfilled, the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* is to be used.[30] The example of fire and cold temperature, given above as a case of [-b], is the stock-example for a *svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi*, in that the cognition of fire is incompatible with the very thing that is to be determined as absent, i.e. cold temperature (*śītasparśa*). All these secondary sub-types of non-cognition involve the knowledge of certain additional conceptual relationships, that is, incompatibility (*virodha*), causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), or pervasion (*vyāpti*). It is because these additional logical relationships are in themselves established based on a *svabhāvānupalabdhi* that these sub-types are "included" (*antarbhāva*) in the *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, even though the requirement of perceptibility does not fully apply to them.[31] This *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, instrumental to the ascertainment of a conceptual relationship such as incompatibility in the past, is remembered in the situation S2 when a sub-type such as the *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* is actually

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concept, here, a possible approach to the conundrum of 'imperceptibility' could involve the stipulation of conditions for a generalization of the concept. Such generalization conditions would allow to establish that a situationally-specific 'imperceptibility' can be generalized over all situations and all cognizers. If the examples given for 'distant' objects (Mt. Meru etc.) are indeed intended to exemplify utterly imperceptible objects, they either rest on the assumption of such additional generalization conditions, or on a non-situational notion of 'perceptibility' (that requires additional specification conditions) which is different from the one exhibited in Dharmottara's texts. (The present observations on 'imperceptibility' and 'distance' supersede earlier remarks on *viprakarṣa* in Kellner [1997: 106f., n. 165]—the distinctions which were hypothesized therein are precisely those which cannot be decided from the definition of (situational) perceptibility alone.)

[30] NBṬ on each of NB II 32–41, except for NB II 36 (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*), e.g. NBṬ 126,3f.: *kāryānupalabdhiś ca yatra kāraṇam adṛśyaṃ tatra prayujyate / dṛśye tu kāraṇe dṛśyānupalabdhir eva gamikā /* Analogous passages can be found, for example, in PVinṬ II D210a2/P250b2, D210a6f./P250b8–251a1, D211a4f./ P252a2f., D210a7–211b1/P262a7f.

[31] See NB II 45–46 for this "inclusion" (*antarbhāva*), and NBṬ 144,1–19. Explanations of how the relevant conceptual relationships are based on a *dṛśyānupalabdhi* (in the sense of a *svabhāvānupalabdhi*) are given in NBṬ 145,9–146,10.

applied. Consequently, the distinction between the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* and the other sub-types of a *dṛśyānupalabdhi* is based on the degree to which the requirements for perceptibility are met. Viewed from the perspective of S2, where cognizer c intends to determine the object o1 as absent, this allows to distinguish between the following three alternatives:

* [+a], [+b] = past perception of o1 in S1 & present perception of o2 in S2 & the perceptions of o1 and o2 share identical additional causal factors > *svabhāvānupalabdhi* > 'strict' perceptibility in the sense of *dṛśyatvasamāropa* > determination of treatment as absent is allowed

* [+a], [-b] = past perception of o1 in S1 & present perception of o2 in S2, but the perceptions of o1 and o2 do not share identical additional causal factors > iff the necessary conceptual relationships (pervasion etc.) have been previously established through a *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, another sub-type of non-cognition can be applied > 'loose' perceptibility, imperceptibility as an absence of 'strict' perceptibility[32] > determination of both absence and treatment as absent is allowed

* [-a], but [b] is indeterminate = no past perception of o1 in S1 & present perception of some object in S2, where the identity or difference of the additional causal factors remains necessarily indeterminate > no *dṛśyānupalabdhi* at all > imperceptibility as a lack of both 'strict' and 'loose' perceptibility > no determination of either absence or treatment as absent possible

In this manner, the arrangement of *dṛśyānupalabdhi*-reasons in two groups, the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* and the rest, relies on different standards for perceptibility. There are thus two ways in which a given *anupalabdhihetu* can be termed *dṛśyānupalabdhi*: The *svabhāvānupalabdhi* is a "non-cognition of a perceptible [object]" in the sense that it is a "non-cognition of an object for which *dṛśyatva* is presently assumed"; the other types are *dṛśyānupalabdhi*-reasons in that they are a "non-cognition of an object for which *dṛśyatva* was instantiated in the past [but cannot presently be assumed]." In both cases, *dṛśyatva* (or *up.i.*) refers to a past instance of perception, analyzed as the appearance of an object in a perception which necessarily arises because all its causes are given. From the viewpoint of perceptibility, the claim that the other sub-types are "included" in the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* does then not mean that more specific sub-types are included in a more general notion; rather, it means that more complex types of cognitions which involve more knowledge on the part of the cognizer can be reduced to a sequence of steps in which the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* plays a key role.

These ramifications of a causal-phenomenal as well as situational understanding of 'perceptibility' shall suffice, for the time being, to indicate one of the many consequences which a consideration of situation-specificity has for the overall framework of non-cognition. For future enquiries, it remains to be seen to which extent other historically instantiated accounts—most notably that of Jñānaśrīmitra—differ from the one presented herein, and in what way these differences can be traced to different responses to the problems surrounding situation-specificity.

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[32] If no conceptual relationships, established through a *svabhāvānupalabdhi,* are available to the cognizer in question, this case would have to become equivalent to the following (unless 'generalization conditions' for 'imperceptibility' are brought into play, see above, n. 29.

Abbreviations and Literature

AJP *Anekāntajayapatākā* (Haribhadra): H. R. Kāpadīā, ed. *Anekāntajayapatākā by Haribhadra Sūri with his own commentary and Municandra Sūri's supercommentary.* 2 Vols. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 88, 105. Baroda, 1940, 1947.

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DhP *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): Dalsukhabhai Malvania, ed. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955. 2nd ed. 1971.

DhṬ Dharmottaraṭippanaka (Mallavādin): See Yaita [1997].

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HBṬĀ *Hetubinduṭīkāloka* (Durveka Miśra): See HBṬ.

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NAVV *Nyāyāvatāravārtikavṛtti* (Śānti Sūri): Dalasukha Malwaniya, ed. *Nyāyāvatāravārtikavṛtti of Śrī Śānti Sūri, critically and authentically edited in the original Sanskrit with an elaborate introduction, notes, indices, etc., in Hindi by Dalasukha Malwaniya.* Bombay, 1949.

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NBṬ *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See DhP.

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VNV *Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā* (Śāntarakṣita): Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Āchārya Dharmakīrti with the commentary Vipañcitārthā of Āchārya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandha-parīkṣā with the commentary of Āchārya Prabhācandra.* Bauddha Bharati Series 8. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1972.

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A NEW CHRONOLOGY OF DHARMAKĪRTI

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I

Scholars have traditionally agreed that Dharmakīrti was a contemporary of Xuanzang (玄奘 602–664). Enshō Kanakura, Hajime Nakamura and Erich Frauwallner all place him at c. 600–660 because he is absent in Xuanzang's writings but he is mentioned by Yijing (義淨 635–713) as a recent eminent scholar of logic.[1] Xuanzang stayed in India between 629–641 and Yijing was at Nālandā between 673–685.

But Xuanzang's silence on Dharmakīrti does not necessarily mean that Dharmakīrti was not a precursor of Xuanzang. Silence about someone in historical sources does not necessarily imply their absence in history. A writer may not mention a particular person because he does not know him, because he does not estimate the latter highly, or for other reasons. However, if we carefully examine the *argumentum ex silentio* used by former scholars, it turns out not to apply to the Xuanzang-Dharmakīrti relationship, for as Shōkō Watanabe reports, Xuanzang orally lectured his disciples on Darmakīrti's theory of *arthakriyāsāmarthya*.[2]

According to Xuanzang's followers, Xuanzang is said to have taught the following verse about the three types of object of cognition (三類境).

> "The essential object does not follow the mind, the shadowy object follows only the noesis of mind, and judgement reflects an essence of passion or an essence of object." (性境不隨心、獨影唯從見、帶質通情本、性種等隨應)[3]

Watanabe stresses that, according to Xuanzang's granddisciple Huizhao (惠沼), the essential object occurs from the substance (實種) and has its own essence and operative function (實

[1] Yi jing, *Nan hai ji gui nei fa zhuan* (南海寄歸內法傳), T 2125, vol. 54: 229b; *Da tang xi yu qiu fa gao seng zhuan* (大唐西域求法高僧傳), T 2066, vol. 51: 9b.

Cf. Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 5 (1961): 137f. Hajime Nakamura used my chronological scheme of Dharmakīrti and his followers, which was drawn in accordance with Frauwallner's interpretation in *Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes* (Delhi, 1985: 304). I published a paper on the chronology of Dharmakīrti, "Shijin Dharmakīrti" [The Poet Dharmakīrti], in *Indogaku Mikkyōgaku Kenkyū* 1 (1993): 426ff. The present paper aims at adding more data to my chronology and making it available to Western scholars.

[2] Watanabe, "Bukkyō Ronrigakuha to Setsunametsu-setsu no Ronshō" [Buddhist Logicians and the Proof of *Kṣaṇikatvam*], *Tetsugaku Nempō* 14 (1953).

[3] The granddisciple Huizhao (惠沼)'s note *Cheng wei shi lun liao yi deng* (成唯識論了義燈) is a better datum for the understanding of the three types of object than the direct disciple Kuiji (窺基)'s *Cheng wei shi lun zhang zhong shu yao* (成唯識論掌中樞要). See T 1832, vol. 43: 677c–678a.

體用); it is called the essential object because one cognizes its particular feature (自相) by perception. However, we cannot find such an epistemological theory among the Vijñānavādins or even in the texts of the Mādhyamikas.

Dharmakīrti seems to have introduced this concept of the operative function from the definition of 'present time' as an operation (*kāritra*) given by Vasumitra in the *Abhidharmakośa* V 26 (*adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ*). Vasubandhu confirmed Vasumitra's definition.

But Dharmakīrti changed the term *kāritra*, which F. Edgerton pointed out to be a hybrid Sanskrit expression, into *arthakriyāsāmarthya* used by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*.[4] Vātsyāyana intended the term to express the ability of words to indicate a particular object and gave examples, such as *ajāṃ grāmaṃ naya* (take the goat to the village). He mentioned such usages in the context of the explanation of verbal sophistry (*vākchala*). Words have the function of directing an action toward a particular individual (*arthakriyādeśanā*), says Vātsyāyana, so that one can reproach the use of the word *navakambala* in the sense of 'a man of nine cloths' against that in the sense of 'a man of new cloth'. In this manner, the term *arthakriyāsāmarthya* was used in his linguistic theory.

Furthermore Vātsyāyana used the term *arthakriyāsamartha* for the efficacy of a substance (*dravya*), such as poisonous or medicinal plants, in his commentary to the *Nyāyasūtra* 3.1.69 (NBh 535). Dharmakīrti seems to have applied Vātsyāyana's terminology to his ontology.

Thus we can consider the report of Watanabe to be highly probable.

II

Enshō Kanakura cites Dharmapāla's reference to a logical theory of Dharmakīrti.[5] Namely, he suggests that Dharmapāla had referred to Dharmakīrti in his *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*, which is available only in a Chinese version.[6] So far no scholar, including Kanakura himself, has examined this astonishing fact, so here I would like to investigate it.

In his *Ālambanaparīkṣā* Dignāga criticizes an ontological tenet according to which the object of perception is a real substance. He points out that the object is neither the image of atoms nor the substance itself because it consists of an aggregate of atoms. Thus, Dignāga says that the Realists' tenet is false. Dharmapāla explains the fault of the opponents as follows:

> "If you assume that cognition is caused by an aggregate of atoms and not by atoms themselves, then you cannot assert the substance as the object of cognition. Then you could not help but committing the self-contradiction of your own standpoint. Thus Dharmakīrti does not approve your argument (然法稱不許) because it lacks an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) for the syllogism."

According to Dharmakīrti, a logical proof needs a well-known instance so that the logical concomitance is accceptable for both sides of a debate, the proponent and the opponent. Thus it is certain that Dharmapāla was acquainted with the logic of Dharmakīrti.

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[4] NBh 193.

[5] Enshō Kanakura, *Indo Seishin Bunka no Kenkyū* [Studies in Indian Spiritual Culture] (Tokyo, 1944), 357.

[6] *Guan suo yuan lun shi* (觀所緣論釋), T 1625, vol. 31: 889 c.

III

As another piece of evidence in dating Dharmakīrti, I would like to consider Candrakīrti's writings. Candrakīrti referred to Dharmapāla as a respected contemporary in his *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*.

> "This [*Catuḥśataka*] was divided into two parts by a contemporary scholar. That is, the great contemporary scholar Dharmapāla divided this *Catuḥśataka* into two parts in accordance with its contents." (*de 'di da lta'i snyan dngags mkhan gyis byas / bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa de ni da lta'i snyan dngags mkhan btsun pa Chos skyong gis ji ltar bkod pa phye nas rnam pa gnyis su byas te /*)[7]

Candrakīrti and Dharmapāla criticized Bhāviveka who had criticized Dignāga. Dharmakīrti ridiculed Uddyotakara and Kumārila who had vehemently assailed Dignāga. Thus Dharmakīrti, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti seem to be two generations later than Dignāga. Frauwallner suggests the dates of Dignāga to be c. 480–540 (according to Hattori c. 470–530), and Gray reports that Bāṇa had respectfully called Subandhu 'the story-teller' (*ākhyāyikākāra*)[8] who alluded to Dharmakīrti as we shall see below (IV). According to R. C. Majumdar,[9] Bāṇa was a courtpoet under the reign of Harṣa who died in the year of 646 or 647 A.D.

Furthermore, Xuanzang lived in the north-side house at Nālandā Mahāvihāra next to the house of the late *ācārya* Dharmapāla.[10] In other words, Xuanzang lived at Nālandā when the memory of Dharmapāla was still alive. Furthermore, he was well acquainted with Dharmapāla's direct disciples, Śīlabhadra and others. The date of Dharmapāla, 530–561, proposed by Hakuju Ui,[11] contradicts the above circumstantial evidence. Based upon the above evidence, I propose the time of Dharmapāla's death to be about ten years earlier than Xuanzang's arrival at Nālandā. In that case, he would have lived c. 550–620. Candrakīrti praised the lineage of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmapāla on the terminal page of his *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*.[12] Therefore I would like to set the date of Candrakīrti about 20 years later than Dharmapāla.

Hereafter I will refer to Uddyotakara, Bhāviveka and Kumārila as 'scholars of group A', and Dharmakīrti, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti as 'scholars of group B'.

IV

How can we decide the date of Dharmakīrti? Subandhu, the author of the *Vāsavadattā*, alludes to Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Dignāga in his usage of puns (*śleṣa*). The puns alluding to the scholars of group A run as follows:

(1) *nyāyasthitim iva Uddyotakara-svarūpāṃ... Vāsavadattāṃ... dadarśa* / "He (i.e., Kandarpaketu) saw Vāsavadattā who was as bright as the logical school of Uddyotakara [the brilliant]."[13]

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[7] Tohoku no. 3865, Ya 31b7–8.

[8] L. H. Gray, *Vāsavadattā* (New York, 1912; reprint 1965), 14.

[9] R. C. Majumdar, *Ancient India* (Delhi, reprint 1994), 256.

[10] *Da tang da ci en si san zang fa shi zhuan* (大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳), T 2053, vol. 50: 237a.

[11] H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* [Studies in Indian Philosophy], vol. 5 (Tokyo 1929), 128–132. See also Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, 132–134.

[12] Tohoku no. 3862, 'A 347b2–3. This was pointed out to me by Prof. H. Isoda.

[13] V 235,2–3.

(2) *Upaniṣadam iva ānandātmakām uddyotayantīṃ . . . Vāsavadattāṃ dadarśa* / "He saw bright Vāsavadattā who consisted of delight just as the Upanishad did so."[14]

(3) *kecij Jaiminimatānusāriṇa iva Tathāgatamata-dhvaṃsinaḥ . . . sthitā rājaputrāḥ* / "Some princes battled one another for Vāsavadattā, just as the Mīmāṃsakas had destroyed the Buddhist philosophy."[15]

(4) *kaścid Bauddhasiddhānta iva kṣapitaśrutivacanadarśano 'bhavat* / "The hearing, speaking and seeing of a certain man were destroyed just as the canon, statements and philosophy of a certain Buddhist school were destroyed."[16]

The pun 1 clearly designates Uddyotakara and the puns 3 and 4 seem to suggest Kumārila and Dignāga respectively. Now we must examine one problematic passage:

(5) *Bauddhasaṅgatim iva alaṅkāra-bhūṣitām . . . Vāsavadattāṃ dadarśa* / "He saw Vāsavadattā who adorned herself with an ornament just as the Buddhist meeting was adorned with an ornament."[17]

The commentator Śivarāma explains as follows: "The term *alaṅkāra* means a specific work composed by Dharmakīrti" (*alaṅkāro Dharmakīrtikṛto granthaviśeṣaḥ*).[18]

Modern scholars of Indian poetry have interpreted the term *alaṃkāra* as referring to a specific text of poetry, and have tried to determine whether Śivarāma's explanation is authentic or not.[19] There are now several interpretations of the terms *alaṃkāra* and *grantha.*

It is untenable that the Buddhist meeting was adorned by a text of poetry. The term *alaṅkāra* means 'an ornament' anyhow. I suggest that the term *grantha* means 'a poem'. That is, the ornament that adorned the Buddhist meeting was a religious poem by Dharmakīrti, e.g., the *Buddhaparinirvāṇa-stotra* for the anniversary of the Buddha's death.[20]

V

Thus we can assume that Subandhu knew Dharmakīrti as well as Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Dignāga. If we can determine the date of Subandhu, then we can set the date of Dharmakīrti as well, because the scholars of group B are placed between those of group A and Subandhu, and the scholars of group A between Dignāga and those of group B. In this connection we presuppose that Dignāga lived between 480–540.

Although A. F. R. Hoernle once suggested the date of the composition of the *Vāsavadattā* as 606–612,[21] we would like to set the date of Subandhu more accurately on the basis of an introduc-

[14] V 235,3–236,1.

[15] V 144,2–3.

[16] V 297,7.

[17] V 235,3.

[18] Darpaṇa 235,13.

[19] See, for example, A. L. Masson, "Did Dharmakīrti Write the *Kārikās* of the *Alaṅkāraśekhara*?" *Indo-Iranian Journal* 14 (1969).

[20] Translated into German from the Tibetan version by Prof. Steinkellner, "*Buddhaparinirvāṇastotram*," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 17 (1973).

[21] A. F. R. Hoernle, "Some Problems of Ancient History IV: The Identity of Yaśodharman and Vikramāditya, and Some Corollaries," *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (London): 139 (1909).

tory verse of the *Vāsavadattā*:

> *sārasavattā vihatā navakā vilasanti calati no kaṅkaḥ /*
> *sarasīva kīrtiśeṣaṃ gatavati bhuvi vikramāditye //*
> "The favour was annihilated and new kings appeared, for the king Vikramāditya has passed away from the earth leaving his fame. Just as no heron comes to the waterless pond, no favour comes to me."[22]

Following the epigraphic evidence Hoernle identified Vikramāditya as Yaśodharman who died in 583 A.D. After his death, Rājyavardhana, Śaśāṅka and lastly Harṣavardhana reigned over the Mālava district. Subandhu mentions the plural 'new kings' (*navakāḥ*). Therefore, he wrote the *Vāsavadattā* under the reign of the third king Harṣa. The latter was crowned in 612. Thus Subandhu must have written the *Vāsavadattā* between c. 612–625, and we suppose the lifetime of Subandhu to be c. 555–625, as he was 28 years old when his patron Yaśodharman died. Subandhu could not have lived earlier or later than this date.

Dharmakīrti can be placed two generations after Dignāga (480–540) and must have lived before Subandhu (555–625). Since Dharmapāla (550–620) acknowledged Dharmakīrti's new logic, either the two were contemporaries, or Dharmakīrti was a little older than Dharmapāla.

Conclusion

We can now conclude the dates of Dharmakīrti to be c. 550–620 in accordance with the circumstantial evidence mentioned above.

Moreover, Yijing mentions in his *Nan hai ji gui nei fa zhuan* (南海寄歸内法傳) that Dharmapāla was a contemporary of Bhartṛhari, the editor of *Śataka*s (not the grammarian, 450–510), and that 40 years had passed since his death.[23] Yijing's reference to Dharmapāla contradicts the former chronology proposed by H. Ui. Yijing reports that Wuhang (無行) had learned the texts of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti from a paṇḍit well-learned in logic at the temple Tilādda near Nālandā.[24] Furthermore, there is a tradition that Vajrabodhi, the founder of Chinese Tantrism, learned the texts of Dharmakīrti in his youth (685–689) in Western India.[25] Considering the fact that Dharmakīrti lamented his lack of fame in his poems, the Chinese data seem to support my new chronology of Dharmakīrti which is half a century earlier than the well-accepted dates.

Among the scholars of group B, Dharmakīrti may be the eldest and then Dharmapāla. Candrakīrti must have lived between c. 570–640, for he held Dharmapāla in high esteem.

Additional Note

Prof. Lindtner proposes the date of Dharmakīrti to be 530–600 in his "Apropos Dharmakīrti—Two New Works and a New Date" (*Acta Orientalia* 41), but Prof. Steinkellner challenges Lindtner's

[22] V 7,3–4. See Hoernle, *op. cit.*, 138.
[23] *Nan hai ji gui nei fa zhuan* (南海寄歸内法傳), T 2125, vol. 54: 229a–b.
[24] *Da tang xi yu qiu fa gao seng zhuan* (大唐西域求法高僧傳), T 2066, vol. 51: 9b.
[25] *Zhen yuan xin ding shi jiao mu lu* (貞元新定釋教目録), T 2157, vol. 55: 875b.

data in his "Apropos of Lindtner's Two New Works of Dharmakīrti" (*Prajñājyoti*, Gopikamohan Bhaṭṭacharya Commemoration Volume, Delhi 1988). It is also pointed out that Bhavya belongs to the eighth century or later. Cf. E. Ejima, "*Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* ni tsuite" (On the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*), *IBK* 28 (2); "Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya/Bhāviveka," *IBK* 38 (2).

Abbreviations

Darpaṇa	See V.
IBK	*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*).
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana): G. Jhā and Dhundhirāja Shastri, eds. *Nyāyadarśana, the Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāsya of Vātsyāyana.* Chowkhambā Sanskṛit Series 281, 282, 288, 295, 302, 308, 318, 323, 332, 336. Benares, 1925.
T	J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds. *Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo.* 85 vols. Tokyo, 1924–33. Reprint, 1965.
Tohoku	H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura and T. Tada, eds. *A complete catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist canons.* Sendai: Tohoku Imperial University, 1934. Reprint, 1970.
V	*Vāsavadattā* (Subandhu): Fitzedward Hall, ed. *The Vāsavadattā: A romance by Subandhu, accompanied by Śivarāma Tripathin's gloss entitled Darpaṇa.* Bibliotheca Indica 30. Calcutta, 1855–59. Reprint, 1980.

DHARMAKĪRTI'S AND KUMĀRILA'S REFUTATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: A CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

by

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The chronological order of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, who are regarded as contemporaries, is still controversial. The main positions regarding their chronological relationship may be summed up as follows:[1] In his paper on Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, Erich Frauwallner[2] proposed that Dharmakīrti's earliest writing, the so-called **Hetuprakaraṇa*, which he incorporated as Svārthānumāna chapter in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, already takes Kumārila's critique on Dignāga in his *Ślokavārttika* into consideration, and that Kumārila in his *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* refines his view in light of Dharmakīrti's considerations. Frauwallner's arguments are supported by Steinkellner in his new interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* I 33.[3] This sequence of the texts, *Ślokavārttika* → **Hetuprakaraṇa* → *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, has been questioned by John Taber, who feels "justified in believing that the *ŚV* was composed after the *BṬ* and contains Kumārila's mature views" and that there exist "evidences suggesting that Kumārila is indeed sometimes addressing Dharmakīrti's ideas also in the *ŚV*."[4] The present paper does not deal with the material and arguments used by the above authors, but aims at solving the question of the relation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Ślokavārttika* by basing itself on material that has so far not been considered. Both parties, the Buddhists as well as the Mīmāṃsakas, do not accept an eternal God (*īśvara*) as creator of the world, and both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila refute this idea, at least partially, with more or less similar arguments in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Ślokavārttika* respectively. This examination attempts to determine whether there is a relationship between these passages at all, and if so, what the direction of influence might be.

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[1] The problem is also dealt with in Tosaki Hiromasa (*Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū—Hōshō-cho "Pramāṇavārttika" no genryōron* [Studies on Buddhist Epistemology: The theory of perception in Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika], Vol. I (Tokyo, 1979), 7–20) where he refers to the opinion of Prof. Hattori who considers Dharmakīrti to have had knowledge of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. In a recent paper, too, dealing with the question of 'the exclusion of others' (*anyāpoha*), Hattori proposes the same sequence of texts: *Ślokavārttika* → *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (cf. Masaaki Hattori, "Discussions on Jātimat as the Meaning of a Word," in *Śrījñānāmṛtam: A Memorial Volume in Honour of Prof. Shri Niwas Shastri*, ed. Vijaya Rani (Delhi, 1996), 387–394).

[2] E. Frauwallner, "Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens* 6 (1962): 78–90.

[3] E. Steinkellner, "Kumārila, Īśvarasena, and Dharmakīrti in Dialogue. A New Interpretation of Pramāṇavārttika I 33," in *Bauddhavidyāsudhākāraḥ: Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1997), 625–646.

[4] John A. Taber, "Further Observations on Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā," *The Journal of Oriental Research* (Madras) 56–62 (1986–92) [:179–189], 189; 180.

At the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV II), Dharmakīrti, after having shown that an eternal entity (*nitya*) that could serve as reliable authority (*pramāṇa*) is not possible, states that there are neither proofs for an ephemeral (*anitya*) nor for an eternal entity that could be assumed to be the creator of the universe (vv. 8–9). The reasons for this he formulates in the following verses:[5]

> *sthitvāpravṛttisaṃsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu /*
> *iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte saṃśayo 'thavā // 10 //*
> "In [the case of the logical reasons put forward by the opponents] such as 'activity after a rest', 'having a specific configuration', and 'accomplishment of a purpose' [there obtain the logical faults that they are] proving what is already accepted [by us], or [that the probandum] is not established in the example, or [that there remains] doubt [regarding the *hetus*]."

The arguments referred to in this verse are, as Kamalaśīla informs us, those of Aviddhakarṇa and Uddyotakara.[6] In order to provide the context we may have a look at the proof of the existence of God as put forward by Aviddhakarṇa:

> [*atrāviddhakarṇopanyastam īśvarasādhane pramāṇadvayam . . . tad uktam*] *dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam, svārambhakāvayava-* ***sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt,***[7] *ghaṭādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti* TSP 52,16–18.
> "That which is to be grasped and not to be grasped by two sense organs and which is subject of [our] dispute presupposes a conscious cause, because it has a specific configuration of its parts which cling together [in order to constitute the universe], like a pot, etc. The atoms [serve] as dissimilar example."

Without going into the details of the complicated formulation of the *pakṣa*, an explanation of which is given by Kamalaśīla, we now come back to Dharmakīrti in order to see why these proofs should be afflicted by these logical faults which are not at all self-evident and which we may expect to learn from the following verses. In the next verse Dharmakīrti states that an inference is based on a necessary connection between the probans and the probandum and formulates this

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[5] As a critical edition of the following verses of PV II is included in my study on Śaṅkaranandana's *Īśvarāpakāraṇasaṅkṣepa* (to be published in 1999), I refrain here from text critical remarks.

[6] On *sthitvāpravṛtti* cf. TSP 54,14–16: *uddyotakaras tu pramāṇayati—bhuvanahetavaḥ pradhānaparamāṇvadṛṣṭāḥ svakāryotpattāv atiśayabuddhimantam adhiṣṭhātāram apekṣante, sthitvāpravṛtteḥ, tantuturyādivad iti.* Kamalaśīla here probably is referring to *pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante, acetanatvāt, vāsyādivad iti. yathā vāsyādi buddhimatā takṣṇā adhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi acetanāni pravartante. tasmāt tāny api buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitānīti* NV 945,12–16 ("Primordial matter, the atoms, and the *karman* become active [only] insofar as before their activity they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc. An ax, for example, becomes active when it is governed by a conscious carpenter. For it is insentient. Primordial matter, the atoms, and the *karman* which are insentient become active in the same way. Therefore, they too are governed by a conscious cause.") *arthakriyā* is not reported by Kamalaśīla to refer to an argument held by Uddyotakara, but in his *Nyāyavārttika* we can find a similar proof: *buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni svāsu dhāraṇādikriyāsu mahābhūtāni vāyvantāni pravartante, acetanatvāt, vāsyādivat* NV 957,9–11 ("The elements terminated by 'air' [i.e. excluding *ākāśa*] become active regarding their activities such as holding when they are governed by a conscious cause. For they are insentient, like an ax, etc.")

[7] Instead of the term *sanniveśaviśiṣṭa* ascribed to Aviddhakarṇa, Dharmakīrti uses the formulation *saṃsthānaviśeṣa* which already is to be found in Uddyotakara (NV 959,10ff. on NS 4.1.22).

general theorem by referring to Aviddhakarṇa's reason alluded to in the previous statement:

siddhaṃ yādṛg adhiṣṭhātṛbhāvābhāvānuvṛttimat /
sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumīyate // 11 //
"[That kind of governor] which is inferred from such a configuration, etc., of which it is established that it follows the presence and absence of a [certain] governor, is correct."

Here he is saying, in other words, that a *hetu* is correct and may be applied when the necessary conditions of positive and negative concomitance, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, are satisfied. However, as he goes on, an incorrect *hetu*, which is similar to the correct, established one only inasmuch as one and the same word may be applied to both of them, does not bring about a valid inference. This would be like the inference of fire from snow on account of the snow being white, like smoke.

vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyād abhedinaḥ /
na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravyād iva hutāśane // 12 //
"It is not correct to infer something that is generally known [as occurring] in the case [of the presence] of one real entity (*vastubhede*) on account of [a reason] that is not different [from that entity] [only] due to the sameness of a word [applied to both of them]. [This would be] like [the inference] of fire on account of a white substance."

When we apply this critique to Aviddhakarṇa's proof, it means that the reason *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt* is not a property of the *pakṣa* to be proven. For the property *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva* which belongs to the pot where the pervasion (*vyāpti*) has been established, and the property *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva* belonging to the *sādhyadharmin* are two completely different things, even if the same word is applied to them. If the opponent nevertheless insists on this kind of procedure, he is ridiculed. The opponent would then have to accept a termite hill as being produced by a potter like a pot, for both of them are modifications of clay:

anyathā kumbhakāreṇa mṛdvikārasya kasyacit /
ghaṭādeḥ karaṇāt sidhyed valmīkasyāpi tatkṛtiḥ // 13 //
"Otherwise it would be established that a termite hill is also a product of this [potter], because a certain modification of clay such as a pot is produced by that potter."

In the next verse Dharmakīrti objects that his criticism could be misunderstood to constitute a false objection, *jāti* or *dūṣaṇābhāsa*, called *kāryasama*, 'similar to the effect' or 'balancing the effect' (Tucci).[8]

sādhyenānugamāt kārye sāmānyenāpi sādhane /
sambandhibhedād bhedoktidoṣaḥ kāryasamo mataḥ // 14 //
"[And our criticism does not constitute the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* called *kāryasama*, for] the fallacy that is assumed as *kāryasama* consists in pronouncing a difference [between the effect which serves as *hetu* and the effect known in the example] [only] because of a difference of the related terms [i.e.

[8] *kāryasama* is defined by Dignāga in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* VI v. 7 and in *Nyāyamukha*, Taishō vol. 32, 5b (translated in Giuseppe Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga* (Heidelberg, 1930), 60).

sādhyadharmin and *dṛṣṭāntadharmin*] when an effect is a probans also in general because it is accompanied by the probandum [in general]."

In verse 15 Dharmakīrti repeats what he had formulated in verse 12 with regard to a real entity (*vastu*), but relates his statement to general concepts (*jāti*) by which he means notions such as 'effect' (*kārya*) or 'configuration' (*saṃsthāna*) or that of any other universal. By the last verse dealing with the refutation of the opponents' proofs for the existence of God, he expresses the view that things are not established by the mere utterance of the words denoting them.

jātyantare prasiddhasya śabdasāmānyadarśanāt /
na yuktaṃ sādhanaṃ gotvād vāgādīnāṃ viṣāṇivat // 15 //
"[However] a proof of something that is generally known [to occur] in the case [of the presence of the property consisting of] a certain general concept on account of knowing (*darśana*) a universal consisting of a word [applied to both of them] is not correct. [This is] like [proving] that speech and so on have horns on account of [their having the property consisting of the general concept of] the *gotva* [because the word *go* denotes, besides other things, 'cow' as well as 'speech']."

vivakṣāparatantratvān na śabdāḥ santi kutra vā /
tadbhāvād arthasiddhau tu sarvaṃ sarvasya sidhyati // 16 //
"Or, since [words] depend on [the speaker's] intention, is there any [object] for which there are no words? [However] if objects were established by the [mere] presence of that [word applied to them], everything would be established for everybody."

Now, if we consider these verses again, we may say that nos. 11–16 are more or less self-evident and can be understood without difficulty. This also applies to verse 14, the definition of the *kāryasama dūṣaṇābhāsa,* although at first glance it does not look that obvious. For this is nothing but a reformulation of the definition as given by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* VI v. 7. These verses do not, however, constitute an explanation of verse 10 as one would have expected. The logical fault addressed in verse 12, for example, is, as one can easily see, that the *hetu* is not established (*asiddha*). This classification also obtains for verse 15. And this is the exact way that Dharmakīrti himself classifies this fallacy of the reason addressed here, for he had incorporated vv. 11–16 into the third chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (vv. 70–75)[9] under the heading of the *hetvābhāsa* called *asiddha.* Thus it is quite obvious that vv. 11–16 are not intended by Dharmakīrti as a comment on verse 10 but as an additional criticism. However, why the proofs of the opponents constitute the fallacies of proving what is already established for the Buddhists (*iṣṭasiddhi*) and of the probandum's being unestablished in the example (*asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte*), etc., still remains unclear.

As it is unlikely that Dharmakīrti would accuse his opponents of using incorrect arguments without discussing them and without showing why these fallacies should obtain, we may assume that this has been formulated elsewhere either by himself or by somebody else and that here in

[9] Derge Tshad ma Vol. 14, No. 4227 Tshe [1–178a3]: 128a5–129b1 = Peking Vol. 137, No. 5727 We [1–209b3]: 150a7–151b6. For a Japanese translation and explanation of these verses, cf. Motoi Ono, "Pramāṇaviniścaya ni okeru shusaishin sonzai ronshō hihan" [Critique of the proof for the existence of God in the Pramāṇaviniścaya], *Hikaku Shisō no Michi* 5, 1986: 65–71.

the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter he presupposes that explanation. But such an explanation is, at least to my knowledge, not to be found in any of Dharmakīrti's works. However, help in understanding that verse may be obtained from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika.*

In *Ślokavārttika,* Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 74–82ab, Kumārila considers the argument of Aviddhakarṇa, reformulating it at the beginning of this section in the following way:

sanniveśaviśiṣṭānām utpattiṃ yo gṛhādivat /
sādhayec cetanādhiṣṭhāṃ[10] *dehānāṃ tasya cottaram* // 74 //
"Now (*ca*), the [following is our] answer to the one who wishes to establish that the creation (*utpatti*) of bodies specific in configuration must be governed by a conscious being (*cetanādhiṣṭā*), like [the creation of] houses, etc."[11]

In the first part of his answer, in vv. 75 and 76ab, Kumārila argues that this proof is not valid because it proves what is already established for the Mīmāṃsaka:

kasyacid dhetumātratvaṃ[12] *yady adhiṣṭhātṛteṣyate*[13] /
karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānāṃ[14] *tatsiddheḥ siddhasādhanam* // 75 //[15]
"If [you] assume that to govern something means no more than to be its cause, then [you] prove what already is established [for us]. For that [fact of being no more than cause] is constituted (*tatsiddhi*) by the [past] actions (*karma*) of all beings."

icchāpūrvakapakṣe 'pi, tatpūrvatvena karmaṇām / 76ab //
"[The same defect disqualifies you] even if [you take] the alternative [and claim] that [to govern something means] presupposing the will [of that governor]. For the actions [themselves] presuppose that [will]."

In the second half of v. 76 Kumārila shows that the proving property would not occur in the example if this governing agency (*adhiṣṭhātṛtā*) were understood in such a way that things come into existence immediately after he had wished it.

icchānantarasiddhis tu dṛṣṭānte 'pi na vidyate // 76cd //
"[You may assume that to govern something means] to come into existence (*siddhi*) immediately after that will. But (*tu*) this is not to be found in any example."

Verse 77 expresses the idea that the body of God could be taken as a counter-example, for his body possesses the proving property, namely *utpatti* and being specific in configuration, but the property to be proven, i.e. being governed by a conscious being, is not to be found. For the opponent does not assume that for its creation God's body requires yet another conscious being: this would lead to an infinite regression. As the *hetu* thus occurs where the property to be proven

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[10] *cetanādhiṣṭhāṃ* ŚV : *cetanādhiṣṭhā* Kā saṃ [cf. ŚV 467[2]]

[11] I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Alexis Sanderson, Oxford, for kindly providing his translation of ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vv. 42c–114b.

[12] °*mātratvaṃ* ŚV : °*mātrasya* NBhūṣ, Vyom

[13] *adhiṣṭhātṛteṣyate* ŚV : *adhiṣṭhātṛtocyate* NBhūṣ, Vyom

[14] *sarvajīvānāṃ* ŚV, NBhūṣ, NM : *sarvabījānāṃ* Vyom

[15] v. 75 quoted in NBhūṣ 448,11f.; Vyom 103,20f.; v. 75cd quoted in NM 510,11

is available as well as where this is not the case, it would be inconclusive, *anekānta.*

anekāntaś ca hetus te taccharīrādinā bhavet /
utpattimāṃś ca taddeho dehatvād asmadādivat // 77 //
"Moreover, your reason would be inconclusive because of his body, etc. And [you cannot deny that] his body had an origin, because it is a body, like ours."

If, as formulated in the next verse, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in order to avoid this fault, argues that his body does not serve as a counter-example (*vipakṣa*), for his body, too, is governed by God himself, then it follows that God, in order to create his body, would have to be a governor without a body, like any other liberated soul. To govern without having a body, however, is not possible.

atha tasyāpy adhiṣṭhānam tenaivety avipakṣatā /
aśarīro hy adhiṣṭhātā nāsau[16] *muktātmavad bhavet // 78 //*
"If [the opponent claims] that [God's body] is not a counter-example, for that [body] too, is governed by this [God] himself, [we answer that this assumption is] not [possible]. For he would have to be a governor without a body, like [any other] liberated soul."

Verse 79 shows another case where the example lacks the proving property. This fault would obtain, Kumārila argues, if one assumes pots, for example, to be governed by God. For this has not been seen by anyone. If, on the other hand, one assumes that pots are governed by potters, then the undesired consequence follows that they could not be governed by God.

kumbhakārādyadhiṣṭhānam ghaṭādau yadi ceṣyate[17] */*
neśvarādhiṣṭhitatvam syād, asti cet sādhyahīnatā // 79 //[18]
"Moreover, if you hold that in case of the pot and so on the governing agency (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is that of the potter, etc., then [pots, etc.] would not be governed by God. If [on the other hand] [they] are [governed by God himself], then [the example] is lacking the property to be proven."

Aviddhakarṇa's reason is not only considered to be inconclusive (*anekānta*), but also to prove the opposite of what it is intended to do. For if the example is understood to exhibit the property to be proven, then it would follow that the atoms are governed by human beings which are neither God nor eternal. Thus the reason would be contradictory.

yathāsiddhe ca dṛṣṭānte bhaved dhetor viruddhatā /[19]
anīśvaravināśyādikartṛmattvam prasajyate // 80 //
"And if [you understand] the example as it is normally understood (*yathāsiddha*), then the reason would be contradictory. [For] it would follow that [the subject to be proven] would have a creator who is a non-God and perishable (*vināśin*)."

As a final refutation of Aviddhakarṇa's proof Kumārila adds that if, unlike the creation of a pot by a potter, God creates the world without having a body by his mere will, then the atoms

[16] *nāsau* 1 Pu [cf. ŚV 468[1]] : *nātmā* ŚV
[17] *ceṣyate* ŚV, NBhūṣ : *veṣyate* ĪS
[18] v. 79 quoted in ĪS 6,4–5; NBhūṣ 449,11–12
[19] v. 80ab quoted in ĪS 6,6; NBhūṣ 449,13

could not obey to his will, for they are unconscious by nature.

kulālavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate[20] /
acetanaḥ katham bhāvas tadicchām anurudhyate[21] // 81 //[22]
"And if his activity is not held [to be of the same kind] as that of a potter, how could an entity that is insentient (*acetana*) [like an atom] obey [this] will of his?"

tasmān na paramāṇvāder ārambhaḥ syāt tadicchayā // 82ab //
"Therefore, the atoms do not cling together [in order to constitute the world] due to his [mere] will."

In this small section of the *Ślokavārttika* we have seen so far that the fallacies of *iṣṭasiddhiḥ, asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte*, and *saṃśayo 'thavā* referred to by Dharmakīrti in PV II 10 are explained here *in extenso* in verses 75–76ab, 76cd and 79, and 77–78 respectively. Thus, these verses could be a candidate for what Dharmakīrti may have had in mind when he accused the opponents' proofs of containing the fallacies just mentioned. In order to see whether Kumārila's critique is also acceptable for a Buddhist, we should have a look at how Dharmakīrti is explained by his commentators.

The fault of *siddhasādhana* as explicated in ŚV 75 obtains, because, under the condition that 'the being mere cause' (*hetumātratva*) is intended to be the *sādhya*, this fact of being the mere cause is constituted by the actions of all living beings. And this is the very way in which this fallacy is expounded by Dharmakīrti's commentators. For the sake of convenience I do not follow one commentary only, but quote those passages where the correspondence with Kumārila's ideas finds its most clear and succinct expression. In this case we will have a look at Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*:

... ***iṣṭasyaiva siddhiḥ*** *siddhasādhanaṃ.* ... *karmalakṣaṇacetanādhiṣṭhitaṃ ca sakalam iṣyate.* PVA 35,29f
"... **'proving what already is accepted [by us]'** means 'proving what already is established [for us]'. ... And we assume that everything is governed by volition (*cetanā*) which is defined as *karman*."

In this context the commentators normally quote *Abhidharmakośa* IV 1ab, which says that "the variety of the world arises from action. And this [action] is volition and that which is produced through volition."[23] Here there is no doubt that the argument as formulated by Kumārila and the one adopted by Prajñākaragupta are the same. One could now assume, however, that Dharmakīrti was thinking of this passage from the *Abhidharmakośa* alone. But this does not seem very likely to me. For he could not expect an opponent to understand and react to such an accusation that his proof when understood in a general way contains the fault of *iṣṭasiddhi* because of that statement in the *Abhidharmakośa* alone.

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[20] *kalpyate* 3 Pu [cf. ŚV 469[2]], NM, NBhūṣ : *kalpate* ŚV
[21] *anurudhyate* ŚV, NBhūṣ : *anuvartate* NM
[22] v. 81 quoted in NM 508,8–9; NBhūṣ 453,14–15
[23] *karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam. cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat. Abhidharmakośa* IV 1ab

Be this as it may be. The next fault, namely *asiddhir vā dṛṣṭānte*, which, according to ŚV 79, obtains when the opponent wishes to prove that things are governed by a specific conscious being, namely God, is explained in the very same manner, for example, by Devendrabuddhi having Uddyotakara's proof in mind:

> *ci ste de las gzhan pa'i phan 'dogs par byed pa la ltos pa med pa'i skyes bu gcig gi khyad par gyi blos byin gyis brlabs pa sngon du song ba can nyid sgrub pa de'i tshe /* ***dpe ma grub*** *pa yin te / dpe bsgrub par bya bas stong pa zhes bya ba'i don to //* PVP D 8b4f, P 9b5f
> "If [the opponent] wishes to prove that [things] presuppose the governance of the mind of a specific, single *puruṣa* that is independent of subsidiary causes (*upakāraka*) different from him, then [the probandum] **is not established in the example**. That means that the example is lacking the property to be proven."

The last fault addressed by Dharmakīrti, *saṃśayo 'thavā,* may correspond to ŚV 77–78, where Kumārila explains that the *hetu* brought forward by the opponent is inconclusive (*anekānta*) because of the body of God which is not governed by another sentient being. This defect is illustrated by Devendrabuddhi, who—as was the case with the previous one—considers Uddyotakara's proof in the following way:

> *sdod nas 'jug pa'i phyir dang / don byed par nus pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs 'di dag ni /* ***yang na the tshom za ba yin te*** / (v. 10d) *de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu de nyid kyis ma nges pa yang yin no // de lta bu'i rnam pa can gyi skyes bu gzhan gyis phyin gyis brlabs pa de ni sdod cing / sdod nas lus la sogs pa dag la 'jug par byed na / thug pa med pa thal bar 'gyur pa'i phyir ro //* PVP D 8b7–9a1; P 9b8–10a2
> "**Or there [remains] doubt** regarding the logical reasons [such as] 'because [they] act after a rest' and 'because [they] are capable of accomplishing a purpose'. This means that [these *hetu*s] are also inconclusive (*ma nges pa, anaikāntika*) because of that very *puruṣa* [i.e. God] which is of such a kind [as you assume]. For if he [i.e. God] becomes active regarding such [things as his and others'] bodies by being governed by another *puruṣa* of that kind, then an infinite regression (*anavasthā*) follows . . ."

Because from the above examination it is quite obvious that all of these fallacies alluded to by Dharmakīrti are illustrated by his commentators in the very same way as they have been demonstrated by Kumārila and because PV II 10 could not have been understood at that time in a proper context without knowledge of the critique as formulated in the *Ślokavārttika*, we safely may conclude that Dharmakīrti was aware of the criticism by Kumārila when he set out to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' proofs for the existence of God.

The fact that Dharmakīrti did not include the *hetu*'s being contradictory (*viruddha*) or the statement that the atoms, being insentient, could not obey God's will, may be explained in such a way that he considered it to be enough to refer to that passage in the *Ślokavārttika* by mentioning some of the faults shown there, and that he felt no need to repeat all of them. What is noteworthy in this connection is that Dharmakīrti's commentators did not refer to these fallacies either.[24]

[24] It is only Śāntarakṣita in TS 74 and Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* who consider the *hetu*s to be also *viruddha.*

Abbreviations

ĪS	*Īśvarasiddhi* (Utpaladeva): Madusudan Kaul Shastri, ed. *The Siddhitrayi and the Pratyabhijna-karika-vritti of Rajanaka Utpala Deva.* Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 34. Srinagar, 1921.
NBhūṣ	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vāraṇasī, 1968.
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī* (Jayantabhaṭṭa): K. S. Varadacharya, ed. *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇī—Nyāyasaurabha by the editor.* Vol. 1. Mysore, 1969.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): *Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā-sahitam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭikā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti.* Vol. 1. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calcutta, 1944. Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.
PV II	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Pramāṇasiddhi): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 2–41. [Chapter 1 in Miyasaka's edition.]
PVA	*Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
PVP	*Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4217 (Tshad ma, vol. 2, Che 1b1–326b4), P 5717(b) (vol. 130, Che 1–390a8).
ŚV	Ślokavārttika (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa): Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, ed. *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.
TS	*Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Swāmi Dvarikadas Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla.* 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi, 1981–82.
TSP	*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.
Vyom	*Vyomavatī* (Vyomaśiva): Gaurinath Sastri, ed. *Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya.* Vol. 1. Varanasi, 1983.

BHEDA AND *VIRODHA*

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0. Introduction

Although a large number of studies have hitherto referred to the concept of 'incompatibility' (*virodha*) in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, it is in recent years that several articles have been devoted to the study of its definition given by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660).[1] He defines two kinds of incompatibility, i.e., 'impossibility of co-existence' (*sahānavasthāna*) and "having the property established by mutual exclusion" (*parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*).[2] The former occurs between two opposed facts, e.g. , the sensation of cold (*śītasparśa*) and the sensation of heat (*uṣṇasparśa*). On the other hand, the latter stands between a property or concept and its negation, e.g., the concept of being eternal (*nityatva*) and the concept of being non-eternal (*anityatva*). When we take account of the fact that incompatibility is one of the fundamental concepts in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, it seems reasonable to suppose that Dharmakīrti's definitions played a vital role ever after.

This would also be true of Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030), who often mentions these definitions in one of his main works, the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* (KA). In several contexts these definitions are discussed and fundamentally accord with what Dharmakīrti intended. Arguing about the causality between momentary existents, however, Jñānaśrīmitra gives a certain aspect to the definitions, although it is still based on the discussions of Dharmakīrti. This aspect generalizes two definitions and is explicitly stated in his argument against Trilocana.[3]

In this paper I would like to inquire into the process of this argument and examine some problems around the concept of incompatibility, especially *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*, in Buddhist causal theory. In the following, first I deal with Trilocana's criticism and point out

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[1] Cf. Bandhyopadhyay [1988: 229ff.]; Steinkellner [1991: 316 n. 32]; Kellner [1997]; Kyuma [1997].

[2] Cf. NB III 72–75. These two are also mentioned in PVSV 5,13–15 and PVin II 13,3–7. As for *paraspara-parihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*, there is a variant, i.e., *-sthiti-*, which is also often found in later Buddhist works. It is true that Dharmakīrti uses the synonymous term *anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthitilakṣaṇatā* in PVSV, but this *-sthiti-* is problematic, because Karṇakagomin commentates this word as *-sthita-*. Cf. PVSVṬ 36,17–19: *anyonyopalabdhiḥ parasparapratipattis tasyāḥ parihāro vivekas tena sthitaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ svarūpaṃ yayos tau tathoktau* / In this paper I adopt *-sthita-* for the reason that Dharmakīrti explicitly defines it as *-sthita-* in NB III 75. Concerning the separation of the compound, I followed Dharmottara's commentary. Cf. NBṬ 203,9–10: *parasparasya parihāraḥ parityāgas tena sthitaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ rūpaṃ yayos tadbhāvaḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā tayā* /

[3] Trilocana is considered as the guru of Vācaspatimiśra and as the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* which is not the same as that of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Cf. the introduction to JNA (20). As for the chronology of Trilocana and his disciple Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Kanazawa [1987]. There are four hypotheses on the chronology of Vācaspatimiśra, i.e., 1) ca. 976, 2) ca. 841, 3) ca. 890–984, 4) ca. 820–900. At present 1) is widely accepted.

the possibility that he aimed at driving Buddhist causal theory to a kind of self-contradiction by taking advantage of Buddhist terms related to *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*. Next I turn to Jñānaśrīmitra's counterargument and analyse his view of incompatibility, considering the reason why he had to add a generalized aspect to Dharmakīrti's two definitions.

1. Trilocana's criticism of the causality between momentary existents

Before discussing Trilocana's criticism in detail, it would be suitable to outline the content of KA and its second chapter where Trilocana's criticism is quoted. In a verse placed at the beginning of KA, Jñānaśrīmitra gives the following proof:

> "Whatever is existent is momentary; just like a cloud;
> these (things around us) are existent. (Therefore, these are momentary.)"[4]

All discussions in the four chapters of KA (*pakṣadharmatādhikāra*,[5] *anvayādhikāra*, *vyatirekādhikāra*, and *ahetukavināśādhikāra*) center around this proof. Out of the four chapters, the second chapter deals with the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) of this proof and the following point comes into question: how can causality be possible between momentary things? With regard to this problem, various kinds of criticism attributed to *Naiyāyika* authors are quoted and refuted by Jñānaśrīmitra. Among the arguments, he goes into detail especially about the causality between many causes and one effect and between one cause and many effects.

Trilocana's criticism is concerned with the latter and is as follows:

> "It is also possible to point out by Mādhyamika's logic that existence (*sattva*) (as logical reason in the above-mentioned proof) is the specific (indeterminate) (*asādhāraṇa*). Namely, in the doctrine of momentariness too, if a preceding colour (or shape) as momentary thing (*pūrvarūpakṣaṇa*) produces the following momentary thing by a certain essence (*svabhāva*),[6] does it also produce a taste as momentary thing (*rasakṣaṇa*) by the same (essence) or by another? If (it were to produce it) by the same, it would follow that taste also is colour (or shape). (But) indeed, we don't see any difference in the effects (produced) from a cause which has the same essence, because, (if so,) it would follow that all things have no cause. In case (a colour or shape as momentary thing) makes (a taste as momentary thing) by another, two incompatible (*viruddha*) essences would attach to one (thing), for the essence of producing a colour (or shape) does not deviate from the absence of the essence of producing a taste (*rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārin*). If another essence were to exist in that (one thing), its existence and non-existence would exist in the same (thing), and the existence and non-existence divide the preceding colour (or shape) as momentary thing. But, (in fact), it is not seen to be divided."[7]

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[4] JNA 1,8: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṃ yathā jaladharaḥ santaś ca* (: *tu*) *bhāvā ime.* The editor's reading *tu* is based on manuscript '*a*', but the reading *ca* is supported by SDS 26,4; SVR 747,9; and the copy of manuscript '*ā*' in Vienna.

[5] In JNA this chapter is entitled *pakṣadharmādhikāra*, but I corrected it on the basis of manuscripts '*a*' and '*ā*' in Vienna.

[6] Here I provisionally translate *svabhāva* not with 'essential property' but with 'essence', because it is not clear in this passage whether Trilocana accepts the two levels of *svabhāva* in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, i.e., *svabhāva* related to reality and to conceptual analysis.

[7] JNA 36,4–11: *asādhāraṇam api sattvaṃ mādhyamikanyāyena śakyam udbhāvayitum / tathā hi, kṣaṇavāde 'pi pūrvarūpakṣaṇo yena [sva]bhāvenānantarakṣaṇam utpādayati, kiṃ tenaiva rasakṣaṇam apy āhosvit svabhāvāntareṇa?*

Here Trilocana criticizes one of the causal theories in Buddhism that a *kṣaṇa* such as *rūpakṣaṇa* produces both the following *rūpakṣaṇa* and another *kṣaṇa* such as *rasakṣaṇa*.[8] The two alternatives (*vikalpa*) he brings forth are, as Trilocana stated, also found in the works of Mādhyamika authors.[9] What has to be noticed in this passage is the second alternative, whose logic resolves itself into the following two ideas. Firstly, according to Trilocana, if a *kṣaṇa* as cause were to produce two effects, it would have two incompatible essences, because the essence of producing one effect does not deviate from the absence of the essence of producing the other effect. Secondly, he insists that two incompatible essences would divide its substratum. I would like to assume from the following reasons that these two ideas originate in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition itself and that Trilocana tried to point out a self-contradiction in Buddhist causal theory.

As for the first one, i.e. , the concept of deviation, it is possible to build up the following hypothesis. Arguing against Trilocana, Jñānaśrīmitra uses the term 'non-deviating from the absence of each other' (*parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra*), by which he means the concept of deviation in Trilocana's criticism.[10] And Ratnakīrti (ca. 1000–1050), who paraphrased this argument in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi anvayātmikā*, uses the term *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra*.[11] The term

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yadi tenaiva, rasasyāpi rūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ / na hy ekasvabhāvāt kāraṇāt kāryabhedaṃ paśyāmaḥ, viśvasyāhetukaprasaṅgāt / atha svabhāvāntareṇa karoti? yady evam ekasya viruddhaṃ, svabhāvadvayaṃ prasajyeta / rūpajananasvabhāvo hi rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārī (: rasajananasvabhāvān nāvyabhicārī) */ tatra yadi svabhāvāntaraṃ bhavet, bhavet tatraiva tasya bhāvo 'bhāvaś ca / bhāvābhāvau ca sākṣādviruddhau pūrvakaṃ rūpakṣaṇaṃ bhintaḥ / na ca bhinno dṛśyate saḥ /* (Question marks, commas, and hyphens in JNA are added by the editor himself. In my translations I didn't follow some of them.)

[sva] is supplemented by the editor himself. Since this '*sva*' is found in Ratnakīrti's paraphrase, I followed the editor. Cf. footnote 11. The reading of the underlined part is based on the manuscript '*a*' The copy of the manuscript '*a*' in Vienna, however, offers the possibility that this part reads *rasajananasvabhāvābha(bhā?)vāvyabhicārī*. The copy of the manuscript '*ā*' in Vienna offers the reading *rasajananasvabhāvāvyabhicārīti*, but it makes no sense in the context. In the above-mentioned translation I followed the reading *rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārī*, from the reason shown in footnote 17.

[8] This theory corresponds to *sahabhūhetu* in the Abhidharmic theory of causation.

Cf. AKBh 52,24–53,1 (ad II 22): *sarvasūkṣmo hi rūpasaṃghātaḥ paramāṇur ity ucyate / yato nānyataro vijñāyeta / sa kāmadhātāv aśabdako 'nindriyaś cāṣṭadravyaka utpadyate nānyatamena hīnaḥ / aṣṭo dravyāni catvāri mahābhūtāni catvāri copādāyarūpāṇi rūpagandharasaspraṣṭavyāni /* Dharmakīrti also refers to this theory. Cf. PVSV 7,14–15 (v. 9): *ekasāmagryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ / hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat //*; PV II 182: *tat tasya kāraṇaṃ prāhus tat teṣām api vidyate / sparśasya rūpahetutvād darśane 'sti nimittatā //*

[9] We should notice that Mādhyamika authors, such as Jñānagarbha (ca. 700–760) and so on, also criticized the causality between momentary things. In their criticisms the following tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) are brought forth; 1) the causality between one cause and many effects, 2) the causality between many causes and one effect, 3) the causality between many causes and many effects, 4) the causality between one cause and one effect. Cf. Moriyama [1988: (123), 12ff.]. Mādhyamika authors also use two alternatives, such as *yena svabhāvena* (or *atiśayena*) . . . *tena* . . . and *svabhāvāntareṇa* (*atiśayāntareṇa*) . . . , although the concepts of *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra* and *viruddhadharmādhyāsa* are lacking in them.

[10] Cf. JNA 38,17–19: *tad evaṃ rūpajananarasajananayoḥ* ***parasparābhāvāvyabhicāre*** *'pi kṛtakatvānityatvavad bhedamātraṃ śabdapramāṇāntarākarṣi, na tu virodha iti sthitaṃ /*; JNA 38,22–23: *na ca mayedam aṅgīkṛtaṃ* ***parasparābhāvāvyabhicāramātreṇa*** *virodha ekatrānavasthānahetur iti /*

[11] Cf. RNA 77,24–78,1: *tathā hi bījam aṅkurādikaṃ kurvad yadi yenaiva svabhāvenāṅkurādikaṃ karoti tenaiva kṣityādikaṃ tadā kṣityādīnām apy aṅkurasvābhāvyāpattiḥ / nānāsvabhāvatvena tu kārakatve svabhāvānām* ***anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritvād*** *ekatra bhāvābhāvau parasparaviruddhau syātām ity ekam api bījaṃ bhidyeta / evaṃ pradīpo 'pi tailakṣayavarttidāhādikam / tathā pūrvarūpam apy uttararūparasagandhādikam anekaiḥ* (: *anaikaiḥ*)

anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra itself traces back to Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBṬ), where Dharmottara refers to it as incompatibility.[12] Concerning this point, as shown above, Trilocana also shares the same view. From these facts it seems possible to assume that Trilocana knew NBṬ and that Trilocana turned it to his own advantage.[13] Even if Trilocana did not know NBṬ, we can safely say that Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti interpreted the concept of deviation used by Trilocana as the terms *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra* or *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra*, which are also mentioned in NBṬ. On the interpretation of this term, however, opinions are divided between Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra. This is a question to be considered later.

Concerning the second idea, Ratnakīrti, in his paraphrase, puts it into the term 'attribution of incompatible property' (*viruddhadharmādhyāsa*).[14] Its definition has its origin in Dharmakīrti.

> "Indeed, this very (numeral) difference of things, or the cause of the (numeral) difference, is the attribution of incompatible property and the difference of cause."[15]

Obviously the sense of this sentence is in accordance with what Trilocana meant. Furthermore, Vācaspatimiśra, his disciple, directly quotes this passage in the similar context.[16] It suggests the possibility that Trilocana also knew the passage and used it in his criticism. At least, it is clear that Ratnakīrti, and Jñānaśrīmitra too, related Trilocana's criticism to the problem of *viruddhadharmādhyāsa*.

From what has been said above, we can point out the possibility that Trilocana's criticism attempted to lead Buddhist causal theory to a self-contradiction, and the fact that Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti interpreted Trilocana's criticism as such an attempt.

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svabhāvaiḥ parikalitaṃ karoti / teṣāṃ ca svabhāvānām ***anyonyābhāvāvyabhicārād*** (:*anyo 'nyābhāvāvyābhicārād*) *viruddhānāṃ yoge pradīpādikaṃ bhidyeta / na ca bhidyate / tan na* ***viruddhadharmādhyāso*** *bhedakaḥ /*

[12] Cf. NBṬ 203,14: *nīlāt tu yad anyad rūpaṃ tad nīlābhāvāvyabhicāri /*; NBṬ 204,2–3: *tathā ca bhāvabhāvayoḥ sākṣādvirodhaḥ, vastunos tv anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritvād virodhaḥ /* (The comma is added by the editor.)

[13] Assuming it to be true, Trilocana must be contemporary with Dharmottara, who is considered to have lived from the middle of the 8th century A.D. to the beginning of the 9th century A.D., or he must be later than Dharmottara. This assumption seems to be compatible with each hypothesis on the chronology of Vācaspatimiśra. Cf. footnote 3, above.

[14] Cf. footnote 11. Jñānaśrīmitra also refers to this term more than once. Cf. JNA 21,21–24: *kṣaṇikatvavādinā hi śaktāśaktasvabhāvatayā viruddhadharmādhyāsād bhedam āropayatā yādṛśī śaktir aśaktiś ca vivakṣitā tatpratividhānam ācaritum ucitam asya /*; JNA 22,19–20: *evaṃ hi viruddhadharmādhyāsād bhedo 'py asiddha ity api bruvāṇaḥ kathaṃ vāryate*?; JNA 39,11–12: *śāstre 'pi hi viruddhadharmādhyāso bheda ukto, na virodhaḥ / viruddhadharmādhyāsa* in the third case is meant to be *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra*, which Trilocana regarded as *virodha*, not in its proper sense, but for the purpose of ridiculing Trilocana's criticism.

[15] Cf. PVSV 20,21–22: *ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca /*; PVin II 37*,2–4: *dngos po rnams kyi tha dad pa'am rgyu tha dad pa ni 'di kho na yin te / chos 'gal bar gnas pa'am rgyu tha dad pa'o //*

[16] Cf. NK 526,11–527,2: *na khalu kāraṇābhede bhedavat kāryaṃ bhavitum arhati kāryabhedasyākasmikatvaprasaṅgāt / yad āha ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā yad* (!) *viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ceti /*; this passage is quoted in JNA 49,20–24: *na khalu kāraṇābhede bhedavat kāryaṃ bhavitum arhati, kāryabhedasyākasmikatvaprasaṅgāt / yad āha, ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā yad uta* (!) *viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ, kāraṇabhedaś ceti /* A quite parallel passage is found in NVTṬ. Cf. NVTṬ 841,25–26: *na khalu bhavatāṃ kāraṇābhede bhedavat kāryaṃ bhavitum arhati kāryabhedasyākasmikatvaprasaṅgāt / yathoktaṃ bhavadbhir eva—ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā yad viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ceti /* Interestingly enough, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Bhāsarvajña also knew this passage of Dharmakīrti. The former makes use of it in his criticisms of Buddhist *kṣaṇikatva* theory and

2. Jñānaśrīmitra's view of incompatibility

Having observed Trilocana's criticism, let us turn to Jñānaśrīmitra's counterargument and investigate his view of incompatibility. As to the concept of deviation Trilocana brought up, he states as follows:

> "On the other hand, it is said (by Trilocana) that the essential property (*svabhāva*) of producing a colour (or shape) does not deviate from the absence of the essential property of producing a taste (*rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārin*). (We respond that) by such a thing too, only difference is established, but incompatibility is not (established), just like something created and something non-eternal (whose properties are only different)."[17]

We should treat the above-mentioned *svabhāva* as a conceptual property, since Jñānaśrīmitra mentions the relation between *kṛtakatva* and *anityatva* or the relation between *rūpajanakatva* and *rasajanakatva*. Therefore, the incompatibility which comes into question in this case is *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*. Here Jñānaśrīmitra distinguishes *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra* or *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra* from the incompatibility, by asserting that it is nothing but a difference. As a result, he rejects Dharmottara's view that *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritva* is also incompatibility.[18] His definition of incompatibility is as follows:

> "On the other hand, even if incompatibility is the restriction on two things which cannot co-exist in the same substratum, in one case, it is based on the fact that the one, out of two things, vanishes when the other exists, just like a fire and a piece of ice. In the other case, it is based on the fact that the one, out of two properties, does not exist (in a substratum) only by the nature (of them) when the other exists, just like existence and non-existence, or the concept of being blue and the concept of being non-blue."[19]

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the latter quotes it in his counterargument on Buddhist *pramāṇaphala* theory. Cf. NM II 319,3–4: *viruddhadharmayoge 'pi yadi caikatvam iṣyate / anekakṣaṇayoge 'pi bhāva eka upeyatām //*; NBhūṣ 5,2–5: *tathā ca dharmakīrtinaivoktam ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ yad viruddha-dharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ceti / tataś cen na bhedasiddhir na kasyacit kutaścid bheda ity ekaṃ dravyaṃ śākyamate hy upapadyate /* This fact shows that this passage of Dharmakīrti was well-known to Naiyāyika authors in the 8–10th century A.D. and supports the possibility that Trilocana also knew it.

[17] Cf. JNA 37,14–15: *yat tūktaṃ—rūpajananasvabhāvo hi rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārīti* (: <u>*rasajananasvabhāvatāvyabhicārīti*</u>), *tāvatāpi bhedamātraṃ sidhyati, na tu virodhaḥ, kṛtakānityavat /* The editor's footnote to KA shows that his reading of the underlined part is based on manuscript *'ā'* and *'ra'*, i.e., Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's transcript of manuscript *'ā'*. The corresponding part in the copy of manuscript *'ā'* in Vienna is faint and illegible. In the copy of manuscript *'a'* in Vienna, this part reads *rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārīti*. Both readings are not contradictory to the context, but the reading *rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārīti* directly corresponds to the term *tadabhāvāvyabhicāra* or *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra*, which plays a central role in this argument. Besides, this part is the repetition of Trilocana's criticism cited in JNA 36,9, as shown in footnote 7, and as for the corresponding part in JNA 36,9, the copy of the manuscript *'a'* in Vienna offers the possibility of *rasajananasvabhāvābha(bhā?)vāvyabhicārī*. From these reasons, I followed the reading *rasajananasvabhāvābhāvāvyabhicārīti* when translating this part and JNA 36,9.

[18] However, it is likely that Dharmottara presupposed two affirmative properties which are not co-existent in the same substratum when dealing with *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritva*. Cf. Kyuma [1997: 24(L), 25ff.]. Karṇakagomin (ca. the 9–10th century A.D.) states that *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritva* does not always entail incompatibility. Cf. Kyuma [1997: 25(L), 21–31].

[19] Cf. JNA 37,17–19: *virodhas tu yady apy ekasmin dharmiṇi dvayor asaṃbhavayor niyamaḥ, sa ca kadācid*

Accepting the second idea of Trilocana that two incompatible essences would divide the thing which has them, Jñānaśrīmitra adds a generalized aspect to Dharmakīrti's two incompatibilities. This aspect repeatedly appears in his argument against Trilocana.[20] He also explains the reason why *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra* or *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra* must be distinguished from *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*.

> "The concept of producing a colour (or shape) merely appears in the conceptual cognition, as if it were an independent thing. In that manner, the concept of producing a taste, which does not deviate from the absence (of the concept of producing a colour or shape), is determined entirely separately, because the operation of a valid verbal cognition (*śabdapramāṇavṛtti*) is separately required. Only through that, he (Trilocana) determines incompatibility. (However,) no one determines such a comprehension in the case of the concept of being created and the concept of being non-eternal, either. Besides, to call it incompatibility does not contribute to anything, for incompatibility is established for the purpose of excluding one other thing in the same substratum. Therefore, if there is the mixture (of two things) in the same substratum even in the case of incompatibility, there is no need to consider incompatibility. On the other hand, the incompatibility whose essence is mutual exclusion (*parasparaparihārātman*) is applied to the case of the concept of being blue and the concept of being non-blue and so on."[21]

In the case of *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra* or *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra*, according to Jñānaśrīmitra, there is no incompatibility, for the reason that two concepts can co-exist in the same substratum.[22] Owing to verbal cognitions, which occur separately, they seem to be divided and incompatible.[23]

What has been mentioned above leads us to the following conclusions:

1) It is likely that Trilocana's criticism attempted to drive Buddhist causal theory to a self-contradiction, by taking advantage of terms borrowed from the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, i.e.,

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vastunor ekasya bhāve 'nyaparyādānād dahanatuhinavat / kadācid dharmayoḥ svabhāvenaiva ekādhiṣṭhite 'nyāsaṃbhavāt bhāvābhāvavat, nīlatvānīlatvavad vā / In another place Jñānaśrīmitra commentates the term *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā* in detail. Cf. JNA 38,15–17: *yadvyavacchedena yasya vidhānaṃ yadvidhānena vā yasya vyavacchedo niyamena tat tena pratiyoginā viruddham /* This kind of expression is also found in NBṬ. Cf. NBṬ 203,11–12: *iha yasmin paricchidyamāne yad vyavacchidyate tat paricchidyamānam avacchidyamānaparihāreṇa sthitarūpaṃ draṣṭavyam /*

[20] Cf. footnote 10; JNA 38,11–12: *ekatra dharmiṇy aparaparihārārtham eva hi virodhaḥ sādhyate /*

[21] Cf. JNA 38,8–13: *kevalaṃ kalpanābuddhau yathārthāntaram iva rūpajanakatvaṃ pratibhāti, tathā tadabhāvāvyabhicāri ca pṛthag eva rasajanakatvam avasīyate / yataḥ pṛthak śabdapramāṇavṛttiḥ apekṣyate, tāvataiva virodham adhyavasyati sāvagatiḥ kṛtakatvānityatvayor api na vyavasīyate kenāpi / nāpi tatra virodhābhidhānena kaścid upayogaḥ / ekatra dharmiṇy aparaparihārārtham eva hi virodhaḥ sādhyate / tad yadi virodhe 'py ekadharmisaṃparkaḥ, kṛtaṃ virodhacintayā / nīlatvānīlatvādiṣu tu prayujyate parasparaparihārātmā virodhaḥ /*

[22] Jñānaśrīmitra also distinguishes them from each other with the help of the concepts of *ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda*. Cf. JNA 37,25–38,2: *atha katham atra tadabhāvāvyabhicāraḥ? na hi kṛtakena satā nānityena bhāvyam ity upapattir asti / yady evaṃ rūpajanakena satā rasajanakena na bhāvyam ity atrāpi kopapattiḥ? rūpajanakatvād eveti cet—na, ayogavyavacchedena viśeṣaṇe kṣīṇatvād upapatteḥ, anyayogavyavacchedasyāsiddhatvāt /* In this case the qualifier *rūpajanakatva* as only the function of *ayogavyavaccheda*, which excludes the disconnection between the substratum and *rūpajanakatva*, and it does not exclude the connection between the substratum and the concept of *rasajanakatva* by way of *anyayogavyavaccheda*.

[23] It seems to be accordant with Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory. Cf. PVSV 25,15–17: *yato yato bhinnās tadbhedapratyāyanāya kṛtasaṃniveśaiḥ śabdais tatas tato bhedam upādāya svabhāvābhede 'py anekadharmāṇaḥ pratīyante /*

viruddhadharmādhyāsa and *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritva.* At least, we can say that Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti interpreted Trilocana's criticism as such an attempt.

2) Jñānaśrīmitra's generalization of two incompatibilities, i.e., 'the restriction on the impossibility of co-existence of two things in the same substratum', is brought about by the necessity of distinguishing *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra* or *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra* from *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā* in the context of the causal theory.

The definition of *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā* literally lacks what is meant in Jñānaśrīmitra's generalization, i.e., 'impossibility of co-existence of two things in the same substratum', even though Dharmakīrti suggested it by the term *viruddhadharmādhyāsa.* We may say that this lack produced the argument about *parasparābhāvāvyabhicāra* or *anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāra*, problematic terms in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition.

Abbreviations and Literature

AKBh — *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu): Prahlad Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. 2nd ed. by Aruna Haldar. Patna, 1975.

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JNA — Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist philosophical works of Jñānaśrīmitra.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna, 1959. 2nd ed. Patna, 1987.

KA — *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* (Jñānaśrīmitra): In JNA, 1–159.

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NB — *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): Dalsukhabhai Malvania, ed. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955. 2nd ed. 1971.

NBhūṣ — *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇāsī, 1968.

NBṬ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See NB.

NK — *Nyāyakaṇikā* (Vācaspatimiśra): Elliot Stern, ed. *"Vidhivivekaḥ" of Maṇḍanamiśraḥ, with commentary "Nyāya-kaṇikā" of Vācaspatimiśraḥ, and supercommentaries, "Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī" and "Svaditaṅkaraṇī," of Parameśvaraḥ, critical and annotated edition: The pūrvapakṣaḥ.* Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1988. [UMI, Ann Arbor, No. 8908395].

NM II — *Nyāyamañjarī* (Jayantabhaṭṭa): K. S. Varadacharya, ed. *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇī—Nyāyasaurabha by the editor.* Vol. 2. Mysore, 1983.

NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (Vācaspatimiśra): Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, eds. *Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā-sahitam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭikā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti.* Vol. 1. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936.

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PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

PVSVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam.* Allahabad, 1943.

RNA Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist nyāya works of Ratnakīrti.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 3. Patna, 1957. 2nd ed. Patna, 1975.

SDS *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (Mādhava): V. S. Abhyankar. *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Sāyaṇa-Mādhava.* Government Oriental Series, Class A, no.1. Poona, 1978.

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SVR *Syādvādaratnākara* (Vādidevasūri): L. Motilal, ed. *Ārhatamataprabhākarasya caturtho mayūkaḥ, śrīmad-vādidevasūriviracitaḥ pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāraḥ tadvyākhyā ca Syādvādaratnākaraḥ.* Poona, 1926–30.

DHARMAKĪRTI AND HIS SUCCESSORS ON THE DETERMINATION OF CAUSALITY

by

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The ascertainment of causality or—to be more precise—the procedure of ascertaining that a certain thing is the effect of another certain thing, seems a promising topic for finding out something about the thinking of Dharmakīrti and some of his followers. The fact that a certain thing arises from another certain thing, the *tadutpatti*, is one of the two principles which Dharmakīrti uses to recognize with certainty that a chosen reason (*hetu*) has the second and third characteristic out of the three characteristics of a valid reason. In other words, the *tadutpatti*, also referred to as *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, is responsible for the *vyāpti* in those cases where the things referred to by the concepts which are used as logical reason (*hetu*) and consequence (*sādhya*) are not one and the same. The ascertainment of the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* obviously belongs to the core of Dharmakīrti's logic. We know of no other method of ascertaining the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* which could have been used as a model by Dharmakīrti, and so it is most probable that it is his own invention. These two facts, as well as the fact that there are a lot of difficulties in understanding the statements of Dharmakīrti and some of his followers on this subject—at least to my mind—suggest it would be useful to conduct some further investigations, a sample of which I would like to present now.

As a starting point I will take a statement made by Professor Gillon in his paper "Dharmakīrti and the Problem of Induction."[1] He writes:

"But, how is knowledge of the causation relation acquired? Dharmakīrti's answer is that it is acquired by observation. One knows that an f is the cause of an s if one knows that (1) at some time and in some place an f exists and an s does not and (2) immediately thereafter in the same place an f exists and an s exists, and (3) later in the same place when an f does not exist, an s does not exist (PVSV 22,2–4). [. . .] In other words, Dharmakīrti seems to believe that a sequence of five simple non-relational observations results in relational knowledge. For example, one observes (1) first that a place has neither smoke nor fire; (2) then, when fire is brought, that the place has fire yet no smoke; (3) next, that the place has both smoke and fire; (4) then when the fire is removed, that the place has smoke yet no fire; and (5) finally, that the place has neither smoke nor fire. The problem is that this sequence cannot discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations. Suppose one observes that a place has neither a donkey nor smoke, then when a donkey is brought, one observes that the place has the donkey but still no smoke, but a moment

[1] Brendan S. Gillon, "Dharmakīrti and the Problem of Induction," in Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna June 11–16, 1989* (Wien, 1991): 53–58.

later, one observes the place to have both the donkey and smoke. Later, when the donkey is removed, one observes that the place has no donkey but still has smoke. And finally, when the smoke dissipates, the place has neither a donkey nor smoke. But the donkey, even though it satisfies the conditions for being the cause of the smoke, is not its cause."[2]

As I understand it, this statement consists of three parts: Professor Gillon first gives his understanding of PVSV 22,2–4, saying that for Dharmakīrti the knowledge of the causal relation depends on the knowledge of three certain facts and that this knowledge can be acquired by observation. He then shows what he thinks might be the procedure of acquiring this knowledge by observation that Dharmakīrti had in mind. This procedure looks like the one we are used to attributing to the Pañcakavādins. Lastly Professor Gillon shows that this procedure does not give the expected result.

Let us skip for the moment the question of whether the procedure intended by Dharmakīrti may be equated to the one of the Pañcakavādins.

Let us first reconsider whether we know what the procedure of the Pañcakavādins looks like. In the appendix to Professor Kajiyama's paper "Trikapañcakacintā. Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality,"[3] there is a collection of statements about the *pañcakavāda* made by various Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers. And, in fact, based on these statements, we may understand the procedure in the way Professor Kajiyama describes it in his paper: "The causal relation of fire and smoke, for instance, can be ascertained if we observe that smoke, which has not been there, occurs when fire has appeared, and that when the fire has gone, the smoke disappears as well."[4] But, this procedure is very easy to find fault with, as Professor Gillon has demonstrated. Could this really be the product of Dharmakīrti's intellectual endeavor or an offspring of that product, which the tradition considered worth transmitting? I cannot help but suspect that there is something wrong with the available descriptions of the *pañcakavāda*. A look at the descriptions of the *trikavāda* will help in understanding what is possibly wrong.

Again in the appendix to Professor Kajiyama's paper, there is also a collection of statements about the *trikavāda*. Based on this material, Professor Kajiyama describes the procedures propagated by the Trikavādins as follows: "Others, however, thought that either 1) one prior non-perception of fire and smoke as a unit, followed by two successive perceptions, or 2) one perception grasping fire and smoke together and followed by two successive non-perceptions can severally determine a causal relation [. . .]"[5] Of course, these procedures invite the same criticism as Professor Gillon makes of the *pañcakavāda*.

A glance at two statements made by Jñānaśrīmitra, a Trikavādin, will change our way of looking at these descriptions.

A verse in the *Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi*, which is used again by Jñānaśrīmitra in his *Vyāpticarcā*, gives a description of the procedures:

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[2] *Op. cit.*, 58.

[3] Yuichi Kajiyama, "Trikapañcakacintā. Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality," *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia* 4/5 (Kyoto, 1963): 1–15.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.

prāgadṛṣṭau kramāt paśyan vetti hetuphalasthitim /
dṛṣṭau vā kramaśo 'paśyann anyathā tv anavasthitir //[6]

In Professor Kajiyama's translation: "Perceiving successively the (two things) which were not seen before, or perceiving successively the disappearance of the two things which were seen before, we come to know the definite relation of a cause and an effect; otherwise, it would require an infinite series (of cognitions)."

In another place, in the *Vyāpticarcā*, Jñānaśrīmitra gives some more information on the two procedures. Concerning the one including a perception of smoke and fire, for instance, followed by a non-perception of fire, which again is followed by a non-perception of smoke, he writes:

yadāgnyabhāve dhūmābhāvaṃ pratyeti, tadā sahopalambhapūrvakam agnimātrābhāve dhūmādarśanam upayuktaṃ pratibandhasiddhau (JNA 165,5–7).

Here, he says that the non-perception of smoke—this refers to the third and last moment in the procedure—proves the connection, if there was a perception of both smoke and fire before—this refers to the first moment—, and if out of the things present during the first moment nothing but fire is absent—this refers to the second moment.

The information new to us concerns the second step of the procedure: the act of perception in the second moment not only has to provide the knowledge that fire is absent, but also the knowledge that out of the things present in the first moment all but fire are still present.

Why this restriction is necessary Jñānaśrīmitra explains some lines later: "If the fire disappears together with another thing, one cannot ascertain whether the previous presence of it (namely of the smoke) depends on the presence of the fire or on the presence of the other thing. But if fire alone is absent, it is easy to understand that the previous presence of it (namely of the smoke) depends on the presence of this (fire)."[7]

Jñānaśrīmitra then goes on to describe a similar restriction in the procedure which includes a non-perception of smoke and fire, for instance, followed by a perception of fire, which again is followed by a perception of smoke. Here again, the restriction concerns the second step of the procedure: apart from the things present during the first step of the procedure, it is fire alone that has to appear in the second moment. No other thing is allowed to appear. Because, if fire and another thing appeared in addition to the things present in the first moment, one could not decide whether the lack of fire or the lack of the other thing was responsible for the absence of smoke in the first moment.[8]

The two procedures of the Trikavādins as explained by Jñānaśrīmitra can indeed better discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations, as the common descriptions would have us believe. If in a kitchen at a certain moment the necessary complex of causes for the production of smoke is incomplete, and in the second moment a donkey enters the kitchen, but nothing else changes, one cannot reasonably suppose that smoke will arise in the third moment.

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[6] JNA 169,21f.; 319,22f. For the critical apparatus, see *loc. cit.*

[7] *[. . .] yadi vastvantarasahitahutāśāpasāraḥ, tadā pūrvam asya sattā kiṃ hutāśasya vastvantarasya vā sattayā prayukteti na niścayaḥ. hutāśamātrābhāve tu tadbhāvaprayukta eva prāg asya bhāva iti sulabham* (JNA 165 8–10).

[8] Cf. JNA 165,10–14.

Similarly, if in a kitchen at a certain moment the necessary complex of causes is present and smoke arises, and in the next moment there is no change, except that a donkey leaves the kitchen, one cannot reasonably suppose that in the third moment the production of smoke will stop. Note the covert assumption that everything of relevance in this relation is perceptible.

The comparison of the quoted verse with the description and explanation of the procedures in the prose text of the *Vyāpticarcā* has shown that the description in the verse is lacking an important part, namely the restriction. How is this possible? The answer, I think, is that the function of this verse is not to give a complete description of the whole procedure, but only to display a special feature of it. In the *Vyāpticarcā*, Jñānaśrīmitra impugns the opponent's procedure of ascertaining a *svābhāvikasambandha* for not consisting of a definite number of perceptions. The verse illustrates that the ascertainment of the *kāryakāraṇabhāva,* on the other hand, consists of a definite number of perceptions. In the *Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi*, where the verse originally occurs, the opponent is a Pañcakavādin. That means that Jñānaśrīmitra and his opponent share a lot of ideas, but they disagree on the question of how many perceptions are necessary to ascertain a causal relation. For the remainder of the procedure they seem to agree, inasmuch as Jñānaśrīmitra does not say that the procedure of the Pañcakavādins does not work. All he criticizes is that it contains some superfluous elements. Jñānaśrīmitra, as far as I understand it, explains that the procedure, the principles of which both agree, can be restricted to three perceptions, and that if one does not accept this and asks for five perceptions, one cannot stop there, but would expect additional ones ad infinitum.

We have seen that the representation of the procedures accepted by the Trikavādins as we find it in the verse quoted above and in some other places does not contain all elements of those procedures. It rather emphasizes those features which distinguish them from the procedures of the opponents, above all of the Pañcakavādins.

In the same way, I suspect the available representations of the *pañcakavāda*, which only speak of the sequence of perceptions and non-perceptions, to be incomplete. They, on their part, emphasize the features which distinguish their procedure from the opponent's, the Trikavādin's, and are silent about what they agree on.

If these considerations are correct, the feature both sides agree on can be nothing but the restriction that at certain moments in the procedure nothing must appear or disappear except the cause under investigation. If we were to insert such a restriction into the sequence of five perceptions, possible places would be at the second step and at the fourth step. The procedure could include both of these restrictions or only one of them. To decide which is the most plausible among these possibilities, a look at the source of these restrictions, the common ancestor of both the *trikavāda* and the *pañcakavāda*, may be of some help.

As already mentioned, Professor Gillon's description of the procedure referred to by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 22,2–4 can be identified with the description which we are used to associate with the Pañcakavādins and which should probably be modified. But until now we have not compared this description with the statement of Dharmakīrti.

Professor Kajiyama says in respect of this very passage and of various other statements of Dharmakīrti which he considers as 'the same formula', albeit 'in a slightly different style', that "Dharmakīrti himself did not clearly set forth the number of indispensable cognitions, and so far

as this point is concerned, his formula was equivocal. This is why the commentators of his logic started to interpret the theory differently."[9]

Let us turn to Dharmakīrti's own words:

> *yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ yad upalabhyate, tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya kāryam* (PVSV 22,2–4).

If we arrange them in the temporal sequence, we find:

(1) a non-perception of the effect, for instance smoke, the conditions of whose perception are fulfilled (*tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham*)
(2) a perception of a multitude of things (*yeṣām upalambhe*); Dharmakīrti does not explicitly say of which things, but we should understand a perception of everything present at the place under observation, for instance fire, fuel, pots, and so on, as this is the most natural assumption when we try to make the procedure work
(3) a perception of the effect, for instance smoke
(4) a perception that supplies the knowledge that out of the multitude of things perceived in the second moment all but the one thing, the presence of which is to be proved as necessary for the production of the effect, for instance fire, are still present (*tatraikābhāve 'pi*); Dharmakīrti does not actually mention a perception, but we have to supply it, as the mere fact that only one thing out of the observed multitude is absent can be of no use without being cognized.
(5) a non-perception of the effect, for instance smoke (*nopalabhyate*)

The function of the first three perceptions is to ascertain that the multitude of things present in the second moment includes all the things which are necessary to produce the effect. The fourth and fifth perceptions prove that the thing under investigation is necessary for the production of the effect, as it is the absence of this one thing that makes the causal complex incomplete, which otherwise would produce the effect, provided that there is no hindrance.

As is easily seen, Dharmakīrti's procedure does not correspond to the procedure of the Pañcakavādins, irrespective of whether we understand it as we have until now or in a modified form, nor does it correspond to one of the procedures of the Trikavādins. As far as Professor Gillon's criticism is concerned, it misses its object. Of course, I am not arguing that Dharmakīrti has solved the problem of induction. How could he be supposed to have done so? But if one intends to show how Dharmakīrti failed to solve this problem, one has to do it in another way.

I would also hesitate to subscribe to Professor Kajiyama's statement, as I would expect Dharmakīrti to present to his readers the best procedure he can think of. Given the cultural context, one cannot suppose Dharmakīrti to have considered a procedure a good one if, in his opinion, it contained more elements than necessary. I therefore think that at the time of the composition of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* Dharmakīrti considered every element of his procedure as indispensable and I also think that every reader from the same cultural background would have under-

[9] Kajiyama, *op.cit.*, 3.

stood this. Furthermore, I cannot see any ambiguity in Dharmakīrti's formulation that could have opened a way to different interpretations.

A comparison shows that the procedure of the Pañcakavādins, understood without the restrictions in the second and fourth moment, is less capable of providing certainty than the procedure propounded in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Understood with one or both restrictions, it has the same capability, but includes redundant elements, as shown by Jñānaśrīmitra in the *Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi*. The procedures of the Trikavādins are as effective as the one of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, but they are shorter. Compared to the procedure of the Pañcakavādins, they give the impression of being more developed. This and the fact that the procedure of the Pañcakavādins bears more resemblance in its outer appearance to the one of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* makes it rather tempting to propose the following historical development: Dharmakīrti's procedure as described in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* was transformed into the one proposed by the Pañcakavādins for some reason or other. Then, someone noticed the redundant elements and developed the two procedures of the Trikavādins by splitting up the single procedure of the Pañcakavādins.

A table shows the divergences and concordances at a glance:

	PVSV	*pañcakavāda*	*trikavāda*	
1	non-perception of the effect	non-perception of the effect	non-perception of the effect and the cause	
2	perception of all things present in the place under observation	perception of the cause (yielding the additional information that this is the only thing new in the place under observation)	perception of the cause, yielding the additional information that this is the only thing new in the place under observation	
3	perception of the effect	perception of the effect	perception of the effect	perception of the effect and the cause
4	non-perception of the cause, yielding the additional information that all the other things that were present at the second moment are still present	non-perception of the cause (yielding the additional information that all the other things that were present at the second moment are still present)		non-perception of the cause, yielding the additional information that all the other things that were present in the second moment are still present
5	non-perception of the effect	non-perception of the effect		non-perception of the effect

Parts in parentheses indicate the restrictions I propose to supply.

The only disturbing fact is that the earliest proponent of the *pañcakavāda* we know of is Dharmottara,[10] whereas a reflex of the procedures of the Trikavādins can already be found in Śākyabuddhi's commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* and its *Vṛtti*.

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10 Cf. Kajiyama, *op. cit.*, 4.

Śākyabuddhi splits up Dharmakīrti's description into two parts, both of which he considers to be a description of a separate means of ascertaining a causal relation independently of the other. In the first portion (*yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ yad upalabhyate*), he finds expressed the means consisting of perception, which is preceded by non-perception. As we have seen, the original function of this part of Dharmakīrti's procedure was to ensure that the multitude of the things which are present at the place under investigation includes all the things which are necessary for the production of the effect, but in no way was it meant to be an independent means for proving the causal relation. Accordingly, Śākyabuddhi should have some difficulty in explaining Dharmakīrti's words. After explaining the function of non-perception of the effect, he repeats the words of Dharmakīrti and supplies "that is the effect of those."[11] If we understood *'yeṣām'* and *'teṣām (de dag gi)'* as referring to the multitude of things which were present before the appearance of the effect, Śākyabuddhi would then in fact be saying that a thing is the effect of that multitude of things which has been perceived at the moment before its existence. This is hardly a procedure that could discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations. It is also not advisable to understand *'yeṣām'* and *'teṣām'* as referring to the necessary complex of causes, as in this case one would have to presuppose that the necessary complex is known in advance. If we do not suspect Śākyabuddhi of taking a step backwards, we should understand the plurals *'yeṣām'* and *'teṣām'* in another way. I cannot think of any other explanation of what Śākyabuddhi has in mind than the first procedure of the Trikavādins: the plural is understood by him to indicate that this procedure can be applied with respect to each and every visible necessary cause by repeating it. But then there are two questions. How could Śākyabuddhi dare to change the meaning of a clear statement of Dharmakīrti? And why did he not feel it necessary to give a complete description of the procedure, which would include the restriction that the cause must be the only thing out of the things present before the appearance of the effect which has newly appeared? I think the answer is that Śākyabuddhi could refrain from giving a full description by counting on the circumstance that the readers already knew the procedures of the *trikavāda*, and that he could change the meaning of Dharmakīrti's statement because there was a common acceptance among the readers he aimed at that the procedure described in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* should silently be replaced by the other one.

But who was the person who had enough creative power and authority to replace Dharmakīrti's procedure by a new one? Nothing indicates that Devendrabuddhi could be responsible. Should we attribute the achievement to an unknown?

Dharmakīrti's main statements on this topic may be arranged in groups:

The description of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* has been adopted in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* with either no or with only a small modification:

> —*yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ yad upalabhyate, tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya kāryam; tac ca dhūme 'sti* (PVSV 22,2–4). (*de'i mtshan nyid kyir gyur pa mi dmigs pa las gang dag dmigs na dmigs la / de las gcig med na yang mi dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni de'i 'bras bu yin*

[11] *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (P5718) 59a8f.: *dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid kyir gyur pa de nyid snga na mi dmigs pa las gang dag dmigs na dmigs pa de ni de dag gi 'bras bu yin no.*

te / de yang du ba la (: *las*) *yod do.* [P5717, 418a2f.])
— *de'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa'i mi dmigs pa las gang zhig gang dag dmigs na dmigs la / de las gcig ma tshang na mi dmigs pa de ni de'i 'bras bu yin te / de yang du ba la yod do* (PVin II 33,33–34,2).

The relevant statements in the *Hetubindu* and in the *Vādanyāya* form another group:

— *[. . .] kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ, yathedam asyopalambha upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ prāg anupalabdham upalabhyate, satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣv asyābhāve na bhavatīti yas tadbhāve bhāvas tadabhāve 'bhāvaś ca pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvas tasya siddhiḥ* (HB 4,7–12).
— *[. . .] kāryakāraṇabhāvaprasādhanaṃ bhāvābhāvasādhanapramāṇābhyām, yathedam asmin sati bhavati, satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu tadabhāve na bhavatīti* (VN 4,1–3).

Whereas the grammatical construction in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* and in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* connects the two parts of the description (*yeṣām [. . .] yad upalabhyate, tatra [. . .] nopalabhyate, tat [. . .]*), we find no such connection in the *Hetubindu*, where both parts are independent of each other. Furthermore, in the first part we find the plural *yeṣām* replaced by the singular *asya*. By this replacement the function of the first part has totally changed. In accordance with these two changes, there is also a change in the second part. Whereas in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* and in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* the knowledge that only one thing out of the sufficient complex is absent is acquired by recourse to the first part (*yeṣām upalambhe [. . .], tatraikābhāve 'pi*), the corresponding description in the *Hetubindu* is independent of the first part (*satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣv asyābhāve*). How one comes to know that all the other causes are present, Dharmakīrti does not say. But as the rest of the sentence (*na bhavati*) shows, the whole second portion is not a description of the cognitions which the knowledge of the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* depends on, but rather a description of facts, or maybe a description of the content of the corresponding knowledge. The whole situation seems to indicate that Dharmakīrti did not stop working on the problem of how to ascertain the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* after the composition of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. As I do not see any improvement in the description in terms of greater precision—in fact, the contrary seems to be the case—or of the procedure itself in terms of greater certainty, I wonder why Dharmakīrti was not satisfied with his first solution. In Dharmakīrti's opinion the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* is nothing but the fact that a certain thing behaves in a certain way in respect of another certain thing (*tadbhāve bhāvas tadabhāve 'bhāvaś ca* [. . .] *kāryakāraṇabhāvas*). Depending on his Yogācāra background, Dharmakīrti might have wished that the description of the ascertainment of the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* should follow the same structure as the description of the *kāryakāraṇabhāva* itself.

Finally, the *Hetubindu*'s description of the first part (*idam asyopalambha upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ prāg anupalabdham upalabhyate*), which refers to perceptions, is in the *Vādanyāya* also replaced by a description of a fact, or maybe by a description of the content of a corresponding knowledge (*idam asmin sati bhavati*).

Verse 13 of the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* on it form a group of their own:

'ga' zhig mthong na ma mthong mthong / de ma mthong na ma mthong ba /
'bras bu yin pa nyid du ni / ston pa'i skye bo med par shes //

[. . .] *'di ltar rgyur mngon par 'dod pa 'ga' zhig mthong na / rig bya'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa 'bras bu zhes bya ba ma mthong ba mthong ba ni / gang mthong na mthong ba yin te / de ma mthong na 'bras bur mngon par 'dod pa ma mthong ba ni / 'bras bu yin pa nyid du shes te /* [. . .][12]

Here we find in the first part of the description the restriction that the cause must be the only thing (*'ga' zhig* = *eka-*)[13]—except the things that were already present before—that is seen in the moment, before the effect is seen.

The findings presented may lead to the following assumption: the early Dharmakīrti developed a procedure of ascertaining a *kāryakāraṇabhāva* which consists of two cooperating parts, and gave a description of it in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti.* He adopted this procedure in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* without or with only a small modification in the description. He did not stop there and continued to work on the problem. He abolished the connection of the two parts, at least in linguistic form. He changed the first part, made the second part independent, and introduced a restriction in the first part. He seems to have been aiming at conformity of the description of the two parts with the description of the *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, which also means conformity with the second and third characteristic of a valid reason. But he did not give a definitive description of the procedure in his later works. One gets the impression of perceiving the work in progress, but not the final result. Of course, it would be vain to speculate on Dharmakīrti's eventual solution, which he might have communicated to his contemporaries in private. But we also should be aware of the fact that quite soon afterwards Śākyabuddhi was able to count on his readers' knowledge and acceptance of the procedures that later would become known as *trikavāda.*

Abbreviations

HB — *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I, tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 252. Band, 1. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 4. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1967.

JNA — Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist philosophical works of Jñānaśrīmitra.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna, 1959. 2nd ed. Patna, 1987.

PVin II — *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte.*

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[12] Both texts are given here as constituted by Erich Frauwallner in his editions (266 and 273,24–27) in "Dharmakīrtis Saṃbandhaparīkṣā. Text und Übersetzung," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 41 (1934): 261–300. For the critical apparatus, refer to this work. As far as the verse is concerned, at least two versions seem to have existed. One is transmitted in Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (*Prameyakamala-Mārtaṇḍa by Shri Prabha Chandra* [*A Commentary on Shri Manik Nandi's Pareeksha Mukh Sutra*], ed. with Introduction, Indexes etc. by Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri. Delhi 1990³, 510,11f.) and Devasūri's *Syādvādaratnākara* (*śrīmadvādidevasūriviracitaḥ pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāraḥ, tadvyākhyā ca syādvādaratnākaraḥ* [. . .] *lāghājitanūjamotīlāla ity etaiḥ* [. . .] *saṃśodhitaḥ. dvitīyo bhāgaḥ.* 1988; reprint, Dillī 816,1f.): *paśyann ekam adṛṣṭasya darśane tad-adarśane / apaśyan kāryam anveti vināpy ākhyātṛbhir janaḥ.* Śaṅkaranandana's *Sambandhaparīkṣānusāra* also seems to be based on this version (cf. D4237 32a2f.). But the Tibetan translation and also Dharmakīrti's *Vṛtti* and Vinītadeva's *Ṭīkā* (D4236 12a3–6) are based on a version of the verse that may have looked somewhat like: **paśyann adṛṣṭam ekasya darśane tadadarśane / apaśyan kāryam anveti vināpy ākhyātṛbhir janaiḥ.*

[13] Note the better rendering of *eka-* by *gcig pu* in the Tibetan translation of Vinītadeva's *Ṭīkā* (D4236 12a3).

Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

VN *Vādanyāya* (Dharmakīrti): Michael Torsten Much. *Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāyaḥ, Teil I, Sanskrit-Text.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 581. Band. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens Nr. 25. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991.

THE DISJUNCTION IN THE PRAMĀṆASIDDHI

by

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I

The occurrence of the disjunctive particle *vā* in verse 5c of the Pramāṇasiddhi of the *Pramāṇavārttika* has provoked problems on two accounts: 1. The definitions of valid means of knowledge = *pramāṇa*, which the initial verses of the chapter apparently provide, appear *prima facie* inadequate if the particle is interpreted according to its usual meaning. 2. The rationale for the occurrence of a plurality of alternative definitions is not immediately plausible. In view of the difficulties of finding a common solution to the problems of the two categories, interpreters have succumbed to the temptation of attacking some of the presuppositions on which they rest. I will try to demonstrate that a) previous attempts of avoiding the problems by questioning the presuppositions generating them are unsatisfactory and b) that there is no need to resort to such strategies.

The problem arising from the assumption that the initial verses of the Pramāṇasiddhi represent definitions of *pramāṇa* has been clearly formulated in the paper "The Disjunction in *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter Verse 5c" read by Eli Franco at the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference as well as in the author's recently published book *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* (Wien 1997: 46): The trouble with the interpretation according to which *pramāṇa* can be either a non-belying cognition or a cognition which illuminates an unapprehended object, or both, is that "a cognition that belies its promise, but apprehends an unapprehended object, as well as a cognition that does not belie, but apprehends an apprehended object, would have to be considered as *pramāṇa*" and that "[t]wo inadmissible consequences that follow immediately from this interpretation are that hallucination of an entirely new object on the one hand, and memory or recollection on the other hand, would become means of knowledge." In short, the alleged difficulty is that, if the remarks of the initial segment of the Pramāṇasiddhi were meant to provide definitions of *pramāṇa* they would at best furnish necessary but not sufficient and *a fortiori* not both necessary and sufficient conditions of being a *pramāṇa* and accordingly would have to be considered as blatantly inadequate.

Apart from Eli Franco Christian Lindtner has also dealt with the topic of the initial verses of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter in a paper read at the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference. It must be said, however, that none of the remarks which are to be found in the above mentioned papers are apt to dissolve the above formulated difficulty and in so far as they represent attempts of solving the problem they have to be regarded as entirely unsuccessful. More precisely, both Franco's and Lindtner's suggestions are insufficient to show that the crucial problem can be solved on the basis of an acceptance of the assumption that the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi did

not intend to furnish sufficient conditions of being a *pramāṇa*. Since it can be considered as doubtful that any such demonstration is possible at all, I prefer the supposition that Dharmakīrti in fact intended to present both sufficient and necessary or at least sufficient conditions and that the view of the traditional commentators according to which the initial segment of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter was meant to formulate definitions of *pramāṇa* cannot be far from the truth. It should be noted that by embracing the claim that the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi intended to provide sufficient conditions or even to define *pramāṇa*, I am not advocating the thesis that the pertinent remarks of the relevant textual passage had this as their exclusive purpose.

II

On this background it is not difficult to see that Lindtner's comments, even if their content were regarded as acceptable, do not solve the pertinent problem, simply because they are irrelevant to it. Lindtner advocates the view that Dharmakīrti "indulged in philosophical punning" and that, accordingly, the relevant verses "were in fact intended to be read in s e v e r a l equally meaningful ways." But there is not the slightest need to deny this possibility. The decisive point is that, as long as one makes the supposition that the initial verses do not furnish both necessary and sufficient conditions, one should either substantiate the proposition that defining *pramāṇa* did *not* constitute one of the aims of the pertinent textual passage *at all* or make it plausible that, although a definition of *pramāṇa* constituted one of the objectives, this goal had been pursued in some way which did not involve the formulation of sufficient and necessary conditions. Alternatively, one would have to support the thesis that the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi in fact and at least among other things performed the act of formulating necessary and sufficient conditions.

None of these alternatives have been demonstrated by Lindtner. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the author took the supposition that the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter contains a specification of both necessary and sufficient conditions simply for granted, because he claims that according to one of the intended readings "*pramāṇa*, i.e. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, is first defined as reliable (*avisaṃvādi*) cognition (*jñāna*)" and that later Dharmakīrti is brought to the second definition of *pramāṇa* as *ajñātārthaprakāśa* (p. 156). It is true that Lindtner devotes some remarks to the issue as to whether the second definition is apt to include inference (*anumāna*) as a *pramāṇa*, and it appears that the author intends to show in which manner inference can be seen as being accounted for. But the other problem that the definitions might not be specific enough is left out of consideration. With respect to the second way of taking the pertinent verses mentioned by Lindtner it is difficult to see why it must be considered as a second or alternative reading at all. Lindtner says that the verses can also be considered as a polemic of debate on contemporary *pramāṇa*-ideas. A number of remarks embodied in them might be directed against previous remarks made in connection with *pramāṇa* by several other authors. Let us grant this. Why should this amount to a second alternative? Should not it be that what has been declared as a second alternative is rather a by-product of the first reading, because it appears quite plausible that if the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi intended to present definitions of *pramāṇa* he might have intended that *by* propounding the definitions alternative views concerning this topic should be implicitly criticized? Should we derive from the circumstance that Lindtner recognizes a second alternative here that he supposed that the purpose of refuting alternative views is independent of

the purpose of formulating definitions because the issue in the second case is merely to reject certain attributes as characterizations of *pramāṇa*? Nevertheless, even if this were supposed, it would remain true that the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi *also* intended to present definitions of *pramāṇa* which are endangered by the possibility of being inadequate. As regards the third alternative reading presented by Lindtner, it does not pertain to the adequacy of the definitions themselves but to the rationale of formulating more than one definition. It is suggested that whereas the segment dealing with the first explication of *pramāṇa* deals with its two "empirical" varieties, the passage to which the subsequent definition belongs pertains to absolute or *pāramārthika pramāṇa*. Let us grant for the sake of argument that Lindtner's considerations in favour of the validity of this reading on account of the context are valid. The problem is that they do not possess implications which are relevant for the present topic but for the different issue as to whether Dharmakīrti was justified in presenting two definitions of *pramāṇa* instead of one.

It should be clear that Lindtner's contention that Dharmakīrti "was more than just a dry and abstract thinker" and that "[h]e was also a poet, and a good one at that" is of little help in the present context, although it is true that this consideration must not be entirely irrelevant. For it could be argued that precisely because the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi pursued also other than philosophical values, he might have sacrificed full compliance with one of the values in order to comply with several values simultaneously. Accordingly, it might be supposed that Dharmakīrti renounced precision and explicitness in order to enhance rhetorical and poetic virtues. However, should we really assume that the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi specified only necessary and no sufficient conditions in the context of the explication of a term because of poetic qualities? And even if we accepted this supposition in principle—which precisely are the poetic merits which made the sacrifice compulsory in the present case? As long as this is not shown, the hypothesis that apparent deficiencies are explainable by the circumstance that somebody wants to be more that just a philosopher is only suited to provoke the comment that it might have been apropos to tell Dharmakīrti the fact that it is often preferable to do one thing properly instead of trying to follow a profession which is not one's own.

III

In contradistinction to Lindtner's paper, Franco's investigation both in the Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference and in his book *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* brings the problem of the possible inadequacy of the definitions into focus. However, apart from the fact that the solution proposed by the author is hardly acceptable, he also obfuscates the issue to a certain extent by a number of remarks pertaining to logical properties of the particle *vā*.

First it needs to be noticed that the topic of whether *vā* should be taken in an inclusive or exclusive sense is irrelevant for the above formulated problem. On the other hand a distinction must be observed which is not taken into consideration in Franco's investigation. The relevant segment of the Pramāṇasiddhi exhibits the structure of: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānaṃ*—A—*ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*—B, where in the place of 'A' and 'B' word-material occurs which constitutes several sentences. Accordingly, we must not only reckon with the possibility that *vā* is used in order to connect phrases which are part of some single sentence, in particular verbal-phrases,

but also with the eventuality that the particle has been employed in order to connect whole sentences. In view of the general structure of the textual passage the latter alternative appears even *prima facie* much more probable. But in this case, we cannot be sure that the propositional structure of the segment which remains if 'A' and 'B' are taken away corresponds to *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam ajñātārthaprakāśo vā* and not to *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam, pramāṇam ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*. This means that the "logical form" of the segment might not correlate with "Something is *pramāṇa* exactly if it is *avisaṃvādi jñāna* or *ajñātārthaprakāśa*" but rather with "*Pramāṇa* is *avisaṃvādi jñāna* or *pramāṇa* is *ajñātārthaprakāśa*." It is not difficult to ascertain that Franco's argument against the hypothesis of an exclusive sense to the effect that "there is nothing to prevent a cognition from being both non-belying and able to illuminate an unapprehended object" is valid only against the first and not with respect to the second reading which is presumably preferable. Even the other argument adduced by Franco that "some logicians call the exclusive 'or' a myth" and that, presumably, "there is no such operator in natural languages" is, in the final analysis, irrelevant, because the mere fact that an exclusive sense cannot be conveyed by the particle *vā* in particular does not refute the possibility that the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi intended that the entire syntagma of which *vā* constitutes a part should be understood in such a manner. It is not that I want deny that Franco might be correct in not supposing an exclusive meaning. I think too that this is probably not the case. But the decisive point is that the question of whether an exclusive or inclusive import should be assumed can be neglected in the present context. Since a proposition of the form 'P or Q' entails that at least one of the disjuncts must be true irrespective of whether an inclusive or exclusive import is supposed, the circumstance that the predicate expressions are too unspecific in order to yield acceptable definitions possesses its relevance with respect to any expression of the form '*pramāṇa* is F or *pramāṇa* is G' regardless of the presumption of an inclusive or exclusive meaning.

For similar reasons all discussions pertaining to a possible conjunctive import of the particle *vā* or the entire segment to which this expression belongs, are partially irrelevant. At any rate, both the assumption that the original version of the Pramāṇasiddhi exhibited a conjunctive particle, in particular *ca*, in the place of *vā* and the surmise that *vā* can also convey the sense of a conjunctor are quite preposterous. Nevertheless, even if one made one of those suppositions, not much would be gained. One would at best get rid of the difficulty on the basis of the assumption that *vā* connects verbal phrases and not sentences. For in this case, the import of the pertinent textual segment would be equivalent to '*Pramāṇa* is that which is both an *avisaṃvādi jñāna* and *ajñātārthaprakāśa*', and since the *definiens* is made more specific by conjoining the predicates, the threat of insufficient specificity of the individual terms might be averted. On the other hand, the problem is rather aggravated by the assumption of a conjunctive sense of the relevant particle as soon as it is supposed that it connects entire sentences. For in this case the import of the segment amounts to '*Pramāṇa* is *avisaṃvādi jñāna* and *pramāṇa* is *ajñātārthaprakāśa*', and the consequence is that insufficient specificity of even one of the predicates endangers the acceptability of the entire statement. The predicament is that a verbal-phrase reading of *vā* or any other hypothetical substitute appears highly improbable. The remarks made in the section of verse 1c–5b represent additional comments on the nature and knowability of *pramāṇa*, and they are such that they must appear grossly misplaced if they occurred between two predicates which together

specify what *pramāṇa* is.

Despite the fact that Franco's paper does not convey a fully accurate picture of the logical situation connected with the pertinent particle, the author seems to be right in looking for a solution which does not relate to those issues. Nevertheless, the proposal made in order to mitigate the relevance of a possible lack of specificity concerning the *definiens*-phrases is not satisfactory. Franco tries to defuse the problem by questioning the supposition that the pertinent expressions were really meant as *definientia*. He suggests that the pertinent textual passage should not be taken as embodying definitions of *pramāṇa*, but as representing an attempt to demonstrate that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* and that it had been attempted to realize this objective by showing that the Buddha meets certain characteristics associated with the concept of *pramāṇa*. It should be clear, however, that the problem has not been fully thought through in this proposal. For it might be true that, if it were merely the purpose of the pertinent text to show that the Buddha can be duly considered as falling under the concept of *pramāṇa* or that it is appropriate to apply this term among other things also to the Buddha, reference to a definition comprising a specification of necessary and sufficient conditions is not absolutely necessary. But the quandary originates from the circumstance that, according to Franco's own exposition, only necessary and not sufficient conditions are specified in the text. If instead sufficient, but not necessary conditions had been indicated, one might relinquish the demand for both necessary and sufficient conditions, because in this case it could have been appropriate to derive the proposition that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* on account of the circumstance that he meets certain sufficient requirements for *pramāṇa*-hood. But in the present situation Franco's proposal invites us to assume an argumentation on the part of the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi which is formally analogous to the claim that the Buddha is an Eskimo because he is a featherless biped. To be sure, all Eskimos are featherless bipeds and being featherless and being a biped are necessary conditions of something's being an Eskimo, and *a fortiori* being either featherless or a biped constitutes a necessary requirement of Eskimo-hood. But should we derive that the Buddha was an Eskimo because he certainly fulfilled more than one necessary requirement for such a status? It is of no avail here to point out the fact that the properties of being *avisaṃvādi* and of being *ajñātārthaprakāśa*, which are mentioned in the pertinent textual passage, might *together* represent not only a sufficient but even a both necessary and sufficient condition of *pramāṇa*-hood. For Franco himself, and I think rightly, does not want to assume a conjunctive sense of *vā* or the occurrence of *ca* or some other conjunctive particle in the original text, and the point of his enterprise was to defuse the problem without assuming any other import of the particle *vā* than that of an inclusive disjunction. Apart from the "logical" problems of Franco's account, there is also a philological problem. It seems that Dharmakīrti in the segment of verse 5d–6d advances an objection and formulates its refutation. However, the objection amounts to the charge that the concept of *pramāṇa* has not been sufficiently narrowed down in the previous context, i.e. the objection says that the specification of *pramāṇa* which has been offered in the preceding passage is not restrictive enough, that it leaves room for classifying as *pramāṇa* entities which should not be classified as such, and Dharmakīrti's reply appears to be that this reproach is not justified because his remarks should be understood in a way which guarantees the desired exclusion and required restriction. This is also the way in which Franco and other commentators and scholars have understood this textual

segment. But why should the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi have made such a remark, if he did not deem it necessary that his specification should be restrictive enough in order to meet the requirement of a sufficient condition? It seems therefore that there are internal textual reasons for presuming the wish of providing a definitional elucidation of the *pramāṇa*-concept on the part of the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi. Accordingly, Franco's suggestion that the traditional commentators were led to such a supposition exclusively or mainly by the desire to read a definition into this textual passage, because for systematic reasons they felt a need for a general definition of means of knowledge and could not find any such account in any other of Dharmakīrti's works, can hardly be correct.

IV

The prospects of giving a satisfying account of the initial segment of the Pramāṇasiddhi on the basis of the assumption that it contains a specification of only necessary conditions of the concept of *pramāṇa* appears generally very dim. It seems therefore advisable to investigate whether that assumption cannot be proven as unfounded.

Let us first look at the qualification *ajñātārthaprakāśa*. Franco's careful study of the commentarial tradition informs us that even Devendrabuddhi noticed the problem that this specification might not be restrictive enough and that he claims that cases of illusions like the double moon etc. should be understood as being excluded by virtue of the component *-artha-* = "object." Franco qualifies this explanation as ingenious and he provokes the impression that he intends to convey that it is ingenious but not true. But in fact Devendrabuddhi's interpretation appears quite natural and plausible, and there is no reason to discard the assumption that it was indeed Dharmakīrti's intention to indicate by the choice of *ajñātārthaprakāśa* instead of the formulation *ajñātaprakāśa*, which could have been also possible otherwise, precisely that which Devendrabuddhi takes to be indicated.

Regarding the other qualification represented by *avisaṃvādi (jñānam)* the situation is a bit more complicated. Nevertheless there are a number of ways of averting the danger of lack of specificity which represent solutions that are preferable to the one suggested in Franco's paper. First it could be accepted that the expression *avisaṃvādi (jñānam)* does not represent a qualification which is specific enough in order to yield a sufficient condition of *pramāṇa*-hood and at the same time maintain that it is not this expression in particular but the entire textual passage of verses 1–5b which represents the first alternative definition. The expression *avisaṃvādi (jñānam)* would thus function as a first approximation in the form of a specification of a necessary condition which would be further specified in the subsequent context, in particular by the remark of the first half of the third verse *gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāṃvṛtam*, which, irrespective of the precise import of the expression *sāṃvṛtam*, implicitly conveys that something that apprehends an already apprehended object should not count as *pramāṇa*. Dharmakīrti's procedure would thus be similar to that of *utsarga* and *apavāda* in grammar. Secondly, one could accept the view of Dharmottara according to which *avisaṃvādi* in fact implies that a means of knowledge has an unapprehended object. Franco cites a pertinent passage of Dharmottara's commentary on the *Nyāyabindu*. Although he first introduces this text as representing a solution to the problem, he later seems to regard Dharmottara's account as insufficient for settling the issue. However, there

is no need to suppose that Dharmottara's remarks in the *Nyāyabindu*-commentary account for *all* the problems connected with the topic of definitions of *pramāṇa*. Why should we not assume that Dharmottara at least shows the way how the specific problem of the imminent danger of lack of sufficient restrictiveness can be solved? There is nothing in Franco's paper which refutes this possibility. Nevertheless, one can account for the apparent lack of specificity even if one does not want to accept one of the previous alternatives. We had already referred to the passage of verses 5c–6d which are obviously dedicated to the objective of refuting a charge of insufficient restrictiveness. On account of the position of the text one might be inclined to connect this passage with the second alternative explication, represented by *ajñātārthaprakāśo* in particular. But on a closer look it turns out that this is by no means imperative; one could associate the remark equally well with the first explication either in combination with the second one or even exclusively. This means that we should connect the word material of *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe yaj jñānam* at least also with the first explication represented by *avisaṃvādi jñānam*. But this opens the possibility of reading the first explication as equivalent to *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam avijñāte svalakṣaṇe yaj jñānam* or *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam avijñāte svalakṣaṇe*, and we would interpret the remark of the passage of verse 5c–6d as telling us that the first explication should be read in that way. But now the problem of the possible non-exclusion of the cognition of something cognized before vanishes because the import of the explication can be taken as conveying that a *pramāṇa* is a cognition which does not belie with respect to a *svalakṣaṇa* which has not been cognized [before by some numerically different means of cognition]. Since, by assuming a *locativus absolutus* in this case, it is equally possible to connect the phrase *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe yaj jñānam* or *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe* with the expression *ajñātārthaprakāśo*, which represents the second elucidation, this complement is suited to ban the danger of a possible insufficient specificity even with respect to the second explication. Its import would accordingly be that a *pramāṇa* is a cognition which is an illumination of an unapprehended object if/when a *svalakṣaṇa* has not been apprehended or that a *pramāṇa* is is an illumination of an unapprehended object if/when a *svalakṣaṇa* has not been apprehended.

V

If it is true that the initial section of the Pramāṇasiddhi presents us with two explications of *pramāṇa* in the form of both necessary and sufficient conditions, one might wonder why the disjunctive particle *vā* and not some expression with a conjunctive import has been employed in order to connect the alternatives. It is not difficult to find an answer. If a conjunctive particle, e.g. *ca*, had been employed, the suggestion would have been conveyed that the specification of sufficient conditions is at stake. In this case it would have been natural to interpret the passage as saying that, firstly, every not belying cognition with respect to an unapprehended particular is *pramāṇa* and, secondly, everything which is an illumination of an unapprehended object is *pramāṇa* and that, thirdly, like the two preceding items also the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*. But it was essential for the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi that the issue is not merely the enumeration of three conditions of *pramāṇa*-hood or of various types of *pramāṇa*, but to make explicit the relationship between the way in which the Buddha can be classified as a *pramāṇa* and the notion of *pramāṇa* in so far as it is employed in the context of epistemology. Probably we should assume that

Dharmakīrti's point was that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* inasmuch as two attributes are true of him which correspond to the result of a subtraction of the component "cognition" = *jñāna* within two both necessary and sufficient specifications of *pramāṇa* in the epistemological sense. By the employment of the particle *vā* it is made explicit that the two concerned specifications are in some respect equivalent and could be employed as alternatives for an explication of *pramāṇa*. Thus the occurrence of *vā* is not only compatible with but even supports the assumption that the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi intended to provide, among other things, definitions of *pramāṇa*.

Concerning the question as to whether two and not merely one explication has been presented in the present text, various answers can be given which do not necessarily exclude each other. First, even if the specifications represented by *avisaṃvādi* and *ajñātārthaprakāśo* were equivalent in the sense that exactly the same ranges of objects are subsumable under them, they are not conceptually identical and their equivalence is not trivial or self-evident. Consequently any enterprise of conveying *that* they are equivalent and that they can be alternatively used for the purpose of specifying the concept of *pramāṇa* is pragmatically adequate. Second, one might accept the suggestion which is to be found in the texts of a number of the traditional commentators to the effect that both elucidations do not amount to exactly the same thing. This holds good in particular with respect to the view that the two explications differ in that the first is applicable to empirical and the second to absolute or also to absolute reality. Thus the two specifications might not be extensionally equivalent, and Dharmakīrti's definitional enterprise could be paraphrased by expressions of the form: "*Pramāṇa*, in so far as it relates to empirical reality, is equivalent to F, and *pramāṇa*, in so far as it relates (also) to absolute reality, is equivalent to G." It should be maintained against Franco that such a reading is not linguistically eccentric, and it does not militate against the employment of *vā*. Thirdly, one could suppose that both alternative specifications *are* equivalent in Dharmakīrti's eyes, but that nevertheless the fact of their equivalence depends on certain theoretical assumptions, in particular epistemological theorems. More specifically, the first definition could be considered as tailored to Dharmakīrti's own theoretical assumptions whereas the second alternative represents a more general explication. Even if we assume that the phrase *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe (yaj jñānaṃ)* should be connected with both definitions the resulting specifications are strictly speaking not equivalent without further theoretical assumptions. In order to guarantee an equivalence between a) 'cognition which is not belying with respect to a particular that is not apprehended' and b) 'illumination of an unapprehended object if/when a particular is not apprehended', it must be at least assumed that there are no other types of objects than particulars in the sense of *svalakṣana* or that a cognition of any other type of object than particulars must always be preceded by a cognition of some (corresponding) particular. Moreover, it might be—although it appears difficult to establish this with certainty—that the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi in some more or less intuitive manner grasped the fact that the one-place predicate 'is a *pramāṇa*' can be related to and derived from a relational notion '*x* is a *pramāṇa* with respect to *y*' and that the first elucidation is better suited to establish a link to this relational concept than the second one, so that Dharmakīrti adduced the latter one as a more traditional counterpart of his own favoured explication represented by the first definition. At any rate, *theoretically* at least, the establishment of a link between a one-place *pramāṇa*-predicate and a relational notion would be appropriate in the framework of Dharmakīrti's theory. Because

of the theorem of *svasaṃvedana* certain object-related cognitions like remembrances are not a *pramāṇa* with respect to their objective component if this is a really existing object cognized before, but the theory demands that such cognitions should be *pramāṇa* with respect to those cognitions themselves.

RESPONSE TO CLAUS OETKE'S PAPER

by

Eli Franco, Hamburg

First, I would like to thank Professor Katsura for giving me the opportunity to respond shortly to Professor Oetke's paper "The Disjunction in the Pramāṇasiddhi." This response (as well as Oetke's response to it) seems worthwhile to me not only because this controversy is likely to clarify certain points and hopefully advance our understanding of the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, but also because Oetke does not represent my position faithfully.

Oetke's main point, if I understand him correctly, is that Pramāṇasiddhi 1a and 5c should be interpreted as referring to either necessary and sufficient conditions or at least sufficient conditions for being *pramāṇa*. This, he seems to believe, refutes my suggestion that Dharmakīrti did not intend to define *pramāṇa* in general. However, my contention does not depend on the assumption that 1a and 5c refer only to necessary conditions, and this is the main point in which Oetke misunderstands me. The basic question I raised was not whether the statements in 1a and 5c could be read as definitions; in the same paper I showed how Dharmakīrti's commentators had done so, and in this respect Oetke beats the air. The question I asked myself was whether Dharmakīrti intended to define *pramāṇa* in general or whether he only intended to show that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*. It is true that I arrived at my hypothesis that the latter is the case by reading 1a and 5c as formulations of necessary conditions (and this, I believe, is the more natural reading[1]). However, my resulting suggestion does not rest on the assumption that 1a and 5c refer only to necessary conditions. To make this point clear, let it be assumed, only for the sake of argument, that Oetke is right, i.e., that 1a and 5c refer to sufficient or necessary and sufficient conditions of *pramāṇa*; does it follow from this that Dharmakīrti intended to define *pramāṇa* here? I

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[1] This is not only my individual intuitive impression; cf. e.g., *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* 30,16: *tathāpy ajñā[n]<t>ārthagrahaṇena gṛhītagrāhipratyayaḥ śakyaḥ parihartuṃ nāvisaṃvādigrahaṇena tatrāpy avisaṃvāda-grahaṇāt.* "Even so, [the second definition is not superfluous, because] by the employment of [the word] 'unapprehended object' a cognition which apprehends an apprehended object can be rejected [from the realm of the definition, but] not by the employment of [the word] 'non-belying', because non-belying is apprehended even in [the case of a cognition that apprehends an apprehended object]."

Furthermore, the qualification of *pramāṇa* as apprehending a non-apprehended object was also adopted by the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas, and they too clearly understood it as a necessary condition; cf. *Śāstradīpikā,* ed. Kiśordās Svāmī (Varanasi, 1977), p. 71,10–12: *etac ca viśeṣaṇatrayam upādadānena sūtrakāreṇa kāraṇadoṣabādhakajñāna-rahitam agṛhītagrāhi jñānaṃ pramāṇam iti pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ sūcitam.* "And the *Sūtrakāra*, inasmuch as he appropriates these three qualifications, has indicated the [following] definition of *pramāṇa*: *pramāṇa* is a cognition which is free from faults in the causes and from a sublating cognition [and] apprehends a non-apprehended [object]."

As an afterthought it occurred to me that my interpretation of the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter is somewhat similar to Kumārila's interpretation of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4 as not containing a definition of perception, whereas Oetke's interpretation resembles that of the Vṛttikāra.

think not. My main reason for assuming that Dharmakīrti did not intend to define *pramāṇa* in general is the absence of such a definition in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu.* In other words, if Dharmakīrti had wanted to define *pramāṇa* in general at the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, he would have repeated his definition, maybe in a modified form, in the systematic presentations of his epistemology. To further substantiate this hypothesis I pointed out that no philosopher before Dharmakīrti had attempted to define *pramāṇa* in general and that the topic of the general validity of cognitions had become central to Indian philosophers only after Dharmottara. In his conference presentation, as well as in the slightly enlarged version of it printed in the present volume, Oetke completely ignores these corroborative points in particular and the broader historical context of Dharmakīrti's statements in general. Consequently, his treatment of Dharmakīrti is, as is often the case with analytical philosophers, ahistorical and anachronistic. After his presentation I asked Oetke several times why, in his opinion, Dharmakīrti did not define *pramāṇa* in general in the above mentioned works. The only reply I have received so far is the mildly amusing statement that Dharmakīrti was not a professor of Indology and therefore did not have to repeat himself. If Oetke remains satisfied with this reply, I shall prefer not to continue the debate on this point.

I would like to turn now in some detail to Oetke's points of criticism in the order in which they appear. First, Oetke claims that my remarks on the logical properties of the particle *vā* "obfuscate" the issue because whether *vā* should be understood in an inclusive or an exclusive sense is irrelevant to the problem. I agree that this question becomes relevant only after the truth of at least one of the two propositions connected with *vā* has been ascertained, i.e., after the two propositions have been examined as to whether they refer to necessary or sufficient conditions. Nevertheless, I cannot see why, in my introductory remarks on the general problem seen here by commentators and scholars alike, I should not also look at the two possible intended senses of *vā* under the assumption that Dharmakīrti indeed named two sufficient conditions here. Further, Oetke chastises me for not taking into consideration the distinction whether *vā* connects verbal phrases of the same sentence or whole sentences. First of all, this distinction which seems important to Oetke ("must be observed") was not addressed by me because the former alternative is hardly justifiable on the basis of the grammatical structure of the present passage. Neither Oetke, nor I,[2] nor, to my knowledge, anybody else ever assumed that 1a and 5c should be understood as parts of a single sentence. As long as the overall grammatical structure of the relevant passage does not warrant the possibility of interpreting its propositional structure in an alternative way the introduction of such a distinction seems pointless to me. Second, it is not clear to me why Oetke claims that my remarks against assuming an exclusive sense would be valid only as regards the first type of connection because very often, and also in this case where obviously no quantifier or negation is involved, disjunctive coordination of verbal phrases with "or" is logically equivalent to disjunctive coordination of clauses. Perhaps he would like to clarify this point in his response and also to explain why he does not illustrate the two alternatives in a parallel manner. Third, it has to be noted that some native speakers of English feel that the difference between "*pramāṇa* is

[2] Cf. the addition of "[a means of valid cognition]" in my translation of 5c which makes my understanding of the propositional structure more than clear.

a non-belying cognition or the illumination of an unapprehended object" and "*pramāṇa* is a non-belying cognition or *pramāṇa* is the illumination of an unapprehended object" is precisely that in the second case the disjunction is exclusive. Thus, my brief remarks are not completely disconnected from the issue at hand, as Oetke suggests to the reader. Oetke's next criticism concerns the aspect mentioned by me that, according to some logicians, *vā* does not formally have an exclusive sense. Contrary to what Oetke implies I did not claim or even wish to imply that this *formal* aspect excludes the possibility that due to *internal* reasons Dharmakīrti intended an exclusive sense in the relevant passage.

Perhaps at this place a word should be said about Oetke's tone. While welcoming debates and controversies, I think we should not confuse sharpness of argument with sharpness of expression. In p. 246 Oetke refers to the suggestion proposed by Katsura and others to interpret *vā* in a conjunctive sense. I too disagree with this interpretation, but I do not see the point of calling it "preposterous." Oetke's propensity to use "strong words" leads him also to distortions which are, to be sure, unintentional, but nevertheless unfair. Thus, referring to Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of *vā*, he says (p. 250): "It should be maintained against Franco that such a reading is not linguistically eccentric," but all I said is that this interpretation "is not really convincing" (*Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, p. 50). I still think that it is not convincing, and even Manorathanandin, who usually follows Prajñākaragupta, did not think it to be so. Further, although it is not my task here to defend Lindtner's paper it is clear that Oetke does not do it justice. Lindtner does not question the assumption that Dharmakīrti intended to define *pramāṇa*, and Oetke basically criticizes him for not answering questions that he (Lindtner) did not raise in the first place.[3]

Oetke claims (p. 247) that my "proposal invites us to assume an argumentation on the part of the writer of the Pramāṇasiddhi which is formally analogous to the claim that the Buddha is an Eskimo because he is a featherless biped." This statement could only be made by a logician who has lost sight of the way people use language. In many contexts it is not inappropriate to say that, to remain with Oetke's example, an Eskimo is someone who lives in an igloo and hunts polar bears, even though some non-Eskimos may also live in igloos and not all hunters of polar bears are Eskimos. One may use a property which is *typical* for Eskimos to characterize them even though it may not be a necessary and sufficient condition for being an Eskimo. In what other way could Dharmakīrti be expected to show that the Buddha is *pramāṇa* if no one before him had defined *pramāṇa* in general, if he himself had no intention to define *pramāṇa*, and moreover if he was looking for a formulation that could in some sense be acceptable not only to himself but also to his Brahmanical opponents? It is only natural that he should mention characteristics that were widely associated with and typical of the *pramāṇa*s. Of course, Dharmakīrti's position would

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[3] In this connection I would like to rectify Lindtner's statement (p. 157) that according to Siddhasena "*pramāṇa* is in need of no further definition." Siddhasena does define *pramāṇa*; cf. *Nyāyāvatāra* 1ab: *pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādhavivarjitam*. The statement which is quoted by Lindtner says that the individual *pramāṇa*s such as *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* need not be defined. Siddhasena's definition of *pramāṇa* seems to presuppose a knowledge of Kumārila's concept of *pramāṇa*, and because the latter is a contemporary of Dharmakīrti it is probable that Siddhasena is later than Dharmakīrti as claimed by Steinkellner, but doubted by Lindtner.

have been stronger if he had named characteristics which are sufficient conditions or necessary and sufficient conditions; in this case no further problems would have arisen. However, he did not do so, or was unsuccessful in this attempt, because the more natural reading of 1a and 5c is to interpret them as referring to necessary conditions, and consequently all the commentators had to grapple with this problem and propose different solutions to it. Oetke's own interpretation of the text presents possible solutions to the problem, some of them inspired by the commentators' attempts to turn the necessary conditions into sufficient ones by implication, but this does not account for the final return to the assumption of necessary conditions and the ensuing rejection of the disjunctive meaning of *vā* by Manorathanandin as well as the later Tibetan tradition. This does not mean that Oetke could not explain this turnaround in the tradition if he cared to do so. As regards the understanding of the commentators' solutions to the basic problem within the framework of my own hypothesis, I argued that the commentaries are not faithful to Dharmakīrti's intention—which was *not* to formulate a definition—because after Dharmottara's work on general validity a new situation had arisen. This reasoning, of course, is not directly applicable to the case of Devendrabuddhi, but it nevertheless explains why Devendrabuddhi did not elaborate on this topic. The same could be said also about pre-Dharmottara texts which are not direct commentaries on Dharmakīrti's work, such as the *Tattvasaṅgraha*; and indeed Śāntarakṣita is more concerned with the topic of *svataḥ/parataḥ prāmāṇyam* than with that of general validity. In any case, whether 1a and 5c are referring to necessary or to sufficient conditions, it does not follow from either that Dharmakīrti intended to define *pramāṇa* in general.

Oetke also raises a "philological problem" that rests on the interpretation of verse 5d–6d whose function he takes to be a restriction of the scope of the specification formulated in 5c. It is easy to see that Oetke's argument begs the question. If 5c aims at the formulation of a specification of *pramāṇa* which is a sufficient condition, then 5d–6d could be interpreted as restricting the scope of the specification formulated in 5c. On the other hand, if 5c does not aim at such a formulation, then 5d–6d could just present an additional clarification. In this connection I would like to add that I have serious doubts about the usual interpretation of 5c–6d which I previously followed myself. 5d–6d reads as follows:

svarūpādhigateḥ param // 5 //
prāptaṃ sāmānyavijñānam avijñāte svalakṣaṇe /
yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ // 6 //

The usual interpretation of this passage, which is based on the commentaries, divides it into an objection (*svarūpādhigateḥ param // prāptaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam*) and its reply (the remainder of verse 6).[4] However, there is no indication in the passage itself of such a division, and the essential negation is strangely missing. If one attempts to read 5d–6d independently of the commentaries, one may translate it as follows:

[4] Accordingly 5d–6d may be translated as follows: "[Objection:] The cognition of the universal that is subsequent to the apprehension of the own form [of the particular] would be [a means of knowledge]. [Reply: No,] because [in 5c we] intend that [only] the cognition in respect to an unapprehended particular [is *pramāṇa*], for the particular is examined [here]."

"The cognition of a universal [in an inferential cognition] which has occurred as different from/ after the apprehension of the own form [of a particular is *pramāṇa*] because [in 5c we] intend that the cognition in respect to a non-apprehended particular [which also appears in an inferential cognition, albeit with a different form, is *pramāṇa*], for the particular is examined [here in connection with its two possible forms]."[5]

I interpret this statement in the light of *Pramāṇavārttika* III 53–54 which says that an inferential cognition which has a universal as its object is nevertheless a means of knowledge because it apprehends a particular with a different form, which is not the particular's own form (*tasya [svalakṣaṇasya] svapararūpābhyāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam*). However, Dharmakīrti's mode of expression in verse 5d–6d is too laconic to allow a definitive interpretation.

What about Oetke's own solution to the problem at hand? According to Oetke's first possibility outlined in section IV as regards 1a, [1] *avisaṃvādi jñānam* represents the specification of a necessary condition only. Oetke attempts to solve the problem that 1a may thus not state a sufficient condition by itself by assuming that the entire textual passage 1–5b represents the first definition. This suggestion seems highly improbable, and Oetke does not advance a single argument to support it. In fact, with the exception of 3a he does not even attempt to show how 1b–5b are relevant to his purpose. Further, his suggestion that Dharmakīrti's procedure could be "similar to that of *utsarga* and *apavāda* in grammar" is pure speculation. I am not familiar with any case in which an Indian philosopher proposed a definition in such manner, neither of *pramāṇa* nor of anything else. Perhaps Oetke can supply in his response some instances to substantiate his claim.

Oetke continues by suggesting that [2] we may also follow the view of Dharmottara according to which 1a implies 5c, an interpretation which similarly to Oetke's first suggestion aims at providing a restriction of the specification named in 1a by use of subsequent statements. In this connection Oetke claims that Dharmottara did not solve all problems connected with the topic of the definitions of *pramāṇa*; which problems he has in mind he does not say. Maybe he would like to specify them in his response. In any case, this interpretation is also improbable. Dharmottara's suggestion is a brilliant move of a commentator who attempts to read a later theory into an earlier venerated text. However, if we assume that the implication suggested by Dharmottara was already intended by Dharmakīrti, we would also have to assume that Dharmakīrti did not care to be understood by his readers and perhaps even purposely misled them. Besides, it should not be overlooked that Dharmottara's commentary is on the *Nyāyabindu*; thus, great care should be exercised when one uses his comments to derive his direct, word-for-word interpretation of specific passages in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

Further Oetke proposes that [3] one should associate the words *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe yaj jñānam* in 6b–c for the purpose of restriction [3a] with 5c, or even [3b] with 1a either in combination with

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[5] I proposed this interpretation in my summary of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter prepared for Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Although this summary was written in the early nineties it is still not published and, given the speed of publication of other volumes of the *Encyclopedia*, it will not be published in the near future. I therefore take this opportunity to repeat it here.

5c or [3c] with 1a exclusively. However, I fail to see that, in interpretations [3b] and [3c], 6b–c can be associated "equally well" with 1a. No matter if one accepts the commentatorial interpretation of verse 5d–6d or my suggested reading (cf. above), the remark in 6b–c refers first of all to 5d–6a; next one could interpret it as referring back also to 5c which is the starting point of the clarifying discussion in 5d–6d. To connect 6b–c additionally, to say nothing of exclusively, all the way back to 1a seems to be far-fetched and certainly not "equally" possible. I also wonder whether Oetke took into consideration that the semantic stress on *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe* would have to shift from *svalakṣaṇe* to *avijñāte* to make the remark meaningful in association with 1a. Moreover, the first Sanskrit sentence construed by Oetke to clarify his reading of 1a in association with the complete relative phrase 6b–c is syntactically awkward, if not impossible in regular Sanskrit prose. Next Oetke modifies his proposal [3c] (and [3b]?) and suggests that only 6b, *i.e.*, *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe*, should be connected with 1a. Oetke concludes his deliberations on this topic by suggesting that *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe* could also be understood as a locative absolute and thus be associated, either alone or together with *yaj jñānam*, not only with 1a (and there, too, as a locative absolute?), but also with 5c in order to provide a sufficient restriction also of the specification named there [3b]. However, I gather that this latter connection of *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe* also with 5c would only have to be assumed if one does not follow Devendrabuddhi's attempt to arrive at a sufficient restriction because at the beginning of section IV Oetke considers his interpretation to be "quite natural and plausible."

Moreover, Oetke's explanation as to why Dharmakīrti connected the two definitions with *vā* rather than with a conjunctive particle such as *ca* is not at all convincing. It is simply not the case that if he had used, *e.g.*, *ca* instead of *vā* it would have been "natural" to interpret the passage as an "enumeration of three conditions of *pramāṇa*-hood or of various types of *pramāṇa*"; the third condition would presumably be Buddhahood, or the third type everybody who is a Buddha. Oetke argues as if 7a would be connected to the preceding words by a simple *ca*, and not by *tadvat* which first of all points at a comparison. Further, I fail to grasp why the very employment of *vā* supports the assumption that Dharmakīrti intended to provide two definitions of *pramāṇa*. I could easily reformulate Oetke's argumentation to fit my own assumption that Dharmakīrti intended to provide two characteristics typical of *pramāṇa*.

Now, the final question arises if Dharmakīrti, according to Oetke, really proposed two definitions and not merely one. Oetke gives four different answers to this question. His first answer is that although the two definitions refer to the same range of objects they are not conceptually identical. Thus, the employment of *vā* has the pragmatical purpose to indicate their equivalence which is not self-evident. This "enterprise," as Oetke grandly calls it, is theoretically possible, but it would be rather unusual for the historical period with which we are concerned. In Dharmakīrti's time, in contradistinction to the Navya-Nyāya period starting with Udayana when proposing more than one definition for the same "thing" had become a playful activity, it was not common to propose two definitions. I invite Oetke to inform us in his response about a parallel case in order make his suggestion more plausible, if indeed he thinks that it is plausible and not merely possible. Oetke's second suggestion basically repeats Prajñākaragupta's interpretation. I already mentioned above that I do not consider this interpretation "linguistically eccentric," but nevertheless it seems improbable to me. Neither here nor to my knowledge elsewhere in Dharma-

kīrti's writings are there any indications to the effect that he intended the first explication of *pramāṇa* to be applicable only to empirical reality, and the second (also) to absolute reality, and that he himself used the two explications with this distinction in mind. Oetke's third explanation suggests that the first definition is "tailored to Dharmakīrti's own theoretical assumptions whereas the second alternative represents a more general explication," although with the addition of Dharmakīrti's own epistemological assumptions the second alternative can become equivalent to the first. This partially dovetails with my own hypothesis that Dharmakīrti formulated the two characteristics intentionally in such a way that they could be acceptable in one sense to himself, in another to philosophers of different persuasions; unlike Oetke, however, I argue that this applies to both characteristics. Finally, Oetke proposes that the two definitions are equivalent but that the first one is more suitable to indicate the fact that the one-place predication of something as *pramāṇa* can be derived from a relational concept. Oetke himself admits that the last alternative is difficult to establish.

Neither here nor in the case of the various interpretations of 1a and 5c as referring to necessary and sufficient conditions does Oetke attempt to narrow down the philologically and logically possible readings to such which are most plausible within the wider historical context of Dharmakīrti's thought and within the conceptual framework of his works. Therefore, I can only concur with Halbfass' remarks on Oetke's *Bemerkungen zur buddhistischen Doktrin der Momentanheit des Seienden* (Wien, 1993): "Questionable, however, is the one-sidedness with which Oetke concentrates on the logical-analytical dimension of Dharmakīrti's thought pursuing thereby an ideal of precision that is prescribed (vorgegeben) by modern logic, but not by Dharmakīrti's own orientation and its historical context. Although rudimentary stages of wishing to understand historically and following attentively and carefully Dharmakīrti's thought are certainly present they are again and again superseded and covered over by free exploration of intellectual possibilities which is not so much concerned with what Dharmakīrti really has thought, but rather with what he could have or should have thought. One may be tempted to speak here of 'analytical overkill'. Greater precision pursued for its own sake leads by no means *eo ipso* to greater clarity and better understanding."[6]

[6] Cf. W. Halbfass, "*Arthakriyā* und *Kṣaṇikatva*: Einige Beobachtungen," in *Bauddhavidyāsudhākaraḥ: Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday,* ed. P. Kieffer-Pülz and J.-U. Hartmann (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1997), p. 237.

CLARIFICATIONS

by

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In order to facilitate assessment of the the pros and cons in our controversy I will only deal with the major issues. Accordingly, non-expression of dissent on certain points does not automatically mean consent. As I see it, the main weakness of Franco's response lies in a negligence of important systematic connections of the relevant issue and in disregard for the argumentative context in which some of my points appear.

Let us begin with a concise presentation of the principal problem. According to our analysis this is constituted by the circumstance that the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter poses a difficulty ensuing from a tension between the following facts: 1. The most important ancient commentaries on the relevant textual passage advocate the opinion that Dharmakīrti intended to provide definitions of *pramāṇa*. 2. The formulation of the textual passage entails *prima facie* difficulties for this interpretation primarily because the terms which might embody definitions appear to be applicable to items which should not constitute instances of *pramāṇa* according to Dharmakīrti. In addition to this two questions arise: A) Why did Dharmakīrti do that which he is supposed to have done according to some interpretation or the other? B) Why did Dharmakīrti do what he did in the way which is attested by the relevant textual passage and in no other way? I had assumed that to this extent our opinions do not essentially differ.

Concerning the principal problem two sorts of solutions are theoretically possible: I) One denies that 1) possesses decisive relevance and claims that the interpretations of the indigenous commentators are wrong. II) One disclaims that 2) possesses decisive relevance and maintains that the *prima facie* difficulties are not momentous enough in order to refute the view of the ancient commentators. Franco's proposal amounts to the approval of I), whereas my position involves a commitment to II). So far so good. Difficulties for Franco's view result from the specific implementation of I) which his proposal entails. It is precisely in this respect in which Franco's position does not seem fully thought through.

First we need to clarify a terminological point. Franco's "Response" suggests that he takes the expression 'define *pramāṇa* (in general)' in a more specific sense than 'furnish both necessary and sufficient conditions for *pramāṇa*'. It remains a bit nebulous which difference, in particular which semantic surplus, Franco associates with his notion of definition. In our case the matter is clear: 'providing a definition of . . .' has to be taken as equivalent to 'providing necessary and sufficient conditions for . . .'. The reason is *not* that we uncritically assume that this represents the most natural or only legitimate way of understanding the expression 'definition' and its cognates but that *for the present argumentative context* it is irrelevant whether one takes the term in this or in some more specific sense.

The impasse in which Franco's position leads results from the fact that according to his view

Dharmakīrti "only intended to show that the Buddha is *pramāṇa.*" Now, if Dharmakīrti had such an intention it must equally hold good that Dharmakīrti intended to show that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*. There is no doubt, however, that Franco admits that the passage of *kārikās* 1–6 mentions characteristics that were "associated with the *pramāṇas.*" But now we must ask: Are those "associated characteristics" equivalent to a) necessary conditions, b) sufficient conditions, c) both necessary and sufficient conditions or d) neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of being a *pramāṇa*? And let us also further ask: How can the act of mentioning the pertinent "associated characteristics" of *pramāṇa* possess any relevance for the aim of showing that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*? A most plausible answer to the latter question is: Mentioning characteristics of *pramāṇa* possesses such a relevance on account of the fact that if the Buddha also possesses these characteristics, there might be a basis for subsuming him under the concept of *pramāṇa.* I presume that Franco admits this too. At this place we must revert to the fourfold distinction. In the case of a) the reasoning would be analogous to the one in which one would infer that "the Buddha is an Eskimo because he is a featherless biped." This was the argumentative role of that example. If d) were assumed another example would be appropriate, e.g., one which results by replacing 'is a featherless biped' by 'drinks liquids' etc., but the character of the argument would remain essentially the same. Accordingly, in both cases Franco's position is inconvenient because it entails the ascription of too serious deficiencies in Dharmakīrti's reasoning. In case of b) my contention in the weaker form would be vindicated. If, however, the opponent assumes c) he would accept my contention even in the stronger form. There might be a way out which Franco does not mention in clear terms, as far as I see, but which could have been tacitly acknowledged by him: Dharmakīrti's aim is, strictly speaking, not to show that the Buddha *is* a *pramāṇa*, but that he can be *called 'pramāṇa',* i.e. the term *'pramāṇa'* can be applied to the Buddha. The basis for this possibility lies in the circumstance that the Indian tradition possesses the notion of a "metaphorical use" of terms and that a "metaphorical transference" can rely on properties which need not represent (necessary and) sufficient conditions of the non-metaphorical applicability of the concerned term.[1] The fact that this possibility could save Franco from the imminent dilemma in theory does of course not vindicate his thesis that Dharmakīrti's aim was not to define *pramāṇa.* But in order to refute the modified tenet other considerations would be required than the one adduced above. If Franco resorts to this modified version as what he "really intended" and if it proved to be tenable in the final analysis, my charge against him might boil down to the fact that he did not present the issue with the degree of accuracy which is needed in the present context.[2] On the other hand, I maintain that the above presented considerations are sufficient in order to show that the unmodified tenet is hardly suited for a solution of the initial problem.

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[1] This can be easily gathered from examples like calling a boy a "lion" on account of his courage which is (assumed to be) typical for lions.

[2] It is true that also according to the "traditional" view the application of the term '*pramāṇa*' to the Buddha must involve a transference from the original domain of cognitions (at least as long as one does not assume a "reduction" of the Buddha to cognitions). But this does not strengthen but weakens the plausibility of the modified tenet. For on the assumption that defining characteristics are presented the other qualifications apart from that of being a cognition would themselves constitute a sufficient basis for applying the term *pramāṇa* to the Buddha. But if one supposes that the pertinent characteristics are connected with the concept of *pramāṇa* in a looser manner the

The "textual" argument against the assumption that Dharmakīrti did not intend to define *pramāṇa* is not affected by the mentioned possibility of modification. But Franco's attempt of its refutation is not successful because it is based on a faulty view of the argumentative situation. Franco claims that my argument rests on the presupposition that "5c aims at the formulation of a specification of *pramāṇa* which is a sufficient condition" and that otherwise "5d–6d could just present an additional clarification." But the charge that the argument begs the question rests on a failure to grasp the argumentative import. It indeed relies on some presupposition, but not that Dharmakīrti intended to specify (necessary and) sufficient conditions—which would make the argumentation circular—but that the "traditional" interpretation is acceptable at least with respect to the import attributed to the expression *prāptam* in *kārikā* 6. According to this view the segment of 5d–6a refers to the fact that the presented specification of *pramāṇa*-hood is too wide, that, in other words, a consequence ensues which is characterizable by the technical term *ativyāpti*. Accordingly, my argument rests on the consideration that (1) a mention of the pertinent fact has no point if the question of the existence or non-existence of an *ativyāpti* is irrelevant in the present context and (2) that it appears hardly possible to attribute relevance to this question if Dharmakīrti's aim would lie in a mere adduction of characteristics which are connected with *pramāṇa* in a looser manner (e.g. if merely necessary conditions were at stake). It ensues from this that the "textual argument" can be countered *in principle* by showing that the "traditional" interpretation of the textual segment is wrong in the relevant respect. On this background the fact that Franco mentions in his "Response" a new alternative possibility of interpreting the concerned verse is by no means irrelevant—although I in Franco's position would not feel at ease if I had to resort to the proposed alternative reading in order to rescue my tenet. It deserves to be mentioned that Franco refers at this place to a mere possibility while at the same time accusing me of mentioning merely possible readings due to some misguided "analytical approach." I think it is fair to demand of him that he does not operate a double standard with respect to himself and other "analytical" colleagues. If I refer to possibilities I mostly do it on the same principles as those which could justify Franco's play with possibilities. The difference is mainly that I implement those principles in a more rigorous manner. Accordingly the relevant issue should be whether or not the increase of thoroughness and rigour is excessive, and I presume that this question calls for a differentiated answer.

Disregard of context and systematic connections characterizes also Franco's remarks on what I said in connection with *vā*. Without going into further detail I will confine myself to the following remarks: 1. In order to convey that *pramāṇa* can be alternatively defined as F or as G, i.e. that two alternative definitions are possible, an expression of the form '*pramāṇa* is F or (*pramāṇa* is) G' is not only possible but even the most natural way of putting the point. *In this*

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danger arises that the basis for the transference becomes too meager in order to make the "metaphorical" application of the pertinent term plausible. Moreover, if the purpose of the initial verses of the Pramāṇasiddhi was merely to justify a metaphorical application of '*pramāṇa*' to the Buddha the employment of the specification *jñāna* loses its point: For this purpose a mere reference to the qualification represented by *avisaṃvādi* would be sufficient and more appropriate. This is different if one adopts the "traditional" position rejected by Franco. These considerations are admittedly not yet decisive but they should suffice to show that a retreat to the modified tenet would not offer much comfort—at least not immediately.

regard the disjunction does not pose any problem. 2. The question of *vā* is of no decisive relevance for the initially mentioned problem in connection with a lack of specificity of the characteristics of *pramāṇa except if* one supposes that the particle conjoins verbal phrases. For under that hypothesis the issue of the import of *vā* possesses a bearing on the problem because, e.g., on the assumption of a conjunctive import the relevant characteristic would be decisively more specific. Therefore Franco's reproach that I play with irrelevant possibilities because a "phrasal reading" should be excluded as improbable from the outset is unfair. First, I am not so sure that the possibility should be excluded from the outset. Second, and more importantly, I referred to this possibility in order to acknowledge that Franco's discussions on the import of *vā might* be of relevance for the main issue. As a matter of fact, what Franco tries to discredit here is merely a case of applying the well known "principle of charity" in the context of the interpretation of Franco's statements. 3. I should clarify that the expression 'preposterous' was used in no connection with any name at all, but only with respect to two suppositions one of which was that *vā* can also convey the sense of a conjunctor. Nevertheless, if it is understood as a personal attack, I am ready to withdraw it.

My "mildly amusing" statement Franco refers to was indeed more rhetorical than argumentative. It was primarily a way of *expressing* my non-readiness to attribute decisive weight to the consideration that Dharmakīrti did not repeat the same statements elsewhere. But this does not mean that my reluctance cannot be supported by arguments. For it is by no means true that the fact that the author of the Pramāṇasiddhi did not say similar things again can *only* be explained on the supposition that he did not intend to define *pramāṇa* at the present place. Too many alternative explanations are equally possible. For example: 1. Dharmakīrti did not maintain when he wrote other treatises that *pramāṇa* can be defined in the way he suggested in the Pramāṇasiddhi. 2. Dharmakīrti felt an obligation to treat the issue of a general definition only because he intended to show at the present place that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*. At places where the issue of the *pramāṇa*-hood of the Buddha is not thematic, there was no *sufficient* motivation for Dharmakīrti to revert to the same topic again. (Note that according to our view it holds equally good that Dharmakīrti at the beginning of the Pramāṇasiddhi wanted to show among other things that the Buddha is *pramāṇa*). 3. Apart from the way of defining a term by reference to characteristics, a term can be also defined by reference to the things covered by it. It is quite plausible to suppose that at many other places at which some definition of *pramāṇa* is called for, the "designative" variant of definition which consists in expressing that *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* and only these are *pramāṇa* was or appeared to be more appropriate. At any rate, the *argumentum ex silentio* has no force if it is employed in a superficial manner, but requires a careful study of the pertinent textual passages in which a *pramāṇa*-definition can be called for and one has to pay due attention to the context of those passages.

I cannot dwell on the discussion of my proposals as to how the apparent difficulties for the traditional interpretation can be surmounted. Only the following points need to be mentioned: 1. I still think that above all the last mentioned variants among my proposals deserve to be taken seriously. 2. In view of the fact that the difficulties can at best be solved but not abolished it would be unfair to assess any solution on the background of plausibility-demands which could be appropriate if those difficulties did not exist at all. 3. The objective of the pertinent discussions is

not that the traditional interpretation must be definitely accepted as correct but that it is preferable to other accounts, in particular to the one proposed by Franco. 4. Franco is too ready to dismiss suggestions as "improbable" without providing satisfying justifications for his probability-assessments. 5. Even if Franco's aspirations that *all* my suggestions turn out to be improbable should be fulfilled, a hasty acceptance of his position would not be wise. In such a situation we should above all look for entirely new solutions.

Franco's remarks on the "logical-analytical approach" invite some comments because they are both inappropriate and irresponsible. First they are not necessitated by the pertinent argumentative context. But perhaps Franco wants to furnish an "explanation" of the alleged deficiencies as something which necessarily ensues from adopting an "analytical attitude." Second, the remarks unduly suggest an antagonism between two components which, as a matter of fact, should complement each other. Taking into account the "wider historical context" is not an antagonistic alternative to intensity of examination of individual textual passages. It is true that there is no relationship of entailment between encyclopedic breadth and analytical depth or vice versa. But I fail to see why the one must necessarily exclude the other. Many, if not the majority of Indian studies, in so far as they attempt to comply with one of those ideals at all, comply with the first quality at the expense of the second. The fact that the occurrence of encyclopedic breadth without pursuit of analytical depth has been widely accepted—and even appreciated—in the scholarly tradition shows that it is not commonly assumed that both qualities must always occur together. But if this is so, why is it not equally accepted that, the other way round, analytical depth can occur without encyclopedic breadth? It is not feasible to dismiss the thought with reference to holistic aspects of understanding. The thesis that absolutely nothing can be understood without taking into consideration the totality of historical context is preposterous—and here I am not willing to take back this expression. Why is it on principle illegitimate to fade out historical context to some extent in order to gain more precision and depth in detail? The possible reply that this leads to one-sidedness ignores the fact that science is a collective enterprise: It is incumbent on other members of the scientific community who lay more emphasis on historical context to counterbalance possible deficiencies ensuing from the emphasis on analysis of detail and vice versa. How misconceived sweeping dismissals of any form of emphasis on analysis are can be gathered if one merely considers the issue of finding out what an author of a textual passage has meant. In one sense of the term this amounts to grasping what some author *intended to convey* by the passage in question. However, the case that the producer of an utterance or textual passage expects that the possible addressees should consider what other persons have elsewhere said in order to grasp his intention is rather exceptional and only an excessive egomaniac would require that a hearer or reader must contemplate everything which he himself has uttered on other occasions in order to understand what he wants to say in the present situation. It ensues from this that the enterprise of identification of communicative intentions exhibits a considerable degree of autonomy and independence from "historical context." But even if the question of what some author of a text *believed* at the time he wrote some passage is at stake the exploitation of data pertaining to historical and biographical context is subject to considerable restrictions and limitations for principle reasons. This ensues from the fact that historical and biographical context does not exert a determinant influence on individual beliefs: Somebody

might possess unique opinions shared by no one else in his community or he might have radically changed his opinions during his life. (Russel, Carnap and Wittgenstein are pertinent examples in the field of philosophy). There is also another reason which forbids us to employ the idea of consideration of context in the crude way in which this is suggested on occasion: Our knowledge about context is bound to remain extremely limited if we deal with the interpretation of documents of past epochs. We (practically) never attain a position in which we can start from the assumption to know everything about context which could be relevant. Franco's as well as most other criticisms of the so called "analytical approach" ignore the crucial fact that its adoption is partially necessitated by this limitation: One of its most important functions in the context of textual analysis (though by no means the only one!) consists in the prevention of particular dangers ensuing from the very fact that we are bound to reason under incomplete information. In the final analysis, any more radical variety of rejecting analytical approaches is tantamount to depriving textual investigations its scientific character and academic status. For this reason sweeping enunciations of the *cliché* of the barren and ahistorical nature of the "analytical attitude" is extremely irresponsible. This holds good all the more because it can be expected that they will be widely applauded in fields where one is eager to find excuses for shunning the hardships of analysis.

BHARTṚHARI ON REPRESENTATIONS (*BUDDHYĀKĀRA*)*

by

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0. As is well known, Buddhist epistemologists posited as the *śabdārtha* a conceptual representation (*buddhyākāra*) from the viewpoint of appearance (*pratibhāsa*), an external individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) from the viewpoint of reification or judgement (*adhyavasāya*), and the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*), where others are either other conceptual representations or other external individuals. This is succinctly summed up by Jñānaśrīmitra in his *Apohaprakaraṇa* as follows:

> *śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate 'rthas*
> *tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyaḥ /*
> *arthaś caiko 'dhyāsato bhāsate 'nyaḥ*
> *sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścid //*[1]
>
> "First of all, an object (*artha*) is primarily conveyed by the word. In that case, *apoha* ('exclusion'), being subordinate to it [i.e., the object] (*tadguṇatvena*), is to be understood. And the object [is twofold]: One is posited as a denotatum (*vācya*) from the viewpoint of reification or judgement (*adhyāsa* = *adhyavasāya*) and the other from the viewpoint of appearance (*bhāsa* = *pratibhāsa*). [But] in reality (*tattvataḥ*) neither [of them] are [the denotatum of the word]."[2]

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[1] JNA 203. See Katsura [1986: 173]. As Katsura suggests it, the phrase *bhāsate 'nyaḥ* in the *pāda* c should be read as *bhāsato 'nyaḥ*.

[2] The purport of the whole verse is explained by Jñānaśrīmitra himself as follows:

JNA 232: *tad evaṃ katham apohaḥ śabdavācya iti praśne tadguṇatvena yathoktārthenety uttaram. atha buddhyākāraḥ svalakṣaṇam upādhayo vā kasmān na vācyā iti praśnaḥ, tad adhyavasāyasya pratibhāsasya ubhayasya cābhāvād iti krameṇa visarjanāni. yadā tu śabdaiḥ kiṃ vācyam ity anuyogaḥ, tadā pratibhāsād athādhyavasāyāt, yad vā tattvata iti vikalpya vikalpasthe 'nyāpoḍhākāraḥ* [Read *vikalpastho 'nyāpoḍhākāraḥ*], *anyāpoḍhasvalakṣaṇaṃ na kiṃcid iti prativacanāni krameṇaivety uktaṃ bhavati.* ("Thus, in this way, the following is meant [by the verse presented earlier]: If the question is put how it is that *apoha* is the denotatum of the word, then the answer is given that it is so, by saying *tadguṇatvena* in the sense as explained above. But if the question is raised why the conceptual representation is not a denotatum [of the word], why the individual is not so, or why [properties as postulated by non-Buddhists as] limiting factors [of an individual, such as *sattva* ('the property of being existent'),] are not so, then these [questions] are dismissed one after another by bringing forward the respective reasons of the absence of *adhyavasāya*, that of *pratibhāsa* and that of both. Pressed for an answer to the question of what is to be denoted by the word, we reply just one after another, by adducing alternative reasons, that it is, on account of *pratibhāsa*, a representation excluded from others which appears to a conceptual cognition; that it is, on account of *adhyavasāya*, an individual excluded from others; and that neither of them are [denotata], in reality.")

It is thus plain that a conceptual representation (*buddhyākāra*) and an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) are regarded as *śabārthas* from the viewpoint of *pratibhāsa* and from that of *adhyavasāya*, respectively. As Katsura [1986: 171] pointed out, Jñānaśrīmitra makes no original contribution to the development of the theory of *apoha*. Rather, he seems to wish to restore, if not Dignāga's *apoha* theory, then Dharmakīrti's, which had been modified within the

Bhartṛhari would agree with them, except on the last view, *anyāpoha*,[3] the notion of which,

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Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition itself by Dharmottara and criticized by the non-Buddhist (Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra). Therefore I take the present verse as faithfully reflecting Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory.

[3] By giving various interpretations of the phrase *tadguṇatvena* in the *pāda* b of the present verse, Jñānaśrīmitra considers the question of how *apoha* is to be treated as the *śabdārtha*. He seems to intend to cover all the aspects of the *apoha* Dharmakīrti conceives of and moreover tries to show that his arguments stem from Dharmakīrti himself. Broadly speaking, the interpretation is made in two ways: (I) By taking the compound *tadguṇa* as a *tatpuruṣa* and *tad* in the compound as referring to an object (*artha*) or the function of conveying an object (*arthākhyāna*); (II) by taking the compound as a *bahuvrīhi* and *tad* in the compound as referring to *apoha* or *vācya*. The interpretations of that phrase and respective quotations from Dharmakīrti's works to endorse them are as follows:

I. ***tadguṇatvena = arthaguṇatvena*** 1) JNA 203: *vidhau hi mukhyatayā pratipādyamāne tadviśeṣaṇatayopasarjana-tvena gamyata evāpohaḥ* ("For, when something positve (*vidhi*), as something primary, is conveyed, *apoha* is in fact understood, as something subsidiary to [it] (*upasarjanatvena*), because of being its qualifier (*tadviśeṣaṇatayā*).")—PV I 124ab: *niveśanaṃ ca yo yasmād bhidyate vinivartya tam.* In rendering the present verse, I adopted this interpretation of *tadguṇatvena.* 2) JNA 204: *dharmavācī vā guṇaśabdaḥ, anyāpohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya pratīteḥ* ("Or, the word *guṇa* [in the phrase *tadguṇatvena*] refers to the property (*dharma*), since something positive whose property is the exclusion of others is understood.")—[PV I 128: *tenavivāparamārtho 'sāv anyathā na hi vastunaḥ / vyāvṛttir vastu bhavati bhedo 'syāsmād itīraṇāt //* This verse is indeed not cited by Jñānaśrīmitra but the present interpretation is relevant to it.]

tadguṇatvena = arthākhyānaguṇatvena 3) JNA 206: *atha vā tasyārthākhyānasya guṇo ayam eva yad anya-niṣedhanaṃ nāma tenāsau gamyata iti vyavahartavyam.... etena tātparyārthatvam apohasya darśitam...* ("Or, it is this [i.e., *apoha*] that is a secondary thing (*guṇa*) to the function of conveying an object[, in other words, it is the *apoha* that is connoted by the word]; it [i.e., the object (*artha*)] is understood with that which is called *anyaniṣedhana* ('the negation of others'). This should be expressed [by the *pāda* b: *tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyaḥ*] ... By this [interpretation] is shown that *apoha* is the intended meaning (*tātparyārtha*) . . .")—PV I 96: *tadanyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti ca dhvaniḥ / ucyate tena tebhyo 'syāvyavacchede kathaṃ ca saḥ //* PV I 123: *vyartho 'nyathā prayogaḥ syāt taj jñeyādipadeṣv api / vyavahāropanīteṣu vyavacchedyo 'sti kaś cana //*

II. ***tadguṇatvena = *apohapradhānaśabdatvena*** 4) JNA 207: *yadi vā guṇyate 'bhyasyata iti guṇa upādeyo dharmas tena prādhānyam atra lakṣaṇīyam, tataḥ sa eva guṇo* [,] *'poha eva pradhānaṃ yeṣu śabdeṣu tadbhāvenāpoha eva... gamya ucyate...* ("Or, [the word] *guṇa* means what is multiplied or repeated (*guṇyate 'bhyasyata iti guṇaḥ*), and hence a property to be taken (*upādeyo dharmaḥ*). [Accordingly] by the [word *guṇa*] the state of being principal (*prādhānya*) is to be implicated here. Therefore, [the compound *tadguṇāḥ*] means those words for which the principal thing (*guṇa = pradhāna*) is nothing but the *apoha* (*tad = apoha*). [This is how the word *tadguṇatva*] means the state of being such [words] (*tadbhāvaḥ*). [As a result the *pāda* b *tatrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyaḥ*] means that, for those [words] (*tatra*) as those for which the principal thing is the [*apoha*], it is the *apoha* that is to be understood.")—PV III 172: *anyatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt kvacit taddṛṣṭyapekṣaṇāt / śrutau sambadhyate 'poho naitad vastuni yujyate //* PV I 132cd–133a: *vastudharmasya saṃsparśo vicchedakaraṇe dhvaneḥ // syāt satyaṃ sa hi tatreti /* PV I 185: *rūpābhāvād abhāvasya śabdā rūpābhidhāyinaḥ / nāśaṅkyā eva siddhās te vyavacchedasya vācakāḥ //*

tadguṇatvena = *vācyasthitadoṣaniṣedhaśabdatvena 5) JNA 207: *yad vā tasminn apohe paryudāsenāpoḍhākāre vā vācye sthito guṇo doṣaniṣedho yeṣāṃ śabdānāṃ tadbhāvenāpoḍha eva vācya ucyate.* ("Or, [the word] *guṇa* means the negation of a fault (*doṣaniṣedha*). [Hence the compound *tadguṇāḥ*] means those words with reference to whose denotatum, whether *apoha* or a representation excluded from others (*apoḍhākāra*) by way of limitational negation (*paryudāsa*), merits (*guṇa*) are determined. [Accordingly the word *tadguṇa*] means the state of being such [words]. [By this] is thus meant that, for those [words] as those with reference to whose denotatum merits are [determined], [the object] to be denoted by them [is to be understood] to be precisely what is excluded from [any reality] (*apoḍha = apoha*).")—PV I 169: *nivṛtter niḥsvabhāvatvān na sthānāsthānakalpanā / upaplavaś ca sāmānya-dhiyas tenāpy adūṣaṇā //*

These interpretations of *tadguṇatvena* reveal manifold aspects of the *apoha*. 1) Whenever something positive is conveyed by the word, *apoha* is invariably understood because of being subordinate to it (*upasarjana*) and hence being its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). 2) As a property (*dharma*) of something positive that is understood from the word, *apoha* has the relation of property and property-holder (*dharmidharmabhāva*) with it, though the relation is merely

needless to say, constitutes the central feature of Buddhist linguistic thought and was already known to him.[4] For Bhartṛhari provides the same frame of reference in considering what is the *śabdārtha* (i.e., *padārtha*) as opposed to the *vākyārtha* ('sentence-meaning').

Regarding the question of what could be assumed to be the *śabdārtha*, Bhartṛhari, in his *Vākyapadīya* II 119–142, mentions a *buddhiviṣaya*-view as one of the twelve views all of which can be properly attributed to Bhartṛhari because of his 'perspectivistic' attitude. In his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śabdārthaparīkṣā, Śāntarakṣita takes up and criticizes six of the views outlined by Bhartṛhari, and in doing so, he explicitly identifies the *buddhiviṣaya*-view with the *buddhyākāra*-view. Indeed, so close are these two views that Kamalaśīla feels compelled to distinguish them.[5]

In this paper I shall demonstrate that Bhartṛhari posits a *buddhyākāra* and an external individual as *śabdārtha*s from the same points of view as Jñānaśrīmitra mentions. Such a semantic position of Bhartṛhari is taken for granted by later Pāṇinīyas like Kaiyaṭa, Helārāja and Puṇyarāja but has not yet been traced back to Bhartṛhari's words themselves so far. As is well known, Dignāga, who is believed to have first advocated the *apoha* theory, is well acquainted with Bhartṛhari's linguistic thought. And moreover, he is a representationalist, as is shown by his theory of 'appearance' (*ābhāsa*). Naturally, Dignāga did know that the conceptual representation and the external individual were involved in verbal behavior. It is certain, therefore, that clearing up the situation in which Dignāga had to propound the *apoha* theory will give a new perspective of the so-called historical development of the *apoha* theory and stimulate Buddhists scholars to re-examine it.

The late Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal [1971: 33] once remarked in passing: "According to Bhartṛhari, the meaning of a linguistic expression is to be identified with the *vikalpa*, the

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conceptual. 3) As the intended meaning (*tātparyārtha*), *apoha* is connoted by the word. 4) *Apoha* plays the main role in verbal behavior in that the word-meaning relation is established mainly through *vyatireka* ('joint-absence') reasoning—which is known to have been emphasized by Dignāga, that the word is connected with a real entity through *apoha* and that a word for an unreal thing (*abhāvavāciśabda*) denotes *apoha*. 5) An entity posited by Buddhists as a denotatum of a word is excluded (*apoḍha*) from predicating something of the entity since it has no essence (*niḥsvabhāva*).

[4] Bhartṛhari was familiar with the idea that entities were excluded from one another, which Helārāja ascribes to Buddhists, as is shown by VP III, Jāti, v. 19: *anuvṛttirūpāṃ yāṃ prakhyātām ākṛtiṃ viduḥ / kecid vyāvṛttirūpāṃ tu dravyatvena pracakṣate //* ("Some consider [to be the universal] a representation (*ākṛti*) of a recurrent nature (*anuvṛttirūpā*) manifesting itself [in the mind] and regard [a representation] of an exclusive nature [manifesting itself in the mind] as the particular (*dravya*).") and v. 101: *anupravṛtteti yathā bhinnā buddhiḥ pratīyate / artho vyāvṛttarūpo 'pi tathā tattvena gṛhyate //* ("Just as a cognition which is dissimilar is known to be of a recurrent nature, similarly, an object is also understood to be so even though it is of an exclusive nature.") To argue this point would carry us too far away from the purpose of this paper.

[5] The portion in question of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* is dealt with by Hattori [1993ab]. In addition to the kārikās mentioned here, Śāntarakṣita adduces VP II 117 which states an idea that any linguistic item can become the cause of *pratibhā* ('intuition') through repeated practice, and criticizes the idea from the viewpoint that ultimately an object of *pratibhā* should be not an external entity but the difference (*bheda*), that is, *apoha* [TS 902–905]. I do not agree with Hattori [1993a: 139], who says: "All these seven views are repudiated by Śāntarakṣita. Neither TSP nor VPT inform us to whom or to which school these views are to be attributed." To be sure, neither Kamalaśīla nor Puṇyarāja tell us anything about it, but all these seven views are to be attributed to Bhartṛhari himself. In the kārikās of VP quoted by Śāntarakṣita, Bhartṛhari describes all possible factors involved in the denotation of an object by the word (*padārtha*) from different angles.

constructed image which is assumed as external reality. One can easily discover an echo of Buddhist idealism here: External reality is nothing but modes of consciousness externalized." To be sure, a parallel thinking is found between Bhartṛhari and Buddhist epistemologists, but one should not underestimate the fact that he is a Vaiyākaraṇa who is engaged in the investigation of language by means of its empirically verifiable observations. Even if the thought of Bhartṛhari has anything akin to that of Buddhists, it is possibly derived from what is immanent in Vaiyākaraṇas' approach to language. In this sense, rather, we may even consider that the germ of his thought is found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.*

In the pursuit of the above-mentioned aim, I shall try to understand Bhartṛhari's thought mainly from his *Vākyapadīya* and the *Vṛtti* thereupon so that internal evidence may be found in what Bhartṛhari himself says, avoiding heavily relying upon Helārāja and Puṇyarāja, who are post-Dharmakīrti Pāṇinīyas and who evidently know of Dharmakīrti.

1. In VP III, Sambandha, v. 1, Bhartṛhari declares that it is cognition *(jñāna, buddhi)*,[6] the external entity (*bāhyo 'rthaḥ*) and the word's own form (*śabdasvarūpa*) [i.e., the word itself] that are the elements indispensable for our speech behavior (*vyavahāra*).

[1] *jñānaṃ prayoktur bāhyo 'rthaḥ svarūpaṃ ca pratīyate /*
śabdair uccaritais teṣāṃ saṃbandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ //
"When words are uttered, the cognition of the speaker, the external entity and the word's own form are understood through them. The relation of these [with the word] is well-established."[7]

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[6] Puṇyarāja remarks that the words *sampratyaya*, *buddhi* and *vijñāna* are synonymous with one another. See Puṇyarāja on VP II 445.

[7] Helārāja explains that an external entity (*bāhyo 'rthaḥ*) is what brings about a certain effect or has causal efficacy (*phalasādhana*), and that the cognition of a speaker is what is in the form of his intention (*prayoktur abhiprāyaḥ*). On the point that Bhartṛhari holds the property of bringing about an effect to be nothing but the *śakti* ('capacity'), see Ogawa [1997; 1998].

Houben [1995: 149–150] interprets this kārikā, and especially the word *jñāna*, in a way which is not tenable. He says: "Unlike the other two elements, the third element [i.e., *jñāna*] understood from a word is something for which it is not so easy to find traditional support in the MBh." But here the term *jñāna* means a cognitive state (*buddhyavasthā*), which may be either a speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) or an appearance of a representation in cognition (*ākāra*). And as is well-known, a speaker's intention has a very important role to play in the grammatical theories of both Kātyāyana and Patañjali. (See Scharf [1995].) Moreover, this is not the only passage where Bhartṛhari draws on Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's notion of speaker's intention. In VP I 25 [cf. note 9], Bhartṛhari maintains that *śabda* bears both a causal relation and a signifier-significand relation to *artha*, an idea found both in Kātyāyana's vārttika to P 1.1.68: *śabdapūrvako hy arthe sampratyayaḥ* ('the understanding (*sampratyaya*) of the meaning is preceded by [the utterance of] the word') and in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (ad P 2.1.1): *arthakṛtena nāma śabdena bhavitavyam* ('Indeed, [the utterance of] the word should be based upon [a speaker's wish to convey] the meaning'). This satement of Patañjali is explained by Kaiyaṭa [*Pradīpa* on MBh ad P 2.3.50]: *arthasya pratipipādayiṣayā viṣayīkaraṇākaraṇābhyāṃ śabdasyoccāraṇānuccāraṇalakṣaṇau bhāvābhāvau* ("The presence or absence of linguistic items, which are characterized as their pronunciation or non-pronunciation, results from bringing to mind or not bringing to mind a meaning according to whether or not one wishes to convey the meaning.") We find a parallel statement to Kaiyaṭa's in MBh. Patañjali [MBh ad P 1.1.44] states: *arthagatyarthaḥ śabdaprayogaḥ. arthaṃ sampratyāyayiṣyāmīti śabdaḥ prayujyate* ("Linguistic items are used for the purpose of conveying the meanings [they denote]. With the intention, "I will cause a meaning to be understood [by a listener]," a linguistic item is used.") Thus Patañjali admits that there is a speaker's intention behind his utterance of a word. It is natural to suppose that when a listener hears a word a speaker has uttered, the listener considers that the speaker has used the word for the

It is highly important that Bhartṛhari here proposes, as what is understood from the word, the cognition side by side with the external entity. For this suggests that he has a theory which links the cognition and the external entity together as well as a theory of cognition which sustains that theory.[8] The first point to be investigated is therefore how Bhartṛhari conceives of cognition in this context.

To give a brief outline of Bhartṛhari's theory of cognition in connection with his linguistic theory: Bhartṛhari holds that there stands a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between verbal cognition and word; that cognition has a representation (*ākāra*, *rūpa*); and that cognition is of a self-cognitive nature (*svasaṃvedana*). What is crucial here is that a verbal cognition bears a causal relation to the word.[9] Concerning the causal relation between the cognition and the word, he states as follows:

[2] *śabdaḥ kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate /*
tathā ca buddhiviṣayād arthāc chabdaḥ pratīyate // (VP III, Sambandha, v. 32)
"The word is the cause of the *artha*, for it [i.e., the *artha*] arises from that [i.e., the word]; likewise, the word is understood [by the listener] from the *artha* which is a *buddhiviṣaya*."

When he says that the word is the cause of the *artha*, he naturally intends to mean that when one hears a word, the *artha* which is an object (*viṣaya*) of cognition (*buddhi*) occurs to the mind. Therefore, the *buddhiviṣaya-artha* is introduced here as a cause for uttering a word from a speaker's point of view, as well as an effect of hearing a word from a listener's point of view. Thus it follows that the cognition (*buddhi*) causally related to the word has a certain *artha* for its object and a causal aspect of the word-meaning relation (*śabdārthasambandha*) is closely linked with the notion of *buddhiviṣaya-artha*.

Now we have to take into consideration the following kārikā, which is quoted by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS 890) and taken as putting forward the view that a *buddhyākāra*, namely, a representation appearing to the mind, is a *śabdārtha*.[10]

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meaning he has wished to convey. By accepting the notion of speaker's intention, consequently, Patañjali assumes that it is what the speaker means, what he has in mind, his intention that one understands from words. Therefore we may say that we have traditional support in MBh for Bhartṛhari's addition of *jñāna* to the two other elements understood from words.

[8] From a different perspective, it is to be said that Bhartṛhari's attaching great significance to the role of cognition in verbal activities allows him to admit that *śabdārtha*s could be posited differently according to different systems (VP II 135: *svapratyayānusāreṇa śabdārthaḥ pravibhajyate*).

[9] According to Bhartṛhari, of the three elements understood from the word—i.e., cognition, the external entity and the word-form, to the cognition the word is related through a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*); to the rest of them through a signifier-significand relation (*vācyavācakabhāva*), that is, the relation of *yogyatā* ('potentiality'). He includes these relations in the eight topics (*aṣṭaka*) to be dealt with in VP and holds them to be essential factors for the understanding of the meaning of the word. The eight topics are mentioned in VP I 24–26. They are: Two kinds of meanings—*apoddhārapadārtha* ('abstracted meaning') and *sthitalakṣaṇārtha* ('meaning of a fixed character'); two kinds of words—*anvākhyeyaśabda* ('words to be grammatically analysed') and *pratipādakaśabda* ('words used for analysis'); two kinds of relations—*kāryakāraṇabhāva* and *yogyatā*; two kinds of purposes—*dharma* ('merit') and *pratyaya* ('understanding of meaning'). See Sharma [1987] and, for the notion of *yogyatā* as postulated by Bhartṛhari as the denotational relation, see Ogawa [1997].

[10] In his introduction to this kārikā, Kamalaśīla says as follows:

[3] *yo vārtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ /*
sa bāhyaṃ vastu iti jñātaḥ śabdārtha iti gamyate // (VP II 132)
"Or, the *artha* which is a *buddhiviṣaya* and which rests upon an external entity is understood to be a *śabdārtha*, when it is known as something external."

It is to be noted that in the kārikās of the *Vākyapadīya* the term *buddhyākāra* does not occur at all; instead, the term *buddhiviṣaya* ('an object of cognition') is used. The point made is that what is considered to be a *śabdārtha* is the *artha* which is a *buddhiviṣaya*, whose basis (*nibandhana*) is an external entity, and moreover, which is externalized. It is important to note here that the *buddhiviṣaya-artha* is treated as distinct from the external entity and as something to be judged to be external. Next we have to consider what the *buddhiviṣaya-artha* is.

2. Of the term *buddhiviṣaya* in the above-mentioned kārikā ([3]) Śāntarakṣita quoted from the VP, Kamalaśīla gives the interpretation that the word *buddhiviṣaya* means that which multifariously presents itself in the mind, in short, what occurs to the mind.[11] What Bhartṛhari means by that word is in essence not different from what is suggested by this interpretation. We will begin by considering the following kārikā.

[4] *śabdopahitarūpāṃś ca buddher viṣayatāṃ gatān /*
pratyakṣam iva kaṃsādīn sādhanatvena manyate // (VP III, Sādhana, v. 5)
"And besides, [a storyteller] regards as *sādhanas* Kaṃsa and others who appear as if they were present before the eyes, since their forms (*rūpa*) are created by words and hence become objects of cognition (*buddher viṣayatāṃ gataḥ*)."

By this kārikā is offered an interpretation of the following *Bhāṣya*.

[5] *te 'pi hi teṣāṃ utpattiprabhṛtyā vināśād ṛddhīr vyācakṣāṇāḥ sato buddhiviṣayān prakāśayanti /* (MBh on P 3.1.26)
"For those [storytellers] who relate the prosperity they [i.e., *Kaṃsa* and others] enjoyed from birth to end, too, reveal them to be present as objects brought to mind (*buddhiviṣaya*)."

With reference to the utterance *kaṃsaṃ ghātayati*, with which storytellers (*granthika, kathaka*) narrate the story of the slaying of *Kaṃsa* precisely as an event, Patañjali here proposes this *Bhāṣya* for solving the difficulty in justifying its time reference to present time. According to Patañjali, the time reference pertaining to this utterance is justifiable since the storytellers reveal them to be present as objects brought to mind; that is, those storytellers manifest them by words, although *Kaṃsa* and others do not exist in the external world because it has been a long time since they flourished. What we have to note here is that Kaṃsa and others, it is stated, become *buddhiviṣayas* by virtue of their forms (*rūpa*) appearing to the mind, which indicates that a

TSP on TS 891: *anye tu buddhyārūḍham evākāraṃ bāhyavastuviṣayaṃ bāhyavastutayā gṛhītaṃ buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvitam* [Read *buddhirūpatvenānāvirbhāvitam*] *śabdārtham āhuḥ.* ("Others, on the other hand, argue that the word-meaning is a representation arising in the very mind, whose object is an external entity and which is grasped as the external entity but which does not appear as the form of cognition.") Hattori [1993b: 370, 374] suggests reading *buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvitam* as *buddhirūpatvenānāvirbhāvitam*, following the Tibetan version.

[11] TSP on TS 891: *buddhiviṣaya iti. buddhau viparivartamānaḥ, buddhistha iti yāvat.*

buddhiviṣaya is a form appearing to the mind. And, as a matter of course, we should not overlook that Bhartṛhari explains the *Bhāṣya*'s phrase *ṛddhīr vyācakṣāṇāḥ* with the clause *pratyakṣam iva manyate*, so that he means to imply that the *buddhiviṣaya* is determined as distinctly visible.[12] This is important in that it gives a clue as to how a form present in the mind is to be connected with an external entity, which we shall touch on later.

In this connection, let us take up the following kārikā, which seems to show how the *buddhi* relates to the form (*rūpa*) that, being an object of cognition (*buddhiviṣaya*), is supposed to appear to the cognition.

[6] *buddhipravṛttirūpaṃ ca samāropyābhidhātṛbhiḥ /*
artheṣu śaktibhedānāṃ kriyate parikalpanā // (VP III, Sādhana, v. 6)
"And speakers, superimposing (*samāropya*) upon [external] entities a form associated with the function of cognition (*buddhipravṛttirūpa*), make an assumption that there is a variety of capacities (*śakti*) in them."

This kārikā explains that a single entity is spoken of as having a manifold capacity of functioning as agent, instrument and so on. It is somewhat difficult to understand what Bhartṛhari means by the word *buddhipravṛttirūpa* here. The interpretation given by Helārāja is as follows:

[7] *buddheḥ pravṛttiḥ vyāpāraḥ paricchedalakṣaṇaḥ / tasyā rūpam ākāro viṣaya ābhāsamānaḥ /* (Helārāja on VP III, Sādhana, v. 6)
"[The word *buddhipravṛtti* means] 'the function (*pravṛtti* = *vyāpāra*) of cognition', that is, the cognition's function characterized by determination (*pariccheda*). [Accordingly, the word *buddhipravṛttirūpa* means] 'a form connected with it [i.e., the function of cognition]', that is, a representation (*ākāra*) appearing [to the mind] as an object (*viṣaya*) of that [function]."

From this explanation one point becomes very clear: The *buddhi* has the function (*pravṛtti*) to determine (*pariccheda*) the form (*rūpa*) appearing to the mind.[13] This interpretation of the word *buddhipravṛttirūpa* is in conformity with the view put forward in the *Vṛtti* on VP I 123.

[8] *saṃvijñānapadanibandhano hi sarvo 'rthaḥ smṛtinirūpaṇayābhijalpanirūpaṇayākāranirūpaṇayā ca nirūpyamāṇo vyavahāram avatarati /*

According to the *Vṛtti*, all the entities that are made known by words capable of conveying them enter into verbal expression only if they are determined (*nirūpyamāṇa*); and there are three stages through which they come to be verbally expressed: 1) *smṛtinirūpaṇā* ('recollective determination'), by which an aspect of an entity is determined as interwoven with a certain word capable of conveying it, 2) *abhijalpanirūpaṇā* ('verbal determination'), by which it is determined as identical with the word, and 3) *ākāranirūpaṇā* ('representational determination'), by which a represen-

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[12] The *Vṛtti* on VP I 24–26 refers to the present *Bhāṣya* in order to illustrate the causal relation between word and meaning. Patañjali uses the term *buddhiviṣaya* in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P 1.4.109 also, where he makes a statement to the effect that a sequence of sounds is merely a mind-construct (*buddhiviṣayam eva śabdānām paurvāparyam*). Kaiyaṭa glosses the *buddhiviṣaya* with *buddhiprakalpita* ('that which is conceptually constructed').

[13] It is interesting to note here that in explaining the word *saṃvitrūpa* ('cognition-form') in VP III, Bhūyodravya, v. 1 Helārāja makes an alternative interpretation of the word *rūpa*: essence (*ātman*) or a representation (*ākāra*).

tation corresponding to the aspect is determined.[14] Of these three, it is explicitly dealt with by the following kārikā that the *ākāranirūpaṇā* is essential for the application of the word:

[9] *kevalānāṃ tu bhāvānāṃ na rūpam avadhāryate /*
anirūpitarūpeṣu teṣu śabdo na vartate // (VP III, Vṛtti, v. 475)
"The form of bare entities cannot be determined and the word does not occur to denote them if their form is not determined."

As Bhartṛhari argues, a bare entity cannot appear to the mind and hence is ineffable; in order for an entity to be spoken of as something it is absolutely necessary that its form should be determined. This amounts to saying that for the application of the word to an entity, the entity has to figure *as something*, 'something' standing for an aspect it is assumed to have. That is: Given a certain entity, to refer to it, the word 'pot' is used when the entity is cognized as a pot, and the word 'blue' is used when the entity is cognized as something blue.

Moreover, another kārikā is to be referred to, which states that a word does not reflect an entity as it is.

[10] *akṛtsnaviṣayābhāsaṃ śabdaḥ pratyayam āśrtitaḥ /*
artham āhānyarūpeṇa svarūpeṇānirūpitam // (VP III, Sambandha, v. 54)
"A word, being based on the cognition in which its object does not manifest itself in its entirety, denotes an object which cannot be determined by its own form and is determined by another form."

In this kārikā it is clearly shown that the cognition upon which speech behavior relies has the appearance of its object (*viṣayābhāsa*), though not total but merely partial. It is through this appearance of the object that the object comes to be denoted by a word. The object denoted by the word is thus what is determined in terms of its form which appears to the mind (*pratyayopārūḍharūpa*) and which results in being superimposed upon that object (*samāropitarūpa*).[15]

And further, it is beyond question that the terms *pariccheda* and *nirūpaṇā* mean the same

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[14] *Paddhati* explains that the *smṛtinirūpaṇā* is the recollection of an object along with a word which has a denotational relation to the object (*śabdānuviddhayā buddhyā smaryate idam evaṃ ca iti smṛtinirūpaṇā*); the *abhijalpanirūpaṇā* the identification of the word with the object (*śabdārthayor abhedadarśanam abhijalpanirūpaṇā*); the *ākāranirūpaṇā* the determination of a state of the object (*idam asyā sādhanam iyam eṣāṃ sādhyā ity ākāranirūpaṇā*). Note that the *ākāranirūpaṇā* as explained in the *Paddhati* leads us to understanding that if a given object is known as the accomplisher (*sādhana*), then it comes to be donted by a nominal (*subanta*); and, if it is known as something to be accomplished (*sādhya*), then it comes to be denoted by a verb (*tiṅanta*). Such an interpretation results from taking these stages as put in a certain logical order. It makes no difference how a given object is determined. The essence of the *ākāranirūpaṇā* lies in the determination of an object as *something*. For the interpretation of the *abhijalpanirūpaṇā*, see VP II 127cd, which is also quoted by Śāntarakṣita (= TS 888cd). *Paddhati* gives another interpretation, too, according to which the *smṛtinirūpaṇā* is simply the determination of cognition (*jñānasya nirūpaṇam*); the *abhijalpanirūpaṇā* the determination of the word (*śabdasya nirūpaṇam*); the *ākāranirūpaṇā* the determination of the object (*arthasya nirūpaṇam*).

[15] Herārāja on VP III, Sambandha, v. 54: *evam avidyāmāndyād vikalpānāṃ yathātattvam avasāyapāṭavābhāvāt samāropitarūpeṇāvasāyasya sarvavādibhir abhyupagatatvāt tadupadarśitaviṣayaviṣayāḥ śabdāḥ sarva eva bahirasadarthaviṣayāḥ pratyayopārūḍharūpābhidhāyinaḥ siddhā* ... It is worth pointing out that the commentators on VP repeat that words denote representations appearing to cognition (*pratyayopārūḍhākārābhidhāyināḥ śabdāḥ*). See, for example, Helārāja on VP III, Vṛtti, v. 474.

thing. For, Helārāja on VP III, Jāti, v. 109 treats the *pariccheda* as synonymous with the *nirūpaṇā*, saying that to determine an object is to determine it in the form that it is of such and such a form (*paricchinatti nirūpayati—evaṃrūpo 'yam arthaḥ iti*).[16] Viewed in this light, Helārāja's interpretation of the word *buddhipravṛttirūpa* as a form or a representation determined by the mind may be regarded as well-founded in Bhartṛhari's own system. Therefore we may say that the *buddhi* relates to the form appearing to the mind through its function of determination.

The following kārikā is noteworthy in that Bhartṛhari describes there the existential character of the *buddhiviṣaya*:

[11] *buddher viṣayatāṃ prāpte śabdād arthe pratīyate /*
pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā śrutyā hi artho 'nuṣajyate // (VP III, Vṛtti, v. 280)
"In regard to the *artha* which has become an object of the mind (*buddher viṣayatāṃ prāptaḥ*), one understands from a word its existence or non-existence. For it is such an *artha* that is connected with the word."

This kārikā states that the *artha* which has attained the state of being a *viṣaya* of *buddhi* enables one to have any affirmative or negative statement with reference to it. And such an *artha* is what is characterized as independent of its external existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*). The *buddhiviṣaya* thus has a relative independence to the external world, in other words, it has a mental existence (*upacārasattā*).[17]

It follows from what has been observed that, for Bhartṛhari, the *buddhiviṣaya-artha* is the form (*rūpa*) or the representation (*ākāra*) which appears to the mind; an object of the determina-

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[16] Helārāja repeatedly emphasizes here and there in his commentary on VP that without the determination (*nirūpaṇa*) by the *buddhi* anything cannot be verbalized (on VP III, Sādhana, v. 3: *yāvad buddhyā nirūpaṇaṃ nāsti tāvad aviṣayaḥ śabdānāṃ avyavahāryaḥ*) and that the word is applied to what is determined (on VP III, Sādhana, v. 3: *nirūpite 'rthe śabdaprayogād yathānirūpaṇaṃ śabdopapattiḥ;* on VP III, Sambandha, v. 54: *śabdasya ca nirūpitārthaviṣayatvāt*).

[17] See VP III, Sambandha, v. 39: *vyapadeśe padārthānām anyā sattaupacārikī / sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣām ātmarūpasya darśikā //*. ("In consequence of being designated, entities have their secondary existence (*aupacārikī sattā*), different [from their external existence]. [The secondary existence] shows the own form of all things in all states.") In Bhartṛhari's view, an external entity has a mental existence which is called *upacārasattā* ('secondary existence'), independently of the external existence of its own (*mukhyasattā*, 'primary existence'); when a representation of a certain entity appears to cognition, it can be said to be *existent* (Helārāja on III, Sambandha, v. 39: *buddhisamārūḍhārthākārarūpā sattā*). It is to be noted in passing that, in Bhartṛhari's system, the concept of secondary existence offers the key to what is called 'empty subject' problem.

What is more, the idea that the *buddhiviṣaya* is common to both existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*) or the one that the word-meaning is endowed with the secondary existence (*upacārasattāsamāviṣṭaḥ śabdārthaḥ*) is made use of by the Buddhist epistemologists in order to demonstrate that a conceptual knowledge does not have for its object an external entity. Jñānaśrīmitra, for example, states as follows:

JNA 212: *yaj jñānaṃ yatra bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇapratibhāsaṃ, na tena tasya viṣayavattvam, yathā gojñānasyāśvena. bāhye ca bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇapratibhāsaṃ vṛkṣavikalpajñānam . . .* ("With reference to a given entity, that cognition to which appears a representation common to its existence and non-existence does not have the entity for its object, just as the cognition of a cow does not have a horse for its object. With reference to an external [tree], there arises a conceptual cognition of a tree whose representation is common to its existence and non-existence. [Therefore, the conceptual cognition does not have the external tree for its object.] ") See Katsura [1986: 174] and PV IV 226, 228.

tion which leads to the denotational function of the word; and that which exists in independence of the external world. Besides, as indicated by the above-mentioned kārikā ([11]), it is clear that, when Bhartṛhari uses the word *artha* in construction with the word *buddhiviṣaya*, he intends to distinguish a *śabdārtha*, which is a *buddhiviṣaya*, from the one which is not. Considering what he says in VP III, Sambandha, v. 1 ([1]) and VP II 132 ([3]), the latter must be a *śabdārtha* which is an external entity (*bāhya*), being never treated as *buddhiviṣaya*.

Concerning the *buddhi* itself, a few remarks should be made. According to Bhartṛhari, both from a speaker's point of view and from a listener's point of view, the *buddhi* plays a key role in understanding the word-meaning and in uttering the word as well. Here, we have to take it into account that Bhartṛhari frequently states that *buddhyavasthā* ('a state of mind') is the basis of verbal expression (*vyavahāranibandhana*).[18] When a speaker utters a word, his *buddhi* assumes the form of *vivakṣā* ('the speaker's intention').[19] Therefore, the *avasthā* of *buddhi* means the state in which something meant is present in the mind (*vivakṣāprāpitasannidhānārtha*)[20], or the state in which manifold representations appear to the mind (*pratibhāsanānātva*).[21]

3. Now that we are sure that the *buddhiviṣaya* is the form or the representation appearing to the mind, the next step is to consider Bhartṛhari's representation theory itself. As is well known, in the history of the theory of knowledge in India, there are two opposing tendencies: One is marked by the theory that whatever object it grasps, cognition itself undergoes no change as if it were colorless and pure (*nirākāravāda*); and the other by the theory that cognition assumes the form of its object and thereby gets colored by the latter (*sākāravāda*). Then what is the case with Bhartṛhari?

He deals with 'purity'/'impurity' of cognition. Concerning the purity of the cognition he states as follows:

[12] *sarvārtharūpatā śuddhir jñānasya nirupāśrayā /*
tato 'pi asya parāṃ śuddhim eke prāhur arūpikām // (VP III, Sambandha, v. 56)
"Some say: To have the form of all objects, without [dependence on] a support [by the sense-organs and the like], is purity of cognition; when no form of objects figure in the cognition, its purity is still higher than [other purity]."

According to him, the purity of cognition has two stages, initial and final. Cognition is said to be 'pure', in the initial stage, for the reason that it has the form of all objects without dependence

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18 VP III, Sādhana, vv. 104–5; Vṛtti, vv. 569, 571, 624.

19 Cf. Helārāja on VP III, Sādhana, v. 105: *vivakṣārūpāyā buddheḥ* ('of the *buddhi* in the form of *vivakṣā*').

20 *Vṛtti* on VP I 13: *vivakṣā hi yogyaśabdanibandhanā. yogyaṃ hi śabdaṃ prayoktā vivakṣāprāpitasannidhāneṣv abhidheyeṣu pratyartham upādatte.* ("Indeed, a speaker's intention is based upon a word capable of [conveying a particular object]. For, insofar as [objects] to be denoted have obtained their presence in the mind through the speaker's intention, a speaker uses a separate word capable of conveying each object.")

21 Helārāja on VP III, Sādhana, v. 104: *buddher avasthā pratibhāsanānātvam.* According to Bhartṛhari, the *vivakṣā* is to be inferred from the word. Cf. VP III, Vṛtti, v. 198: *śabdād arthāḥ pratīyante* [Read *pratāyante*] *sa bhedānāṃ vidhāyakaḥ / anumānaṃ vivakṣāyāḥ śabdād anyan na vidyate //* ("Meanings are exhibited by the word. The [word] creates separate [meanings]. There is no means-of-inference (*anumāna*) for the speaker's intention other than the word." Rau [1977] reads *pratīyante*, but I follow Iyer's reading.) And the latter half of this verse is quoted

upon a support by the sense-organs, and in the final stage, for the reason that it is free from the appearance of the forms of the objects. What is important is that Bhartṛhari here points out that cognition advances towards the stage where it has no object-form from the stage where it has an object-form, which is naturally based upon the implicit assumption that cognition has a form or a representation.

By contrast, he continues to say, the 'impurity' of cognition consists in its assuming a particular form of an object.

[13] *upalavo hi jñānasya bāhyākārānupātitā /*
kāluṣyam iva tat tasya saṃsarge vyatibhedajam // (VP III, Sambandha, v. 57)
"For, a distortion (*upaplava*) of cognition consists in its [assuming the forms] following the forms of external objects. It is a kind of impurity (*kāluṣya*), which arises from the assimilation (*vyatibheda*) [of their forms] when the cognition comes into contact with them."

In short, the impurity of cognition consists in its representational function (*ālekha*), the cognition getting tinged with the forms of an object.[22] Interestingly, according to Bhartṛhari, the object, cognition and the word—all these may be equally said to be 'impure': the coloring by the association with limiting factors like *jāti* is the impurity of the object; the word also, expressing the object not in its entirety but by way of its limiting factors, has impurity; the cognition has the impurity consisting in a coloring by an external form (*bāhyākāroparāga*). And it is very important that it is on their impurity, Bhartṛhari asserts, that our verbal behavior is grounded.[23]

In addition, one finds the word *iva* ('a kind of') used in the present kārikā ([13]). According to Helārāja, the use of the word *iva* there suggests that although cognition has a connection with the form of the object, the distortion does not reach the self-illuminating nature of the cognition (*svaprakāśaṃ jñānarūpam anavagatam*).

Now consider the following kārikās:

[14] *yathā jyotiḥ prakāśena nānyenābhiprakāśyate /*
jñānākāras tathānyena na jñānenopagṛhyate // (VP III, Jāti, v. 106)
"Just as light is not illuminated by another light, similarly, the form of a cognition is not grasped by another cognition."

[15] *ghaṭajñānam iti jñānaṃ ghaṭajñānavilakṣaṇam /*
ghaṭa ity api yaj jñānaṃ viṣayopanipāti tat // (VP III, Jāti, v. 109)
"The [apperceptive] cognition that this is a knowledge of the jar (*ghaṭajñāna iti jñānam*) is different from the cognition that this is a jar (*ghaṭa iti jñānam; ghaṭajñana*). The cognition that this is a jar refers to an external object [and not to cognition]."[24]

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by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* on TS 906.

[22] VP III, Sambandha, v. 58ab: *yathā ca jñānam ālekhād aśuddhau vyavatiṣṭhate.*

[23] VP III, Sambandha, v. 59: *evam arthasya śabdasya jñānasya ca viparyaye / bhāvābhāvāv abhedena vyavahārānupātinau //* Cf. Helārāja: *jātyādisaṃsargarūpoparāgo 'rthasyāśuddhiḥ. śabdasyāpy akṛtsnārthābhidhānāt tadupādhirūpeṇābhidhānād aśuddhiḥ. jñānasya bāhyākāroparāgaḥ. evaṃ tritayam api viparyastam.*

[24] Hattori [1968: 108 (note 1.69)] makes reference to this kārikā.

[16] *yato viṣayarūpeṇa jñānarūpaṃ na gṛhyate /*
arthạrūpaviviktaṃ ca svarūpaṃ nāvadhāryate // (VP III, Jāti, v. 110)
"Since the form of the cognition is not grasped as an object, its form is not determined independently of that of the object."

As Dignāga accepts the self-illumination theory of cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), so does Bhartṛhari. According to Bhartṛhari, each cognitive state consists of a twofold appearance, the object-appearance (*artharūpa*) and the appearance of itself (*svarūpa*); in other words, a cognitive state while cognizing an object also cognizes itself.

Bhartṛhari thus entertains the theory of self-cognition as inevitably entailed by the theory of representation. As Helārāja points out, Pāṇinīyas consider cognition to have a representation (*sākāra*) and to be self-illuminatory.[25] Then, for them, how does a representation of an object relate to an external entity?

4. Of a perceptual cognition of an external entity, as has been indicated by VP III, Sambandha, v. 57 ([13]), the following may be said: When the perception of an external entity arises, the form of the external entity appears in the perceptual cognition.[26] And, according to the *Vṛtti*, cognition assumes the form of its object (*ākāraparigraha*) in dependence upon the object (*arthanibandhana*) and hence cannot be differentiated from its object on account of its having the form similar to that of the object (*anurūpa*).[27] To look at this from the angle of a representation appearing to cognition, what substantially characterizes Bhartṛhari's theory of representation comes to light.

In connection to the extraction of the capacities (*śakti*), which are assumed as possessed by the word-meanings, from a sentence-meaning which is something mental, Bhartṛhari introduces the very important notion of externalization (*bāhyīkṛtya*) of what is mental. He states:

[17] *saṃpratyayārthād bāhyo 'rthaḥ sann asan vā vibhajyate /*
bāhyīkṛtya vibhāgas tu śaktyapoddhāralakṣaṇaḥ // (VP II 445)
"From [the sentence-]meaning which is of the nature of cognition (*saṃpratyayārtha*), whether or not it is externally present, [the capacities of word-meanings] are abstracted after its being externalized. The abstraction consists in extracting the capacities of the word meanings. [For the sentence meaning is a conglomeration of capacities.[28]]"

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[25] In addition to these features, Helārāja characterizes the cognition as devoid of the universal nature. Helārāja on VP III, Jāti, v. 106: *sākārāḥ svaprakāśāḥ niḥsāmānyā buddhayaḥ siddhāḥ.*

[26] Helārāja explains the process through which what is perceived is verbalized as follows: When an external entity is there, its perception arises; and when the perception takes place, the form of the external entity appears in cognition; when the representation appears to the mind, the desire to express it occurs; then a word for it is uttered. Helārāja on VP III, Sambandha, v. 33: *tathā hi bāhyārthe sati darśanam. darśane 'rthanirbhāsaḥ, tasmin sati vaktumīhā tataḥ prayatnādeḥ śabdoccāraṇam iti paramparayā bāhyārtha eva vācyeta tatra pravṛttir iti vināpi tu bāhyārthaṃ śakyate vijñānamātradarśane 'pi tannirbhāsavaśena kriyākārakasaṃbandho melayitum ity evopanyastam.*

[27] *Vṛtti* on VP II 241: *buddhir apy arthanibandhanā kṛtākāraparigrahā tasmād arthād anurūpatvenāvasthitā viśeṣayitum aśakyā.*

[28] Puṇyarāja on VP II 440: *vākyārthasya nānāśaktikhacitasya nirvibhāgasya . . .*

The word *sampratyayārtha* here refers to the sentence-meaning.[29] According to the *Vṛtti*,[30] if it is something externally present, the *sampratyayārtha* is taken as *mukhyārtha* ('primary object'), which is what is reflexively grasped by a single cognition (*ekabuddhipratyavamṛṣṭa*) and which accords with what appears in the mind in consequence of its existence, irrespective of how a sentence is pronounced; and if it is not externally present but something expected to be so (*bāhya-rūpatayāpekṣite 'rthe*), then the *sampratyayārtha* is taken as what is of the nature of cognition (*buddhyātmaka*). In any case, one can extract from a sentence-meaning the capacities assumed to be possessed by the entities denoted by words, only on the basis of the secondary or mental existence (*upacārasattā*) and the externalization of the sentence-meaning. For the capacity of producing an effect, say, the capacity of a seed to produce a sprout, ought to be attributed not to a seed as mentally represented but to an externally existent seed. The point is, therefore, that, irrespective of its external existence, the sentence-meaning, something mental, is susceptible of externalization. However what matters immensely is that even in the case where a certain entity is externally present, its mental representation goes further into being externalized after it is grasped and its representation appears to the mind, which is shown by the first interpretation of the *sampratyayārtha*.

Then what is the externalization? In explaining the causal relation between word and meaning, the *Vṛtti* states as follows:

[18] *[kāryakāraṇabhāvena /] arthākāranirbhāsamātrānugatasya pratyayasyārtheṣu pratyastarūpasyārthatvenādhyavasāye, tasyārthātmanaḥ śabdo nimittam / tathārthāvagrahadarśanaṃ so 'yam iti śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaprasiddher nādābhivyaktasyāntaḥkaraṇasanniveśinaḥ śabdasya pravṛttau kāraṇam /* (*Vṛtti* on VP I 24–26)

"The cognition (*pratyaya*) is accompanied by its part (*mātrā*), the appearance of a representation (*ākāra*) of an object; and the form (*rūpa*) appearing to the cognition is superimposed (*pratyasta*) upon objects. When such a form is judged to be an object (*arthatvenādhyavasāye*), the word is the cause of that [form] identical with the object (*tasyārthātmanaḥ*).

In a similar vein, the cognition (*darśana*) by which [the form of] the *artha* is determined (*arthāvagrahadarśana*) is the cause of the application of that word which appears to the mind and which is manifested by the sounds, since the relation of identity between the word and the meaning in the form 'It is this' is established (*so 'yam iti śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaprasiddhiḥ*)."[31]

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[29] Bhartṛhari's use of the term *sampratyayārtha* in this kārikā reminds us of Patañjali's formula *śabdapūrvako hy arthe sampratyayaḥ*. See note 7. Puṇyarāja interprets the term as referring to the sentence-meaning, mental, whose constituent meanings are appearing to cognition (*sampratyayo 'rtho 'bhidheyarūpo yasyāsau tathā tathābhūtāt tasmād bauddhād vākyārthād*).

[30] *Vṛtti* on VP II 445: *ekabuddhipratyavamṛṣṭe 'rthe mukhye[']nāśritakriyābhede buddhinirbhāsānupātini buddhyātmake vā bāhyaicchedāpekṣite 'rthe bāhyatvena saty asati vā pravibhāgaḥ samanugamyate. sa tu bāhyo 'rtho mukhyaḥ sann upacārasattayā śaktim apoddhṛtyāpoddhṛtya pravibhajyate.* The phrase *bāhyaicchedāpekṣite* is so unreadable that I would like to propose another reading, i.e., *bāhyarūpatayāpekṣite*, in accordance with Puṇyarāja's statement: *abāhya evāsau bāhyarūpatayā prathate vivekenānavadhāraṇāt.*

[31] *Arthāvagrahadarśana* and *so 'yam iti śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaprasiddhi* are respectively nothing but *ākāranirūpaṇā* and *abhijalpanirūpaṇā*.

What is to be noted here is that the author of the *Vṛtti* gives the structure of *arthatvenādhyavasāyaḥ* ('judgment of something as an *artha*') to the effect that the word is the cause of that form appearing to the cognition which is judged to be an *artha* and thereby identified with the *artha*.[32] The *artha* here should be something external. Consider the following statement given in the *Vṛtti*.

[19] *na hi pratilabdhārtharūpaviparyāsāṃ buddhim antareṇa bāhyaṃ vastu vyāvahārikīṣv arthakriyāsu samarthaṃ bhavati / tasmād antarniviṣṭarūpeṇārthena sarvo vyavahāraḥ kriyate* / (*Vṛtti* on VP II 31) "Without the cognition obtaining the distortion by the form of the object (*artharūpaviparyāsa*), an external entity does not become capable of bringing about the causal efficacy at the conventional level (*vyāvahārikī arthakriyā*). Therefore, all verbal behavior (*vyavahāra*) is carried out through the *artha* which appears [to the mind]."

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[32] It is well known that Dharmakīrti introduces the notion of *adhyavasāya* into his epistemological theory. See HB 3,14–15: *rnam par rtog pa de las kyang de la lhag par chags pas dngos po kho na la 'jug pa'i phyir ro* (*tato 'pi vikalpād vastuny eva tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ*) ["because, even from a conceptual cognition, one takes action precisely towards a real entity on account of judging [its conceptual representation] to be such"]; PVin II 2,8–10: *rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par shen nas 'jug pa'i phyir* (*svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ*) ["since one takes action by means of judging to be a [real] object its [i.e., the conceptual knowledge's] own appearance which is not the [real] object"]. According to Jñānaśrīmitra [JNA 226], the *adhyavasāya* is a function of a conceptual cognition and the word for it refers to the conceptual cognition's state of being potentially capable of causing one to take action towards an object which has not been grasped directly, namely, through perception (*adhyavasāyas tv agṛhīte 'pi pravartanayogyatānimittaḥ*).

The notion of *adhyavasāya* itself was commonly accepted by ancient Indian theorists as essential for explaining the performance of purposeful human activities (*puruṣapravṛtti*). Patañjali, in his *Bhāṣya* on P 1.4.32, stating that the process involved in an action has six stages, namely, *saṃdarśana*, *prārthanā*, *adhyavasāya*, *ārambha*, *nirvṛtti* and *phalāvāpti*, places the *adhyavasāya* as forming a part of the action-process. MBh ad P 1.4.32: *kriyā api kriyayā īpsitatamā bhavati. kayā kriyayā. sandarśanakriyayā vā prārthayatikriyayā vā adhyavasyatikriyayā vā. iha yaḥ eṣaḥ manuṣyaḥ prekṣāpūrvakārī bhavati saḥ buddhyā tāvat kamcid artham sampaśyati sandṛṣṭe prārthanā prārthanāyām adhyavasāyaḥ adhyavasāye ārambhaḥ ārambhe nirvṛttiḥ nirvṛttau phalāvāptiḥ. evam kriyā api kṛtrimam karma.* (Joshi and Roodbergen [1975: 123]: "Even a *kriyā:* 'action' can become (the thing) desired to be reached directly through an action. Through which action? Through the action of *saṃdarśana:* '(mentally) conceiving', through the action of *prārthayati:* 'wishing for (something)', and through the action of *adhyavasyati:* 'deciding'. Here a perceptive person first views some matter in his mind. Once it has been conceived, a wish (arises). Once the wish is there, decision (comes). Having made a decision, one undertakes. Once (the action) has been undertaken, it is brought to completion. Once it has been brought to completion, one obtains the fruit (of the action). In this way, even an action can be a *karman;* 'desired object' in the technical sense (of the word).") In VP III, Sādhana, vv. 16–17, Bhartṛhari makes an interpretation of the present *Bhāṣya* as follows:

saṃdarśanaṃ prārthanāyāṃ vyavasāye tv anantarā / vyavasāyas tathārambhe sādhanatvāya kalpate //
pūrvasmin yā kriyā saiva parasmin sādhanaṃ matā / saṃdarśane tu caitanyaṃ viśiṣṭaṃ sādhanaṃ viduḥ //
"The act of perceiving (*saṃdarśana*) becomes a *sādhana* in relation to the act of wishing (*prārthanā*); in relation to the decision (*vyavasāya*), on the other hand, what comes immediately before it (*anantarā*) becomes a *sādhana*; in addition, the decision becomes a *sādhana* in relation to the act of undertaking (*ārambha*)."
"The same thing that is regarded as an action in correlation to the preceding [activity] is regarded as a *sādhana* in correlation to the succeeding one. With reference to the act of perceiving, on the other hand, they consider that it has consciousness (*caitanya*) for its special *sādhana*."

In this manner, by Pāṇinīyas, the *adhyavasāya* (*vyavasāya*) is placed as a *sādhana* ('means of accomplishing an action'), direct, in relation to a mental activity (*mānasī pravṛttiḥ*) of the act of undertaking (*ārambhakriyā*), and, indirect, in relation to the physical action (*bhautikī kriyā*), through which the fruit of the action is obtained (*phalāvāpti*). According to Helārāja, one undertakes to perform purposeful activity through the *adhyavasāya* (*vyavasāyabalenārthakriyākaraṇārambhāt*). Then, what is the *adhyavasāya* as postulated as the means of those activities? Helārāja

There is no doubt that the author of the *Vṛtti*, associating the notion of *arthakriyā*, which surely is known to Bhartṛhari,[33] with the external entity, regards the latter as what is capable of producing an effect (*arthakriyāsamartha*). And the same author states what is most significant: The external entity does not come in the field of speech behavior until it is wrongly identified with the form appearing to the mind. Recall that Bhartṛhari holds that cognition is reckoned as impure if it has the form of the object and without its impurity it is impossible to have verbal behavior; an external entity cannot be verbalized as it is, rather, it is expressed as it is conceived. Taking it into consideration that the *Vṛtti* recognizes the *arthatvenādhyavasāya*, the external entity capable of bringing about the causal efficacy enters the field of speech behavior, when its form manifest itself in the mind and then is judged to be external. Therefore, we may safely say that what is mental is linked to the external world through the *arthatvenādhyavasāya* or *artharūpādhyāsa*, to put it in other words, through a *buddhiviṣaya* being known as external (VP II 132c [3]: *sa bāhyaṃ vastu iti jñātaḥ*), and that irrespective of the external presence of the correspondent to what is mental this externalization takes place, as is implied by the above-quoted kārikā ([17]).

5. Now we can see from what has been said that Bhartṛhari regards a conceptual representation and an external entity as *śabdārtha*s and that he has the theory according to which both are linked with each other through *adhyavasāya*. Then what difference is there between Bhartṛhari's and Buddhist epistemologists' views?

Commenting upon [3] (VP II 132 = TS 891), Kamalaśīla states as follows:

[20] *ayaṃ hi buddhyākāravādī bāhye vastuny abhrāntaṃ saviṣayaṃ dravyādiṣu pāramārthikeṣu adhyastaṃ buddhyākāraṃ paramārthataḥ śabdārtham icchati / na tu nirālambanaṃ bhinneṣv abhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrāntam itaretarabhedanibandhanam icchati. . . . na cāpohavādinā paramārthataḥ kiṃcid vācyaṃ buddhyākāro 'nyo vā śabdānām iṣyate. . . . ataḥ samāropita eva śabdārthaḥ. . . . buddhyākāravādinā tu buddhyākāraḥ paramārthato vācya iṣyate . . .*

"Indeed, a Buddhyākāravādin accepts: A conceptual representation is in an ultimate sense the *śabdārtha*; the conceptual representation is that which is non-deceptive (*abhrānta*) with regard to an external entity, which has an [external] object [corresponding to it] (*saviṣaya*) and which is

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glosses the word *vyavasāya* in the kārikā with '*dṛḍhagrāhitā*' and '*niścaya*', saying that the word *vyavasāya* means resoluteness (*dṛḍhagrāhitā*), that is, the determination of a specific action as a means of obtaining a result (*kriyāviśeṣasya phalasādhanatvena niścayaḥ*). Whatever interpretation may be given of the word '*adhyavasāya*', the *adhyavasāya* should have the structure such that *x* is judged or determined as *y* and hereby be regarded as a cause of an purposeful activity in a pragmatical context.

It would be plausible to consider that Buddhist epistemologists attempted to establish their own theory of *adhyavasāya* on their own epistemological and ontological foundations. Important is that both Pāṇinīyas and Buddhist epistemologists equally consider that a *buddhyākāra* appearing to the mind is identified with an external entity through *adhyavasāya*.

[33] See, for example, VP I 33: *nirjñātaśakter dravyasya tāṃ tām arthakriyāṃ prati / viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate //*

According to the *Vṛtti* on this kārikā, the fire has the power to bring about modification in wood (*agnyādīnāṃ kāṣṭhādivikārotpādane dṛṣṭasāmarthyānām*). The idea that an external entity is capable of producing the causal efficacy let Helārāja consider the reason Dravyavādins like Vyāḍi considers a *dravya* as denoted by a word to be that only a *dravya* is fit for bringing about the causal efficacy. Helārāja on VP III, Dravya, v. 1: *ihārthakriyāyāṃ dravyam evopayujyate iti tad eva pravartakam arthinām. ataḥ śabdena tad evocyate. anabhidhīyamānā tu jātir avacchedikā*

superimposed upon ultimately real things such as *dravya*.[34] However, he does not accept [as the *śabdārtha* the conceptual representation] which, [as an Apohavādin argue,] has no externally corresponding object, which is erroneous because one takes action by virtue of judging different things to be non-different from one another, and which is based upon their difference from one another. . . . And the Apohavādin does not accept, from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, that there is something to be denoted by the word, whether it is the conceptual representation or the other. . . . Accordingly the *śabdārtha* is nothing but what is superimposed [upon the reality]. . . . The Buddhyākāravādin, on the other hand, accepts that the conceptual representation is in an ultimate sense a denotatum [of the word]."

It is said on the part of Vaiyākaraṇas as follows:

[21] *saugatānāṃ vikalpapratibiṃbasya bhedānadhyavasāyāt bahiṣpravṛttiḥ. prāmāṇyaṃ tu vaktrābhiprāya* [Read *vaktrabhiprāya*] *eva śabdānāṃ na bāhye vyabhicārāśaṅkanāt, anyavyāvṛttimātraniṣṭhatā tu bahiḥ. vaiyākaraṇānāṃ tu vyāvṛttavastuviṣayatā, tathādhyavasāyāt tatraiva prāmāṇyam iti darśanabhedaḥ.*[35]

"According to the Buddhists, one takes action towards an external [entity] by virtue of not judging an image appearing to a conceptual cognition (*vikalpapratibimba*) to be distinct from [the external entity]. And it is precisely with regard to a speaker's intention (*vaktrabhiprāya*) [i.e., what appears to a speaker's mind, in short, a conceptual representation],[36] and not with regard to the external, that linguistic items are the means of valid cognition, since there is the fear that [what are understood from linguistic items] might deviate from the external world. With reference to the external (*bahiḥ*), however, [linguistic items] are in relation merely to the exclusion of others (*anyavyāvṛttimātraniṣṭhatā*).

According to the grammarians, on the other hand, they have for their objects entities excluded [from others] (*vyāvṛttavastuviṣayatā*) since [the image appearing to a conceptual cognition is] judged [not as such but] as [something external]; they are thus the means of valid cognition precisely with regard to the [external world]. There is such disagreement between them."

Disagreement between the Buddhists epistemologists and Vaiyākaraṇas is shown over whether one is allowed to have the *śabdārtha*, with reference to what verbal cognition has the validity (*prāmāṇya*),[37] and whether the word is connected with the external in a negative way or the former is directly connected with the latter in a positive way. The crucial point is that while the

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guḍaśabde mādhuryādaya iveti dravyavādināṃ darśanam. See also note 7.

[34] According to Bhartṛhari, *dravya* falls into two categories: one that is in itself beyond verbalization and one that is something that can be referred to by the pronominal *tad* or *etad.* The former is described in VP III, Dravyasamuddeśa and the latter in VP III, Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa. Here by the word *dravya* presumably is meant the former, which is ultimately identified with Brahman.

[35] Helārāja on VP III, Sādhana, v. 6.

[36] Raghunātha Śarmā reads *vaktrābhiprāya* as *vaktrabhiprāya*. Cf. PV II 4: *vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate / prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam //* This kārikā is adduced by Helārāja in commenting upon VP III, Sambandha, v. 1. Manorathanandin takes *vaktṛvyāpāra* as *vivakṣā* and *vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayaartha* as *jñānākāra*.

[37] While the Buddhist epistemologists maintain that the word has the validity in respect to the conceptual representation itself, the Vaiyākaraṇas assert that the word has the validity in respect to the conceptual representation as externalized.

Buddhist epistemologists argue that anything real is ineffable, the Vaiyākaraṇas maintain that a conceptual representation is ultimately posited as the *śabdārtha*. Although both equally admit that the *śabdārtha* is something superimposed upon the reality, the Vaiyākaraṇas cannot help saying that the conceptual representation is ultimately the *śabdārtha*. For they have a fundamental idea that something purposive (*artha*) that is the cause of speech behavior (*vyavahārāṅga*) is not the thing as it is (*vastvartha*) but the thing as understood from the word (*śabdārthaḥ arthaḥ na vastvarthaḥ*);[38] that is, for the Vaiyākaraṇas who believe in the words as their authority, what the words express is their authority. (*śabdapramāṇakā vayam / yac chabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam*).[39]

As has been said, according to Bhartṛhari, the determination of a representation or that of a given object through its forms is the basis of verbal behavior. Any word is finally related to the ultimate real, Brahman, which is, unlimited by any adjuncts, beyond verbalization. Although the representation is said to be unreal (*asatya*) in comparison to the ultimate real, it is a direct object of the word and through the object the word is by all means related to Brahman. Consider the following kārikā.

[22] *satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate /*
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyam evābhidhīyate // (VP III, Dravya, v. 2)
"The ultimately real entity is determined through its unreal forms. It is the ultimate real that is denoted by the words [which denote] its limiting factors, the unreal."[40]

Thus, for the Vaiyākaraṇas, the word does have its object, directly a conceptual representation and indirectly Brahman. While for the Buddhists epistemologists the word never touches the reality, for the Vaiyākaraṇas it does in one way or another.

6. To conclude: We should note that Bhartṛhari properly recognizes the role cognition plays in our verbal communication. He keenly observes the fact that a speaker has the intention to speak (*vivakṣā*), which is nothing but a particular mode of cognition, and that in a listener does occur a certain mode of cognition when he has heard a word. It is a matter of common experience and the fundamentals of speech behavior. It is natural to suppose that when Bhartṛhari deals with semantic problems, he tries to depict what is universally valid, apart from his own metaphysical position. For he takes such a standpoint as expressed by the maxim *sarvapārṣadam idaṃ śāstram vyākaraṇam* ('this science of grammar belongs to all schools of thought').[41]

In consequence of a theoretical affinity between Bhartṛhari's linguistic thought and Buddhists' one may be tempted to find an echo of Buddhist idealism which explains the world center-

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[38] Helārāja on VP III, Kriyā, v. 2. Similar expressions are found here and there in the commentaries of Helārāja and Puṇyarāja.

[39] MBh (Paspaśā) on vt. 9. Cf. Helārāja on VP III, Vṛtti, v. 280: *iha yaḥ śabdād arthaḥ pratīyate sa vyavahārāṅgaṃ bahiḥ sadasattvam anapekṣya* ("Here in this world, that which is understood from the linguistic item is the cause of speech behavior, whether it is externally present or not"). Here what is understood from the linguistic item is nothing but a *buddhiviṣayārtha*. See VP III, Sambandha, v. 32 ([2]).

[40] Bhartṛhari sets forth the same view in VP II 127ab (= TS 889ab): *asatyopādhi yat satyaṃ tad vā śabdanibandhanam* ("Or, the real, limited by unreal adjuncts, is the cause [of the application] of the word").

[41] For this maxim, see Houben [1995: 332, fn. 517].

ing upon cognition, as did Matilal. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that, for Bhartṛhari, the placing of the cognition in his linguistic theory in the above-said manner results in positing a conceptual representation and an external individual as *śabdārtha*s. Or rather, it has to be considered that Bhartṛhari's linguistic thought that a *śabdārtha* is the conceptual representation, which is based upon an external entity and which is to receive *arthatvenādhyavasāya*, is solidly founded on his empirically verifiable observations of language. Thus, by contraries, we may say that as far as the theory of language is concerned, Bhartṛhari has already provided the framework for the development of Buddhist epistemologists' linguistic theory.

At this point, I cannot refrain from saying that there is nothing original to be found in Buddhists epistemologists' linguistic theory, other than the theory of *apoha*. But there is a sharp contrast between the positions of Pāṇinīyas and Buddhist epistemologists: The former accounts for the reality in terms of language, ending up maintaining that everything in this world is *śabda*; the latter, on the other hand, explains language on the basis of reality, finishing with the assertion that everything in this world is beyond verbalization, which is explicitly stated by Jñānaśrīmitra as *apohasya vācyateti vācyatāyā evāpohaḥ* ('When it is said that *apoha* is the *śabdārtha*, it is meant that verbalization itself is excluded from the reality').[42] As shown by Jñānaśrīmitra,[43] the theory of *apoha* was introduced for the purpose of establishing both the relationship between reality and language and the ineffability of the reality. It was never a matter of concern to the Vaiyākaraṇas to establish such things. For them there is no reality other than speech (*śabdatattva*) identical with Brahman.

Before the eyes of Buddhist epistemologists beginning with Dignāga, a linguistic thought fully developed by Pāṇinīyas must have unfolded itself. Then why did Dignāga, disregarding the other aspects of the Pāṇinian linguistic thought which he must have been fully aware of and which were later taken up by his followers, focus his efforts upon establishing the *śabdārtha*-theory only in terms of *anyāpoha*? It is likely that Dignāga did not feel it necessary to formulate an overall theory of language systematically; he had only to lay emphasis on the points in disagreement with Pāṇinīyas, as in his *Traikālyaparīkṣā*. In fact, all that Dignāga denied to be the *śabdārtha* were those which were postulated as such by the realists. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, tried to construct independently his linguistic theory, into which all three factors—a mental representation, an external individual and *apoha*—were integrated, within the framework of the *svalakṣaṇa*-characterized ontology, so that he could make a counterattack against Uddyotakara and Kumārila.

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[42] JNA 232. See Katsura [1986: 176].
[43] See note 3.

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P *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (Pāṇini).

Pañjikā *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

Pradīpa *Pradīpa* (Kaiyaṭa): See MBh.

PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti).

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TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Embar Krishnamacharya, ed. *Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla*. 2 vols. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30. 1926. Reprint, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1984–88.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

VP *Vākyapadīya* (Bhartṛhari): [The verse numbers refer to Rau's edition.]

(1) W. Rau, ed. *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya: Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften Herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index Versehen*. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Band 42,4. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1977.

(2) K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, ed. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva; Kāṇḍa I*. Deccan College Monograph Series 32. Poona: Deccan College, 1966.

(3) K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, ed. *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari; Kāṇḍa II: With the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the ancient Vṛtti*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

(4) K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, ed. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja; Kāṇḍa III, part 1*. Deccan College Monograph Series 21. Poona: Deccan College, 1963.

(5) K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, ed. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa of Helārāja; Kāṇḍa III, part ii*. Poona: Deccan College, 1973.

(6) Raghunātha Śarmā, ed. *Vākyapadīyam [Part-III] (Pada-kāṇḍa) (Jāti, Dravya and Saṃbandha Samuddeśa) with the commentaries 'Prakāśa' by Śrī Helārāja and 'Ambākartrī' by 'Padmaśrī' Pt. Raghunātha Śarmā*. Sarasvatībhavana-Granthamālā 91. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, 1974.

PRAVṚTTI AS AN ACTION OF A PERSON

by

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The aim of this paper is to point out that the word *'pravṛtti'* means an action of a person when it is used by Dharmakīrti and his followers together with the word *'adhyavasāya'* (ascertainment, or identification of what one cognizes with what he wants to obtain) to explain the function of valid cognition (*pramāṇa/samyagjñāna*) as a causative factor (*pravartaka*).

When the role of valid cognition is discussed, the word *'pravṛtti'* generally means either 'an operation/occurrence of cognition towards its object' or 'the taking an action by a person towards the object of cognition'.[1]

Dharmottara, in the first chapter of his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, explains that the validity of cogni-

[1] The word *pravṛtti* means, in addition to an action of a person, (1) occurrence of expression or utterance (*vyavahāra, śabda*), (2) occurrence or operation of mind/cognition, (3) occurrence of the idea/thought, (4) occurrence of feelings, etc. Some examples from Dharmakīrti are as follows:

(1) occurrence of expression or utterance

PVSV 125,28–126,1: *prāg eva yathādarśana**pravṛttayaḥ** samyaṅmithyā**pravṛttayo lokavyavahārāḥ** / nanv ādikalpikeṣv adṛṣṭā eva **vyavahārāḥ** paścāt **pravṛttā** iṣyante / na / teṣām apy anyasaṃskārāhitānāṃ yathāpratyayaṃ prabodhāt /*

PVSV 175,20–23: *parasparaviruddhārthā katham ekatra sā bhavet //337// yady **eṣa pratiniyamo** vācyaṃ vastv antareṇa **śabdo na pravartata** iti / bhinneṣu pravādeṣv ekatra vastuni viruddhasvabhāvopasaṃhāreṇa **vacanavṛttir** na syāt /*

(2) occurrence or operation of mind/cognition

PVSV 31,8: *sa tu bhrāntyā na avadhāryata iti **pramāṇāntaraṃ pravartate** /*

PVSV 31,12–13: *tat tarhi bhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ **pravṛttaṃ pramāṇam** anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam iti siddham anyāpohaviṣayam /*

PV III 103: ***anumānaṃ pravartate //***

PV IV 2: *vācaḥ prāmāṇyam **asmin (āgamārthe) hi na anumānaṃ pravartate //***

HB 26,23–27,4: ***kvacit pramāṇaṃ pravṛttam*** . . . (cf. HBṬ 197,28–198,23)

PVSV 4,9–12: *tathā hi sattvam upalabdhir eva vastuyogyatālakṣaṇā tadāśrayā vā **jñānapravṛttiḥ** /*

PV III 108: ***buddhayo arthe pravartante** abhinne bhinnāśrayā iva /*

PV III 176: *icchātaḥ **pravarteran** na īkṣeran bāhyam **akṣajāḥ (buddhayaḥ)** /*

PV III 449: *āśrayālambanābhyāsabhedād **bhinnapravṛttayaḥ** (nānākārāḥ) / sukhaduḥkhābhilāṣādibhedā **buddhaya** eva tāḥ //*

PVSV 39,4–5: *nanu bāhyā vivekino na ca teṣu **vikalpapravṛttir** iti . . .*

PVSV 28,17–28,18: ***niścayasya** samāropaviveke **asya pravṛttir** iti gamyate //49//*

(3) occurrence of the idea/thought

PV IV 108: *śāstraṃ yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate / dṛṣṭe adṛṣṭe api tad grāhyam iti **cintā pravartate //***

(4) Desire, etc., occurs under the restrictions of the same kind of impressions.

PV II 157cd–158ab: *sajātivāsanābhedapratibaddha**pravṛttayaḥ** // yasya **rāgādayas** tasya (bauddhasya) naite doṣāḥ prasaṅginaḥ /*

tion means the ability to lead a person to a successful result. Valid cognition can cause a person to act towards the intended object, and therefore he can accomplish his purpose thanks to valid cognition. This valid cognition is called *(pradarśitārtha-)prāpaka* (a cognition which causes a person to obtain the specified object), *(pradarśitārtha-)pravartaka* (a cognition which causes a person to act towards the specified object), or *(pravṛttiviṣaya-)pradarśaka* (a cognition which shows a person the intended object).[2] Consequently, the word *'pravṛtti'* means an action of a person when it occurs with a valid cognition that functions as *pravartaka*, and Dharmottara, in his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, keeps it clearly in mind that valid cognition is a causative factor of an action of a person.

Dharmottara cites the phrase *"svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ"* from Dharmakīrti[3] twice in the first chapter of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, first to show that inference is a kind of deceptive cognition,[4] and secondly to show that inference has two types of objects.[5]

The first citation is to point out that inference is deceptive because action towards an external

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[2] NBṬ 17,1–24,1: *avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyagjñānam. loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam arthaṃ prāpayan saṃvādaka ucyate / tadvaj jñānam api svayaṃ* ***pradarśitam arthaṃ prāpayat*** *saṃvādakam ucyate.* ***pradarśite cārthe pravarttakatvam eva prāpakatvam,*** *nānyat / tathā hi, na jñānaṃ janayad arthaṃ prāpayati, api tv* ***arthe puruṣaṃ pravartayat prāpayaty artham / pravarttakatvam api pravṛttiviṣayapradarśakatvam*** *eva / na hi puruṣaṃ haṭhāt pravarttayituṃ śaknoti vijñānam / ata eva cārthādhigatir eva pramāṇaphalam /* ***adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ*** */ tathā ca saty arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ / ata eva cānadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam /* ***yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthaḥ, tenaiva pravarttitaḥ puruṣaḥ, prāpitaś cārthaḥ*** */ tatraiva cārthe kim anyena jñānenādhikaṃ kāryam / ato 'dhigataviṣayam apramāṇam / tatra yo 'rtho dṛṣṭatvena jñātaḥ sa pratyakṣeṇa* ***pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtaḥ*** */ yasmād yasminn arthe pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvavyāpāro vikalpenānugamyate* ***tasya pradarśakaṃ pratyakṣam,*** *tasmād dṛṣṭatayā jñātaḥ pratyakṣadarśitaḥ / anumānaṃ tu liṅgadarśanān niścinvat* ***pravṛttiviṣayaṃ darśayati*** */ tathā ca pratyakṣaṃ pratibhāsamānaṃ niyatam arthaṃ darśayati / anumānaṃ ca liṅgasambaddhaṃ niyatam arthaṃ darśayati / ata ete niyatasyārthasya* ***pradarśake*** */ tena te pramāṇe / nānyad vijñānam,* ***prāptuṃ śakyam artham ādarśayat prāpakam*** */ prāpakatvāc ca pramāṇam . . . arthakriyārthibhiś* ***cārthakriyāsamarthavastuprāptinimittaṃ jñānaṃ*** *mṛgyate / yac ca tair mṛgyate tad eva śāstre vicāryate / tato* ***'rthakriyāsamarthavastupradarśakaṃ samyagjñānam*** */ yac ca tena pradarśitaṃ tad eva prāpaṇīyam / arthādhigamātmakaṃ hi* ***prāpakam*** *ity uktam /*

[3] PVin II 8–10: ***rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas 'jug pa'i phyir*** *'khrul pa yin yang don dang 'brel pa de la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir tshad ma yin no //*

NBhūṣ 140,25f.: ***svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanād*** *bhrāntir apy arthasambandhena tadavyabhicārāt pramāṇam /* Cf. NBṬ 71,5; PVV 142,11; DhP 78,20f; NBhūṣ 195,15; 196,6f.; 209,8f.

Steinkellner interprets *pravṛtti* as the immergence/occurence of inference. Steinkellner [1979: 26–27]: "Obwohl sie Irrtum ist, **weil sie in der Weise auftritt, daß** sie ihr eigenes Erkenntnisbild, das nicht der (wirkliche) Gegenstand ist, als [diesen] Gegenstand bestimmt, ist sie als mit dem Gegenstand verbundene (dennoch) gültige Erkenntnis, weil sie von ihm nicht abweicht." Cf. Stcherbatsky [1962: 17 fn. 6]: Indeed inference is an illusion, since **it operates** through ascertaining an object in the non-object which represents (this inference's) own reflex. (Skt.: NBṬ 47,1. See note 4.)

[4] NBṬ 47,1: *bhrāntaṃ hy anumānaṃ* ***svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt*** */ pratyakṣaṃ tu grāhye rūpe na viparyastam /*

[5] NBṬ 71,1–72,2: *dvividho hi viṣayaḥ pramāṇasya, grāhyaś ca yadākāram utpadyate, prāpaṇīyaś ca yam adhyavasyati / anyo hi grāhyo 'nyaś cādhyavaseyaḥ / pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ / adhyavaseyas tu pratyakṣabalotpannena niścayena saṃtāna eva / santāna eva ca pratyakṣasya prāpaṇīyaḥ / kṣaṇasya prāptum aśakyatvāt / tathānumānam api,* ***svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter*** *anarthagrāhi / sa punar āropito 'rtho gṛhyamāṇaḥ svalakṣaṇatvenāvasīyate yataḥ, tataḥ svalakṣaṇam avasitaṃ* ***pravṛttiviṣayo 'numānasya*** */ anarthas tu grāhyaḥ /*

object takes place by virtue of inference erroneously cognizing its own image, which is not the external object, as if it were the external object.

The deceptiveness of inference, the formula of which is *"atasmiṃs tadgrahaḥ,"* is shown as *"anarthe 'rthagrahaḥ"* by the words *"svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena,"* and the act of a person for obtaining the external object by means of inference (*arthādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt*) is the reason to prove the deceptiveness of inference. In other words, inference is deceptive because it identifies the non-external object which is appearing as an image (e.g., *agnitva*) with the external object (e.g., *agni* itself as a *vastu/artha/svalakṣaṇa*), and the deceptiveness of inference is proved by the difference between the object of inference and the object of action of a person.

Prior to the second citation of the above phrase, Dharmottara says that valid cognition has two types of objects, that is to say, *grāhya* (a direct object), with the image of which valid cognition arises (*yadākāram [jñānam] utpadyate*), and *prāpaṇīya* (also called *adhyavaseya* or *pravṛttiviṣaya,* the object to be obtained or reached by the person who validly cognizes[6]) which is ascertained or identified [by *niścaya*[7]] (*yam adhyavasyati*). The former is the internal object and the latter is the external one. Therefore the word *'pravṛttiviṣaya'* in the sentence *"svalakṣaṇam avasitaṃ* ***pravṛttiviṣayo 'numānasya****"*[8] means the external object of inference towards which a person undertakes action to obtain by means of inference. It is evident that inference causes him to act, and therefore the agent of *pra√vṛt* is a person and inference is *pravartaka.*

In addition, Dharmottara asserts that valid cognition precedes recollection of the thing experienced before and recollection precedes wish, which precedes action of a person towards the object, and the action precedes obtaining.[9] This means that the practice of obtaining an object follows upon a valid cognition concerning the second type of object, namely, *prāpaṇīya* or *pravṛttiviṣaya.*

At the conclusion of this investigation, we can say that Dharmottara treats inference as a causative factor, namely, *prāpaka* or *pravartaka*, when he treats the second type of object of valid cognition. Durveka Miśra properly interprets the word *'pravṛtti'* as *'pravarttana'* in his subcommentary on the quotation from Dharmakīrti.

> DhP 72,5–10: *na kevalaṃ pratyakṣam anyad gṛhṇāti, anyad adhyavasyati, kin tv* ***anumānam apy*** *anyagrāhy anyādhyavasāyīty* ***apiśabdenāha.*** *ihaiva chedaḥ kartavyo 'nyathā vyākhyānam asamañjasaṃ syāt. kiṃ gṛhṇātīty āha* ***svapratibhāsa*** *iti. svasya pratibhāsa iva pratibhāsaḥ. śaktidvayayogāt tathāropyamāṇam rūpam. tasminn* ***anarthe*** *'bāhyarūpe* ***'rthādhyavasāyena*** *bāhyādhyavasāyena tadbhedānavabhāsanātmakābhedādhyavasānalakṣaṇena* ***pravṛtteḥ*** *pravarttanāt.*
> "By the word *'api'* [Dharmottara] said that not only does perception directly cognize one [object] and ascertain another [object], but also inference directly cognizes one [object] and ascertains

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[6] DhP 71,16–17: *prāpaṇīyo yam adhyavasyati / tato jñānād yatra pravarttata iti yāvat /*

[7] In the case of intuitive perception (*pratyakṣa*), *niścaya* is a function of perceptual judgment (*vikalpa* or *niścaya*). In the case of inference (*anumāna*), *niścaya* is a function of *anumāna* itself.

[8] See note 5.

[9] NBṬ 28,2–4: ***samyagjñāne*** *hi* ***sati*** *pūrvadṛṣṭasmaraṇam / smaraṇād abhilāṣaḥ / abhilāṣāt* ***pravṛttiḥ / pravṛtteś ca prāptiḥ*** */ tato na sākṣād hetuḥ /*

another [object]. The separation [of the sentences] must be made here [after the word *'api'*]. Otherwise the interpretation [of Dharmottara] will not be proper.
[Question] What does [inference] cognize directly?
[Answer] [Dharmakīrti] said [inference cognizes directly] its own appearance, which is [in fact] as if it were its own appearance. It is the figure being supposed as such in consequence of the twofold faculty [of cognition]. Because [inference] causes [a person] to act towards [the external object] by identifying the non-external appearance with the external object with disregard to the difference [between the internal appearance and the external object, inference cognizes non-external appearance directly]."

An English translation of the paragraph cited in note 5, which includes the citation from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II 2,8, is as follows:

NBṬ 71,5–72,2: "In the same manner, inference also [has two types of objects, i.e., a direct object which appears as an image in the mind and an object which is to be obtained (or to be rejected) by a person who infers. It] directly cognizes [an object] which is not an [existent external] object, **because [, as Dharmakīrti said, inference causes a person] to act [towards the existent external object] by identifying (or ascertaining) the image [of a common characteristic, which appears in the inference] itself [and therefore is its direct object] and is not an [existent external] object, with the [existent external] object [which is supposed to be the object to be obtained].** And moreover, when being cognized directly [by inference], this object which is supposed [to be an existent external object] is ascertained as (or identified with) an individual characteristic. Therefore, as for inference, the ascertained individual characteristic is the object [towards which inference causes a person] to act, but its direct object [, which appears as an image,] is [the object called a common characteristic, i.e.,] that which is not an [existent external] object."

In the above mentioned phrase of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II 2,8–10, if the interpretation of *pravṛtti* as *pravartana* in the *Dharmottarapradīpa* and the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* is correct, then the agent is a person and this phrase shows two things: (1) inference is deceptive cognition because it cognizes its image (namely, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) as an existent external object,[10] and (2) it is deceptive but valid because it causes a person to act towards the ascertained external object.[11]

The *Hetubindu* shows us a similar phrase: *"tato 'pi vikalpād vastuny eva tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ,"* and it explains the role of perceptual judgment which follows intuitive perception (*pratyakṣa*). In this case perceptual judgment plays a similar role to inference. The paragraph in question is as follows:

HB 3,10–16: *rang gi mtshan nyid rtogs nas de'i mthu las skyes pa can rnam par rtog pa de dang mthun par byed pa ni bya ba'i sgo nas de'i yul can yin pa'i phyir dran pa kho na yin gyi tshad ma ni ma yin te / dngos po'i ngo bo ma rtogs pa rtogs pa med pa'i phyir ro // tshad ma rnam par gzhag pa ni dngos po la brten pa can nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //* ***de'i don du [gnyer ba rnams kyi] 'jug pa ni***

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[10] Cf. PV III 55ab: *ayathābhiniveśena dvitīyā* ***bhrāntir*** *iṣyate /*
PVA 215,22–23: *bhrāntir eva, pūrvadṛṣṭārthajanitavāsanāprabodhabalabhāvitvād avastusaṃsparśo 'pi* ***tadadhyavasāyāt*** / See Tosaki [1979: 126].
[11] Cf. PV III 55cd–56ab: *gatiś cet pararūpeṇa, na ca bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā //* ***abhiprāyāvisaṃvādād*** *api bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā /* See Tosaki [1979: 127].

don byed par rung ba'i yul can yin pa'i phyir ro *// dngos po ni don byed par rung ba'i mtshan nyid can yin pa'i phyir ro //* ***rnam par rtog pa de las kyang de la lhag par chags pas dngos po kho na la 'jug pa'i phyir ro*** *// zhugs nas mngon sum dang rnam par rtog pa grub pa dang bde ba tha mi dad pa'i phyir ro //*

adhigate tu svalakṣaṇe tatsāmarthyajanmā vikalpas tadanukārī kāryatas tadviṣayatvāt smṛtir eva na pramāṇam, anadhigatavasturūpānadhigateḥ, vastvadhiṣṭhānatvāt pramāṇavyavasthāyāḥ, ***arthakriyāyogyaviṣayatvāt tadarthināṃ pravṛtteḥ****, arthakriyāyogyalakṣaṇaṃ hi vastu;* ***tato 'pi vikalpād vastuny eva tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ****, pravṛttau vikalpasya pratyakṣenābhinnayoga-kṣematvāt.*[12]

It is evident that the agent of *pra√vṛt* is a person who wants an existent external object which is capable of causing a successful result for him (*arthakriyāyogyaviṣayatvāt tadarthināṃ pravṛtteḥ*). We can recognize that the process of obtaining objects preceded by inference is illustrated in the same manner as intuitive perception, namely, first of all valid cognition cognizes its own object, next the object is identified with the existent external object, and lastly a person is caused to act towards the existent external object by identification. Therefore we can compare the phrase *"svapratibhāse 'narthe* ***'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ****"* with the phrase *"tato 'pi vikalpād vastuny eva* ***tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ****"* in the following way:

1. Dharmakīrti himself says that the first *'pravṛtteḥ'* in the *Hetubindu* cited above[13] means the action of persons. The second *'pravṛtteḥ'* also means the action of a person according to the *Hetubinduṭīkā*.[14] It would be odd, moreover, if the agent of *pra√vṛt* should be a person in only one type of valid cognition.
2. The word *'anartha'* means *sāmānya[lakṣaṇa]*.[15]
3. The word *'artha'* means *vastu* [16] or *svalakṣaṇa*,[17] and it is the object of *pra√vṛt*. And the object of *pra√vṛt* must be *svalakṣaṇa* in both cases of valid cognition.
4. The person, who is the agent of *pra√vṛt*, wants successful result (*arthakriyā*).[18]

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[12] Steinkellner [1967: 36]:" . . . , weil **das Handeln von [Leuten]**, die [die Erfüllung eines bestimmten Zwecks] erstreben, . . . weil auch auf Grund dieser [Erinnerungs-]Vorstellung **ein Handeln** [zustande kommt], das nur auf das [reale] Ding gerichtet ist, indem [das inhaltliche Bild der Vorstellung durch sie] als dieses [Individuelle] begrenzend festgelegt wird; mit Bezug **auf das Handeln** nämlich ist dann der Nutzen der Vorstellung der gleiche wie der Wahrnehmung."

[13] HB 3,10–16.

[14] HBṬ 35,22–27: *punar apy anubhavottarakālabhāvino nīlavikalpasya prāmāṇyam apanetum upacayahetum āha /* ***"tato 'pi"*** *yathoktād* ***"vikalpād"*** *na kevalaṃ nīlasvalakṣaṇānubhavād* ***"vastuny eva" svalakṣaṇa eva "tadadhyavasāyena" svalakṣaṇādhyavasāyena*** *anyathā tatra pravṛttyayogāt* ***puruṣasya "pravṛtteḥ"*** *adhigate svalakṣaṇe tatsāmarthyajanmā vikalpo na pramāṇam iti sambandhaḥ /*

[15] DhP 71, fn. 2.

[16] HB 3,10–16. HBṬ 36,4–19: *yadi nāma* ***tadadhyavasāyena vastuny eva puruṣasya pravṛttis*** *tathāpy anadhigatasāmānyagrāhiṇo 'sya darśanāt pṛthak prāmāṇyaṃ kim iti neṣyate? iti cet; āha . . . ayam asyābhiprāyaḥ / yadi vikalpo nirvikalpacetasaḥ prameyāntaraviṣayas tadā tatraiva* ***puruṣaṃ pravartayatu*** *tatsādhyām arthakriyām adhigantum / naiva vā pravartayet, tadviṣayatvābhimatasya sāmānyasyābhinnajñānalakṣaṇāyā evārthakriyāyā upagamād vikalpodayād eva ca tatsiddheḥ /* ***na hi nīlānubhavāt prameyāntaraviṣayāḥ pītādipratyayāḥ puruṣaṃ nīlavastuni pravartayanti****, sādhitārthakriyā vā kvacid apīti / tasmād ālocanājñānān naivāyaṃ prameyāntaraviṣayaḥ /*

[17] HBṬ 35,22–27. (See note 14.)

[18] HB 3,10–16.

HBṬ 35,4–7: *atha vastvadhiṣṭhānaiva pramāṇavyavastheti kuta etad? ity āha / "arthakriyāyāṃ"*

5. *pravṛtti* of a person is characterized as (*vastu-*)*prāpti-tyāga-lakṣaṇa*[19] or (*svalakṣaṇa-*) *tyāga-āpti-phala.*[20] That is, *pravṛtti* aims at success of obtaining what he wants or of rejecting what he does not want.

This comparison leads us to the conclusion that there is no reason to interpret in a different way the similar phrases which illustrate the process of two kinds of valid cognition.[21] These phrases by Dharmakīrti point out the following facts:

1. Inference directly cognizes an image of its own, namely, a common characteristic which is not an existent external object, and identifies its own image with the existent external object which is only supposed to be real. Therefore it is deceptive. As a causative factor, it is what Dharmottara calls *pradarśaka* and is therefore valid. Intuitive perception cognizes directly an individual characteristic and is *pradarśaka.* Perceptual judgment identifies the individual characteristic as an image of intuitive perception with the individual characteristic as an object of action of a person.
2. Inference leads a person to act towards the existent external object. As a causative factor, it is *pravartaka.* Intuitive perception which is followed by perceptual judgment does the same thing as inference.

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sukhaduḥkhalakṣaṇāyāṃ yad "yogyaṃ" śaktaṃ ***"tadviṣayatvāt tadarthinām"*** ***arthakriyārthināṃ "pravṛtteḥ"*** ***prāptityāgalakṣaṇāyāḥ*** /

PVSV 88,26–89,21: *yam ātmānaṃ puraskṛtya* ***puruṣo ayaṃ pravartate*** //179ab// *sarva eva gaur aśvād bhinno abhinno vā iti bhedam abhedaṃ vā pṛcchan viśeṣam eva bhāvasya svabhāvākhyam adhikṛtya pravartate . . . tasmād yo asya ātmā ananyasādhāraṇo yaṃ puraskṛtya* ***puruṣo viśiṣṭārthakriyārthī pravartate*** *. . . svātmanā eva abhede tu tatsvabhāvanibandhan****ārthakriyārthī*** *samaṃ dvayor api* ***pravarteta*** /

HB 25,9–10: *na hy ayam analaṃ paśyann api kevalam analam eva paśyati, yena salil****ārthī*** (*agnimati padeśe* HBṬ 190,3) ***na pravarteta*** /

PVSV 90,9–10: *sa eva atiśayo* ***arthakriyārthipravṛtti****viṣayo dadhi* /

[19] HBṬ 35,4–7. (See note 18.)

[20] PVSV 87,2–3: *tatkāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ca uktaṃ tat svalakṣaṇam iṣyate* / ***tattyāgāptiphalāḥ*** *sarvāḥ* ***puruṣāṇāṃ pravṛttayaḥ*** //172//

[21] Other materials to be consulted are:

PVSV 39,5–8: ***vyākhyātāraḥ*** *khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ / te tu svālambanam eva arthakriyā-yogyaṃ manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv* ***ekīkṛtya pravartante*** /

PVSV 42,12–22: *na eṣa doṣaḥ / jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādhikaraṇyadharmadharmivyavahārāḥ / yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhiṇā anubhavena āhitāṃ vāsanām āśritya vikalpakam utpadyate, atadviṣayam api tadviṣayam iva, tadanubhavāhitavāsanāprabhavaprakṛter adhyavasitatadbhāvasvarūpam, abhinnakārya-padārthaprasūter abhinnārthagrāhi iva tadanyabhedaparamārthasamānākāram / tatra yo arthākāraḥ pratibhāti bāhya iva eka iva anarthakriyākāry api tatkārī iva,* ***vyavahāriṇāṃ tathā adhyavasāyapravṛtteḥ, anyathā pravṛttyayogāt*** */ tad arthakriyākāritayā pratibhāsanāt tadakāribhyo bhinnam iva / na ca tat tattvaṃ, parīkṣānaṅgatvād iti pratipādayiṣyamāṇaḥ* /

PVSV 110,3–4: *sarva eva āgamam anāgamaṃ vā* ***pravṛttikāmo*** *anveṣate prekṣāpūrvakārī na vyasanena* /

PVSV 110,11: *caitasyebhyo hi guṇadoṣebhyaḥ* ***puruṣāḥ samyaṅmithyāpravṛttayaḥ*** /

PVSV 173,27–174,2: *tat tu sarvasya śakyavicārasya viṣayasya yathāsvaṃ pramāṇena vidhipratiṣedhasiddhau* (text *-viśuddhau*) *nāntarīyakatvābhāve api śabdānām artheṣu varaṃ saṃśayitasya vṛttiḥ tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasaṃbhavāt / na tv anyatra dṛṣṭapramāṇoparodhasya* ***puruṣasya pravṛttir*** *iti* /

HB 34,2–3: *trirūpaṃ liṅgaṃ saṃvādakam arthasya iti tadrūpaṃ ye na vidanti, na* ***teṣāṃ tataḥ pravṛttir*** *iti . . .* / (cf. HBṬ 224,10–14)

HBṬ 34,1–4: *"kāryatas tadviṣayatvāt" na paramārthataḥ / kāryam atra* ***svalakṣaṇe puruṣasya pravartanam, tadadhyavasāyaś ca*** */ yataś ca kāryataḥ tadviṣayatvāt smṛtir evāto "na pramāṇam" darśanabalotpanno vikalpaḥ* /

3. A person can by means of valid cognition either obtain the existent external object that he wants or reject that which he does not want. In this case valid cognition is what Dharmottara terms *prāpaka*.

Therefore we can conclude that the word *'pravṛtti'* means an action of a person when it is used by Dharmakīrti and his followers together with the word *'adhyavasāya'* to explain the function of valid cognition as a causative factor (*pravartaka*).

Abbreviations and Literature

DhP — *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra): Dalsukhabhai Malvania, ed. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955. 2nd ed. 1971.

HB — *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I, tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 252. Band, 1. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 4. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1967.

HBṬ — *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa): Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, eds. *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Baroda, 1949.

NBhūṣ — *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*. Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇāsī, 1968.

NBṬ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See DhP.

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PV II, III, IV — *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Pramāṇasiddhi), chapter 3 (Pratyakṣa), chapter 4 (Parārthānumāna): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 1–206. [Chapters 1, 2 and 4 in Miyasaka's edition.]

PVA — *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

PVin II — *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes*. Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

PVV — *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtayā vṛttyā saṃvalitam (Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin)*. Appendix to *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna) 14–16 (1938–40).

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DHARMAKĪRTI AS A VARṆAVĀDIN

by

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In the history of the linguistic speculations in India there had been controversies on the nature of *śabda* (word) between Varṇavādins and Sphoṭavādins. The Varṇavādins, especially the Mīmāṃsakas, define *śabda* as what is grasped by the auditory organ (*śrotragrahaṇa*) and assert that in the case of the word '*gauḥ*' ('cow') only three *varṇa*s (letters/phonemes), i.e., *ga-kāra*, *au-kāra* and *visarga* ('*ḥ*') figure in the auditory cognition.[1] The Sphoṭavādins, the Vaiyākaraṇas, on the other hand, insist that the *śabda* should be defined as a cause (*nimitta*) of the cognition of the meaning/object (*arthapratyaya*) which *varṇa*s by no means bring about.[2]

In the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, Maṇḍanamiśra criticizes two Varṇavādins, i.e., Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. He raises an objection to the Varṇavādins that the *varṇa*s are incapable of causing the cognition of the meaning on the following grounds:[3]

(1) *Varṇa*s cannot severally convey the meaning.
(2) There is no coexistence of the *varṇa*s which are uttered and grasped in a definite order. Therefore they never act together to produce the cognition of the meaning.
(3) Even if we accept the coexistence of the *varṇa*s which figure in a certain cognition, when they are uttered by different speakers or in a different order, the understanding of the meaning does not occur.

Kumārila maintains that the audibleness (*śrotragrāhyatā*) is the one and only definition of the *śabda* and the *varṇa* alone can enjoy the state of being *śabda*, whether it conveys the meaning or not.[4] According to him Sphoṭavādin's definition of the *śabda* is too wide as well as too narrow. A thing like smoke which causes the cognition of the object (i.e., fire) is not said to be *śabda*. And it is not proper that one considers each single *varṇa* as non-*śabda* just because it is not capable of conveying any meaning.[5]

Kumārila admits that each single *varṇa* in the word '*gauḥ*' has no meaning. But he asserts that a particular number of *varṇa*s have the capability of causing the cognition of the meaning.

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[1] ŚBh 38,4–5: *śrotragrahaṇe hy arthe loke śabdaśabdaḥ prasiddhaḥ. te ca śrotragrahaṇāḥ.*

[2] MBh 1,10–11: *yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām saṃpratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*; SS v. 3ab: *arthāvasāyaprasavanimittaṃ śabda iṣyate /*

[3] SS 27,2–28,2: *pratyekam apratyāyakatvāt, sāhityābhāvāt, niyatakramavartinām ayaugapadyena sambhūya-kāritvānupapatteḥ, nānāvaktṛprayuktebhyaś ca pratyayādarśanāt kramaviparyaye yaugapadye ca.*

[4] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 5: *tasmāc chrotraparicchinno yady arthaṃ gamayen na vā / sarvathā tasya śabdatvaṃ lokasiddhaṃ na hīyate //*

[5] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 7: *agnyādīn gamayanto 'pi śabdā dhūmādayo na hi / na cāpratyāyakatvāt syād ekavarṇeṣv aśabdatā //*

yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādane /
varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ //[6]

"As many *varṇas* (e.g. *g-au-ḥ*) of whatever kind [i.e., uttered uninterruptedly by a single speaker in a definite order] as are known to have the capability of conveying a particular meaning/object (e.g., cow) [previously at the time of the observation of the usage of elder persons (*vṛddhavyavahāra*)] cause to understand that particular meaning (i.e., cow) in that very manner."[7]

Kumārila points out several conditions for the understanding of the meaning from *varṇas*: (1) coexistence (*sāhitya*) of the *varṇas*, (2) singleness of the speaker (*ekakartṛtva*) and so on, (3) definite order (*krama*) of the *varṇas*.[8]

The simultaneity of the *varṇas* is possible only when they are uttered by different speakers. But in that case the cognition of the meaning does not take place.[9] Therefore *varṇas* should be uttered by a single speaker.[10] If that is so, the sequence of the *varṇas* is inevitably accepted. According to Kumārila a certain definite order of the *varṇas* is to be ascertained through the observation of the usage of elder persons (*vṛddhavyavahāra*).[11] In Mīmāṃsaka's theory of language the *vṛddhavyavahāra* is wellknown as a determinative factor in ascertaining the relation between word and its meaning/object (*śabdārthasambandha*). The same *vṛddhavyavahāra* plays an important role in ascertaining the singleness of the speaker, the definite order etc., which themselves are determinative factors causing the notion of *pada* (e.g., the word '*gauḥ*'). With regard to the coexistence/simultaneity of the *varṇas* Kumārila maintains that the coexistence/simultaneity of the *varṇas* in their own form (*svarūpasāhitya/svarūpayaugapadya*) is not indispensable for the understanding of the meaning.[12] Even though *varṇas* are uttered, grasped and recollected in a definite order, after hearing the last *varṇa* (i.e., '*ḥ*'), there arises a cognition of all *varṇas* (i.e., '*gauḥ*') which itself is a recollection (*smaraṇa*). The simultaneity of the *varṇas* is established in this cognition.[13]

In the *Pramāṇavārttika*, First Chapter (Svārthānumāna), Dharmakīrti discusses on the na-

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[6] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 69.

[7] See KṬ on ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 69: *yāvanto militā naikaikaśyena yādṛśā nirantaram ekena vaktrā niyatakrameṇoccaritā ye gakārādayo varṇā yasya gavāder arthasya pratipādakatvena vṛddhavyavahāre 'vagatāḥ, te tatprakārabhāja eva pratipādakā ity āstheyam. na tv apramāṇakaśabdāntarakalpanā yuktaiveti.*

[8] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 70: *teṣāṃ tu guṇabhūtānām arthapratyāyanaṃ prati / sāhityam ekakartrādi kramaś cāpi vivakṣitaḥ //*

[9] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 72: *yaugapadyaṃ tv aśakyatvān naiva teṣām ihāśritam / kartṛbhedaś ca tatra syān na caivaṃ dṛśyate 'bhidhā //*

[10] According to Sucaritamiśra the notion of *pada* (the word '*gauḥ*') occurs with the help of the uninter-ruptedness (*nairantarya*) and a particular tone/accent (*svaraviśeṣa*) of *varṇas* caused by a single speaker. KṬ on ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 72: *ekatra hi vaktari prayuñjāne nairntaryasvaraviśeṣavaśena varṇānāṃ ko 'pi nāmātiśayaviśeṣaḥ sarvasaṃvedyaḥ parkāśate, yad ekapadabuddhigocaratāṃ pratipadyante.*

[11] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 71: *vaktrekatvena caikāntāt krame sati niyāmakam / prayuñjānasya yat pūrvaṃ vṛddhebhyaḥ kramadarśanam //*; See also KṬ on ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 71: *ekatvāt prayoktur anekatvāc ca prayojyānāṃ varṇānām avaśyambhāvini krame sati vṛddhebhyaḥ kramadarśanaṃ kramaviśeṣasya niyāmakam.*

[12] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, v. 72. (See footnote 9.)

[13] ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, vv. 112–113: *antyavarṇe 'pi vijñāte sarvasaṃskārakāritam / smaraṇaṃ yaugapadyena sarveṣv anye pracakṣate // sarveṣu caitadartheṣu mānasaṃ sarvavādinām / iṣṭaṃ samuccayajñānaṃ kramajñāteṣu satsv api //*

ture of language from the viewpoint of the Varṇavādin. Like other Varṇavādins he also defines *śabda* as what is grasped by the auditory organ[14] and asserts that *śabda* is nothing else but *varṇa.* His basic views on *śabda/varṇa* are as follows:

(1) *Śabda* is nothing other than *dhvani* (sound).[15]
(2) *Śabda* is not to be manifested by the articulated sounds (*dhvanivyaṅgya*) but to be created (*kṛtaka/kārya*) by the human efforts.[16] Therefore *śabda* is transient (*anitya/kṣaṇika*) and derived from human being (*pauruṣeya*).
(3) *Śabda* is in the nature of a vocal indication (*vāgvijñapti*) caused by the mental activity (*citta, cetas, sabhāgavāsanā, vivakṣā, saṃskāra* etc.). Therefore *śabda* varies with each person (*pratipuruṣam/pratikaraṇam*) and even with each utterance (*pratyuccāraṇam*).[17]
(4) *Varṇa* is actually existent but has no meaning. *Pada* (word) and *vākya* (sentence) have meaning but are conceptual.[18]
(5) *Varṇa* is not a single entity but varies with each word (*pratipadam*).[19]
(6) *Varṇa* is consisting of parts and the duration of one *varṇa* is beyond one moment (*ekakṣaṇa*).[20]
(7) There are no entities such as *pada, vākya, ānupūrvī* (sequence) apart from *varṇas*.[21]

Dharmakīrti also admits that the *varṇas* in a *pada* (e.g., '*saraḥ*') are uttered, grasped and recollected in a particular sequence. He explains the sequence of the *varṇa*s as follows:[22]

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[14] PVSV 158,26: *śrotragrahaṇalakṣaṇaḥ śabdaḥ.*

[15] PV I 256cd: *dhvanibhyo bhinnam astīti śraddheyam atibahv idam /*; PVSV 133,5–6: *na hi vayaṃ dhvaniṃ śabdaṃ ca vācakaṃ pṛthagrūpam upalakṣayāmaḥ.*

[16] PV I 261cd: *vyāpārād eva tatsiddheḥ karaṇānāṃ ca kāryatā //* Dharmakīrti denies the manifestation of eternal entities in general and asserts that the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) is nothing else but a particular form of the production (*utpatti*). PV I 234–235: *jñānotpādanahetūnāṃ sambandhāt sahakāriṇām / tadutpādanayogyatvenotpattir vyaktir iṣyate // ghaṭādiṣv api yuktijñair aviśeṣe 'vikāriṇām / vyañjakaiḥ svaiḥ kutaḥ ko 'rtho vyaktās tais te yato matāḥ //*

[17] PVSV 138,10: *pratikaraṇabhedaṃ ca bhinnasvabhāvaḥ śabdaḥ . . .*


[18] PV I 238ab: *varṇā nirarthakāḥ santaḥ padādi parikalpitam /*

[19] PVSV 161,9–10: *tasmān na khalv eka eva padeṣu varṇānāṃ svabhāvaḥ kartṛcittasaṃskārabhedena bhedāt.*

[20] PV III 485d–486ab: *kramavān akramāṃ katham // upakuryād asaṃśliṣyan varṇabhāgaḥ parasparam /*; PV III 494–495: *sarvāntyo 'pi hi varṇātmā nimeṣatulitasthitiḥ / sa ca kramād anekāṇusambandhena nitiṣṭhati // ekāṇvatyayakālaś ca kālo 'lpīyān kṣaṇo mataḥ / buddhiś ca kṣaṇikā tasmāt kramād varṇān prapadyate //*; also see PVSV 119,22–27: *ekavarṇagrahaṇakāle cānekabuddhivyatikramāt. kṣaṇikatvāt buddhīnām. kṣaṇasyaikaparamāṇuvyatikramakālatvāt. ādhikye vibhāgavataḥ paryavasānāyogāt. anekāṇuvyatyayanimeṣatulyakālatvād antyavarṇaparisamāpteḥ.* In PV III 484–510, Dharmakīrti argues on the cognition of the long vowel such as *ā-kāra* as an obiter dictum of the establishment of the self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*). For details see Tosaki [1985: 164–192].

[21] PV I 247cd: *vākyaṃ na bhinnaṃ varṇebhyo vidyate 'nupalambhanāt //*; PV I 259ab: *varṇānupūrvī vākyaṃ cen na varṇānām abhedataḥ /* Generally speaking, Dharmakīrit's views on *śabda* are to a large extent influenced by the Sautrāntikas, as pointed out by Wakahara [1988: notes 31, 32, 35, 38] and Pind [1991: 279].

[22] PV I 302–304: *yo yadvarṇasamutthānajñānajāj jñānato dhvaniḥ / jāyate tadupādhiḥ sa śrutyā samavasīyate // tajjñānajanitajñānaḥ sa śrutāv apaṭuśrutiḥ / apekṣya tatsmṛtiṃ paścād ādhatte smṛtiṃ ātmani // ity eṣā pauruṣeyy eva taddhetugrāhicetasām / kāryakāraṇatā varṇeṣv ānupūrvīti kathyate //* also see Pind [1991: 279]. In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Chapter 24 (Śrutiparīkṣā), Śāntarakṣita often reproduces Dharmakīrti's views on *śabda.* He also gives us his explanation of the sequence of the *varṇa*s in the same line as Dharmakīrit's. The following explanation is to some extent based on TS 2699–2701 and TSP thereon.



In the continuity of the mind (*saṃtāna*) of the speaker there arise *vivakṣās* (desires to utter) of *varṇas* (e.g., '*s*' '*a*' '*r*' '*a*' '*ḥ*') in due order. Among them the *vivakṣā* of each precedent *varṇa* (e.g., *sa-kāra*) is considered to be an immediate condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) of the *vivakṣā* of the succeeding *varṇa* (i.e., *a-kāra*). Therefore the *vivakṣā* of the precedent *varṇa* (i.e., *sa-kāra*) brings about its result (i.e., *sa-kāra*) as well as the *vivakṣā* of the succeeding *varṇa* (i.e., *a-kāra*). Thus *varṇas* are uttered in due order. In the continuity of the mind of the hearer each uttered *varṇa* (e.g., *a-kāra*) directly produces its direct cognition (*śruti*) with the help of its predecessor (e.g., direct cognition of *sa-kāra*)[23] and indirectly brings about its recollection (*smṛti*) with the help of its predecessor (i.e., recollection of *sa-kāra*). Thus *varṇas* are grasped and recollected in due order.

Then how is the understanding of the meaning from *varṇas* possible? After hearing the *varṇas* in due order there arises a cognition of all *varṇas* in the mind of the hearer. Then he obtains the notion of *pada* (the word '*saraḥ*') from this cognition.[24] Furthermore the *varṇas* are considered to be effects with regard to the respective *vivakṣās* in the mind of the speaker, while they are considered as causes with regard to the respective cognitions (*śrutis*/*smṛtis*) in the mind of the hearer. Hence one can suppose the invariable relation (*avinābhāva*) called causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between the speaker's *vivakṣās* and the *varṇas*, the *varṇas* and the hearer's cognitions (*śrutis*/*smṛtis*) respectively. Therefore the hearer is able to infer the speaker's *vivakṣās* from the cognitions of the *varṇas*. But even if the hearer can grasp *varṇas* and infer the speaker's *vivakṣās*, he is not always capable of obtaining the notion of *pada* and understanding its meaning. Through *samaya*/*saṃketa* (convention) the hearer is able to infer the speaker's intention to convey a particular meaning.[25] Kamalaśīla differentiates *vivakṣāviśeṣa* (particular desire to speak)

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[23] According to Karṇakagomin *a-kāra* and the cognition of *sa-kāra* take place simultaneously. PVSVṬ 568,6–7: *tenākāras sakārālambanaś ca pratyayaḥ samānakālaḥ.*

[24] PVSV 119,18–20: *tasmād indriyavijñānaviśeṣānubandhī sabhāgavāsanopādānavikalpapratibhāsavibhramaḥ padaṃ vākyaṃ caikāvabhāsi mithyaiva;* also see PVSVṬ 435,3–4: *kramavarṇānubhavapṛṣṭhabhāvi manovijñānan tān varṇān padādirūpatayaikasvabhāvān adhyavasyatīti padādiparikalpitaṃ mithyaiva.* It is an interresting fact that Śāntarakṣita quotes several verses from the *Ślokavārttika*, Sphoṭavāda with some amendments in order to establish the cogniton of all *varṇas*. Cf. TS 2719–2724 (= ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, vv. 109, 112–116), TS 2728–2730 (= ŚV, Sphoṭavāda, vv. 120–121, 135).

[25] PVSV 113,25–114,3: *arthaviśeṣasamīhāpreritā vāg ata idam iti viduṣaḥ svanidānābhāsinam arthaṃ sūcayatīti*

from *vivakṣāmātra* (desire to speak in general).[26] Without knowledge of the *samaya* the hearer can only infer the speaker's *vivakṣāmātra*. Through *samaya* the hearer is able to obtain the notion of *pada* and infer the speaker's *vivakṣāviśeṣa* (particular intention, i.e., particular idea).[27] The speaker utters *varṇa*s in a particular order to convey a particular meaning in accordance with the intention of the *samayakāra* (convention-creator) and the hearer who grasped *varṇa*s in that particular order understands the speaker's intention to convey that particular meaning in accordance with the intention of the *samayakāra*.

In spite of disagreement on the nature of *varṇa*, Dharmakīrti's argument on the process of the understanding of the meaning from *varṇa*s is quite similar to Kumārila's. Dharmakīrti as well as Kumārila asserts that *śabda* is nothing else but *varṇa* and that the *varṇa*s which are uttered, grasped and recollected in a definite order are capable of conveying the meaning. Kumārila depends on the *vṛddhavyavahāra* in ascertaining the relation between *śabda* and its meaning as well as the sequence of *varṇa*s etc. As the *vṛddhavyavahāra* itself is beginningless, the relation between *śabda* and its meaning is natural (*autpattika*), eternal (*nitya*), not derived from human being (*apauruṣeya*). Therefore the understanding of the meaning from *śabda* especially the Vedas is free from error caused by human being. In Dharmakīrti's argument the *samaya* plays almost the same role as Kumārila's *vṛddhavyavahāra*. According to the Buddhists the observation of the *vṛddhavyavahāra* is nothing else but the learning of the *samaya*.[28] Even if we accept that the *vṛddhavyavahāra* is beginningless, the Vedas are not said to be *apauruṣeya*.[29] Furthermore, as the *vṛddhavyavahāra* (i.e., *samaya*) itself is based on the intention of the *samayakāra*, the *śabda* as well as the relation between *śabda* and its meaning is not *apauruṣeya* but *sāmayika* (conventional). Therefore the understanding of the meaning from *śabda* including the Vedas is not free from error caused by human being.[30]

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buddhirūpavāgvijñaptyor janyajanakabhāvaḥ saṃbandhaḥ, tataḥ śabdāt pratipattir avinābhāvāt. tadākhyānaṃ samayaḥ. tataḥ pratyāyakasaṃbandhasiddheḥ saṃbandhākhyānāt. na tu sa eva saṃbandhaḥ; PV I 327ab: *vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ saṃketas tatprakāśanaḥ /*; PVSV 172,22–23: *tasmād vivakṣāprakāśanāyābhiprāyanivedanalakṣaṇaḥ saṃketaḥ kriyate.* See also Pind [1991: 279].

[26] TSP 854,13–15: *yady api vivakṣāmātreṇa saha kāryakāraṇabhāvo niścitaḥ, vivakṣāviśeṣeṇa tu parasantāne samayād ṛte na niścetuṃ śakyata ity atas tanniścayāya samayaḥ kriyate.*

[27] TSP 855,12–14: *vivakṣāśabdenātatparivartī arthākāro vā svarūpatayā* vyasto yaḥ sa ihābhipretaḥ; paramārthatas tasya vivakṣāsvabhāvatvāt. sa eveha vivakṣāviśeṣo 'bhipretaḥ.* (*read *tatparivartī arthākāro bāhyarūpatayā*)

[28] PVSVṬ 435,7–12: *pratipādako hi saṃketakāle varṇakramam ekapadādirūpatayā pratipannam eva paraṃ praty ekam idaṃ padādīti saṃketayati. tadā ca parasyāpi tatra varṇakrame ekapadādhyāropikā buddhir utpadyate. tasya caikapadādyadhyāropitaikākārānubhavāhitasaṃskārsya puṃso vyavahārakāle 'pi varṇakramaśravaṇād ekam idaṃ padaṃ vākyaṃ vety ekākārasya vikalpasyotpattir bhavati. evaṃ pūvapūrvaśrotṝṇāṃ pūrvapūrvavaktṛbhyo varṇakrameṣv ekatvāropeṇa pratītir bhavatīty anāditvaṃ padādivyavahārasya.*

[29] PV I 244ab: *sarvathānāditā sidhyed evaṃ nāpuruṣāśrayaḥ /*

[30] PVSV 112,19–21: *na hi śabdāḥ prakṛtyārthavantaḥ. samayāt tato 'rthakhyāteḥ kāyasaṃjñādivat. aprātikūlyaṃ tu yogyatā, samaye tadicchāpraṇayanāt*; PV I 226: *arthajñāpanahetur hi saṃketaḥ puruṣāśrayaḥ / girām apauruṣeyatve 'py ato mithyātvasaṃbhavaḥ //*

Abbreviations and Literature

KṬ *Kāśikāṭīkā* (Sucaritamiśra): See ŚV.

MBh *Mahābhāṣya* (Patañjali): F. Kielhorn, ed. *The Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*. Vol. 1. 4th ed. Poona, 1985.

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PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti).
PV I Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.
PV III Chapter 3 (Pratyakṣa): See Tosaki [1985].

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

PVSVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam.* Allahabad, 1943. Reprint, under the title of *Karṇakagomin's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti,* Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.

SS *Sphoṭasiddhi* (Maṇḍanamiśra): S. K. Rāmanātha Sastrī, ed. *The Sphoṭasiddhi of Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with the Gopālikā of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara.* Madras University Sanskrit Series 6. University of Madras, 1931.

ŚBh *Śābarabhāṣya* (Śabarasvāmin): Erich Frauwallner. *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā.* Wien, 1968.

ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila): F. Omae, ed. *Mīmāṃsāśloka-vārttika, Sphoṭavāda with three commentaries: Tātparya-ṭīkā, Kāśikāṭīkā and Nyāyaratnākara.* Forthcoming.

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TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla.* 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi, 1968.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

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DHARMAKĪRTI ON *ASĀDHĀRAṆĀNAIKĀNTIKA**

by

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0. Introduction

It is not entirely clear when Indian or Buddhist logicians began to use the term 'the specific indeterminate' (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) to indicate a category of fallacious logical reasons (*hetvābhāsa*). The Buddhist logician Dignāga (ca. 480–540) may have been the first to use this term.[1] But even before Dignāga we can find traces of attempts to categorize such a fallacious logical reason, which is a specific property of the subject of a thesis (*pakṣa*), and whose examples can be found neither in the similar instance (*sapakṣa*) nor in the dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*).[2]

This strange fallacious logical reason apparently concerns the traditional inductive character of the Indian or Buddhist logic. In Indian logic, when one tries to prove something, one must indicate concrete examples except the subject of a thesis, in terms of which he confirms the inevitable connection between the logical reason (*hetu*) and what is to be proved (*sādhya*). That Dignāga recognizes the specific indeterminate as a category of fallacious logical reasons means that Dignāga's logic still retains the traditional inductive character of Indian logic, although he strives to make a consistent system of formal logic.

However, this inductive character of traditional Indian logic is drastically transformed by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). He inherited Dignāga's thought, but modified his inductive logic forwards a type of deductive system. And in accordance with this transformation of the system of logic, the interpretation of the specific indeterminate must be necessarily changed.[3] In what follows, I would like to examine how Dharmakīrti re-interprets the concept of specific indetermi-

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[1] In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga criticizes Vasubandhu for not using the term 'specific' in order to classify indeterminate fallacious logical reasons in his *Vādavidhi* (cf. PS 8a7f.: ***rTsod pa bsgrub pa*** *nas ni ma grub dbye ba brjod ma yin // 'khrul pa la yang brjod ma yin // de ni* thun mong min pa'ang *yin // 'gal ba mi 'khrul pa can yang //*; H. Kitagawa (1965), *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū*, Kyoto: 399). Therefore, Vasubandhu probably did not use the term in his theory of fallacious logical reasons and Dignāga perhaps introduced this term to the theory of fallacious logical reasons. Prof. Ishitobi assumes that Dignāga probably applied the term '*asādhāraṇa*', which originally meant a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as an object of an perception (cf. PS I 4a), to the theory of fallacious logical reasons (cf. M. Ishitobi (1981), "Indo ronrigaku ni okeru *hetvābhāsa*" [On *hetvābhāsa* in Indian Logic], *Bukkyōgaku* 12, 63–84: 73f.).

[2] For example, the term 'the mark which is recognized as separated from (all) other things' (*thams cad mi mthun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid*; 一切異類可得相) in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (cf. Peking No. 774, Ṅ 57a3; T vol. 16, 710a4), as a later commentator interpreted it, might have been a similar concept to Dignāga's 'specific indeterminate' (cf. Y. Kajiyama (1984), "Bukkyō chishikiron no keisei" [The Origins of Buddhist Epistemology], *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō*, vol. 9, 2–101: 57ff.).

[3] It is well known that Ratnākaraśānti (ca 11c.) regards the specific indeterminate as a valid logical reason from

nate. However, it is not correct to regard this re-interpretation of the specific indeterminate by Dharmakīrti as a mere result of the development of his new theory of logic. We should rather say that Dharmakīrti has established his new deductive logic in confrontation with this difficult problem of the specific indeterminate.

In the following sections, I will first summarize Dignāga's definition of the specific indeterminate. Then I will investigate Dharmakīrti's interpretation of this concept. Finally, I will present the hypothesis that this confrontation with the specific indeterminate is crucial for the development of Dharmakīrti's logic.

1. Dignāga on *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*

Prior to investigating Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the specific indeterminate, we must examine how Dignāga originally defines this logical reason.

1.1. The position of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* in the *hetucakra*

As is well known, the concept of specific indeterminate appears in Dignāga's *hetucakra*, i.e., 'Wheel of reasons'. The *hetucakra* is an invention of Dignāga's which is described in his early work, the *Hetucakraḍamaru*.[4] The *hetucakra* is a list classifying nine sorts of logical reasons according to whether they wholly exist, partially exist or do not exist, both in the similar instance and the dissimilar instance. In terms of this list, Dignāga divides the logical reasons which satisfy the *pakṣadharmatva*, i.e., the first condition of the three forms (*trairūpya*), into four groups, that is to say, a valid group and three fallacious groups, namely, the contradictory (*viruddha*), the general indeterminate (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) and the specific indeterminate (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*). The specific indeterminate is the fifth type in the *hetucakra* and is located at the center of the Wheel. This concept means the fallacious logical reason which exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance. Dignāga shows an example of the logical reason in the following syllogism:

[Thesis] Sound (*śabda*) is eternal (*nitya*).
[Reason] Because (it is) audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*).[5]

'Audibility' (*śrāvaṇatva*) is specific to the subject of a thesis, namely 'sound'. And no other thing than the subject of a thesis has 'audibility'. Therefore, the logical reason, 'audibility', exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance.

Thus, Dignāga considers that there is a logical reason which is specific to the subject of a

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an Antarvyāptivādin's point of view (cf. AVS 113,4ff.; note 44). The change of the evaluation of this logical reason corresponds to the historical development of *antarvyāptivāda* in Buddhist logic.

[4] Cf. E. Frauwallner (1959), "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung," *WZKSO* 3, 83–164: 90, 162f.

[5] Cf. PSV(K) 131b1ff.: *phyogs kyi chos dgu po 'di dag go rims ci lta ba bzhin du dpe dang sbyar bar bya ste / gzhal bya yin pa'i phyir rtag go / byas pa'i phyir mi rtag go / mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba'o // byas pa'i phyir rtag go / mnyan bya yin pa'i phyir rtag go / rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir rtag go / mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin no // rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir mi rtag go / reg par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba de rnams bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa ni /* ***gzhal bya byas dang mi rtag dang / byas dang mnyan rung rtsol las byung // mi rtag rtsol byung reg bya min // rtag sogs rnams la de dgu'o //*** (PS III 21) *de ltar phye bas gtan tshigs dang / 'gal ba dang / ma nges pa rnams brjod par bya ste /*; Kitagawa [1965: 187ff.]

thesis and therefore exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance, designates this logical reason as the specific indeterminate and excludes it from valid logical reasons. This concept as defined by Dignāga shows that Buddhist logic obviously retains its inductive character until the age of Dignāga.[6]

1.2. *Śrāvaṇatva* from the point of view of the *trairūpya*

How is this logical reason regarded from the point of view of the *trairūpya*? Dignāga refers to this issue in the Svārthānumāna chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya.* There he classifies logical reasons according to whether they satisfy or do not satisfy each condition of the three forms (*trairūpya*), and enumerates six cases except the two cases in which all three conditions are satisfied or unsatisfied. Note that Dignāga gives as an example of the fallacious logical reason which satisfies the first condition (*pakṣadharmatva*) and the third condition (*asapakṣe 'sattvam*) but not the second condition (*sapakṣe sattvam*), the following syllogism:

[Thesis] Sound (*śabda*) is non-eternal (*anitya*).[7]
[Reason] Because (it is) audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*).

Namely, Dignāga regards 'audibility', which is indicated as an example of the specific indeterminate in the *hetucakra*, as the logical reason which satisfies the third condition of the three forms.[8]

That Dignāga regards 'audibility' as satisfying the third condition of the three forms is related to his view of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). Namely, he claims that *vyatireka* is confirmed by 'mere non-perception' (*adarśanamātra*).[9] According to this idea, a logical reason

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[6] Logic possessing this inductive character is called the theory of 'the external concomitance' (*bahirvyāpti*). However, usage of this term is not found in the Buddhist literature until Arcaṭa's *Hetubinduṭīkā*. Cf. HBṬ 63,23; 27; see also T. Funayama (1994), "8-seiki Nālandā shusshin chūshakuka oboegaki—Bukkyō chishikiron no keifu—" [Notes on Commentators from the 8th Century Nālandā in the Buddhist *Pramāṇa*-Tradition], *The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association* 60, 49–60: 60.

[7] It is noteworthy that the thesis of this syllogism 'sound is non-eternal' is contradictory to the thesis of the syllogism 'sound is eternal' which is indicated as an example of the specific indeterminate. In terms of this exchange of the *sādhyadharma*, the similar and dissimilar instances are exchanged. However, both syllogisms are similar in that their logical reasons are 'audibility' which is specific to the sound, the subject of a thesis.

[8] Cf. PSV(K)111b3ff.: ***tshul ni re re'am gnyis gnyis kyi // rtags ni don gyi don byed min //*** (PS II 6cd) *de la tshul re re'i ni gang rjes su dpag pa kho na la yod kyi / de dang mtshungs pa la med la / de med pa la med pa ma yin pa dang / de dang mtshungs pa la yod kyi / rjes su dpag par byas la med la / de med pa la med pa'ang ma yin pa dang / de med pa la med kyi / rjes su dpag par bya ba la med la de dang mtshungs par bya ba la'ang med pa'o // tshul gnyis gnyis ni / dper na rjes su dpag par bya ba la yod la / de la mthun pa la yod la / de med pa la med pa ma yin pa dang / rjes su dpag par bya ba la yod la / de med pa la med cing / de dang mtshungs pa la med pa dang / de dang mthun pa la yod la / de med pa la med cing / rjes su dpag par bya ba la med pa ste / gtan tshigs ltar snang ba drug po 'di shugs kyis dgag par rigs par bya'o // de 'di lta ste /* ***byas phyir sgra ni rtag pa dang / lus can phyir dang gzhan min phyir // lus min phyir dang mnyan bya las // mi rtag mig gi gzung bya'i phyir //*** (PS II 7); Kitagawa [1965: 102f.]

[9] The view in which *vyatireka* is confirmed by mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) was hitherto ascribed to Īśvarasena, a teacher of Dharmakīrti (cf. E. Steinkellner (1966), "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund," *WZKSO* 10, 73–85; do. (1991), "The Logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*," in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, Wien, 311–324). Prof. Katsura, however, has recently claimed that this view can be traced back to Dignāga's semantic theory (cf. S. Katsura (1992), "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra*

'audibility' satisfies the third condition of the three forms only because it is specific to the subject of a thesis and therefore cannot be found in the dissimilar instance.

1.3. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* and the problem of the contraposition between *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* and *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*

Dignāga also refers to the specific indeterminate in relation to the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in the Dṛṣṭāntadṛṣṭāntābhāsa chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. There opponents claim that only a statement of the dissimilar example is sufficient because the content of the similar example (*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) is indicated by the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*). Dignāga counters this argument by saying that the specific indeterminate would be a valid logical reason if only a statement of the dissimilar example is sufficient.[10] That is to say, because of the specific indeterminate Dignāga could not explicitly claim that only a statement of the dissimilar example is sufficient, although he mentions the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar examples in another place.[11]

Thus, Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate is deeply concerned with the problem of the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar examples (or the one between the second and the third conditions of the three forms, in Dharmakīrti's term, the one between *anvaya* and *vyatireka*). Dignāga's above-mentioned explanation apparently implies that the specific indeterminate could be a valid logical reason if one admits the contraposition between the similar and the dissimilar examples. Thus, at a later period, when Dharmakīrti consistently claims the contraposition between *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, he had to re-interpret the meaning of the specific indeterminate as a fallacious logical reason.

2. Dharmakīrti's approach to *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*

For Dharmakīrti, the theory of fallacious logical reasons is primarily the topic of a section of the Parārthānumāna chapter. However, the issue of the specific indeterminate is so significant for the basic theory of his system of logic that he dealt with this issue in his earliest work, the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, in which he established his own theory of the logical nexus, the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*).

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and *anupalabdhi*," *Asiatische Studien* 46/1, 222–231). Dignāga's position that the specific indeterminate logical reason satisfies the third condition of the three forms is easy to understand if we accept Katsura's claim. As we shall see later (cf. section 2.2.2.), Dharmakīrti says: 'Depending on mere non-perception, (Dignāga) has explained that (the specific logical reason) has only the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*)'. That is, Dharmakīrti himself probably ascribes the view in which *vyatireka* is confirmed by mere non-perception to Dignāga.

[10] Cf. PSV(K) 149a6: *'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na / mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na / dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te / mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gtan tshigs su 'gyur ro //*; Kitagawa [1965: 252].

[11] Cf. *Nyāyamukha*, T vol. 32, 3a3: 或由義準一能顯二; PVSV 18,17: *arthāpattyā vānyatareṇobhayapradarśanāt;* S. Katsura (1981), "Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū (3)" [A Study on *Nyāyamukha* (3)], *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 41, 61–82: 71ff.

2.1. Some relevant arguments in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*

2.1.1. Criticism of Dignāga's concept of *śrāvaṇatva*

As shown above, Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate concerns his characteristic concept of *vyatireka*. Dharmakīrti, who tries to deny Dignāga's concept of *vyatireka* in order to establish his own theory of the logical nexus, cannot accept Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate. Thus, we can find Dharmakīrti's criticism of Dignāga's concept of 'audibility' in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Dharmakīrti says:

> "Further, 'on the ground of (mere) non-perception, the specific (*viśeṣa*) (indeterminate) would be a (valid) logical reason which is excluded (from the dissimilar instance) (PV I 19ab)'. Audibility also would be a (valid) logical reason which is excluded from this (dissimilar instance) because (audibility) is excluded on the ground of (mere) non-perception both from eternal things and from non-eternal things. Namely, the exclusion is none other than the exclusion from this (dissimilar instance). Nevertheless, (in reality) there is no exclusion, because for any (area) it is not determined whether (audibility) is excluded from (it)."[12]

Here, Dharmakīrti states that Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate is inconsistent with Dharmakīrti's system of logic. Dignāga regards 'audibility' as a logical reason which is found neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance, and therefore satisfies the third condition of the three forms. But that concept is possible, inasmuch as Dignāga asserted that the *vyatireka* is confirmed by mere non-perception. According to Dharmakīrti, who asserts that only the non-perception of a perceptible object (*dṛśyānupalabdhi*) can determine non-existence, it is not possible to say that 'audibility' satisfies the third condition of the three forms.

2.1.2. Criticism of Naiyāyika's *kevalavyatirekihetu*

From almost the same point of view, Dharmakīrti refutes Uddyotakara's proof of the existence of a soul (*ātman*) which depends on 'the pure negative logical reason' (*kevalavyatirekihetu*).[13] Dharmakīrti says:

> "Further, 'the (logical reason) which has (only) the negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*) would be a valid logical reason (PV I 18c)' (The opponent presents the following syllogism:) 'This living body (*jīvaccharīra*) is not not endowed with a soul because (if it is not endowed with a soul) it would not have breathing and the like (*prāṇādi*)'. (He asserts that) one can recognize (the existence of) a soul in terms of excluding this (breathing and the like from the dissimilar instance like a pot), because breathing and the like are not found, whether the pot which is not endowed with a soul is found or not found. (However) so far as one cannot prove the non-existence in terms of non-perception of an imperceptible (soul), one cannot prove that the pot and the like are not endowed with a soul. Therefore, breathing and the like are not excluded (from the dissimilar instance)."[14]

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[12] PVSV 13,19: *kiṃ ca, **viśeṣasya vyavacchedahetutā syād adarśanāt*** / (PV I 19ab) *śrāvaṇatvasyāpi nityānityayor adarśanād vyāvṛttir iti tadvyavacchedahetutā syāt. na hi tadvyāvṛtter anyad vyavacchedanam. avyavacchedas tu kutaścid vyāvṛtter evāniścayāt.*

[13] Cf. NV 291,2, etc.; K. Kanō (1987), "Shusaishin no sonzai ronshō to *kevalavyatirekihetu*" [The Proof of the Existence of God and *kevalavyatirekihetu*], *Indo Shisōshi Kenkyū* 5, 1–27.

[14] PVSV 12,26ff.: *kiṃ ca, **vyatireky api hetuḥ syāt*** / (PV I 18c) *nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti. nirātmakeṣu ghaṭādiṣu dṛṣṭādṛṣṭeṣu prāṇādyadarśanāt tannivṛttyātmagatiḥ syāt.*

Here Uddyotakara asserts that his proof of the existence of a soul is valid because the logical reason 'breathing and the like' has the negative concomitance. Dharmakīrti points out that the *vyatireka* is not confirmed because non-existence of the logical reason in the dissimilar instance is not necessarily confirmed, and concludes that the pure negative logical reason does not satisfy the conditions of a valid logical reason.[15]

2.2. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* in Dharmakīrti's theory of *hetvābhāsa*

Thus, Dharmakīrti acknowledged early on that Dignāga's concept of specific indeterminate is problematic, and must have felt it necessary to re-define this fallacious logical reason in order to reconcile it with his own system of logic. Now, Dharmakīrti deals intensively with the investigation of the specific indeterminate in the context of the description of the theory of fallacious logical reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) in the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. In fact, Dharmakīrti describes his theory of fallacious logical reasons only partially in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and prolongs its completion until the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.[16] But he closely investigates the specific indeterminate in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Thus, in what follows, I will examine Dharmakīrti's theory of specific indeterminate, focusing on the statements in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*.[17] First I will briefly look at the context of the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, in which the specific indeterminate is discussed.

2.2.1. The context of the description of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* in the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*

In 285 verses of the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti deals with two main topics, namely, the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the logical reason (*hetu*). The description concerning the logical reason begins with verse 189. After having considered the first condition of the logical reason (*pakṣadharmatva*) in verses 189–194, Dharmakīrti sets a program verse (195) in order to summarize his classification of logical reasons. There, he interprets Dignāga's *hetucakra* from his own point of view as follows:

> "(In the *hetucakra*,) two (logical reasons) (are stated) in order to establish that the essential property (*svabhāva*) and the effect (*kārya*) (are valid logical reasons, and) two contradictory logical reasons (are stated in order to indicate that they are fallacious). (Further), because of disagreement (with opponents), the specific (*bheda*) and the general (*sāmānya*) (are stated in order to indicate that they are fallacious), (and) the rest establish that (the valid reason is confirmed by) the exclusion (from the dissimilar instance)." (PV IV 195)[18]

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adṛśyānupalambhād abhāvāsiddhau ghaṭādīnāṃ nairātmyāsiddheḥ prāṇāder anivṛttiḥ.

[15] Dharmakīrti also deals with the criticism of Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of a soul in the later part of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Cf. PVSV 154,21ff.; F. Ōmae (1991), "Dharmakīrti no seitenkan—Pramāṇavārttika daiisshō oyobi jichū no wayaku (8)" [Dharmakīrti on Scripture—Japanese translation of the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and its *Svavṛtti* (8)], *Nishinihon Shūkyōgaku Zasshi* 13, 79–94: 86f.

[16] As for a general view of Dharmakīrti's theory of fallacious logical reasons, cf. M. Ono (1987), "Dharmakīrti no gijironshōin setsu" [Dharmakīrti's Theory of *hetvābhāsa*], *Bukkyōgaku* 21, (1)–(21). This article deals with Dharmakīrti's systematic description of the *hetvābhāsa* in the third chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

[17] I will refer to the parallels in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in the notes.

[18] PV IV 195: *svabhāvakāryasiddhyarthaṃ dvau dvau hetuviparyayau / vivādād bhedasāmānye śeṣo*

Thus, in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti attempts to establish his classification of logical reasons on the ground of Dignāga's *hetucakra*. First, in the verses 196–204, he strives to relate the two valid logical reasons in the *hetucakra* to his classification of valid logical reasons, i.e. the essential property and the effect.[19] Next, he goes on to explain 'the specific', skipping the contradictory logical reasons which come next in the program verse.

The explanation of the specific indeterminate begins with the verse 205, and continues to (at least) verse 259.[20] In this paragraph, Dharmakīrti closely examines the concept of specific indeterminate. Here, it is a little curious that Dharmakīrti first considers Naiyāyika's pure negative logical reason, i.e. 'breathing and the like', not the 'audibility' which Dignāga indicated as an example of the specific indeterminate, although he does mention it afterwards.[21] At any rate, as we saw above, Dharmakīrti has certainly realized in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* that the pure negative logical reason and 'audibility' have the same construction. Thus, he identifies the pure negative logical reason with the specific indeterminate in this context, and explains why the pure negative logical reason, that is to say, the specific indeterminate, cannot be acknowledged as a valid logical reason. The reason why the purely negative logical reason is fallacious, is entirely different from the reason which Dignāga demonstrates concerning 'audibility'. Namely, the meaning of the specific indeterminate is here drastically changed by Dharmakīrti.

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vyāvṛttisādhanaḥ //; PVin III 203b3.

[19] Here Dharmakīrti attempts to justify his new classification of valid logical reasons by indicating that the two valid logical reasons in the *hetucakra* are different in their pervasion and this difference is also found between his two types of logical reasons. Cf. M. Ono (1985), "Dharmakīrti no kukuin kaishaku" [Dharmakīrti's Interpretation of the *hetucakra*], *Hikaku Shisō no Michi* 4, 81–85.

[20] As for the following part of the Parārthānumāna chapter, verses 260–279 deal with the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) and the verses 280–285 are concerned with the proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatvānumāna*). According to commentators, Dharmakīrti explains the non-perception here because it is not mentioned in verse 195, although it is a type of valid logical reason (for example, PVP 321b1f.; PVV ad PV IV 260). In my opinion, however, the description of the non-perception and the proof of momentariness is involved with the issue of the specific indeterminate logical reason (cf. note 33; I will mention verses 280–285 below). I suppose that the topic with which Dharmakīrti deals in the last stage of his *Pramāṇavārttika* was the specific indeterminate logical reason. It is certain that Dharmakīrti did not complete the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, or the whole *Pramāṇavārttika*, as Prof. Frauwallner has already elucidated (cf. E. Frauwallner (1954), "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's," in *Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig, 142–154). However, Prof. Frauwallner did not further persue the reason why Dharmakīrti did not complete this work. We need to consider it. A clue is, in my opinion, the last problematic topic for Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, i.e., the specific indeterminate logical reason.

[21] If we compare Dharmakīrti's examples of *hetucakra* in the PVin III with that of Dignāga (cf. note 5), we can easily recognize that only the example of the specific indeterminate is exchanged from 'audibility' to 'breathing and the like' by Dharmakīrti (cf. PVin III 203a3: *phyogs kyi chos dgu bstan pa de dag ni gzhal bya yin pa'i phyir rtag go // byas pa'i phyir mi rtag go // mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las byung ba'o // byas pa'i phyir rtag go / gson pa'i lus ni bdag dang bcas pa yin te / srog la sogs pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro // rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir rtag go / mi rtag pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byung ba'o // mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir ro // rtag ste lus can ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba lta bu'o //*). Dharmakīrti probably considers in the PVin that 'audibility' is not appropriate as a typical example of the specific indeterminate. I will answer the question of why Dharmakīrti had to change the example of the specific indeterminate below.

2.2.2. Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*

Let us now examine how Dharmakīrti re-interprets the meaning of the specific indeterminate in the concrete statements in the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. At the beginning of the long discussion, Dharmakīrti refutes Uddyotakara's proof of the existence of a soul, i.e., 'The living body is endowed with a soul. Because it has breathing and the like':

> "The determination (*aikāntikatva*) of the exclusion (from the dissimilar instance) means the inevitable nexus (*avinābhāva*). But this (determination) does not exist in (breathing and the like) which are not necessarily connected (with a soul). On the ground of this very (determination), the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) is established. Namely, if the identity or the causality is established, (a logical reason) has the negative concomitance. Therefore, neither the negative concomitance nor the positive concomitance are established with respect to the specific (*viśeṣa*) (indeterminate logical reason, i.e., breathing and the like)." (PV IV 205–206)[22]

According to Dharmakīrti, a logical reason has the inevitable nexus with what is to be proved (*sādhya*), inasmuch as it has the negative concomitance. However, the inevitable nexus does not exist between a soul and 'breathing and the like' because they are not necessarily connected on the ground of either the identity (*tādātmya*) or the causality (*tadutpatti*). Therefore, logical reasons such as 'breathing and the like' in a proof of the existence of a soul are fallacious, because the inevitable nexus does not exist there, not because they have only the negative concomitance and lack the positive concomitance, as Dignāga explained concerning the specific indeterminate. In Dharmakīrti's system of logic, whatever has the negative concomitance also has the positive concomitance. So, a logical reason which satisfies *pakṣadharmatva* is valid, inasmuch as it has the negative concomitance. For Dharmakīrti, there is no logical reason which has only the negative concomitance. The reason why so-called 'pure negative' logical reason is fallacious is, paradoxical as it may be, that it does not have the negative concomitance in Dharmakīrti's sense.

Then Dharmakīrti explains the reason why Dignāga defines the specific indeterminate, i.e., 'audibility' as a logical reason which satisfies only the third condition of the three forms, i.e., the negative concomitance, and does not satisfy the second condition of the three forms, i.e., the positive concomitance:

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[22] PV IV 205–206: *aikāntikatvaṃ vyāvṛtter avinābhāva ucyate / tac ca nāpratibaddheṣu tata evānvayasthitiḥ // svātmatve hetubhāve vā siddhe hi vyatirekitā / sidhyaty ato viśeṣe na vyatireko na cānvayaḥ //*; PVin III 223b4ff.: *ldog pa'i rnam pa de lta bu'i* (D: *bu* P) *smra ba des ni med na mi 'byung ba nyid* (D: *nyid du* P) *brjod par 'gyur ro / 'di ltar bdag med pa nyid la* (D: *med pa nyid la* lacks P) *med pa nyid do zhes don gyis bdag* (D: *bdag* lacks P) *la gnas pa gzhan dang ma 'brel par bstan par 'gyur ro // de nyid kyis ni rjes su 'gro ba grub pa'i phyir ldog pa can zhes brjod pa can yang* (D: *zhes brjod pa can yang* lacks P) *ma yin no // med na mi 'byung ba yang 'brel pa yin na bdag nyid 'brel pa de ni* (P: *yin na yang* D) *de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba las* (D: *byung ba las* lacks P) *gzhan med do zhes bshad zin to // de dag kyang mthong ba med par mi 'grub pa'i phyir srog la sogs pa med na mi 'byung ba ma yin no // de nyid kyi phyir* (P: *de nyid kyis* D) *gang las ldog pa can* (D: *can* lacks P) *zhes brjod pa* (P: *brjod pa yang* D) *bdag log* (P: *ma logs* D) *kyang 'di nges par* (P: *'brel par* D) *ldog pa yang ma yin no // 'brel pa med pa ni 'ga' zhig log na nges par ldog pa ma yin no* (P: *'brel pa med pa ni 'ga' zhig log na nges par ldog pa ma yin no* lacks D) *// de bas na khyad par ni ldog pa med pa dang rjes su 'gro ba med pa yin no //*

"Depending on mere non-perception, (Dignāga)[23] has explained that (the specific logical reason) has only the negative concomitance. (But in fact, the negative concomitance is not confirmed by mere non-perception.) Therefore, (the specific logical reason is) indeterminate. Otherwise (i.e., if the negative concomitance is confirmed by mere non-perception), (the specific logical reason) could prove (something)." (PV IV 207)[24]

The ground for Dignāga's assertion that the specific indeterminate satisfies the third condition of the three forms derives from the fact that 'audibility' is merely not perceived in the dissimilar instance, i.e., the non-eternal things (except sound). In the same manner, the ground for Uddyotakara's assertion that the pure negative logical reason has the negative concomitance is no other than the fact that 'breathing and the like' are not perceived in the dissimilar instance, i.e., what is not endowed with a soul (except the living body) like a pot. For Dharmakīrti, the negative concomitance is not confirmed by mere non-perception. To be sure, a soul is not perceived in a pot which is not endowed with 'breathing and the like'. But this non-perception does not necessarily confirm that there is no soul in a pot. Dharmakīrti explains this as follows:

"[Opponents:] Because the non-existence of breathing and the like pervades the non-existence of a soul, breathing and the like would not exist, if a soul does not exist.
[Answer:] It is not right, because the non-existence of one (i.e., a soul) is not necessarily connected with the non-existence of another (i.e., breathing and the like).
[Opponents:] (Breathing and the like are) essential properties of this (soul), or this (soul) causes (breathing and the like).
[Answer:] That is not right. If these (i.e., breathing and the like) are perceived when a soul is perceived, and (a soul) is not perceived when (breathing and the like) are not perceived, (the inevitable connection between a soul and breathing and the like) is established. And such perception and non-perception are not established as far as a completely imperceptible object (*atyantaparokṣa*) is concerned." (PV IV 208–210)[25]

The negative concomitance of two things can be established, inasmuch as they are necessarily connected. And this necessary connection is basically confirmed by establishing between two things a condition that A is perceived when B is perceived and B is not perceived when A is not perceived. As for the proof of the existence of a soul in question, the existence and non-

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[23] Cf. PVinṬ 156a2.

[24] PV IV 207: *adṛṣṭimātram ādāya kevalaṃ vyatirekitā / uktānaikāntikas tasmād anyathā gamako bhavet //*; PVin III 223b7: *ma mthong ba tsam la brten nas slob dpon gyis mnyan par bya ba nyid ldog pa can du bshad do // de tsam gyis med par rtogs pa ni ma yin no zhes bshad zin to / de lta ma yin na the tshom gyi rgyu nyid du mi 'gyur te /*

[25] PV IV 208–210: *prāṇādyabhāvo nairātmyavyāpīti vinivartane / ātmano vinivarteta prāṇādir yadi tac ca na // anyasya vinivṛttyānyavinivṛtter ayogataḥ / tadātmā tatprasūtaś cen naitad ātmopalambhane // tasyopalabdhāv agatāv agatau ca prasidhyati / te cātyantaparokṣasya dṛṣṭyadṛṣṭī na sidhyataḥ //*; PVin III 224a1ff.: *srog la sogs pa med pas* (D: *med pas* lacks P) *bdag med pa la khyab pa'i phyir bdag log na srog la sogs pa ldog par 'gyur ro zhe na ma yin te ma 'brel pa med pas nye bar mi sbyor ba med pa la khyab pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro // gal te srog la sogs pa de'i bdag nyid dam* (D: *ma* P) */ de las byung bas* (P: *ba* D) *bdag dang 'brel pa yin na / de dag de log na ldog par 'gyur bas de'i tshe srog la sogs pa med pas bdag med pa la* (P: *las* D) *khyab par 'gyur ro / de med na med par grub pas khyab pa grub pa'i phyir de yang mi 'grub ste / bzlog* (D: *ldog* P) *pa la 'brel pa med* (D: *ma grub* P) *pa'i phyir ro // de dag gi 'brel pa ni dmigs pa dang mi dmigs pa dag las shes pa yin na / de dag ni shin tu lkog tu gyur pa la mi 'grub po //*

existence of the logical reason 'breathing and the like' can be recognized because they are perceptible (*dṛśya*). But the existence and non-existence of a soul cannot be recognized because it is imperceptible (*adṛśya*).[26] Because a soul cannot be perceived at all, it is indeterminate whether it exists in a pot or not, even if it is not perceived in a pot. For Dharmakīrti, as is often indicated, the non-existence must be confirmed by non-perception of a perceptible object (*dṛśyānupalabdhi*). As a result, the ground for the fallacy of the pure negative logical reason, i.e., the specific indeterminate logical reason, is that both their positive and negative concomitance are doubtful (*saṃdigdha*) because what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is imperceptible.[27]

2.2.3. The position of *śrāvaṇatva*

Thus, Dharmakīrti drastically re-interprets Dignāga's term 'the specific indeterminate' by criticizing Uddyotakara's concept of pure negative logical reason, and reconciles this term with his system of logic. However, he is not entirely free from Dignāga's traditions, because he insists that 'audibility', which Dignāga indicates as an example of the specific indeterminate, be the specific indeterminate in Dharmakīrti's sense as well. He says:

> "The breathing and the like are equal to audibility with respect to the deviation (*vyabhicāra*). (Namely, both of them are devious because they are excluded also from the similar instance).
> [Opponents:] (They are) not (equal). The latter (i.e., audibility) is devious, even if (it has) the negative concomitance. (But the former is not devious because it is not excluded from the similar instance.)
> [Answer:] Why (is audibility devious)?
> [Opponents:] Because this (audibility) is excluded not only from the dissimilar instance (but also from the similar instance).
> [Answer:] If you say so, it follows that there is no positive concomitance (*anuvṛtti*) in the similar instance concerning this (audibility). (And) this (absence of the positive concomitance in the similar instance) is the same for another (logical reason, i.e., breathing and the like) as well. That A is necessarily excluded from the dissimilar instance (actually) means that A exists in the similar instance. That is the reason why (Dignāga) said that 'in terms of implication (*arthāpatti*) one of (two examples) indicates another'.[28] Therefore, (in other words) the above-mentioned non-deviation cannot be established, if the positive concomitance does not exist. And negation of negation is nothing else than affirmation." (PV IV 218–221)[29]

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[26] Cf. PV IV 212: *prāṇādeś ca kvacid dṛṣṭyā sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate / tathātmā yadi dṛśyeta sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate //*; PVin III 224a4f.: *srog la sogs pa yang mthong ba nyid las la lar yod pa dang* (D: *dag* P) *med par rtogs pa yin no / bdag ni de lta ma yin pa'i phyir de yod pa dang med par mi rtogs so //*

[27] Cf. PVin III 223a4f.: *de nyid kyi phyir* (P: *de nyid kyi phyir* lacks D) *rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa dag la* (P: *las* D) *the tshom za ba'i phyir ma nges pa yin te / de las bsgrub par bya ba dang cig zhos dag tu nges pa med pa'i phyir ro //* Here, the concept of 'doubtful' (*saṃdigdha*) plays an important role. Dharmakīrti crucially uses this concept in classifing the fallacious logical reasons in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Cf. Ono [1987: (4)ff.]

[28] Cf. note 11.

[29] PV IV 218–221: *śrāvaṇatvena tat tulyaṃ prāṇādi vyabhicārataḥ / na tasya vyabhicāritvād vyatireke 'pi cet katham // nāsādhyād eva viśleṣas tasya nanv evam ucyate / sādhye 'nuvṛttyabhāvo 'rthāt tasyānyatrāpy asau samaḥ // asādhyād eva viccheda iti sādhye 'stitocyate / arthāpattyāta evoktam ekena dvayadarśanam // īdṛgavyabhicāro 'to 'nanvayeṣu na sidhyati / pratiṣedhaniṣedhaś ca vidhānāt kīdṛśo 'paraḥ //*; PVin III 224b5ff.: *srog la sogs pa mnyan bya nyid dang 'khrul par yang mtshungs so // ma yin te de'i* (P: *de ni* D) *ldog pa 'khrul pa'i phyir ro zhe na ji ltar*

Furthermore, at the end of the discourse on the specific indeterminate, Dharmakīrti defends Dignāga, who indicates 'audibility', not the pure negative logical reason, as an example of the specific indeterminate with the following statement:

> "(Dignāga) made reference to audibility in order to indicate (that fallacies of specific indeterminate logical reasons are) the same. (Therefore), one should assume that each of them is a method of understanding that whatever has (only) the negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*) is not a (valid) logical reason." (PV IV 259)[30]

Thus, Dharmakīrti emphasizes that 'audibility' is still the specific indeterminate, because 'audibility' and 'breathing and the like' have the same fallacy.[31] However, if the two logical reasons are the same in the fallacy, why does Dharmakīrti first indicate the pure negative logical reason as an example of the specific indeterminate? One reason is undoubtedly that he has to criticize the syllogism which Uddyotakara established and Dignāga did not know. But a more essential reason is probably that it is inconvenient for him to criticize 'audibility' directly, as we shall see below.

3. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* and the development of Dharmakīrti's logic—a hypothesis

The foregoing investigation clearly shows Dharmakīrti's basic view that the pure negative logical reason whose negative concomitance is confirmed by mere non-perception is in fact fallacious because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful. It then follows that the inevitable connection (*nāntarīyakatā*), i.e., the positive and negative concomitance between a logical reason (*sādhana*) and what is to be proved (*sādhya*), must be ascertained not by mere non-perception but by further valid logical reasons (*sādhana*) in order to confirm the validity of a logical reason.[32] Dharmakīrti considers the issue of the inevitable connection in verses 245–258. Here, I will not investigate the description of this section closely, but I should point out that Dharmakīrti deals mainly with the issue of the ascertainment of the inevitable connection in the

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'khrul / de ni mthun (P: *mi mthun* D) *pa'i phyogs ma yin pa* (D: *par* P) *kho na las ldog pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhe na / des ni 'di* (D: *'di* lacks P) *mthun pa'i phyogs la 'jug pa med par brjod pa ma yin nam / de ni gzhan la yang mtshungs pa'i phyir / ji ltar srog la sogs pa dang mi mtshungs / mthun pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nyid la med do zhes bya bas ni* (P: *ni* lacks D) *'di mthun pa'i phyogs la yod par brjod pa yin te / dgag pa gnyis kyi rnal ma go ba'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na rnam par bcad par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir nges par gzung ba'i 'bras bu cir 'gyur ro* (P: *ro* lacks D) *// gcig la nges par gzung ba med na ni / ldog pa mi 'khrul par mi 'grub pa'i* (P: *'khrul pa'i* D) *phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang mthun pa'i phyogs ma yin pa nyid la med pa zhes don go bas dpe gnyis las gang yang rung bas* (P: *ba* D) *gnyi ga bstan par brjod do // de'i phyir ldog pa mi 'khrul pa 'di 'dra ba ni rjes su 'gro ba med par mi 'grub po // grub na ni nan gyis rjes su 'gro ba 'gugs par byed de* (P: *'gug par byed do* D) */ de dgag pa bkag pa'i ngo bo ni sgrub pa'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir ro /*

[30] PV IV 259: *ahetutvagatinyāyaḥ sarvo 'yaṃ vyatirekiṇaḥ / abhyūhyaḥ śrāvaṇatvokteḥ kṛtāyāḥ sāmyadṛṣṭaye //*

[31] Mokṣākaragupta, a later follower of Dharmakīrti, also states: TBh 48,1–7: *tatrāsādhāraṇānaikāntiko yathā; sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram, prāṇādimattvād aparajīvaccharīravad ghaṭavat. ayaṃ hetur aparajīvaccharīre ātmanā vyāpta iti na niścitaḥ. ghaṭe ca vipakṣe ātmano 'bhāvān nivṛtta iti na niścitaḥ. dharmiṇi tu jīvaccharīre vidyata ity asādhāraṇānaikāntika ucyate. aparaś cāsādhāraṇo yathā; anityaś chabdaḥ, śrāvaṇatvāt, ghaṭavat, ākāśavad iti*; see also Y. Kajiyama (1966), "An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta," *Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University* 10, 1–173, Kyoto: 113f.

[32] PV IV 246ab: *nāntarīyakatā sā ca sādhanaṃ samapekṣate /*

case of the effect as reason (*kāryahetu*),[33] and that concerning the ascertainment of the inevitable connection in the case of the essential property as reason (*svabhāvahetu*) he only suggests his basic idea as follows:

> "The inevitable connections of the essential property (*svabhāva*) (as reason) should be recognized respectively depending on logical reasons, as (I) have already explained concerning perishment (*vināśa*) and being produced (*kṛtakatva*)." (PV IV 258)[34]

Namely, Dharmakīrti states that the inevitable connections of the essential property as reason should be ascertained according to the method he himself uses in his 'inference on the ground of perishment' (*vināśitvānumāna*).[35] In this statement, the issue of the specific indeterminate is related to one of Dharmakīrti's most crucial topics, i.e., a proof of momentariness. This statement, in my opinion, is a starting point of a new development in Dharmakīrti's logic.

Taking into account the above discussion on the specific indeterminate, I would like to present a hypothesis, in terms of which we could answer the two important questions, i.e., why Dharmakīrti did not complete his *Pramāṇavārttika*, and what motivated him to reform his proof of momentariness.

As is mentioned above, according to Dharmakīrti, the specific indeterminate logical reason is invalid, because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful, not because it is specific to the subject of a thesis and exists neither in the similar instance nor in the dissimilar instance, as Dignāga explained. Namely, Uddyotakara's pure negative logical reason 'breathing and the like' is regarded as the specific indeterminate, because its positive and negative concomitance are doubtful. And the ultimate reason for this doubtfulness is that a soul, i.e., what is to be proved (*sādhya*), is imperceptible (*adṛśya*).

Here, we should recall that Dharmakīrti regards 'audibility' as the specific indeterminate, because 'audibility' and 'breathing and the like' are the same in the fallacy. Therefore, Dharmakīrti must have admitted that the positive and negative concomitance between 'audibility' and 'eternity/non-eternity' (*nityatva/anityatva*) are doubtful. And inasmuch as 'audibility' is perceptible in essence, it follows that 'eternity/non-eternity' is imperceptible (*adṛśya*).[36] On the other hand, in the proof of momentariness which Dharmakīrti presented in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, the so-called 'inference on the ground of perishment', the thesis that things are non-eternal, is proved by ascertaining the inevitable connection between 'being produced' (*kṛtakatva*) and 'non-eter-

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[33] The issue of the inevitable connection in the case of the effect as reason concerns the issue of non-perception (cf. PV IV 246 cd: *kārye dṛṣṭir adṛṣṭiś ca kāryakāraṇatā hi te //*). That is the essential reason why Dharmakīrti deals with non-perception in verses 260–279 (cf. note 20). There, non-perception is finally grounded on self-cognition, and therefore, *regressus ad infinitum* is avoided (cf. PV IV 274: *tasmād anupalambho 'yaṃ svayaṃpratyakṣato gataḥ / svamātravṛtter gamakas tadabhāvavyavasthiteḥ //*).

[34] Cf. PV IV 258: *nāntarīyakatā jñeyā yathāsvaṃ hetvapekṣayā / svabhāvasya yathoktaṃ prāk vināśakṛtakatvayoḥ //*

[35] Cf. PVSV 98,4–100,24; 141,17–150,5.

[36] Dharmakīrti probably noticed this inconvenient consequence. That is the reason why he did not directly criticize 'audibility' as an example of the specific indeterminate.

nity'. And this ascertainment essentially depends on the empirical fact of perishment.[37] Therefore, this ascertainment is possible only if 'non-eternity' is perceptible. If 'non-eternity' is imperceptible, this inference cannot function.[38]

Thus, as a result of the re-interpretation of the concept of specific indeterminate, Dharmakīrti probably would have to reconsider his proof of momentariness presented in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. His fragmentary description of 'the inference on the ground of perishment' located at the end of the Parārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV IV 280–285) reveals a great deal about these circumstances. However, he does not seem to have been able to come to any appropriate solution at that time. In my opinion, that is the direct reason why Dharmakīrti did not complete his main work, the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Afterwards in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, he succeeded in solving this problem by establishing so-called 'the inference on the ground of existence' (*sattvānumāna*). There, as is well known, he introduced 'the negative proof with reference to the contradictory' (*viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*) as a method, in terms of which one can *a priori* ascertain the inevitable connection without depending on any perception of the empirical fact. Thus, he drastically reformed the proof of momentariness.[39]

Conversely, the establishment of *sattvānumāna* might mean that the inevitable connection between 'audibility' and 'non-eternity' could also be ascertained by applying 'the negative proof with reference to the contradictory'. Indeed, Jinendrabuddhi (8c.)[40] observes that the inevitable connection between 'audibility' and 'non-eternity' can be ascertained by 'the negative proof with reference to the contradictory' (i.e., 'whatever is eternal cannot have *arthakriyā*'), and concludes that 'audibility' can be a valid logical reason.[41]

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[37] Cf. E. Steinkellner (1968/69), "Die Entwicklung des kṣaṇikatvānumānam bei Dharmakīrti," *WZKSO* 12/13, 361–377: 366, 371.

[38] On the other hand, at the stage of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, Dharmakīrti did not consider that a soul (*ātman*) and Buddhist dogmas which are included in the four noble truths (*caturāryasatya*) such as 'everything is non-eternal' are objects of the same kind of the inference. Namely, he states that the four noble truths are 'objects of the inference not depending on the scripture' (*anāgamāpekṣānumānaviṣaya*), but that a soul is not so (cf. PVSV 108,24ff.: *tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviṣayābhimatānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ yathā catūrṇām āryasatyānām. ananumeyānāṃ tathābhāvo yathātmādīnām.*). From this point of view, the proof of momentariness in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* may not be invalid.

[39] Cf. Steinkellner [1968/69: 369ff.]. However, inasmuch as the *sattvānumāna* itself depends on Dharmakīrti's definition of existence (cf. PV III 3ab: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat /*), this new proof also cannot be accepted by those who do not accept Dharmakīrti's ontology. For example, Akalaṃka states that there is no essential difference between the *kevalavyatirekin* and the *sattvānumāna* (cf. SVṬ 206,16f.: *jīvaccharīre prāṇādir yathāhetur niranvayāt / tathā sarvaḥ sattvādir ahetuḥ kṣaṇike kvacit //17//* [Everything such as 'existence' regarding a certain momentary (thing) is not less a (valid) logical reason than 'breathing and the like' regarding the living body, because the positive concomitance does not exist (in either cases).]).

[40] Cf. T. Funayama (1995), "Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Kamalaśīla on the aim of a treatise (*prayojana*)," *WZKS* 39, 181–201.

[41] Cf. PSṬ 171a2: *'o na mnyan par bya ba nyid ni rna bas gzung bar bya ba nyid de / rang gi rnam pa can gyi rna ba'i rnam par shes pa'i rgyu nyid kyi mtshan nyid can yin zhing / de yang mi rtag pa kho nar rigs kyi rtag pa ni ma yin te / rnam pa thams cad du don byed nus pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro / don byed nus pa'i mtshan nyid can yang dngos po zhes pa 'di ni bshad zin to // des na mnyan par bya ba nyid mi rtag pa kho na la 'jug go zhes pa 'di ni the tshom med de / de na ci ltar rjes su 'jug pa dang ldog pa dag ma nges pa'i phyir ro zhes brjod ce na / skyon 'di med de / pha rol po'i rtag pa yang dngos por khas len te / des na de'i 'dod pa la ltos pas de skad bshad do // rang gi lugs*

Dharmakīrti himself insists not only in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, but also in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* that 'audibility' is the specific indeterminate as a kind of fallacious logical reason.[42] And almost all of Buddhist logicians including Arcaṭa[43] seem to hold that 'audibility' is a fallacious logical reason, until Ratnākaraśānti explicitly states that it is a valid logical reason.[44] But inasmuch as the *sattvānumāna* is established, we could say that for the later Dharmakīrti there is no actual reason to classify 'audibility' with the specific indeterminate as a fallacious logical reason.

Abbreviations

AVS	*Antarvyāptisamarthana* (Ratnākaraśānti): In *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, ed. Hariprasad Śāstri, Bibliotheca Indica 1226, 103–114. Calcutta, 1910.
HBṬ	*Hetubinduṭīkā* (Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa): Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, eds. *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Baroda, 1949.
IBK	*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*).
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): *Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā-sahitam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭikā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Vol. 1. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calcutta, 1944.
PS	*Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib.): D 4203 (Tshad ma, vol. 1, Ce 1b1–13a1).
PSṬ	*Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4268 (Tshad ma, vol. 20, Ye 1b1–314a7).
PSV(K)	*Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib. tr. Kanakavarman): P 5702 (Vol. 130, Ce 93b4–177a7).

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kyis ni mnyan bya nyid mi rtag pa nyid la gtan tshigs kho na'o // Prof. Wakahara assumes that this description is the basis on which Tibetan Buddhist scholars asserts that Jinendrabuddhi is an advocate of the theory of the internal concomitance (*antarvyāptivādin*). Further, he suggests that Dharmottara might refute Jinendrabuddhi's theory of the internal concomitance (cf. Y. Wakahara (1987), "Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan no naihenjūron hihan" [Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's Criticism of the theory of the internal concomitance], *IBK* 35/2: 867–869).

[42] Cf. PVin II 7,13ff.: *gal te mnyan par bya ba nyid ldog pa yin yang go bar byed pa nyid ma yin no zhe na / ma yin te / ltog pa med pa'i phyir ro // mnyan par bya ba nyid ni 'ga' las kyang ldog pa ma yin te / the tshom sgrub par byed pa'i phyir ro // ldog pa dang ldan pa la ni the tshom med pa'i phyir te / byas pa nyid las mi rtag pa nyid bzhin no // dngos po'i chos dang dngos po thams cad las ldog pa ni 'gal ba'i phyir ro // des na yod par dogs pa nyid kyis the tshom du 'gyur ro // rjes su 'gro ba ma mthong ba'i phyir ldog pa dang ldan par bshad pa yin no // ldog pa'i rnam pa 'di lta bu ni go bar byed pa ma yin te / go bar byed pa gang yin pa de ni brjod zin to // de yang rjes su 'gro ba med par bstan par mi nus te / de'i ngo bo dang rgyu'i dngos po mthong ba sgrub par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro //*; cf. E. Steinkellner (1979), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: svārthānumānam, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Wien: 37f.

[43] Arcaṭa is regarded as a representative who asserts so-called *antarvyāptivāda*. He, however, holds the conservative position that 'audibility' is a fallacious logical reason. Cf. HBṬ 212,6: *saty api hi dharmisambandhe śrāvaṇatvādeḥ sapakṣe bhāvo nāsti* ["Namely, concerning audibility and the like, they do not exist in the similar instance, even if they are related to the subject."].

[44] Cf. AVS 113,12ff.: *athavāsādhāraṇataiva śrāvaṇatvasya mūḍhābhimānopakalpitā. dṛṣṭaiva hi śabdavyaktidharmiṇī vivādādhikaraṇāt. anyathā dharmyasiddhiprasaṅgāc ca. dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaśabdavyaktisādhāraṇaṃ ca śrāvaṇatvaṃ hetuḥ, dhūmasāmānyāt. tataḥ sarvopasaṃhāravatyāḥ vyāpteḥ sambhavāt sattvādivad adṛṣṭam eva sādhanaṃ śrāvaṇatvākhyam. kramayaugapadyānupalambha eva cātra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam. śrotrajñāna-janakatvam eva hi śrāvaṇatvam*; Y. Kajiyama (1989), "Ratnākaraśānti 'Naihenjūron'" [Ratnākaraśānti's Antarvyāptisamarthana], *Bukkyōdaigaku Daigakuin Kenkyūkiyō* 17 (1–24): 22f.; see also Kajiyama [1966: note 301].

PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 1–206. [Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the order followed here correspond to the chapters 3, 1, 2 and 4 in Miyasaka's edition.]

PVin II *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

PVin III *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 3 (Parārthānumāna) (Tib.): D 4211 (Tshad ma, Vol. 1, Ce 152b1–230a7).

PVinṬ *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) (Tib.): D 4229 (Tshad ma, vol. 14, Tshe 1b1–178a3).

PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4217 (Tshad ma, vol. 2, Che 1b1–326b4).

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtayā vṛttyā saṃvalitam (Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin).* Appendix to *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna) 14–16 (1938–40).

SVṬ *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* (Anantavīrya): Mahendra Kumar Jain, ed. *Śrīmad-Bhaṭṭākalaṅkadeva-praṇītasya savṛtti-Siddhiviniś-cayasya Ravibhadrapādopajīvi-Anantavīryācārya-viracitā Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā.* 2 vols. Benares, 1959.

T J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds. *Taisho shinshu daizokyo.* 85 vols. Tokyo: Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai.

TBh *Tarkabhāṣā* (Mokṣākaragupta): H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, ed. *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda.* 2nd ed. Mysore, 1952.

WZKS *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*

WZKSO *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.*

DHARMAKĪRTI'S INTERPRETATION OF *PRAMĀṆASAMUCCAYAVṚTTI* V 36: *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha.**

by

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1. In my contribution to the Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference: "Dignāga on *Śabdasāmānya* and *Śabdaviśeṣa*,"[1] I have shown how Dharmakīrti departs radically from Dignāga's view of the relation between *śabda* and *artha,* which Dignāga describes, within the theoretical framework of the *apoha* theory, as a relation between two types, *arthasāmānya* and *śabdasāmānya,* the nature of each type being defined by exclusion of other. In this paper I would like to address another important aspect of Dharmakīrti's views on *apoha* to which I referred briefly in the above-mentioned paper:[2] his exegesis, in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [PVSV 62,24–63,16], of Dignāga's claim that "a word denotes things *(bhāvān)* exclusively *(eva)* as qualified by negation of other intended objects *(arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān)*" [PSV V 36]. Since the epistemological deliberations underlying this statement constitute the rationale behind Dignāga's formulation of the *apoha* theory, it is obvious that Dharmakīrti's interpretation of it is of special interest not only for the evaluation of his role as an exegete of Dignāga's philosophy, but also for a correct understanding of his own position as expounder of the *apoha* theory. In order to understand Dharmakīrti's exegesis of this pivotal Dignāgan claim, it is necessary first to clarify the theoretical background of the limited passages in which Dignāga attempts to justify why negation or exclusion of other *(anyāpoha)* functions as qualifier of the denotation of any given word.

2. Dignāga rarely formulates the idea, in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* [PS], that a word denotes its objects exclusively as qualified by negation *(nivṛtti)* or exclusion *(apoha/vyāvṛtti)* of other intended objects. He stresses its importance in two theoretically significant passages in PS, one of which is partly extant in Sanskrit. We also find the same view expressed in an interesting Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga's lost *Sāmānyaparīkṣā* [SāmP], one of the sources he exploited

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* A substantial portion of this paper is based upon two unpublished papers, **a.** "Dignāga's *Apoha* Theory, its Presuppositions and Main Theoretical Implications", read at Ryūkoku University, Kyoto, October 1991 at the invitation of Prof. Mikogami Esho; **b.** *"Adarśanamātra"* and the Question of Induction in Dignāgan Epistemology, read for the first time at a seminar conducted by Prof. E. Steinkellner at Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Vienna, August 1992.

[1] Cf. *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference* (Vienna, 1991): 269–80.

[2] Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 273 no. 18.

when writing the Apohaparīkṣā of PS V.[3] Although it is impossible to decide whether his views on *apoha* changed markedly in the course of his career, the fact that SāmP was written before PS makes it reasonable to take this fragment as point of departure for discussing the epistemological considerations underlying Dignāga's statement.[4]

3. The sources make it possible to reconstruct the following fragment:

tathā ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānānām asambhāvāt[5]

tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ.[6]

śabdāntarārthāpohaṃ hi svārthe kurvatī "śrutir abhidhatta" ity ucyate; hiśabdo yasmādarthe. yasmād vṛkṣaśabdo 'vṛkṣaśabdanivṛttiṃ svārthe kurvan svārthaṃ vṛkṣalakṣaṇaṃ pratyāyayatīti ucyate, evaṃ nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ, "dravyādi san," na nivṛttimātram,[7] *alakṣaṇīyam eva ca syān nivṛttimātram, avastutvāt, kharaviṣāṇakuṇṭhatīkṣṇatādivarṇanāvat.*[8]

"And thus [we must conclude that], since [the word] cannot possibly denote the universal, the relation [between the universal and the particular (*bheda*)] or the universal possessor,

the word excludes other [intended objects].

For (*hi*) it is claimed that the word 'denotes' while excluding for the sake of its own intended object, the intended objects of other words (the word *hi* is used in the sense of 'because'). Because it is claimed that the word 'tree', while negating the word 'non-tree' for the sake of its own intended object, indicates that its own intended object is defined as tree. Thus the word's intended object is a factual object (*vastu*) qualified by negation, viz. 'existent substance' or the like, but not mere

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[3] The Jaina philosopher Mallavādin, as indicated by his commentator *Siṃhasūrigaṇin,* used *Sāmānyaparīkṣā* as one of the sources for his criticism, in the *Nayacakra,* of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, cf. NCV 628,8. References to SāmP in post-Dignāgan phil. lit. are scarce; cf., however, Jinendrabuddhi's quotation from *Spyi brtags pa rgyas pa* [= *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvistara*] in *Viśālāmalavatī* [P no. 5766: 219,26ff.]. There is no reason to assume that the term *rgyas pa* [= Skt. *vistara*] is part of the original title; it only indicates that it is a comprehensive and discursive treatment of its subject matter. Jinendrabuddhi does not expressly say that the work is by Dignāga, but since the quotation addresses the problem of whether aggregate terms (*samudāyaśabda*) are subsumed under the general *apoha* theory in much the same way as PS V 50aff., it would seem reasonable to conclude that Jinendrabuddhi quotes from SāmP. It is probably the same work, including a prose commentary, to which Yijing refers in *Nan hai ji gui hei fa zhuan* [T 2125: 230a6] under the title *Guan zong xiang lun* [**Sāmānyalakṣaṇaparīkṣā*]. There is no reason to attach much importance to the presence of the term *xiang* (= Skt. *lakṣaṇa*) in the title. The introductory stanza is interesting because it permits us to deduce that the work was a large-scale work. Introducing his treatise, Dignāga claims that he is writing the *Sāmānya[lakṣaṇa]parīkṣā* for those who value detailed expositions (**vistara*) and do not content themselves with mere summaries (**saṃkṣeparuci*), as if in imitation of VP II 476. It is interesting in this context that PSV 50aff. (Hattori [1982: 147, 21ff.]) quotes, in a slightly edited form, along with quotations from VP II 156 and 155, the old *vṛtti* ascribed to Bhartṛhari [cf. Iyer, p. 223,3ff.].

[4] Uddyotakara quotes in *Nyāyavārttika* part of the same fragment in his exposition and criticism of *apoha*: *tasmād anyāpohakṛcchrutir iti. śabdāntarārthāpohaṁ hi* (so read), etc. [p. 328,20–21], as well as a verse: *vibhaktibhedaniyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ / sāmānādhikaraṇyasyāsiddhiḥ saddravyaśabdayor // iti* [p. 326,5–6]. The verse (printed as prose!) is a slightly edited version of *Vākyapadīya* III 14.8, which Dignāga reformulated so as to suit his own purpose. He quotes the verse in its original form in PSV V 2c–d, cf. Hattori [1982: 106 no. 15].

[5] Cf. NCV 609,19–610,8; this phrase is related to the phrase introducing PS V 11d, cf. Hattori [1982: 115,28–29].

[6] Cf. NCV 611,21; this *ślokapāda* is identical with PS V 11d, cf. Hattori [1982: 115 no. 17].

[7] Cf. NCV 611,21–612.

[8] The NCV quotation ends with *nivṛttimātram.* However, the concluding phrase is no doubt part of the original text as appears from Siddhasenagaṇin's *Tattvārthabhāṣyavyākhyā* V 24, where it is ascribed to Dattakabhikṣu, i.e.,

negation; for (*ca*) mere negation would indeed be non-definable, in that it is not a real object, like [the unreal object of] descriptions such as bluntness or sharpness of hare's horns."

Since Uddyotakara concludes his exposition of Dignāga's views on *apoha* by quoting the first line of the commentary following the *ślokapāda*, and his exposition of Dignāga's arguments as a whole is identical in content with the argumentative structure of PS V 1–11, it is possible to conclude that Dignāga summarised at least this part of the SāmP in the corresponding section of PS V. The fragment is particularly interesting compared to the parallel passage in PS V 11d, which does not present any arguments for *apoha: apoha* is merely claimed to be the only justifiable alternative to the assumption that it is real universals that underly the denotation of words.[9] In PS V 11d Dignāga concludes that the validity of *apoha* follows from the untenability of the views that either the universal (*jāti*), the particulars (*bheda*), the relation that holds between the particulars and the universal (*sambandha*), or the universal possessing particulars (*jātimat*) are the intended objects of any given word. The SāmP fragment clearly presupposes the same line of argument, but Dignāga also adds some clarifying remarks about the function of *apoha.* In the first place he explains that a word denotes its intended object (*abhidhatte*) while at the same time excluding for the sake of its proper intended object (*svārthe*) the intended objects of other words. Thus exclusion or negation qualifies the denotation of the word in that it helps the word to denote its proper intended object. Dignāga illustrates this by saying that the word 'tree' indicates that its proper intended object has the characteristic of being a tree (*vṛkṣalakṣaṇa*) by excluding [the intended object of] the word non-tree.[10] In order to prevent the misunderstanding that exclusion or negation of other leaves nothing but a blank in cognition, Dignāga clarifies his position by explaining that the intended object is a real thing (*vastu*) qualified by negation of other. It is not mere negation, which represents nothing but an absence of real features and therefore is indescribable in terms of its attributes, etc., just like attributes ascribed to non-existent entities such as hare's horns. Dignāga's non-Buddhist critics directed a substantial part of their criticism of the *apoha* theory against the assumption that an absence as such could have any qualifying force. However, in the light of Dignāga's remarks in SāmP many of these objections can be dismissed as mere quibble.

4. Textual evidence thus seems to indicate that Dignāga conceived of the opposition between the excluded non-tree and the thing being qualified by the negation of non-tree, i.e., tree, in terms of a privative opposition between tree and non-tree, i.e., the word tree expresses the presence of a particular distinctive feature (*lakṣaṇa*), whereas non-tree expresses its absence. Paraphrasing Dignāga's statement we may say that the word functions as a limitation operator in that it delimits its own intended object from other intended objects by establishing a boundary between its own referent, tree, and its non-referent, non-tree. This boundary is the result of a conjunction of the presence and absence of a particular distinctive feature. However, according to Dignāga the negation of non-tree is the qualifying property of tree, and this entails a peculiar

Dignāga, cf. NCV 548,14 foll.

[9] Cf. Pind, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

[10] One would expect *avṛkṣaśabdārtha.*

logico-semiotic aporia which Dignāga's critics, as is well-known, did not hesitate pointing out: if any given word and its intended object are defined in terms of a privative opposition in which the presence of a term of the type A necessarily implies the absence of a term of the type non-A and vice versa, the implication becomes tautological. Hence we may conclude that within the structure of the privative opposition the distinctive feature coincides with the opposition itself: the term A at the same time identifies its intended object as A and differentiates or excludes it from non-A. There is reason to believe that this is what Dignāga had in mind, when talking about negation of other as the qualifier of any given intended object, although the formulation as such is analogous to the idea which Dignāga rejects, namely, that the denotation of any given term is grounded in the fact that it denotes things as qualified by the universal or universals inherent in it.

5. It is obvious that Dignāga did not consider a term of the type non-A to be without content: it denotes in a general form the absence of the particular distinctive feature that determines the denotation of the positive term A. He addresses the question of the semantic representation of the type non-A in PS V 43b, introducing the crucial notion of *ekadharma,* which Kumārila made the subject of a detailed discussion in *Ślokavārttika.*[11] Dignāga argues:

> "Nor is the objection justified that no cognition can occur,
>
> > because [the word] excludes necessarily [the excluded] as determined by its general feature (**sāmānyaniścita*).
>
> For (**hi*) it does not exclude different (i.e. other) universals (*jāti*) for each individual substance (**pratyekavastu*), but rather (**kiṃ tarhi*), [it excludes them] on the basis of the single property (**ekadharma*) of their general feature (**sāmānya*) which is intended to be the excluded (**vyavacchedyavivakṣita*). And on this point (**atra*) we have explained [in PS V 34] that [the intended object] is inferred merely through [its] not being observed in the heterologous (**vijātīye adarśanamātreṇānumānam*). Yet, this problem (**doṣa)* [that no cognition can occur] concerns only (**eva*) you; for if [the word] applies (**vartate*) in universally pervading (**vyāpin*) its proper homologous [objects] (**svasajātīya*), the pervaded (**vyāpya*) will be infinite (**ānantya*). Therefore, for instance, as hornedness (**viṣāṇitva*) is not observed in the horse, [the indicated] is inferred through exclusion of this [i.e, 'horse'; (**tadvyavacchedānumāna*)], as in the proposition 'It is a non-horse because it is horned' (**viṣāṇitvād anaśvaḥ*), but the white horses, etc. (**karkādi*) are not excluded each separately (**pratyekam*), nor is every single cow, etc., (**ekaikagavādi*) cognized. Also you maintain that there are notions based upon agreement and difference (**vyāvṛttyanuvṛttibuddhi*).[12] And the principle (**nyāya*) is the same in this context."

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[11] Cf. Apohavāda v. 61 foll.

[12] The reference to concordance and exclusion (**vyāvṛttyanuvṛttibuddhi*) is interesting because it gives us a hint about the ideas which Dignāga attempted to amalgamate, and which thus become important for the assessment of the historical background against which Dignāga worked out his own *apoha* doctrine. I regard it as highly probable that Dignāga is addressing the objections of a Vaiśeṣika opponent, and that many of the peculiar features of the *apoha* theory are best understood with the background of Vaiśeṣika thought, which is the only school of philosophy that has established what one is tempted to call an Indian version of the well-known "Porphyrian Tree" of Western philosophy. The fact is that Dignāga worked out the *apoha* theory on the basis of a conceptual tree that ultimately stems from Vaiśeṣika taxonomy. This explains his claim that exclusion is not a universally pervasive feature, but only operates under certain conditions. If we look at the conceptual tree which he received from the

The problem which Dignāga addresses in this text is the objection that each exclusion would seem to imply the exclusion of innumerable entities. Consequently definite knowledge would seem to be impossible. However, as Dignāga explains, entities are not excluded each individually, but rather they are excluded collectively, according to the general theory of exclusion, as instances of the absence of the single distinctive feature that defines the denotation of the excluding term. The fact that the excluded term is defined by the absence of a single distinctive feature—the Dignāgan *ekadharma*—does not mean that it is without reference and thus not interpretable: it is merely used to define collectively all those entities in which a particular feature is absent, their linguistic representation being a function of the intention of the speaker to convey the notion of the absence of any given feature. Thus, for instance, the term non-horse (*anaśva*) of the inference "It is a non-horse because it is horned" only conveys the idea of a horned animal that is not a horse, i.e., not marked by the distinctive feature of horse, without reference to the specific nature of the animals that are denoted by the term non-horse.[13] Dignāga explains that the relation that holds between the negating term and the negated is defined by their individual domains of application viz. the homologous (*sajātīya* = *tulya*) and the heterologous (*vijātīya* = *atulya*), and to PS V 34 where he explains the role of mere non-observation (**adarśanamātra*) for ascertaining the absence of the negating term from the domain of the heterologous. This is one of the most important passages of the Apohaparīkṣā, first of all because it contains the rationale of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. In spite of tantalizing ellipsis it gives, I believe, the clue to a correct understanding of the role of *apoha* in Dignāga's philosophy.

Vaiśeṣika tradition, the point in question becomes clear. The Vaiśeṣika tree is basically constituted by the supreme universal (*sāmānya*) existence (*sattā*) and its subextensions, the particular universals (*sāmānayaviśeṣa*) substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karman*), each of which ramifies into innumerable subextensions on various levels. According to Dignāga the particular universals exclude each other, whereas the supreme universal *sattā* only excludes *asattā* but not the particular universals with which there is concordance. The same principle is extended to, and remains in force for, all the different subextensions: they exclude each other provided that they belong to the same level in the hierarchy, but they do not exclude their possible subextensions, just as they are not excluded by the relevant term in the hierarchy to whose subextensions they belong. To generalize: there is concordance in the tree *vertically*, but exclusion *horizontally*. In short, the principle is a Dignāgan version of the type of tree that is delineated briefly in *Praśastapādabhāṣya* 7, describing the relationship between the terms constituting the tree in terms of *anuvṛtti* vertically and *vyāvṛtti* horizontally. It seems obvious that Dignāga has adopted the same principle of analysis [cf. his reference supra to *anuvṛtti* and *vyāvṛtti*]. This general principle, of course, becomes ontologically untenable under certain circumstances where mutually exclusive terms go together in defining a single entity which thus would seem to be in internal contradiction with itself. Dignāga addresses this problem in a fairly complicated way that can only be described as a politics of terms, individual terms allying themselves with other terms in much the same way as kings ally themselves with other kings according to the rule of the *cakras* laid down in a political treatise like Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*. Ultimately this part of the *apoha* theory would only make sense if we assume that it represents a Dignāgan version of problems entailed by Vaiśeṣika taxonomy. If this assumption is true, it also becomes understandable why Dignāga would name the fifth chapter of PS Apohaparīkṣā. In the perspective of his other *parīkṣās* this is only understandable as an indication that he is subjecting current views on exclusion to a critical analysis while arguing at the same time for the necessity of his own view: the Dignāgan theory of *apoha*.

[13] It is presumably the same problem Dignāga addresses in the only surviving Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga's *Dvādaśaśatikā*: *yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam "aprasaktasya kimartham pratiṣedhaḥ" iti? naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivṛttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvād anaśvaḥ iti* [qu. in *Nayacakra*, ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, vol. 2, 548,25–25]: "as he claims in the *Dvādaśaśatikā*: even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g. the term *anaśva*] serve? [We

6. In the following fragment from PS V 36, Dignāga claims that only *apoha* contains all the properties that his opponents ascribe to the universal. The chief interest of this paragraph is that the concluding sentence is quoted and commented upon by Dharmakīrti. In it Dignāga makes use of the term (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*) for the first time in PS V. Although our sources only quote parts of the paragraph, it is comparatively easy to reconstruct most of it.

*jātidharmāś caikatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraivāvatiṣṭhante, abhedād, āśrayasyānucchedāt, *kṛtsnārthapratipatteḥ.*[14] ... *guṇotkarṣād (api?)* ... *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha.*[15]

"Moreover (*ca*), the properties of a universal[16] which are characterized by oneness, eternity and extension to each single [particular] are only (*eva*) contained in that (*atra* [viz. *apoha*]), because it is without division [among the particulars], because its substratum is not discontinued, and because it indicates its intended objects *in toto*. Thus, since the said problems do not exist, and because it is superior in quality, the word denotes its intended objects as qualified exclusively (*eva*) by negation of other intended objects (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*)."

7. In PS V 38d Dignāga attempts to shed light on the misconception that the denotative force of the word is merely based upon difference (*vyatireka*). Unfortunately there are no traceable Sanskrit fragments of this important paragraph.

"Suppose, however, that the word's intended object is merely exclusion of other [intended objects] (**anyāpohamātra*), it would then denote its intended object (**arthābhidāna*) merely (**eva*) through difference (**vyatireka*).

This would be the case if we did not maintain agreement (**anvyaya*). However, (**tu*), we do not claim that [the word's] pervasion (**vyāpti*) [of its intended objects] is primary (**pradhāna*),

in terms of its being substantial (**vāstava*) [i.e., of real universals]. For (**hi*) it is impossible, as we have already explained [e.g. in PS II 15],[17] that there be universals in things, whether as distinct (**anya*) or not (**ananya*) from [their substrata]. However (**tu*), when there are no universals (**jātyabhāve*), then the word's agreement and difference (**anvayavyatireka*) are not different in

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answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the object in question is inferred in ordinary language (*loke*) through exclusion of other intended objects like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned."

[14] So probably read; K *mtha' dag rtogs pa'i phyir*; V: *don ma lus pa rtogs pa'i phyir*; TSP *kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś*, cf. Jinendrabuddhi 204,9: *don mtha' dag rtogs pa'i phyir ni re re la yongs su rdzogs* (= Skt. *parisamāp°*) *pa ste.*

[15] Reconstructed on the basis of the following sources:

a. *jātidharmāś caikatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva tiṣṭhanti*, ŚVṬ 74,9.

b. *sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmā ekatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhante*, TSP 389,9–11.

c. *tasmād guṇotkarṣād api*, TSP 389,11.

d. *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*, PVSV 62,27–63,1.

[16] Cf. Dharmakīrti's reference to *jātidharma* at PVSV 48,14–16: *tasmād avaśyaṃ śabdena vyavacchedaś codanīyaḥ. sa cābhinnas tadanyeṣv iti jātidharmo 'py asti.*

[17] Jinendrabuddhi quotes two passages from PS to illustrate Dignāga's claim; one (Hattori [1982: 208,1]) is from the Vaiśeṣika section of PS I (P 101b6), cf. Hattori [1968: 205,37ff.]; it is quoted in SVṬ 342: *anyad evedaṃ tatsahacarasamudāyaviṣayaṃ smārtam abhedena jñānam utpadyate;* PS II 16a: P 32a3 (= Kitagawa [1973: 464,5]), 113a8.

meaning (**anyārtha*) as regards an intended object (**artha*) qualified by exclusion of other [intended objects] (**anyāpohaviśiṣṭa*)[18] because it is not observed [to occur] in the intended objects of other words [(*adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe*) as it is said in PS V 34a]."

In this illuminating passage Dignāga answers a critic who objects to the primacy which Dignāga ascribes to difference (*vyatireka*) in his formulation of the *apoha* theory. To this objection Dignāga explains that the word's concomitance (*vyāpti*) or agreement (*anvaya*) with its intended objects cannot be attributed to the fact that they are qualified by real (*vāstava*) universals because the assumption of universals entails all the problems that Dignāga has pointed out elsewhere. Thus the primacy of concomitance on realistic premises is excluded a priori. Dignāga then continues explaining, once again with a significant quotation of V 34a, that there is really no difference in meaning between agreement and difference when the referent is qualified by exclusion of other. What Dignāga appears to say is that the use of any given term is ultimately based upon the inductive procedures viz. agreement and difference that are re-enacted whenever a term is used within its proper domain of application: it both denotes and differentiates. But it is only the process of differentiation that exerts its qualifying force on the denotation. Consequently *vyatireka* is the primary factor from an epistemological point of view, and not agreement. Since Dignāga also in this text refers to V 34a to explain the relation between *anvyaya* and *vyatireka* and their function within the perspective of the homologous and heterologous domain of application, it is necessary at this point to address the problems Dignāga attempts to solve in this paragraph.

8. The fictive opponent introduces the relevant section by asking

"How can it be that the first mentioned problems [in PS V 2a–b] do not obtain if the word's denoting its own intended object is through exclusion of other intended objects (= *kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaḥ*)?

Since it is not observed [to occur] in the intended objects of other words, and since, moreover (*api*), it is observed [to occur] in a member (*aṃśa*) of its own intended object, the word's connection [with its intended object] is feasible (*sambandhasaukarya*) and there is no uncertainty (*vyabhicāritā*).

For (*hi*) agreement and difference are the means to the word's denoting its intended object (*anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne dvāram*), and these two are: its occurrence (*vṛtti*) in the homologous (*tulya*) and its non-occurrence (*avṛtti*) in the heterologous (*atulya*). Now, its occurrence in the homologous cannot by necessity (*nāvaśyam*) be indicated (*ākhyeyā*) for all of (*sarvatra*) [the homologous], but [it can be indicated] for some (*kva cid*), because, as its intended object is infinite [(*ānantya*) in number], the indication [for all the homologous] is impossible (*ākhyānāsambhava*). But it is possible to indicate its non-occurrence in the heterologous, even though it is infinite [in number], merely through its not being observed [in the heterologous]."[19]

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[18] Or *anyavyāvṛtti°*.

[19] Sanskrit sources:

A: *kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaḥ*. Reconstructed on the basis of **a:** *kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasyārthāntaretyādi*, NCV 650,9; **b:** *pūrvadośāprasaṅga iti*, ibid. 10; **c:** *arthāntarāpohena*

Kamalaśīla who quotes PS V 34 in his *Pañjikā* on TS 965 lets his opponent, a fictive follower of Kumārila's school, introduce the quotation with the remark that, according to Dignāga, difference is claimed to be the primary factor (*vyatirekapradhāna*) when ascertaining the sign function of the word or the indicator, whereas agreement only has a subsidiary function (*anvayopasarjana*). Although this remark to some extent simplifies the issues involved in Dignāga's epistemology, it is basically true, and serves to emphasise one of the most important factors of his *apoha* theory viz. that a valid connection is primarily established through difference (*vyatireka*). However, the real difficulty of Dignāga's explanation is how to interpret the value he ascribes to *adarśanamātra* because it is clear from what he says that the feasibility of establishing a connection depends on *adarśanamātra.*

9. Though Dignāga's explanation in PS V 34 is elliptic to the point of being obscure, the underlying assumption seems to be that the mere fact that a given word is not observed to apply to things that are different from the thing or things with which it is shown to be in agreement can be generalized so as to hold for all of the *atulya,* i.e., everything dissimilar to the object or objects to which the word is applied. Dignāga starts from the premise that complete induction is impossible and that the validity of connections has to be justified by other means than simple agreement. Dignāga claims that it is *adarśanamātra* which is the factor that makes it easy to generalize difference and thus to establish the connection. This generalization, however, is clearly of a different logical order than a standard Dignāgan type of inference which is based upon the canon of the *trilakṣaṇahetu.* The question therefore is if it is possible to show that Dignāga's reference to *adarśanamātra* has a parallel in another philosophical context. The focal point is thus: what are the epistemological considerations underlying the claim that it is easy to establish *vyatireka* through mere non-observation.

10. The Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, Dignāga's severe critic, was apparently well aware of Dignāga's view of induction because he mentions it, although briefly, in the context where one would expect him to deal with it viz. in the Anumānapariccheda of *Ślokavārttika.* Although one cannot a priori exclude the possibility that he is referring to post-Dignāga Buddhist scholars, the view which Kumārila critizises is clearly characteristic of Dignāga. In addition, Kumārila's commentators would seem to give us a clue as to the correct interpretation of the concept of *adarśanamātra* in their comments on the passage. It is found in Anumānapariccheda vv. 131cd–132 where Kumārila writes:

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svārthabhidhāne, NCV 658,15; cf. *pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaś ca kathaṃ arthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne,* ibid. 651,3.

B: *adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt*
śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā.

TSP 378,17–18; cf. NCV 652,8; 660,25; 661,10.

C: *anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛttyavṛttī,* NCV 660,21. *śabdasyārtha°* em.: *śabdārthasya* NCV; cf. *śabdasyānvayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram. tau ca tulyatulyayor vṛttyavṛttī,* NCV 652,10–11; cf. ibid. 664,10–11.

D: *tatra tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā, kva cid, ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇāvṛtter ākhyānam.*

NCV 652,11–12; 16–21. *°mātreṇāvṛtter* em.: *°mātreṇā 'darśane 'pravṛtter* NCV.

aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt // [131cd]
sādhane yady apīṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati./
tāvatā na hy anaṅgatvaṃ yuktiḥ śābde hi vakṣyate // [132]
"Although difference (*vyatireka*) is considered to be the thing that establishes [universal concomitance] because it is dependent on all [of the heterologous] and because [difference] is easy [to establish] through [the indicator or the word] not being observed [in the heterologous], it is by no means the case that agreement (*yukti*) on that account is not a factor when it comes to an inference, as will be explained in the chapter on verbal knowledge (*śābda*)."

The views as well as the vocabulary are strikingly similar to Dignāga's. In contrast to Umveka, whose explanation does not shed any light upon the view which Kumārila briefly relates, the author of the *Kāśikā* is far more explicit:

"In this context the Buddhists argue: what is meant by saying that when the positive example has been formulated in connection with the [formulation of the] universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) there is no need for the negative example? For the reason is not probative if there is even the least bit of doubt about its difference from the heterologous (*vipakṣa*). Consequently the person who is making an inference has to depend on all of the heterologous for discerning the difference [of the *hetu* from the heterologous]. This, however, is not difficult to realise because it is feasible even for someone who is standing in a particular place (*ekastha*) not to observe [the *hetu*] in all [of the heterologous]. Because the observation of all the things that are heterologous is not feasible, whereas their [corresponding] absence [i.e. non-observation] is easily obtained (*saukāryaprāpta*)."[20]

Pārthasārathimiśra is even more explicit:

"The Buddhists, however, being unable to accept that the formulation of the negative example [only] has status as a corollary [to the positive example], claim that only the negative example should always be formulated, not the positive one; they argue, they say, as follows: whoever is of the opinion that the indicator's agreement with the probandum is a factor in an inference or whoever is of the opinion that [its] difference from the heterologous [is a factor in an inference] they necessarily have to agree on its being dependent on the exhaustion [of all of the homologous and the heterologous]. If, in the present case, agreement is taken to be a factor, it will be necessary to perceive the agreement of all past and future [instances of] smoke with all [past and future instances of] fire, but not even the Lord is capable of doing that! And an inference is not possible when the agreement of some has been apprehended because of the other agreements that have not been perceived. Suppose it is objected that what is perceived is the agreement of the property of being smoky with the property of being fiery. Such objection, however, is impossible because the universal cannot stand [the criticism] of the alternatives of its being [identical with or] different from the particular [in which it inheres]. On the other hand, let us assume that the universal exists. But even so fire's agreement with such a thing [as a universal] at all places and modes of time is certainly difficult to perceive. However, its difference from the heterologous is easy to know, for

[20] *Kāśikā* ad ŚV, Anumānapariccheda, vv. 131cd–132: *atra bauddhā vadanti kim idaṃ "vyāptyā sādharmya ukte ca na vaidharmyam apekṣyate"* [= v. 118ab] *ity ucyate? na hi śatāṃśenāpi hetor vipakṣād vyatireke śaṅkhyamāne gamakatvam astīty aśeṣavipakṣo 'numātur vyatirekaṃ grahītum apekṣitah na cāsau duradhigamaḥ, ekadeśasthasyāpi sarvādarśanasaukāryāt. darśanaṃ hi sarvavipakṣāṇāṃ duṣkaram, tadabhāvas tu saukāryaprāpta eva.*

this can be known merely through [the reason] not being observed [in the heterologous]. Indeed, it is feasible even for someone who is standing in a particular place not to observe all [instances of] smoke in non-fires. Therefore when smoke is differentiated from non-fires it makes fire known by means of excluding it from non-fire. Consequently the scope of the indicator or the word is to exclude what is other (*atad*). Therefore only the heterologous example is to be formulated for the sake of exemplifying the exclusion [of the *hetu*] from the heterologous, but not the homologous one."[21]

11. Both authors give a correct exposition of Dignāga's views. In addition they introduce the pivotal concept of *ekadeśastha* describing the placement in space of the one who recognizes through *adarśanamātra* that the indicator is completely excluded from the heterologous. The fact that both commentators introduce the concept of *ekadeśastha* makes it possible to identify the philosophical context in which the concept of *adarśanamātra* is rooted viz. in the context of discussions of implication, *arthāpatti*. Once again Kumārila is helpful in providing us with material that sheds light on the epistemological background of Dignāga's views, while at the same time giving an exposition of his own. The passage which is important for understanding Dignāga's use of the concept of *adarśanamātra* is found in ŚV Arthāpattipariccheda vv. 34–40 where Kumārila discusses with a fictive Buddhist adversary who, like for instance Praśastapāda, subsumes *arthāpatti* under inference.

12. According to Kumārila's exposition, the Buddhist adversary claims that the assumption that NN is out because he is not observed to be at home is equivalent to an inference from not observing NN at home. The passage which is particularly interesting in the present context is the following:

nanv atrāvidyamānatvaṁ gamyate 'nupalabdhitaḥ /
sā cāprayatnasādhyatvād ekasthasyaiva sidhyate // [36]
"Is it not so that the fact that someone is not found here is known from his not being perceived, and that this is established because it can be realised without any effort by [a person] who is merely standing in a particular place?"

This passage explains why Dignāga claims that it is easy to establish *vyatireka* on the basis of non-observation: someone who is standing in a particular place (*ekastha*) can without any effort realise the absence of something from a particular locus. It is obvious that this solution to the problem of making inferences from non-observation aims at overcoming the impossibility of

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[21] Cf. NR ad ŚV, Anumānapariccheda, vv. 131cd–132: *Śākyās tu vaidharmyavacanasya pākṣikatvam asahamānā vaidharmyam eva sarvadā vaktavyaṁ na sādharmyam ity āhuḥ . . . te kila manyate: yasyāpi sādhyānvayo liṅgasyānumānāṅgaṃ yasya vā vipakṣavyatirekaḥ tayor ubhayor api tāvad aśeṣāpekṣitatvam avivādam. tatra yady anvayo 'ṅgam iṣyate, tato 'vaśyaṃ sarveṣām atītānāgātānām api dhūmānām agnibhiḥ sarvaiḥ samanvayo gṛhītavyaḥ. na cāsāv Īśvareṇāpi grahituṃ śakyate; na ca keṣāñcid anvaye gṛhīte 'nyair agṛhītānvayair anumānaṃ sambhavati. vahnimattvasāmānyena dhūmamattvasāmānyasyānvayo gṛhīta iti cet? na, sāmānyasya svalakṣaṇavyatireka-vikalpasahanāsambhavāt. astu vā sāmānyam, tathāpi tadīyāśeṣadeśakālānvayo 'gner durgraha eva. vipakṣavyatirekas tu sujñānaḥ, sa hy adarśanamātragamyaḥ, sukaraṃ ca sarvadhūmānām apy ekadeśasthenaivānagniṣv adarśanam. tasmāt anagnibhyo vyaticecyamāno dhūmo 'nagnivyāvṛttimukhenāgniṃ gamayati. ata evātadvyāvṛttiviṣayatvaṃ liṅgaśabdayoḥ. tasmāt vipakṣavyāvṛttipradarśanārthaṃ vaidharmyam eva vaktavyam, na sādharmyam iti.*

observing the absence of any given A from all non-A: in verse 39 the Buddhist opponent objects that difference could not be ascertained if it is ascertained from factual non-observation (*anupalabdhi*), e.g., of all instances of smoke in time and space in non-fire; to which Kumārila replies in the following that this problem only affects the argument of the Buddhist who claims that the object of cognition is non-existence of other objects. The *Kāśikā* provides us with the useful information that Kumārila is referring to the Vyatirekapradhānavādins, those who claim that difference is the primary factor, which brings us back to Kamalaśīla's remark introducing the quotation from PS V 34.

13. If we return to Dignāga's use of *adarśanamātra* and analyse it with the background of Kumārila's treatment of *anumāna* and *arthāpatti,* it seems clear that Dignāga's way of dealing with the problem of induction belongs in the context of implication. The underlying argument seems to be the following: if someone standing in a particular place, an *eka(deśa)stha,* in time and space observes a given sign or word together with the object to which it applies, this observation entails that the sign cannot by necessity be anywhere else, i.e., in the heterologous, a fact that can be ascertained as effortlessly as the observation that a particular object is absent from somewhere else. Consequently the fact that it is not elsewhere becomes determinant for its validity as an indicator. Dignāga's view would seem to belong in this context. However, the purely hypothetical nature of the way in which the invariable concomitance is established soon became a problem for post-Dignāga Buddhist philosophers which gave the discussion of the problem of induction and the question of the invariable connection a completely new direction, which is evident from Dharmakīrti's impressive philosophical oevre.

14. If we turn to Dharmakīrti's exposition of *apoha,* it is striking to find that verbal knowledge (*śābdam*) is described nowhere in terms of an inferential procedure based upon the primacy of difference (*vyatireka*), although Dignāga repeatedly emphasises this point in PS V.[22] The following section of PS V 34 in which Dignāga deals with the question of uncertainty (*vyabhicāra*) is especially important in this respect:

> "And precisely therefore (*ata eva*) it is explained that since [the word] is not observed [to occur] in other (*anyatra*) but its proper relata (*svasambandhin*), its denoting its own intended object is an inference based upon the exclusion of this [other] (*tadvyavacchedānumāna*). Indeed, if the inference were by means of agreement (*anvayadvāreṇa*), the word 'tree' (**vṛkṣaśabda*) would not, as far as a single (**eka*) entity (**bhāva*) is concerned, give rise to doubt (**saṃśaya*) about its mental reflection (**ābhāsa*) as 'Śiṃśapā' or the like. Yet, in the same way as there is doubt (**saṃśayavat*) [in the case under consideration], there will also be doubt about its mental picture as 'earthenness' (**pārthivatva*) and 'substanceness' (**dravyatva*), etc. However, since the word 'tree' is not observed [to occur] at what is non-earthen (**apārthiva*), etc., the inference is only (**eva*) through difference (**vyatireka*). Moreover it is explained that (**āha ca*)[23]

[22] Cf. PS V 1.

[23] For the Sanskrit fragments, cf. Hattori [1982: 135 nos. 27–31].

'treeness', 'earthen', 'substance', 'existent', and 'knowable' are grounds for doubt, in the reverse order (*pratilomyataḥ*), about four, three, two, and one [property]; but in direct order (*anyathā*) they are grounds for ascertainment (*niścaya*)."

15. There are several important statements in this text. The first deals with the fact that a given word, while denoting its proper intended object, e.g., a tree which is defined by a hierarchy of general properties like existence (*sattā*), substanceness (*dravyatva*), earthenness (*pārthivatva*), etc.—its so-called relata (*sambandhin*) or concomitants (*anubandhin*)—also indicate these properties, provided that they have a well-defined place in the hierarchy of terms defining the entity in question. Thus, for instance, earthenness (*pārthivatva*) which is a subextension of substanceness (*dravyatva*) indicates the latter, which in turn indicates existence *sattā* because whatever is earthen (*pārthiva*) is also a substance (*dravya*), and whatever is a substance is also existent (*sat*). The underlying idea is that if terms defining the essential attributes of a certain entity are co-referential, they are logically related according to their extension, so that it is possible to infer other attributes from any given term denoting one of their subextensions. This, however, is only possible if one assumes that the meaning of a term is equivalent to an inference based upon the exclusion from its scope of what it does not denote (*tadvyavacchedānumāna*). Thus the inference can only be through difference, i.e., through exclusion of non-tree. It is thus clear that the characterisation of Dignāga's *apoha* theory as established upon the primacy of difference (*vyatirekapradhāna*) is basically correct. In fact, the primacy of difference constitutes the epistemological rationale underlying the most crucial aspects of Dignāgan *pramāṇavāda:* difference not only justifies the relation (*sambandha*) between the word and its intended object, but also the relation between indicator and indicated, the two types of relations being treated by Dignāga as essentially identical.[24]

16. Since Dignāga's claim that a word denotes its intended object as qualified by exclusion of other relies on the primacy of difference, it is evident that Dharmakīrti's analysis of it is extremely important for understanding his exposition of *apoha*. Dharmakīrti introduces his analysis of Dignāga's claim [cf. § 1] by stating that the function of the word is to fix the attention of the listener on a certain thing (*kvacid*) while diverting it from something else (*kutaścid*). He then continues addressing two problems: if the meaning of any given term is defined by negation of other intended objects, the qualifying function of negation would seem to leave nothing but a blank. If, on the other hand, as claimed by the poetician Bhāmaha, the word does have a positive value, then any given term would seem to combine two mutually conflicting functions—that of negation and that of affirmation. This objection clearly stems from the difficulty of understanding the nature of a privative opposition of the type A vs. non-A [cf. § 4]. Dharmakīrti answers Dignāga's critics by explaining that the word's exclusion of other meanings is indicated implicitly whenever a word is applied to indicate a particular difference because the enjoinment of the difference that characterises one thing is invariably connected with the implicit indication of

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[24] Cf. Dignāga's concluding remarks at PSV 35 (Hattori [1982: 137,6–7]): *na ca sambandhadvāram muktvā śabdasya liṅgasya vā svārthakhyāpanaśaktir asti* [quoted NCV 663,9–10]: "without the means of connection the word or the inferential indicator is incapable of denoting its own signified object."

exclusion of what is different from that. And he continues explaining that when Dignāga talks about the intended object as being qualified by exclusion, it is because exclusion functions as a delimiting attribute of the understanding of a particular difference (*tadgater tadupādhitvāt*),[25] but this does not mean to say there is a real qualifier-qualified relationship between negation and the thing it qualifies: the underlying intention is to indicate that when a word is applied with a certain purpose, it is invariably connected with an implicit negation of other intended objects. So far Dharmakīrti's analysis seems to explain the qualifying function of negation in accordance with Dignāga's own view. The concluding part of Dharmakīrti's analysis, however, departs markedly from Dignāga. Dharmakīrti explains that when Dignāga uses expressions like "by means of exclusion of other intended objects" or "qualified by the exclusion of other intended objects" he shows that words are parts of discourse by way of enjoining agreement (*anvyaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*), in that exclusion of other is understood even when a particular difference is expressed. Consequently a word does not have two separate functions affirmation as well as negation: any affirmation is implicitly followed by negation of other: agreement and difference are invariably connected in the sense that there is no agreement without difference and vice versa. Agreement and difference are thus equipollent, which is reflected in Dharmakīrti's claim in the beginning of the passage that the function of the word is to direct the listener's attention towards something while excluding it from something else. There is no reference to the combination of partial observation in the homologous and absolute non-observation in the heterologous as the factors that establish *apoha*. This is significant and constitute a marked departure from Dignāga's justification of *apoha*.

17. This conclusion is also supported by the short exposition of *apoha* found in the chapter on sensation (*pratyakṣa*) PV III. In this short section, comprising 10 *śloka*s, Dharmakīrti expounds the essentials of his own version of *apoha*. The crucial passage is PV III 171a–c: *anyatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt kvacid taddṛṣṭyapekṣaṇāt / śrutau sambadhyate 'poho*: "*apoha* attaches to the word in that it depends upon [the word's] observation in some [loci] as well as upon [its] non-observation in other loci." The formulation as well as the vocabulary is strikingly similar to Dignāga's in PS V 34, and Dharmakīrti's use of *apekṣaṇa* (dependence) has a parallel in Kumārila's mention of Dignāga's views in Anumānapariccheda vv. 131cd–132 [cf. § 10]. However, Dharmakīrti's use of *anyatra,* i.e., in the heterologous (*atulye, vipakṣe, asajātīye*) seems consciously to avoid Dignāga's view that *vyatireka* presupposes non-observation in all (*sarvatra*) of the heterologous. In this context it is interesting to observe that Prajñākaragupta in his interpretation of PV III 171a–c mentions the view of some who claim that *vyatireka* is the primary factor in *apoha: anye tu punaḥ sarvato vijātīyād vyāvṛttiṁ kvacid vidheye vṛttim apekṣata iti vyatireke tātparyam anvaye tu neti, vyatireka eva prādhānyena pratyāyate* [PVA 265,23]: "other [scholars], however, claim that [the word] depends upon exclusion from all of the heterologous and occurrence in some instance to which it is enjoined. Consequently (*iti*) it is primarily aimed at difference, not at agreement; and so (*iti*) it is only difference that is understood as the primary thing." This view shows that at the time of Prajñākaragupta there were still scholars who adopted

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[25] Cf. Karṇakagomin at PVSVṬ 252,6: *sāvadhāraṇatvena.*

Dignāga's view of *vyatireka* as constitutive of *apoha.* In fact, Dharmakīrti's reformulation of this point of the *apoha* theory may not have been generally accepted. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why Jñānaśrīmitra, who to a large extent develops Dharmakīrti's views in the *Apoha-prakaraṇa,* quotes a slightly edited version of PV III 171, substituting *sarvatra* for *anyatra.*[26]

18. It is thus clear that Dharmakīrti's version of the *apoha* theory departs completely from the underlying epistemological rationale that justifies its central position in Dignāgan *pramāṇavāda.* It is not yet possible to point to any definite source of influence on Dharmakīrti's own thought that would explain this conspicuous break: there is a deplorable gap in the textual transmission of Buddhist *pramāṇavāda* from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti, to which we must add the equally regrettable fact that almost all of Dignāga's major works are lost. It seems certain that Dharmakīrti's conscious avoidance of reference to *adarśanamātra* as constitutive of difference (*vyatireka*) reflects his criticism of Īśvarasena's theory of *upalambhābhāvamātram,*[27] which depends upon Dignāga's view. It is therefore not surprising that Dharmakīrti's reformulation in PV III 171a–c of this central aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* theory would seem to depend upon his own view of *anupalabdhi,* which ultimately is based upon the equipollence of agreement and difference. Nor does *apoha* play any role whatsoever in Dharmakīrti's treatment of the problem of induction. Instead of relying on an extrinsic collocation of features as a sufficient condition for establishing the invariable connection as Dignāga evidently presupposes, Dharmakīrti addresses the question of induction on a completely different basis, introducing ontological considerations based upon the intrinsicality of related features (*svabhāva*).[28] If, moreover, we take into consideration that Dharmakīrti avoids referring to the effect of *apoha* as an inferential process from *vyatireka,* basically because that would be equivalent to subscribing to the type of arguments from *vyatireka* found in Uddyotakara, to which Dharmakīrti is strongly opposed, it becomes evident that Dharmakīrti's exposition of the *apoha* theory has very little in common with the epistemological considerations underlying Dignāga's views of *apoha.* Although substantial parts of Dharmakīrti's arguments have not yet been studied with a view to clarifying the nature of his relationship to his own contemporaries or predecessors, it is perhaps not entirely wrong to assume, as indicated by numerous quotations from Kumārila's and Uddyotakara's works in Karṇakagomin's *Pramāṇa-vārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā,* that their forceful arguments against Dignāga's philosophy somehow forced Dharmakīrti to reconsider the more controversial issues of Dignāgan epistemology, and persuaded him to reconstruct it on a new epistemological basis.

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[26] Cf. JNA 207,10–11: *tathā hi vijātīye sarvatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt, kvacit tu dṛṣṭyapekṣaṇāt sajātīye* [so read] *śrutau saṁbadhyate 'poha iti śāstram.*

[27] Cf. E. Steinkellner: "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund," *WZKSO* 10 (1966): 73–85; Steinkellner [1967: 154 foll.].

[28] For a recent analysis of this problem, cf. E. Steinkellner: "Kumārila, Īśvarasena, and Dharmakīrti in Dialogue," in *Bauddhavidyāsudhākaraḥ, Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, Indica et Tibetica,* Band 30 (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1997): 625ff.; cf. also C. Oetke, "*Svabhāvapratibandha* and the Types of reasons in Dharmakīrti's Theory of Inference," in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference* (Vienna, 1991): 243ff.

Abbreviations and Literature

Apohaprakaraṇa
Apohaprakaraṇa (Jñānaśrīmitra): In JNA, 202–232.

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Kāśikā *Kāśikā* (Sucaritamiśra): Sāmba Śiva Śāstrī, ed. *The Mīmāṁsāślokavārtika with the commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra.* Part 3. Trivandrum, 1943.

Kitagawa, Hidenori.
1973. *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū: Jinna (Dignāga) no taikei.* Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan, 1965. Reprint.

NCV *Nayacakravṛtti* (Siṃhasūri): Muni Jambuvijaya, ed. *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī Nayacakravṛtti of Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣmāśramaṇa.* Part 2. Bhavnagar, 1976.

NR *Nyāyaratnākara* (Pārthasārathimiśra): See ŚV.

PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga): See Hattori [1982].

PV III *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 3 (Pratyakṣa): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirti with the commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathanandin.* Bauddha Bharati Series 3. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. [Chapter 2 in Shastri's edition.]

PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

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SāmP *Sāmānyaparīkṣā* (Dignāga).

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ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa): Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, ed. *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.

ŚVṬ *Ślokavārtikaṭīkā* (Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra): Kunhan Raja, ed. *Ślokavārtikaṭīkā of Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamiśra.* Madras, 1946.

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TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Swāmi Dvarikadas Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla.* 2 vols. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

VP II Vākyapadīya (Bhartṛhari), chapter 2: K. A. Subrahmania Iyer, ed. *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, kāṇḍa II, with the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the ancient Vṛtti.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

WZKSO *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.*

DHARMAKĪRTI'S REFUTATION OF *KEVALĀNVAYIN* AND *KEVALAVYATIREKIN* REASONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE NAIYĀYIKAS' VIEW

by

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Although Uddyotakara for his purposes adapts Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya*, according to which a valid logical reason has to fulfil the three conditions, namely, to be a property of the subject of proof (*pakṣadharmatva*), to be present in the similar domain (*sapakṣe sattva*) and to be absent in the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣe 'sattva*), he criticises the requirement of the fulfillment of all the three conditions in so far as he argues that obviously correct inferences would be excluded. His critique refers to instances of inferences in which either similar (*sapakṣa*) or dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) do not exist.

In his commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5,[1] to be more precise in his first interpretation of the term *trividha* mentioned in it, Uddyotakara is the first to mention upon a concept of three different kinds of logical reasons, namely *anvayavyatirekin*, *anvayin* and *vyatirekin*: "[The term] 'threefold' (*trividha*) [means in NS 1.1.5 the following]: a [reason] having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*), a [reason] having [only] a positive concomitance (*anvayin*) and a [reason] having [only] a negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*)."[2] Uddyotakara not only mentions these three kinds of inferences, but quotes definitions and examples of the logical reasons involved in them:

> "Of these, a [reason] having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*) is one that, being present in the intended [subject of proof] and in instances similar [to this], is absent in the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*); such as for example: Sound, provided that it covers the universal and the particular (*sāmānyaviśeṣavattva*), is non-eternal (*anitya*), because it is perceivable by people like us with the external sense-organs, like a pot. A [reason] having [only] a positive concomitance (*anvayin*) is one that, being present in the intended [subject of proof] and in instances similar [to this], does not have a dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*), like [for example the following proof] for the supporters [of the doctrine] that everything is non-eternal: Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced. Because for this [instance] a dissimilar domain does not exist. A [reason] having [only] a negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*) is one that, pervading the intended [subject of proof] without having a similar domain (*sapakṣa*), is not present in the dissimilar domain; as for example: This

[1] NS 1.1.5: *atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca.*
[2] NV 294,6: *trividham iti. anvayavyatirekī, anvayī, vyatirekī ceti.*

living body is not without an Ātman because the consequence would be that it would not have breath etc."[3]

Within another interpretation of the term '*trividha*'[4] Uddyotakara further specifies that these three reasons are five by subdividing both the *anvayavyatirekin* and the *anvayin* into two different kinds, according to their either partly or completely occurring in the similar domain (*sapakṣa*).[5]

In this context it should be mentioned that the opinion has been voiced that it was not Uddyotakara who developed the idea of *anvayin* and *vyatirekin* with regard to the logical reason but another, so far unknown Naiyāyika. This has been explained by the fact that Uddyotakara firstly reports the quoted passage on *trividha* as the opinion of another Naiyāyika and secondly, that Uddyotakara himself, after his representation of his wheel of reasons (*hetucakra*), states that a heterodox teacher of the school (*ekāntavādin*) also acknowledges two kinds of *anvayin* and one kind of *vyatirekin* as valid reasons.[6]

It is difficult to decide whether the first argument applies or not. Uddyotakara could have reported the opinion of another Nyāya-teacher or, in the same way, he could have reported his own opinion. Since he adopted this new conception of the reason fully in his logical speculations, it is uncertain if he shares the view of someone else or advocates his own.

The second argument seems to be rather doubtful. It is true that Uddyotakara mentions an Ekāntavādin in connection with the reason called *anvayin*. But neither does the Ekāntavādin support the two reasons called *anvayin* nor does he have to do anything with the reason called *vyatirekin*.

The passage in question is Uddyotakara's evaluation of his own *hetucakra*; it reads as follows:

> "These are the sixteen [reasons] which pervade the subject of proof (*pakṣa*). Of these, five are [valid] reasons, the rest are fallacious reasons. Of the [five reasons] two are [reasons] having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*) which are missing in the dissimilar domain, namely the third and the ninth; two are [valid reasons] having [only] a positive concomitance (*anvayin*) for an Ekāntavādin, namely the tenth and the eleventh; the fifteenth is a [valid reason] having [only] a negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*)."[7]

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[3] NV 294,6–11: *tatrānvayavyatirekī vivakṣitatajjātīyopapattau vipakṣāvṛttiḥ, yathānityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavattve saty asmadādibāhyakaraṇapratyakṣatvād ghaṭādivad iti. anvayī vivakṣitatajjātīyavṛttitve sati vipakṣahīnaḥ, yathā sarvānityatvavādinām anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. asya hi vipakṣo nāsti. vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāpitve sati sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ, yathā nedaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ nirātmakam aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti.*

[4] Cf. NV 296,17–22.

[5] Cf. NV 296,18–20: *anvayavyatireki dvedhā sajātīye 'pi dvedhā sad eva, sad asac ca. anvayy api dvedhaiva. evaṃ vyatireky ekarūpam, sapakṣābhāvāt.* "The [inference] having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*) is twofold, [i.e.] twofold [with regard to the existence of the reason] in the similar domain; [either] being completely present [or] present and non-present (viz. partially present). Also, the [inference] having [only] a positive concomitance (*anvayin*) is twofold [according to the existence of the reason in the similar domain]. Thus, the [inference] having only a negative concomitance is onefold, because a similar domain does not exist."

[6] Cf. E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl., Sitzungsberichte 358 = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens 15 (Wien, 1979), 125, fn. 479.

[7] NV 633,1–3: *ta ete pakṣavyāpakaḥ ṣoḍaśa. eṣāṃ pañca hetavaḥ, śeṣāḥ hetvābhāsāḥ. tatrānvayavyatirekinau*

The comprehension of what is meant by the Ekāntavādin requires us to have a look at the two reasons mentioned by Uddyotakara. The tenth and the eleventh reasons are described as follows:

> "For an Ekāntavādin on the basis of [his] special doctrine (*siddhāntabhedāśrayena*), a [reason] pervading the subject of proof (*sādhya*) and the similar instances (*tajjātīya*), [and for which] a dissimilar domain does not exist (*avidyamānavipakṣa*), is [like the following example]: Sound is non-eternal, because it has the property of being produced. A [reason] pervading the subject of proof (*sādhya*), occurring [only] in a part of the similar instances, [and for which] a dissimilar domain does not exist, is [like the example]: Sound is non-eternal because it is perceivable by the external sense-organs."[8]

According to the examples, the Ekāntavādin must be a teacher holding the opinion, his special doctrine (*siddhānta*), that everything is non-eternal, because the dissimilar domain, everything which is eternal, must be empty. Obviously Uddyotakara is thinking of a Buddhist, as he was in the first passage where he comments on the term *trividha*. This is clearly a hit at the Buddhist teachers supporting that for a valid reason all the three requirements of a logical reason (*trairūpya*) must be fulfilled. But why does he call the Buddhist Ekāntavādin?

It is probably not well known that in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* Pakṣilasvāmin designates a few of the *Nyāyasūtras* as *ekānta*. He introduces Sūtras containing universal propositions with the sequence: "This is another *ekānta*" (*ayam anya ekāntaḥ*), so for example *Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.29: "This is another *ekānta*: 'Everything (*sarva*) is eternal because the five elements are eternal'."[9]

If we take Pakṣilasvāmin's idea of *ekānta* into account for the interpretation of the Ekāntavādin in the *Nyāyavārttika*, one can conclude that Uddyotakara's passage *ekāntavādino 'nvayināv eva* is to be translated as: "Two are [valid reasons] having [only] a positive concomitance (*anvayin*) for somebody who teaches universal propositions (*ekāntavādin*)." It seems to be clear that a universal proposition like "everything is non-eternal" (*sarvānityatvavādin*),[10] logically speaking,

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dvau vipakṣāvṛttī tṛtīyanavamau, ekāntavādino 'nvayināv eva daśamaikadaśau, vyatirekī (NV_2 : °*ki* NV, NV_1) *pañcadaśa iti.*

[8] NV 632,16–19: *sādhyatajjātīyavyāpako 'vidyamānavipakṣaḥ siddhāntabhedāśrayeṇaikāntavādinaḥ, anityaḥ śabda utpattidharmakatvāt. sādhyavyāpakas tajjātīyaikadeśavṛttir avidyamānavipakṣaḥ, anityaḥ śabdo bāhyendriyapratyakṣatvāt.* Cf. also NV 302,2–7.

[9] NBh 966,2–4: *ayam anya ekāntaḥ. sarvaṃ nityaṃ pañcabhūtanityatvāt.*; cf. also NBh ad NS 4.1.34: *ayam anya ekānta. sarvaṃ pṛthag bhāvalakṣaṇapṛthagtvāt.* "This is another *ekānta*. 'Everything is separated because being separated is the characteristic of [all] things'." Cf. also NBh ad NS 4.1.37. The term *ekānta* is already found in the *Nyāyasūtras* in the compound *saṃkhyaikānta* ('quantifying universal proposition'). Cf. NS 4.1.38: *saṃkhyaikāntāsiddhiḥ kāraṇānupapattyupapattibhyām.* "A quantifying universal proposition is not correct, because a reason [for proving this universal proposition] either does not exist or exists [additionally]." The examples for such kinds of propositions (cf. NBh 986,2–987,3) like "Everything is one, because it differs not with regard to its existence" (*sarvam ekaṃ sadaviśeṣāt*), "Everything is twofold, because of the dichotomy of eternal and non-eternal" (*sarvaṃ dvedhā nityānityabhedāt*) etc. are not provable according to the *Nyāyasūtras*. The reason for proving these propositions either would have to be added to the given number as another category which would be contradictory with the proposition itself, or, the reason would be identical with the proposition to be proved which goes to prove that it is unprovable at all (cf. NBh 988,3–989,3).

[10] Cf. fn. 3.

means an all-pervading similar domain (*sapakṣa*) and does not allow at all the existence of a dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*).

Within another context of his commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5 Uddyotakara quotes Dignāga's explanation of the triple characteristic of the inferential mark (*liṅga*)[11] which refers to the definition of the 'inference for oneself' (*svārthānumāna*).[12] After discussing the first and the second condition of the logical reason, Uddyotakara criticises Dignāga's formulation of the third characteristic, namely *nāstitāsati* ('[the reason has to be] absent in that what is not [similar to the subject of proof with regard to the property to be proved]') as 'not well considered' (*asampradhārya*).[13] Uddyotakara explains his rejection with reference to his understanding that it is impossible to speak of the non-existence of something in non-existing things.[14]

As for Bhāsarvajña, centuries later, the Nyāya-position with regard to the three kinds of reasons mentioned by Uddyotakara was virtually unchanged,[15] except for the addition of two more conditions of the logical reason. In addition to Dignāga's *trairūpya*-conditions the Naiyāyikas already held at that time the view that a valid reason must fulfil also the condition that it has an object which is not rejected by the means of knowledge (*abādhitaviṣayatva*) and that a counterthesis to it does not exist (*asatpratipakṣatva*).[16]

Except for the change of name into the more precise terms *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin*, Bhāsarvajña's definition of these two reasons is almost the same as that of Uddyotakara:

> "[A reason] having only a positive concomitance (*kevalānvayin*) is a [reason] which pervades the subject of proof (*pakṣavyāpaka*), is present in the similar domain (*sapakṣavṛtti*) [and] a dissimilar domain does not exist [at all] (*avidyamānavipakṣa*). . . . It is twofold because of the distinction of its presence in the similar domain, like the reason having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*)."[17] . . . "A [reason] having only a negative concomitance (*kevalavyatirekin*) is a [reason] which pervades the subject of proof (*pakṣavyāpaka*), is missing in dissimilar instances

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[11] Cf. PS II 5cd (= NV 301,2): *anumeye* (NV_1 : NV *anumāne*) *'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati.*

[12] Cf. PS II 1c: *trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk.* (Quoted in Vibhūticandra's note in Appendix to PVV 524,1.) "[Inference for oneself] is the knowledge of an object by means of a mark having the three characteristics."

[13] Cf. NV 301,22: *asati nāstiteti cāsaṃpradhārya proktam.*

[14] NV 301,23f.: *yad asat svayam eva tan nāsti. na hy asadādhāro bhavati yatas tatra pratiṣedhaḥ syād iti.* "What is non-existent (*asat*), does not exist by its own. For, there exists no substratum of something non-existent, on account of which there (in case of a non-substratum) a negation could take place."

[15] Cf. NBhūṣ 288,1 (= NSā): *sa trividhaḥ. anvayavyatirekī kevalānvayī kevalavyatirekī ceti.*

[16] Cf. NBhūṣ 301,1–3 (= NSā): *tatra pañcarūpo 'nvayavyatirekī, rūpāṇi tu pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣād vyāvṛttir abādhitaviṣayatvam asatpratipakṣatvam.*

[17] NBhūṣ 301,25–302,4: *pakṣavyāpakaḥ sapakṣavṛttir avidyamānavipakṣaḥ kevalānvayī. . . . anvayavyatirekivat sapakṣavṛttibhedād dvividha iti.* For the example of the *kevalānvayin* cf. NBhūṣ 302,4–7: *tad yathā vivādāspadībhūtāny adṛṣṭādīni, kasyacit pratyakṣāṇi prameyatvāt karatalāmalakavad ity ayaṃ sapakṣavyāpako hetuḥ. tasminn eva pratijñārthe mīmāṃsakānām apratyakṣatvād asmat sukhādivad ity ayaṃ hetuḥ sapakṣaikadeśavṛttir iti.* "An example: [Objects], like the *adṛṣṭa*, which have become subject of the dispute, are perceivable for certain people, because they are an object of cognition, like anything quite clear to all eyes. This is a [*kevalavyānvayin*] reason pervading all similar instances. Regarding the very same proposed object, the reason 'because [these objects] are not perceivable by the Mīmāṃsakas, like [objects] such as pleasure for [normal people] like us', is [an example for a *kevalānvayin* reason] which is present only in a part of the similar domain (*sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti*)."

(*vipakṣād vyāvṛtti*), [and] similar instances do not exist [at all] (*avidyamānasapakṣa*)."[18]

Unlike Uddyotakara, Bhāsarvajña is confronted with the attacks of Dharmakīrti against these kinds of reasons. To give an example of this confrontation and to show how Bhāsarvajña deals with the arguments of Dharmakīrti, Bhāsarvajña's dispute with Dharmakīrti regarding the *kevalānvayin* will be taken into account.

Bhāsarvajña quotes in this context four verses of Dharmakīrti. The first three verses are identical in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II (PVin II 15–17) and *Pramāṇavārttika* IV (PV IV 224–226). The context similar to both the passages is the refutation of the Nyāya-position put forward by Uddyotakara against Dignāga's formulation of the third characteristic of the logical reason.[19] Dharmakīrti argues that the Naiyāyika speaks with reference to the *kevalavyatirekin* of two different types of absence: The absence of the reason in the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*) which should be conclusive and the absence of the possibility of the reason's absence in the similar domain (*sapakṣa*) which does not exist.[20]

The fourth verse cited by Bhāsarvajña is a quotation from the *svārthānumāna* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and it must be added that the first part of the verse can be found also in *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, namely PVin II 74ab.

Bhāsarvajña introduces the quotation of Dharmakīrti by a Buddhist doxographical report of a refutation of *kevalānvayin*.[21] This states that it is impossible to speak of the existence or absence of a reason in a non-existing object such as a sky-lotus and the like,[22] and leads up to Dharmakīrti's verses by asking the embarrassing question if, under these circumstances, one could speak about existence or non-existence in non-existing things at all:[23]

"Therefore he (scil. Dharmakīrti) has stated:
If [the reason] is not absent in that [instances in which the property to be proved is absent], does the [opponent then] think that it is present? [If he thinks that] also this [presence of the reason] does not exist, it is a negation. Does he [then] negate the absence?
[Except] affirmation and negation there are no other [possibilities] in speech. And, if it is so that

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[18] NBhūṣ 303,29: *avidyamānasapakṣaḥ pakṣavyāpako vipakṣād* (NBhūṣ$_m$ 76^r,7 : *vivakṣād* NBhūṣ) *vyāvṛttaḥ kevalavyatirekī*. For the examples of the *kevalavyatirekin* in which Bhāsarvajña cites the proof of Īśvara and the proof of the Ātman cf. NBhūṣ 303,30–304,7: *yathā sarvavitkartṛpūrvakaṃ sarvaṃ kāryaṃ kādācitkatvāt, yat sarvavitkartṛpūrvakaṃ na bhavati, tan na kādācitkam, yathā—ākāśādi. tathā sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ prāṇādimattvād, yan na sātmakaṃ na tat prāṇādimat, yathā loṣṭhādi. prasaṅgadvāreṇa vā prayujyate—nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram, aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgāt, loṣṭhavad iti.* "For example: Every effect presupposes an omniscient creator because it originates occasionally. What does not presuppose an omniscient creator does not originate occasionally, like the ether. In the same way [is the following *kevalavyatirekin*]: A living body has an Ātman because it has breath. What does not have an Ātman does not have breath, like a lump of earth. Or, formulated in the way of a logical consequence (*prasaṅga*): This living body is not without an Ātman, because the consequence would be that it would not have breath etc., like a lump of earth."

[19] Cf. fn. 11–14.

[20] Cf. Steinkellner, *op. cit.*, p. 40, fn. 97ff.

[21] Cf. NBhūṣ 302,9–14.

[22] Cf. NBhūṣ 302,11–13: *atha sādhyābhāvasya khapuṣpāder niḥsvabhāvatvād adhikaraṇāpādānādibhāvo 'nupapannas tena hetor na tatra sattvaṃ tato nivṛttir veti.* Cf. PVA 613,20.

[23] Cf. NBhūṣ 302,13f.: *tat kim idānīm mūkena bhavitavyam.*

> there is no such conduct of speech regarding non-existent [objects], we arrive at total silence regarding these [objects].
> There is no negation of existing [things], also not of non-existing [things according to the opinion of the Naiyāyika]. According to this norm the object of negation has resolved from the world.
> Therefore, regarding the dissimilar example, we do not assume the necessity of a [real] substratum with reference to [the reason], since already from the statement 'and if this is missing, the [other one] is not' one recognises the [negative concomitance].
> Therefore a reason having only a positive concomitance (*kevalānvayin*) does not exist."[24]

Now, how does Bhāsarvajña respond to these reproaches? After defending his definition of the possibility of a pure positive logical nexus (*avinābhāva*) against other Buddhists' attacks,[25] he turns to Dharmakīrti's arguments. He argues against his arguments in a very dogmatic way, not at all logically:

> "Such consequences like 'if [the reason] is not absent in that [instance in which the property to be proved is absent]'[26] etc. would invalidate your own doctrine. If [an object] is absent after one moment, it would be a contradiction of the identity (*tādātmya*) of a real thing (*vastu*). And, if it is not absent, it is a contradiction of [your] momentariness. But, if [you] would not concede both the [possibilities], it would be an invalidation of [your argument] beginning with '[except] affirmation and negation'.[27] [It] also [is so that] your 'object of negation has resolved [from the world]',[28] on account of which you cannot concede a future non-existence of something existing. And for a reason which is logically conclusive by force of the negative concomitance, one has necessarily to accept the substratum of a dissimilar example. Otherwise, by a mere statement the negative concomitance could not be cognized. Or, if [the negative concomitance] could be cognized [only by a statement], one would also not have to accept the substratum of the similar example. The cognition of the [concomitance] would [then] only be the statement that 'if this exist, this exists'."[29]

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[24] NBhūṣ 302,14–23: *tad āha—*
nivṛttir yadi tasmin na hetor vṛttiḥ kim iṣyate /
sāpi na pratiṣedho 'yaṃ nivṛttiḥ kin niṣidhyate // PV IV 224 = PVin II 15
vidhānaṃ pratiṣedhaṃ ca muktvā śābdo 'sti nāparaḥ /
vyavahāraḥ sa cāsatsu neti prāptātra mūkatā // PV IV 225 = PVin II 16
satāṃ ca na niṣedho 'sti so 'satsu ca na vidyate /
jagaty anena nyāyena nañarthaḥ pralayaṃ gataḥ // PV IV 226 = PVin II 17
tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ / PV I 26ab = PVin II 74ab
tadabhāve ca tan neti vacanād api tadgateḥ // PV I 26cd
tasmān na kevalānvayī hetur astīti.
For the German translation cf. Steinkellner, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 and 135.

[25] Cf. NBhūṣ 302,25–303,17.

[26] PV IV 224ab = PVin II 15ab; cf. NBhūṣ 302,15.

[27] PV IV 225ab = PVin II 16ab; cf. NBhūṣ 302,17.

[28] PV IV 226d = PVin II 17d; cf. NBhūṣ 302,20.

[29] NBhūṣ 303,18–24: *nivṛttir yadi tasmin netyādiprasaṅgas tu bhavata eva siddhāntaṃ bādhyate. kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ nivṛttau vastunas tādātmyavirodhaḥ, tadanivṛttau ca kṣaṇikatvavirodhaḥ, tadubhayānabhyupagame tu vidhānaṃ pratiṣedhaṃ cetyādi bādhakam. nañartho 'pi tavaiva pralayaṃ gataḥ, yena sato 'paramabhāvaṃ nābhyupagacchasi. yasya ca hetor vyatirekabalena gamakatvaṃ tasyāvaśyaṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntāśraya eṣṭavyaḥ, anyathā vacanamātreṇa vyatirekāpratīteḥ, pratītau vānvayadṛṣṭāntāśrayo 'pi neṣṭavyas tadbhāve tad astīti vacanād eva tadgatir bhaviṣyatīti.* After this passage Bhāsarvajña concludes the section of *kevalānvayin* with the following

To sum up, it can be said that Bhāsarvajña as an expert in Dharmakīrti's writings choose a rather polemical portion of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and/or the *Pramāṇavārttika* which was intended to reduce Uddyotakara's critique on Dignāga's *trairūpya*-condition of the logical reason to absurdity. It was Uddyotakara who took Dignāga's expression *nāstitāsati* out of its context to refute it without considering Dignāga's intention in detail. Dharmakīrti on the other hand criticises the ambiguity of Uddyotakara's opinion who accepts the absence of the reason in the dissimilar domain, but denies the absence of the reason in a non-existent similar domain in case of the *kevalavyatirekin*. Although Dharmakīrti's critique mainly focused on Uddyotakara's *kevalavyatireki*-proof of the Ātman, Bhāsarvajña on his part invokes it against his *kevalānvayin*. He does not so much as enter into Dharmakīrti's argumentation against Uddyotakara, but rather argues dogmatically against doctrinal Buddhist views in order to reduce Dharmakīrti's arguments to an absurdity and to defend his own tradition.

Abbreviations

NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya* (Pakṣilasvāmin/Vātsyāyana): *Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā-sahitam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭikā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti.* Vol. 1. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28. Calcutta, 1936. Vol. 2. Ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29. Calcutta, 1944. Reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.
NBhūṣ	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇāsī, 1968.
NBhūṣ$_m$	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña) (Manuscript): Microfilm of the manuscript of the Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñāna Maṃdira, Pāṭaṇa, Laheru Vakīla Jaina Jñānabhaṇḍāra, No. 10717.
NS	*Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama): See NBh.
NSā	*Nyāyasāra* (Bhāsarvajña): See NBhūṣ.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati and the Pariśuddhi of Udayana, volume 1, chapter 1.* Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text 20. Dharbhanga, 1967.
NV$_1$	Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara.* Nyāyacaturgranthikā 2. New Delhi, 1997.
NV$_2$	See NBh.
PS II	*Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna).
PV I, IV	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapters 1 (Svārthānumāna), 4 (Parārthānumāna): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 114–163, 164–206. [Chapters 3 and 4 in Miyasaka's edition.]

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words: "Therefore, a reason having only a positive concomitance does neither have a negative concomitance because a knowable dissimilar example does not exist, nor it is not a sound reason. If [the reason] pervades the subject of inference (*pakṣa*), it has an object which is not rejected by [the means of knowledge] (*abādhitaviṣayatva*) and a counterthesis does not exist (*asatpratipakṣatva*), [the *kevalānvayin* is a sound reason] like [a reason] having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*) because it exists in the similar domain." *tasmāt sapramāṇakasya vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasyābhāvat* (NBhūṣ$_m$ 76^r,6: °*kasyāvaidharmya*° NBhūṣ) *kevalānvayino na vyatirekitvaṃ nāpy ahetutvam, pakṣavyāpakatve saty abādhitaviṣayāsatpratipakṣatve ca sapakṣe eva varttamānatvād* (NBhūṣ$_m$ 76^r,6: °*pratipakṣatve sati sapakṣe vartta*° NBhūṣ) *anvayavyatirekivad iti.* NBhūṣ 303,24–27.

PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

PVin II *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtayā vṛttyā saṃvalitam (Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin).* Appendix to *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna) 14–16 (1938–40).

APOHAVĀDA, NOMINALISM AND RESEMBLANCE THEORIES

by

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Some years ago, J. L. Shaw[1] and I independently developed what is essentially the same solution to the conundrum of *apohavāda*. We understood the doctrine to represent a nominalist semantics that employs the distinction between choice and exclusion negation to explain the behavior of kind terms like 'cow'. Since this account does not seem to have found much favor among those working on Yogācāra-Sautrāntika epistemology, I should like to take this opportunity to explain again my understanding of *apoha* semantics. I hope this explication will prove clearer than my previous offerings. But since my earlier work was based primarily on the writings of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, I also wish to say something about how this account applies to Dharmakīrti. I shall claim that the *apoha* semantics I find in *Tattvasaṅgraha* is at least implicit in *Pramāṇavārttika*.

As I shall here use the term, nominalism is the view that in the case of a kind term like 'cow', all that is common to the individuals called cows is the name 'cow'. By contrast, by 'realism' is here meant the view that inhering in each individual cow is the universal cowness, some one entity that all cows share in common. Realists thus hold that at least some of our kind terms pick out classes of particulars based on some one shared, objective character. Nominalists maintain instead that the use of a single term to form a class out of many distinct particulars is entirely the result of human linguistic convention.

Conceptualism is sometimes thought to represent a third possible view of the matter. The conceptualist is understood as holding that what all cows have in common is just that they fall under the same concept, where concepts are thought of as mental contents of some sort or other. But if one holds that concepts are essentially linguistic in nature, so that one could acquire the cow concept only by learning to use the word 'cow', then conceptualism collapses into nominalism. Conceptualism might seem to represent a distinct position if one holds an abstraction theory of concept formation, according to which one forms the cow concept by abstracting away the distinctive features of particular cows and conjoining only the similarities. Such a form of conceptualism would claim, *contra* the nominalist, that our use of 'cow' is governed by objective features of individual cows and not just by linguistic conventions. And since it does not explicitly employ the realist's cowness universal to explain our linguistic behavior, it appears to be distinct from realism as well. What such a variety of conceptualism does require, however, is some

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[1] In "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 6 (1978) pp. 59–77.

account of how two things x and y might resemble one another more than either resembles z.[2] And this turns out to require kind universals to avoid the difficulty raised by the fact that a given resemblance paradigm might always resemble other particulars in a variety of respects (the problem of paradigm overdetermination). Conceptualism is thus distinct from nominalism only when it takes the form of a resemblance theory, and this turns out to lead in the end to one or another type of realism.

Favoring nominalism is the widely shared intuition that the real is always particular.[3] But there are also notorious difficulties. If there is nothing common among the individual cows themselves that warrants our application of the term 'cow', how do we ever learn to use the word, how do we agree among ourselves as to which particulars count as cows, and how am I able to use the word consistently from one occasion to the next? To make our use of kind terms depend solely on human convention is to appear to make such use entirely arbitrary, thereby leaving inexplicable the success we meet with when we learn to use such terms. Thus it is not surprising that some might resist the suggestion that *apoha* semantics represents a radical nominalism.[4]

Certainly some Buddhist philosophers held views that can only be called realist. The Vaibhāṣika notion of *sabhāgatā*,[5] for instance, looks suspiciously like the Vaiśeṣika *jāti*. I maintain, however, that all formulations of *apohavāda*, from Diṅnāga on, are strictly nominalist. It is worth examining the underlying motivation behind this tradition's rejection of universals. When Buddhist epistemology first came into direct confrontation with the explicit realism of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, it was already firmly committed to the principle that all aggregation is mental construction. According to this principle, anything made of parts, such as a forest, a chariot, or a series with temporally successive members, is a mere conceptual fiction, ultimately unreal and mistaken for a real entity solely because of our use of such convenient designations as 'forest'. Now this reductionist view, according to which wholes are ultimately unreal, was supported by various arguments meant to show that no coherent account can be given of the relation between whole and parts. But behind these arguments we can see a more fundamental rationale at work. Our language has a name for a set of chariot parts when these parts are related in a certain way, namely in the assembled-chariot way. We do not have a name for such a set of parts when they are related in certain other ways, e.g., a particular scattering across a battlefield. In the first case

[2] Since everything resembles everything else in some respect or other, the present abstractionist strategy can yield an objectively grounded concept only if the particulars falling under the concept may be said to resemble one another with a greater degree of salience than they resemble other things. On this, as well as the problem of paradigm overdetermination, see D. M. Armstrong, *Nominalism and Realism*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 44–51.

[3] Buddhist nominalists took great delight in raising objections to the existence of real universals. One common argument is that if the universal is truly distinct from all its particular instances and yet present in each, it must be partite. In this case, yet another universal must be invoked in order to explain how these scattered parts constitute some one entity. For Diṅnāga's version of this argument, see Richard Hayes, *Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 183, 282–7. Dharmakīrti's version may be found at PV I 89–90.

[4] The most recent such instance is Georges Dreyfus, who denies that Dharmakīrti, at least, is a radical nominalist, and describes his position as one that might equally be called moderate realism or resemblance-theoretic conceptualism. See *Recognizing Reality* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 146–53.

[5] See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* on AK II 41a, AKBh pp. 67–8.

we would also tend to see the set of parts as one entity, whereas in the second case we would not. This suggests that our judgments concerning entityhood are influenced by the availability of a common term. But why do we have the term 'chariot' for the first case, and no term at all for the second case? Obviously because human interests are such that having a single term for the first case will prove useful, whereas there is no such utility in having a term for the second sort of case. But this in turn means that our judgments concerning the ontological status of sets of parts are dictated by human interests: the entityhood of the chariot is superimposed, the mere projection of human intentions. Since it is always a mistake to allow our wants to dictate our views concerning the nature of mind-independent reality, the chariot must be deemed ultimately unreal.

Given this conclusion, it must still be explained why our use of the word 'chariot' should ever lead to successful practice. But this is easily done. While there is, ultimately, no chariot, there are those individual parts, with those individual assembly relations, that are conveniently designated by the term. Facts concerning so-called chariots are reducible without remainder to facts concerning the ultimate parts of which they are composed. While we are ultimately wrong to suppose there are chariots, our discourse concerning them is still useful given how those ultimate parts are disposed. That King Milinda came in a chariot is conventionally true but ultimately false; yet the utility of our accepting the statement as conventionally true can be explained in terms of the ultimate truth.

This reductionist position had been carefully worked out in Abhidharma, long before Buddhist epistemology came to confront such orthodox realist traditions as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. In this confrontation, the Buddhist tendency to equate aggregation with mental construction would lead to grave suspicions concerning the reality of the universal. Thus it is hardly surprising that Diṅnāga, and all who followed him in his tradition, should reject real universals as mental constructions, and that our tendency to see all the individual cows as sharing in a common character should be relegated to the level of mere conventional truth. What is ultimately real must lack all shared properties, it must be strictly unique. Universals being unreal, the substances in which they are said by the realist to inhere cannot be ultimately real; they could at best be, like partite entities, conventionally real. Hence the bifurcated ontology of the *svalakṣaṇa* and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*: the *svalakṣaṇa* as the genuine particular—that whose nature is its alone, its very identity—is what truly exists; the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*—the common-sense particular whose nature is shared with others of its kind—could at best be only a sort of convenient fiction.[6]

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[6] It is important to remember that '*svalakṣaṇa*' and '*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*' often function as *bahuvrīhi* compounds, denoting the entities that bear, respectively, the 'own nature' and the 'universal nature'. The two terms have their origin in the Abhidharma theory of definition, according to which each type of *dharma* has both a set of distinctive features shared with no other kind of *dharma* (such as the solidity of earth *dharmas*), as well as features that are shared with other kinds of *dharmas* (such as impermanence). See *Atthasālinī* p. 63, and *Vibhaṅga Atthakathā* p. 63. But already in Abhidharma we see a tendency to use '*svalakṣaṇa*' and its synonym '*svabhāva*' as *bahuvrīhi* compounds. See, e.g., *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 157, n. 3. Thus when Diṅnāga banished all but the pure particular from his ultimate ontology, '*svalakṣaṇa*' naturally suggested itself as a name for the entity whose nature is shared with no other real. And '*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*' can likewise serve to name not just a (constructed) common nature, but also the common-sense particular that is thought of as sharing a common nature with other particulars of its type.

Here as well, though, it remains to be explained why our talk of cows should meet with success. Only now the nominalist's standard difficulty—explaining how our use of kind terms might be rule-governed—becomes in the Buddhist context a version of the problem of the two truths. I shall suggest that this connection has important consequences for our understanding of Buddhist nominalism.

The doctrine of *apoha* claims that the meaning of 'cow' is given by the expression 'not non-cow'. Thus to say of a particular that it is a cow is to say that it does not belong to the class of things that are appropriately called non-cows. This strategy obviously avoids positing any shared nature or resemblance among the individual cows; all they have in common, apart from the absence of being non-cows (which, as a mere absence, is not ultimately real[7]), is the name 'cow'. But one wonders whether this does not rely on there being some discernible nature common to all the non-cows. For if there is not, then it would seem I can tell what a non-cow is only by knowing what cows are, and we will have come full circle. This circularity is problematic, given that linguistically mediated cognition is efficacious. If there is not some nature the presence of which makes an individual a cow and the absence of which makes it a non-cow, why when I ask my assistant to fetch a cow do I obtain a cow—something that gives milk—and not an ox or a lawn tractor? It is no help to be told that my assistant knows oxen and lawn tractors are non-cows. How can she know this unless she first knows what a cow is? The Apohavādin hastens to agree that cows do have a common nature, cowness,[8] but adds that this shared nature is a linguistically induced fiction and is ultimately unreal. This does not seem to help. For only what is ultimately real can, in the final analysis, explain efficacy. If each *svalakṣaṇa* is indeed genuinely unique (and thus strictly ineffable), then it is difficult to see why those *svalakṣaṇas* making up what are termed lawn tractors should be excluded from the extension of 'cow', while those making up the milk-givers are included.

A crucial component of the Apohavādin response to this difficulty is the distinction between two kinds of negation: *paryudāsa* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha*. The grammarians explicated *paryudāsa* as primarily positive in force, and negative only by implication, whereas *prasajya-pratiṣedha* was said to be negative in force, with no commitment to any positive characterization. Matilal[9] introduced the terms 'nominally bound negation' for *paryudāsa* and 'verbally bound negation' for *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, thereby bringing out the grammarians' point that where a sentence contains a negation, the former type tends to be associated with the noun (or adjective), the latter with the verb. Thus we may think of two distinct ways to negate the sentence, 'That is

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[7] While Nyāya considers absences to constitute a distinct category of real, the Buddhist tradition has fairly consistently treated them as thoroughly intensional—although AK I 6 records misgivings on the part of some Ābhidhārmikas over the status of *nirodha* or extinction. See, in any event, NB II 25 for Dharmakīrti's strategy for dismissing absences from our ultimate ontology.

[8] Apohavādins have generally been quite explicit in the claim that the exclusion of the other (*anyāpoha*) plays the same role in their semantics that the universal plays in realist semantics. See, e.g., TSP on TS 867–8 (pp. 274–5). See also TSP following TS 1000 (p. 316), where Diṅnāga is quoted as attributing to the *anyāpoha* such properties of the universal (*jāti*) as oneness, permanence, and inherence in each of the many particulars.

[9] *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 156–7. See also Yuichi Kajiyama, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation," *WZKS* 17 (1973) pp. 161–75.

polite', namely, 'That is impolite' (nominally bound negation) and 'That is not polite' (verbally bound negation). And notice that in the former case the negation serves as a positive characterization of the action in question, whereas in the latter case the emphasis appears to be on simply denying attribution of the predicate 'polite' to the action in question. But now notice as well that when the two types of negation are conjoined, as in 'That is not impolite, the result is not what one would expect given the classical rule of double negation; this sentence is not equivalent to 'That is polite'. This is because in this case, the nominally bound negation or *paryudāsa* behaves not classically (like exclusion negation) but like choice negation: besides those things that are said to be polite, and those things that are said to be impolite, there are also those things that may be said to be neither polite nor impolite (namely those actions where questions of politeness simply do not arise). Verbally bound negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*), on the other hand, always behaves like the classical exclusion negation, never occasioning bivalence failure.[10]

With this distinction in hand, we are now prepared to investigate the Apohavādin resolution of the difficulty mentioned two paragraphs back. Their answer begins by considering how we might represent the uniqueness of the *svalakṣaṇa*, which may be thought of as the fact that each *svalakṣaṇa* is wholly distinct in nature from every other. For a given *svalakṣaṇa* s_n, we may then say that every other *svalakṣaṇa* is non-s_n in nature, employing nominally bound negation (*paryudāsa*) on the particular (hereafter to be symbolized as '$-s_n$'). Now if we were to perform verbally bound negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) on this expression, saying of something that it is not non-s_n ($\sim\!-s_n$), what we said would be true precisely of s_n and nothing else, so this gets us no closer to the semantics of kind terms, which must be predicable of many particulars. However, perceptual contact with a *svalakṣaṇa* causes the occurrence of a mental image (considered a representation by Sautrāntika, a cognitive form by Yogācāra). This mental image is itself a particular, and thus its apprehension in perception will not yield the basis for any generality. But given the right training, we can learn to employ a mental image p_n generated by a *svalakṣaṇa* s_n in a somewhat different way. We can learn to form the nominally bound negation of p_n in such a way that not all other mental images are excluded by this negation. Thus the nominally bound negation $-p_n$ may function like choice negation. As we saw above, the choice negation of the predicate 'polite' yields a complement class of those things that are impolite, but at the same time it leaves open the possiblity of a non-empty set consisting of those things that are neither polite nor impolite. By the same token, we can learn to treat $-p_n$ in such a way that mental images p_{n+1}, p_{n+2}, etc., while distinct from p_n, are not in the exclusion class formed by $-p_n$. In this case, the expression '$\sim\!-p_n$' will be true of p_n, p_{n+1}, p_{n+2}, etc. That is, '$\sim\!-p_n$' functions as the name of a mentally constructed pseudo-universal. We have learned to form p_n in such a way as to overlook the differences among p_n, p_{n+1}, p_{n+2}, etc., so that each may be said not to be other than the rest.

Suppose, counterfactually, that cows were *svalakṣaṇas*. (The supposition is counterfactual because the cow, as an aggregate substance, could not be ultimately real.) And suppose that s_n,

[10] TS and TSP 974 explicitly affirm that verbally bound negation behaves classically: the double *prasajya-pratiṣedha* negation of 'cooks' yields precisely the original predicate.

s_{n+1}, and s_{n+2} were particular instances. Now the representation p_n when apprehended perceptually is absolutely distinct from all other representations, including p_{n+1} and p_{n+2}. To learn to use 'cow', however, is to learn to treat some such representation as p_n in such a way that it does not exclude such other mental images as p_{n+1} and p_{n+2}. To have learnt to use the word is to have acquired the disposition to form this paradigm image upon hearing the word. I am then able to determine that the novel instance s_{n+3} is a cow by noting that the mental image p_{n+3} is not excluded by, is not incompatible with, p_n. I correctly call s_{n+3} a cow through overlooking the difference between s_n and s_{n+3}. I am likewise able to correctly say that s_m is not a cow (it is in fact a lawn tractor) by noting that the mental image p_m generated by it is excluded by or incompatible with p_n.

Now one might admire the elegance of this solution and yet still wonder whether anything really has been achieved through its use of all this logical and psychological machinery. How am I able to learn to form p_n in such a way as to ensure that precisely such mental images as p_{n+1} and p_{n+2} are not thereby excluded, given that s_n, s_{n+1}, and s_{n+2} share neither a class character nor any real resemblances? We are told that this learning proceeds in accordance with a set of verbal conventions. This is no doubt true, but it seems unhelpful. These conventions can be employed only if there is some objective basis for intersubjective agreement concerning the formation of p_n. And what might this be if s_n, s_{n+1}, and s_{n+2} share neither a class character nor any real resemblances? The answer is that s_n, s_{n+1}, and s_{n+2} do share something, namely the capacity to give milk. But this is a misleading way of putting the point. Instead we should say that each of these particulars serves as cause of milk, i.e., has the capacity to satisfy a desire for milk. If we are tempted to suppose that this amounts to a real resemblance among them, we should consider the plants *guḍūcī*, *dhātṛ*, *abhaya*, etc., each of which has the power to abate fever. These are distinct kinds of plants, so there can be no temptation to suppose they resemble one another in any way save in their antipyretic virtue. And we should refrain from judging that they have a real resemblance in this respect, since our interest in fever abatement would clearly be behind such a judgment. Just as with 'chariot' and 'forest', our interests make it the case that it would be lighter—less prolix, more parsimonious—to employ the one term 'antipyretic' rather than having distinct names for the power of each. And so, again just as with 'chariot' and 'forest', we end up projecting onto the world something that is not really there—a real resemblance or class character. There is an objective basis to the formation of p_n in such a way as to ensure that mental images p_{n+1} and p_{n+2} are not excluded: each of s_n, s_{n+1}, and s_{n+2} are able to satisfy our interest in obtaining milk. Our use of 'cow' expresses this interest. But such use also leads us to see particular cows as similar and sharing in a common class character, when they are in fact utterly distinct and incommensurable.

Having said all this, certain of our authors were still concerned that the capacity to produce the same effect would be seen as a shared property. Thus we find two additional arguments being given for the ultimate distinctness of the instances of a kind term. The first is that when we collect together a set of particulars on the basis of their each producing the same effect, this basis is better described as their being distinct from what is incapable of producing that effect. The many cows should not be thought of as sharing the causal capacity to produce milk. Instead they should be thought of as sharing only distinctness from such things as lawn tractors, conduct with

respect to which leaves unabated my desire for milk. The causal capacity—what serves as the basis for the convention governing formation of the paradigm mental image—may itself appear to be one shared feature. But this appearance is itself generated by the exclusion of the other.

The second strategy involves taking a straightforwardly empiricist line on so-called causal capacities. When we say that cows produce milk, we tend to imagine in each cow some power out of which milk somehow emerges. And since the product (the milk) seems to be the same in each case, although the particular cows might otherwise vary, we suppose that the power itself must be the same. This view is not empirically warranted however. All we are given in experience is just *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, positive and negative concomitance: this occurring, that occurs, while in the absence of this, that does not occur. The notion of a causal capacity or power is merely a convenient way of collecting together the various positive and negative correlations. That this way of talking proves convenient should not mislead us into thinking it reflects some objective feature of reality. There is ultimately no such thing as the power to produce milk. There are just particular cows, lawn tractors, and pots of milk.

This formulation of *apohavāda* is clearly visible in the work of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. The distinction between *paryudāsa* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha* is drawn at TS 1003, and the application of *paryudāsa* to the *svalakṣaṇa* is discussed at TS 1008cd. At TS 723–6, Śāntarakṣita gives the example of the antipyretic herbs and its application to the problem of forming an exclusion class. The example is reinvoked at TS 1004, in conjunction with a discussion of forming a mental image that excludes other images in the manner of choice negation (TS 1004–1008ab). In his comments on TS 1034, Kamalaśīla explicitly invokes the concept of convenient designation to explain the formation of a class around the notion of one causal capacity. And in his comments on TS 774, Kamalaśīla makes the point that since causality is a thoroughly intensional notion, the concept of a causal capacity cannot be made the basis of a real resemblance.

How much of this is actually visible in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*? Rather more than one might expect, given how frequently Dharmakīrti has been identified as a resemblance theorist. The claim that the kind concept is constructed through exclusion from what lacks capacity for a given effect is made explicitly at PV III 73–4 using the example of the different antipyretic herbs. That the *svalakṣaṇa* lacks all resemblance relations is affirmed at PV II 2a, and at PV III 139. At PV III 108–9 we are told that all appearance of similarity among the distinct particulars belonging to a kind derives from verbally mediated cognition based on exclusion of the other. At PV III 138 the construction of class terms is explained as based on considerations of lightness or parsimony. Dharmakīrti does not use the terms '*prasajya*' and '*paryudāsa*' in his discussion of exclusion. But the (nominally bound) exclusion by a given *svalakṣaṇa* of all other *svalakṣaṇas* is referred to at PV III 139. And the formation of a mental image that excludes after the manner of choice negation is described at PV III 164–5.

Thus the only element crucial to my account of *apoha* semantics that is missing in Dharmakīrti is the distinction between nominally bound and verbally bound negation. I would suggest that this distinction is implicit in his account of *apoha*. For otherwise his discussion of the difference between the exclusion performed by the *svalakṣaṇa* and that performed by the mental image (PV III 163–5) would be pointless, since only by conjoining a *prasajya-pratiṣedha* to the *paryudāsa* of the mental image can one arrive at a predicate applicable to many particulars. What then

happened is, I think, this. In his criticisms of *apohavāda*, Kumārila took '*anyāpoha*' to involve classical double negation, thus giving rise to his circularity objection (that we must first know which are the cows if we are to exclude the non-cows). In addition, he took the Apohavādin to be claiming that word meaning is felt to be negative in nature, and objected that word meaning is universally felt to be positive. Śāntarakṣita introduced the distinction between two kinds of negation in order to answer both objections. Of course, in my view it was a mistake on his part to respond as he did to the objection that word meaning is felt to be positive. The issue of the psychological feel of verbal comprehension is something of a red herring for the Apohavādin, since the *apoha* account is meant to explain the causal processes involved in using kind terms, and not how those processes will feel to the cognizer.[11] The distinction between two kinds of negation does, however, answer the crucial circularity objection in a way that makes clear why *apohavāda* is not illicitly relying on covert resemblances or class characters. And since Dharmakīrti is quite explicit on the point that he rejects real resemblances as much as he does real kinds, it only makes sense to suppose that he had just this distinction in mind in his formulation of *apohavāda*.

Abbreviations

AK	*Abhidharmakośa* (Vasubandhu): See AKBh.
AKBh	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu): Prahlad Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967. 2nd ed. by Aruna Haldar. Patna, 1975.
NB	*Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabinduṭīkā.* Reconstructed and translated by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya. Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971.
PV I, II, III	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapters 1 (Pramāṇasiddhi), 2 (Pratyakṣa), 3 (Svārthānumāna): Ram Chandra Pandeya, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with the commentaries Svopajñavṛtti of the author and Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.
TS	*Tattvasaṅgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Embar Krishnamacharya, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla.* 2 vols. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30. 1926. Reprint, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1984–88.
TSP	*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*

[11] See my "Was Śāntarakṣita a 'Positivist'?" in *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, ed. B. K. Matilal (Reidel, 1985), pp. 184–197.

YOGIC COGNITION, TANTRIC GOAL, AND OTHER METHODOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S *KĀRYĀNUMĀNA* THEOREM

by

Ernst Steinkellner, Vienna

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Watanabe Fumimaro to whom I owe many of whatever feelings for what may be 'Japanese' I have learned to feel.

In many respects this paper may be considered an impudence, for it is neither finished nor are its ideas sufficiently corroborated by considering their consequences within all the areas touched upon or involved. In other words, it raises more questions than I can answer at the moment, both with regard to Dharmakīrti's own frame of interpretation and to the larger frame of his Buddhist context, as well as with regard to the appropriateness of Dharmakīrti's specific way of dealing with the latter as a problem. Nevertheless, I hope that some usefulness can be found in what I think to be another interesting path into the deeper layers of Dharmakīrti's thought and the mechanisms of the tradition developing from it. By some earlier remarks in a like direction made in papers by Inami and Tillemans,[1] as well as by Hayes and Gillon,[2] and recently by Franco,[3] I am at least somewhat encouraged to follow this path of investigation.

In order to introduce the topic I would like to summarize first the results of a previous study.[4] In my contribution to the felicitation volume for Prof. Ji Xianlin (which is not widely available, I am afraid) I tried to explain the reasons for Dharmakīrti's analysis and explanation of the logical structure of a certain kind of inference which is peculiar in several respects, the inference from 'cause to effect'.

According to Dharmakīrti, such an inference which was accepted in Nyāya circles and classical Sāṅkhya[5] has to be differentiated with regard to its possibilities. In principle, the term 'cause' in the position of the logical reason of such an inference from cause to effect can only refer to the continuum (*santāna*) of a complete or sufficient causal complex (*sāmagrī*).[6] But then an effect as such cannot be inferred, due to the possibility of impediments (*pratibandha*). It is, however, possible to infer the conceptual property of 'being fit for the production of the effect' (*kāryotpādanayogyatā* PVSV 6,28) from the property 'completeness of the cause' (cf. *samagrāt*

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[1] Inami-Tillemans [1986: 126, note 10].

[2] Hayes-Gillon [1991: 7–69].

[3] Franco [1997: 6–8, 109f.].

[4] Steinkellner [1991a].

[5] Steinkellner [1991a: 716, 720f.].

[6] Steinkellner [1991a: 722f.].

karaṇāt PVSV 6,27). And since 'fitness (for production)' (*yogyatā*) depends on nothing else than the completeness of the causal complex (*sāmagrīmātrānubandhinī* PVSV 6,29), Dharmakīrti classifies this inference as one from an essential property 'completeness of the causal complex' used as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) to another essential property of the same reality, namely 'fitness for production'. In other words, this inference establishes nothing but the linguistic fact that a 'cause', in the sense of a 'causal complex', which is considered and called 'complete' can also be considered and called 'fit for the production of its effect'.

Strictly speaking, this holds good—in accordance with Dharmakīrti's causality conceptions—only when referring to the last phase (*antyāvasthā, antyakṣaṇa*) of a causal complex, this phase being the only one when the complex is truly 'complete'. But in this case an inference is no longer possible because the presence of the effect will outrun every inferential process.[7] However, in his analysis of the *kāryānumāna* Dharmakīrti keeps to the idea of the causal complex as a continuum (*santāna*). Moreover, he expands the applicability of this inferential form beyond such purely linguistic or conceptual application by making allowance also for the fact of possible impediments. An inference from cause to effect, then, is possible, when the fitness of the causal complex as a continuum for producing it is not dependent on something else.[8] In other words, if it were possible to organise as well as to ascertain the causal complex in such a way that the existence of an impediment[9] can be ruled out, the 'fitness for a production of the effect' as the property to be proven of a causal complex in terms of being a continuum can be established as well. Namely from the reason that another causal factor for producing the effect is not needed,[10] and that at the same time—now we have to jump to PV II for textually supplementing this line of thought—it is not impeded (*bādhyate*) by opposing forces (*vipakṣa*).[11]

With this jump into PV II which can be considered as Dharmakīrti's 'religious text'[12] I thought to have found the real motive for Dharmakīrti to deal with the possibilities of an inference 'from cause to effect' at all: he does not have a logical motive primarily, but a soteriological one. He wants to investigate whether a kind of 'progressive, proleptic causality', necessarily to be acknowledged as a real soteriological fact in the conception of progress towards Buddhahood,

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[7] Steinkellner [1991a: 722].

[8] "This complex of causes is capable for a production of (its) effect on account of a [final] transformation of the respective later forces [in its causally connected continuum of phases], because another [i.e. additional co-operative] condition for the transformation of the [cause's] force, that [the production of the effect] would necessarily depend upon, is lacking." (*uttarottaraśaktipariṇāmena kāryotpādanasamartheyaṃ kāraṇasāmagrī śaktipariṇāmapratyayasyānyasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvād iti.* PVSV 7,8–10)

[9] In PVin II 13,20–22 Dharmakīrti will later define an impediment (*pratibandha*) as "the production of something that does not agree with the arising of the (desired) effect." (*'bras bu skye ba dang mi mthun pa bskyed pa ni gegs kyi mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro.*)

[10] *śaktipariṇāmapratyayasyānyasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt.* PVSV 7,10.

[11] Cf. PV II 129, Vetter [1964: 25–27], and Steinkellner [1991a: 724f.], as well as Franco [1997: 109f.] on PV II 37.

[12] Cf. Vetter [1990: 15] and Franco [1997: 1]. PV II 210, important for its clarification of the cause for the final triumph of the good over the bad mental qualities, was taken over from PV I 223 (cf. Vetter [1984: 110], also for a translation of Dharmakīrti's elaboration of this verse in PVSV 111,1–11).

was supportable on a rational level too.[13] The progress towards Buddhahood laid out in PV II is based upon the idea that the good qualities (*guṇa*) of the mind, e.g. compassion (*kṛpā*), can be developed by continuous practice towards perfection thereby becoming the 'highest inner nature' (*atyantasātmatā*) of a mental continuum (PV II 129). The result of this development is a transformation of the basis (*āśrayaḥ parivartate* PV II 205b), i.e. of the mental continuum (*cittasantāna*),[14] which can no longer be reversed due to a complete elimination of the bad qualities (*doṣa*) (PV II 205–210).[15] An elimination of bad mental qualities, on the other hand, is possible because they do not correspond to true reality, because they can be analysed as to their causes and conditions, and because they can be overcome by applying the appropriate means for the destruction of their causes (PV II 144). But causal existence after this point of radical transformation, and retrospectively too in consideration of the possibility of a successfully practised path (*mārga*), must be understood as proceeding 'automatically', by its own nature and independent of non-essential causal factors.

Thus Dharmakīrti in his logical system provides that specific logical form without which such 'proleptic causality'[16] presupposed as a fact by the idea of progression towards Buddhahood would be rationally inconceivable and, therefore, an illusion. If all opposing forces which could impede the arising of an effect are eliminated from a mental continuum, the finally developed complete or sufficient cause would necessarily give rise to its effect, in the end Buddhahood, that is, and to the latter's continuing existence. Another area of 'proleptic causality', in fact a precondition of the progress towards Buddhahood, is the succession of lifes, rebirth. Here, too, the

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[13] Cf. Steinkellner [1991a: 723ff.] and Hayes-Gillon [1991: 67–69].

[14] Cf. Vetter [1990: 105 note 1], and Franco [1997: 82ff.] for an interpretation of this basis as the so-called "store-consciousness" (*ālayavijñāna*).

[15] Cf. Vetter [1990: 105–110].

[16] In Steinkellner [1991a: note 32], I proposed the term 'e n t e l e c h i a l c a u s a l i t y' to refer to those causal processes where a 'complete causal complex' necessarily proceeds towards perfection because of the ascertained impossibility of impediments. The substantive 'entelechy' in the Western philosophical tradition refers to the fact that every being is directed to a certain goal on account of its constitution, and as such aims at that goal independently, of its own. In this sense it implies a partly teleological explanation in contrast to a purely mechanical-causal one.

However, I assumed in this paper that it would seem to be possible to use the adjective 'entelechial' as an attribute of causality to refer to this Buddhist idea, although here a 'goal' (*télos*) of perfection is not taken into consideration as a causal factor, since such a future goal cannot influence, being inexistent, the original causal complex. The Buddhist idea of a causal process that 'proceeds out of its own natural constitution' (*svarasavāhin*) does not involve a conflict, therefore, between a teleological and a causal model, but rather reserves an area within its purely causal explanation for the possibility of proceeding towards perfection out of necessity, without having to consider that goal itself as an essential part of an existent being. It is of some import in this context, that the Buddhist ideas of continuous causal processes are not developed by means of metaphors and examples from areas of mechanical causality, but rather of organic causality, e.g. in the tradition of the *Śālistambasūtra* (cf. Frauwallner [1956: 49ff.]; Steinkellner [1967: 136ff.]).

David Seyfort Ruegg proposed to call this causality 'p r o l e p t i c' in his *La thèorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra,* Paris 1969 (oral communication, but I didn't find the passage). And, on second thought, considering the heavy Aristotelian occupation of the term 'entelechy', I would now rather prefer to follow Seyfort Ruegg and use his term 'proleptic' in the future.

kāryānumāna model is used, subsequently to Dharmakīrti's question of PV II 37, in proving the future life.[17]

Dharmakīrti himself does not say anywhere to my knowledge that this particular idea of Buddhist soteriology is a, or—at least to my understanding—the most important case for applying the structural scheme of an inference from the reason 'completeness of cause' to the consequence 'fitness for the production of the effect'. He does, however, expressly apply it to at least one non-soteriological case, namely when he explains the non-cognition as a reason (*anupalabdhihetu*) to be a case of 'essential property as reason' (*svabhāvahetu*).[18]

In summing up one can say that Dharmakīrti provided this particular logical form as a rational frame for an indispensable conception of his religious tradition, without, however, expressly stating this soteriological purpose. On the other hand, he also saw the non-soteriological usefulness of this form and applied it, at least once, as a generalised methodological instrument.

This same kind of division in application to soteriological and non-soteriological issues can be observed also in certain later literary layers of the Pramāṇa school, now following in Dharmakīrti's tracks. Naturally the soteriological application remains this logical form's basic domain, although in explaining the progression towards Buddhahood it is not reserved a conspicuous place. Here, all interest is focussed on the most prominent causes themselves and their order of generation, while our logical form seems to be rarely spelt out as ruling upon the very core of this causal progression.[19] It is only within a 'sub-chapter' of Buddhist soteriology that this methodology seems to have been applied more preferably: the development of yogic cognition in its final clarity which we will look at below.

A non-soteriological use of this tool is, however, also attested most notably in Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. Clear examples can be found in two different areas: in Prajñākaragupta's derivation of a cognition's validity (*prāmāṇya*), and in his proof of rebirth (*paralokasiddhi*).

Most conspicuously the tool is used by Prajñākara to present his own idea on deriving cognitional validity as contained in the last part of his commentary on PV II 5a (*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*; cf. PVA 27,12–28,30; ed. Ono 59,6–63,10).[20] I shall, therefore, only give some indications to corroborate my assumption that Prajñākara applies this logical form as an instrument.

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[17] Cf. Franco [1997: 109f., 176f.].

[18] Cf. Steinkellner [1991a: 712f.]; Iwata [1991: 87–89]; Steinkellner [1967: 155f.]. The two concepts involved here are 'capable of being treated as non-existing' (*asadvyavahārayogya*) as consequence, and 'non-cognition of something perceptible' (*dṛśyānupalabdhi*) as reason. They are logically connected by their real identity in one and the same subject (*dharmin*). And the logical relationship between 'completeness of cause' and 'fitness for the production of the effect' applies because the non-cognition of some object is the cause of this object's being treated as non-existing in this certain situation (cf. PVSV 105,1f. and PV IV 269; Iwata [1991: 88]).

[19] For the only relevant remark found until now, namely Devendrabuddhi's in his commentary on PV II 146, cf. Inami-Tillemans [1986: 126].

[20] Ono Motoi is presently preparing the publication of his Vienna dissertation of 1993 in which he edited and translated Prajñākara's commentary on PV II 1–7, and has dealt with this particular subject in greater detail in Ono [1994].

The decisive term chosen by Prajñākara in these contexts is *avaśyambhāvikāryaṃ kāraṇam* ('cause with necessarily arising effect', PVA 27,18). This term occurs in both contexts, validity as well as rebirth related (PVA 27,18 and 28,22), and is accompanied by statements like *anumāne tu kāraṇāt kāryaṃ pratīyate* ("In the case of inference a [future] effect is cognized on account of a cause." PVA 20,32f.), or *yathā ca kāraṇasya pūrvaṃ bhāvaṃ vinā na bhavati kāryam, tathāvaśyambhāvikāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāryasyāparabhāvaṃ* (: *kāryasya para–* R) *vinā na.* ("As an effect does not exist without an earlier existence of the cause, so a cause with necessarily arising effect does not [exist] without a later existence of an effect." PVA 28,21f.), or *kāraṇavaikalye hi kāryasyābhāvaḥ, sakale tu kalāvati kāraṇe kāryam anutpattimad iti vyāhatam.* ("For an effect does not arise when the cause is incomplete. But when the cause is complete, (i.e.) possessing all its parts (*kalāvat*), it is contradictory [to say] that the effect does not arise." PVA 56,22f.), or *kāraṇaparatantraṃ hi kāryam. tatsamarthaṃ kāraṇaṃ haṭhād eva janayati.* ("For the effect depends on a cause. A cause which is capable of that [effect] (*tatsamartha*) produces it necessarily (*haṭhāt*)." PVA 56,26).[21]

Clearly these passages derive from Dharmakīrti's explanation of the inference from cause to effect. For 'a cause with necessarily arising effect' is nothing but Dharmakīrti's 'complete cause'.

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With the next example—the proof of the achievement of perfect cognitional clarity through an extreme intensity of meditation—we are nearer to soteriological grounds. Roughly speaking, the Buddha is accepted in his tradition as an authority on the basis of the belief that he was able to attain an immediate cognitional awareness of what is real by means of a long, continuous, and intensive meditational effort. His immediate experience of reality as it is (*yathābhūta*) has always been considered as the essential element constituting the firm ground for reaching the final goal of salvation in the Buddhist tradition, and, therefore, as the decisive reason for taking refuge in the Buddha's teaching. In its quality as a cognition, this extraordinary experience of the Buddha and his followers on the same path was generally termed 'yogic cognition' (*yogijñāna*) when in the post-classical period of Indian theoretical thought almost all representatives of the Indian systematical traditions started to ascertain these traditions by considerations related to their sources of knowledge.

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[21] For the two latter passages cf. Franco [1997: 176f.]. For similar applications in the proof of rebirth cf. Śāntarakṣita's second proof in TS 1898 or Ratnakīrti's formulation in SS 3,9–11 (cf. Bühnemann [1980: note 50]). It seems to me that Prajñākaragupta when referring in PVA 20,32f. to his later proof of rebirth has that type of inference from cause to effect in mind which Dharmakīrti explained as being based on an essential property. Although generally accepted for this purpose, Prajñākaragupta seems to consider it as too complicated (PVA 69,20–24) and proposes an interpretation of the inference of future existence as based on an effect as logical reason (*kāryahetu*) rather in his comments on PV II 49 (cf. PVA 67,11–69,25). Eli Franco devoted a recent lecture (1997) "Inferring the Future, Producing the Past: Prajñākaragupta's extraordinary interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda*" (Xerox-copy) to Prajñākaragupta's proposals for such a proof and its corollaries for the concept of a cause. His study of this highly interesting interpretation continues the interpretation of PVA in Franco [1997: 230]. Moriyama [1998: 44–57, 103f.] seems to illuminate more or less the same materials in relation to the standard proof.

That the most consequent development of this ascertainment of the epistemic sources of the Buddhist creed in the tradition founded by Dignāga decided on only two kinds of such reliable cognitions, perception and inference, has its basis already in the Buddha's teaching. The Buddha contrasted his immediate experience with the beginningless emotional and intellectual maladjustments (*tṛṣṇā, avidyā*) of all sentient beings which are the ultimate cause of eternal suffering existence. Errors, wrong conceptions of reality are the final causes of suffering. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and controlled conception, inference (*anumāna*), are the only kinds of cognition acceptable, therefore, to the Buddhist epistemological tradition. This clearly conforms to the two poles of the Buddha's teaching which explains the constitution of salvation and of suffering respectively, perception being the most important, because of the fact that all hopes depend on it. 'Yogic cognition', exemplarily present in the Buddha's salvific experience, is naturally classified as a particular kind of perception. And all Buddhist theory of perception seems to have, in the end, only one crucial aim: to rationally understand such a cognition as being possible at all. Although not always visible in the first line of the various topics of our school, this topic of 'yogic cognition' accompanied every historical phase of its theoretical progress as a vivid problem that was dealt with in different degrees of rigidity.[22]

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Our methodological tool is clearly made use of in the last part of a somewhat enigmatic Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* of Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā*.[23] Its topic is that a perception conditioned by meditation (*bhāvanāmaya*) can have everything as its object. This topic is elaborated by one lengthy logically structured argument, and a second, being introduced as an alternative, which takes meditation itself as its subject.[24] The following proof is formulated with this subject on the basis of Dharmakīrti's verse PV III 285 (= PVin I 31):[25]

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[22] Cf. Steinkellner [1978], Pemwieser [1991].

[23] First pointed out in Steinkellner [1978: 128]. A critical edition of this *pūrvapakṣa* (with some further improvements upon Stern's critical edition, together with an annotated German translation and a detailed analysis is contained in Pemwieser [1991: 109–147].

The origin of this *pūrvapakṣa* is still by no means settled. It cannot be connected with Dharmottara, Vācaspati's main Buddhist opponent after Dharmakīrti. Pemwieser [1991: 44–47] finds strong similarities with a digression in Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (TSP 1052,20–1060,16) and considers a summary of this statement by Vācaspati a possibility, at least for the first, larger part of the *pūrvapakṣa,* but also points out that certain logical developments in the argumentation as contained in this text are absent in the TSP, particularly the application of the *kāryānumāna* methodological model that we are interested in here. Since it is hard, however, to imagine that Vācaspati himself added these new developments of Buddhist apologetics, I prefer to consider the source of this *pūrvapakṣa* as still unknown, but with affinities to the TSP material.

The context of this *pūrvapakṣa* is as follows (cf. Pemwieser [1991: 43 note 67]): in the root-text, the *Vidhiviveka*, a thesis is refuted that an omniscient can be the source of the Vedic *vidhi*. The second refutation's stress is on the statement that even a yogic cognition cannot have everything as its object. The Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* introduced at this point argues for the truth of this very position.

[24] *bhāvanāṃ vā pakṣīkṛtyocyate.* NK_P 114,1 (NK 145,20; NK_S 551,8).

[25] *tasmād bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evābhibhāvyate / bhānanāparinispattau tat sphuṭākalpadhīphalam //* PV III 285, PVin I 31.

"Every meditation practised attentively, without interruption, and for a long time results in a cognition with the appearance of an object which is (like) a myrobalan held in the hand; as a love-sick person's meditation with (these) three distinctions on the beloved is cause for the fact that the cognition whose object is the beloved is of clear appearance; and the meditation on the selflessness of all realities is endowed with (these) three distinctions. (In this formulation) an essential property as reason (is used)."[26]

The text continues adding a *prasaṅga* argument for corroboration.

But then the author, in visible dependence on Dharmakīrti's explanation of the *kāryānumāna*, explains why such an inference from a cause, in this case triply distinguished meditation, to an effect, here cognition with a clear appearance of its object, is possible at all:

"And for a complete cause the capability for the production of (its) effect (can) be inferred. Thus, the fruit is necessarily produced only when this unimpeded complex is given. Therefore it is ascertained for a [complete] complex that the fruit which is independent [of other causal factors] will (necessarily) come about."[27]

This application of Dharmakīrti's logical form has no parallel in Kamalaśīla's commentary. I have not found it so far in Prajñākaragupta's comments on yogic[28] cognition either. Since it seems evident that this *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Nyāyakaṇikā* is not too distant from Kamalaśīla's commentary, and since Prajñākaragupta, too, applied this method in other cases, as we have seen, we can state that such application of Dharmakīrti's theorem to various topics involving 'proleptic causality' started to be considered as useful by the end of the eighth century.

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So far we have found only more or less faint traces of such a methodological application, but in the case of the *Tattvasiddhi* ascribed to an Ācārya Śāntarakṣita it seems that the whole text was composed by applying Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* theorem as a model logical form. For this text is written to prove (*siddhi*) that tantristic[29] practice necessarily results in achieving the final

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[26] *tathā hi yā sādaranairantaryadīrghakālāsevitā* [(a)] *bhāvanā, sā sarvā karatalāmalakāyamānālambana-nirbhāsajñānaphalā, tad yathā kāmāturasya kāminībhāvanā viśeṣaṇatrayavatī kāminīviṣayavijñānaviśadābhatā-hetuḥ. tathā ca samastavastunairātmyabhāvanā viśeṣaṇatrayaśālinīti svabhāvahetuḥ.* (NK_P 114,1–5; NK 145,20–146,1; NK_S 551,8–552,2). The same *prayoga* occurs with only minor variants in TSP 1060,22–1061,3.

(a) *sādara-* NK_P em. against *yādara-* NK, NK_S, is well attested by parallel passages (TSP 1060,22, and particularly PVV 204,4 where it is not at the beginning of a *prayoga* which could, in fact start with *yā yā,* and TR 61,2 where *yā* would be out of place altogether).

[27] *hetoś ca samagrasya kāryotpādanasāmarthyānumānam. tathā ca satyāmā eva tasyāṃ sāmagryām apratibaddhāyāṃ niyamena phalam utpadyata ity anapekṣikaphalasambhaviṣyattvaṃ*[(a)] *sāmagryā niścīyata iti* ... (NK_P 115,1–4; NK 146,9–12; NK_S 553,1–5).

(a) NK_P em.: *na pākṣikaphalasambhavaviṣayatvaṃ* NK, NK_S.

[28] An awareness of this model's capacity is also present in Arcaṭa's introduction to the *Hetubinduṭīkā* when he introduces as a consideration (*sambhāvanā*) the idea "This is fit for accomplishing the intended effect as long as there is neither an obstructive factor nor incompleteness (of the causal complex)." (*pratibandhavaikalyayor asambhave yogyam etad vivakṣitaṃ kāryaṃ niṣpādayitum iti.* HBṬ 2,7f.; translation from Funayama [1995: 187]).

[29] I use the term 'tantric' in the sense of 'related to the Tantras', and the term 'tantristic' in the sense of 'related

goal of "Great Bliss" (*mahāsukha*).

First a few remarks on the text and its author. The present state of the text is a catastrophe, and so is the author's style of writing, in a certain sense. The text is nevertheless of considerable import: for the Tantra scholar, because of its numerous quotations from Tantras either totally unknown so far, or not transmitted in Sanskrit;[30] and for our topic, as I would like to show.

The Sanskrit text is available in a number of manuscripts.[31] Already in the eighties both Lindtner[32] and Mishra[33] announced their editions of the text as forthcoming. Prof. Mishra's edition is already composed in Devanāgarī and a copy of this text of 29 pages he put at my disposal in 1986. Some years ago I read this text together with Max Nihom in a seminar using Mishra's pre-print, four manuscripts, and the Tibetan translation (P 4531, D 3708, made by Atiśa and Rin chen bzang po as revised by Kumārakalaśa and Śākya 'od). None of these materials can be said to be at least better than the other. But Mishra's edition could serve as a working basis.

The text has been poorly transmitted. In fact, I think it was transmitted by mistake, because of its name. For it always seems to have been transmitted as part of certain tantristic[29] collections.[34] In these, mostly texts whose names end in *siddhi* were assembled. The other *siddhi*-texts are, in fact, various descriptions of the tantric paths, and the *Tattvasiddhi* is exceptional in that it is not a systematic text but contains a real proof (*siddhi*). In this respect it also differs from the other famous tantristic theoretical treatise of mainly apologetic character, Āryadeva's *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa*.[35] To my knowledge the *Tattvasiddhi* is the only text written as a tantristic proof that we have.

An Ācārya Śāntarakṣita is presented as the author in the Tibetan translation of the 11th century (P 4531,42a8; D 3708,39a1) and in at least four manuscripts. Whether this Ācārya may be the same as the famous author of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*, is the question. The fact that the text is tantristic, does not exclude the latter's authorship, for by the 8th century Buddhist tantristic traditions were already monastically and intellectually established, and there are also other tantristic texts transmitted under Śāntarakṣita's name.[36] Nevertheless, an

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to the systematic or religious traditions based on the Tantras'.

[30] Cf. Mishra [1992 (?)] and Moriguchi [1993].

[31] Four are in Nepalese collections and one is in Baroda according to Tsukamoto *et al.* [1989: 487]. I have been able to acquire copies of four manuscripts. It seems that Prof. Mishra had five or six manuscripts at his disposal. In indicating passages below I shall refer to the most readable manuscript I have (which is Baroda 56), because it is also referred to in Dasgupta [1974], and to Prof. Mishra's pre-print (in case it will one day be edited). Emendational remarks will be added if necessary.

[32] Lindtner [1980: note 33].

[33] Prof. Kameshwar Nath Mishra delivered a paper on the *Tattvasiddhi* at the VIth World Sanskrit Conference in Philadelphia 1985 (cf. Mishra [1985–86]).

[34] Cf. Tsukamoto *et al.* [1989: 344f.].

[35] Cf. Patel [1949: XXVIIff.] and Dasgupta [1974: 188–190]. Dasgupta also summarizes some of the apologetic sections in the *Tattvasiddhi* in [1974: 190–193].

[36] E.g., P 2052, 2055, 2447, 3954, 3892. Cf. also Bhattacharyya [1926: XX]. None of these have been investigated so far.

attribution to the famous Śāntarakṣita has been considered questionable,[37] and although Lindtner promised to present internal and external evidence for the authenticity of the *Tattvasiddhi* as a work of the famous philosopher in the introduction to his "forthcoming" edition,[38] I now consider such attribution as quite impossible for reasons of its style and structure, and above all, because of its idiosyncratic quality as a scholarly treatise which is what it intends to be.

To give my impression of this author's character as a scholar in a nutshell: he has good knowledge of Tantras from which he quotes profusely to support his argument, and also draws from Mahāyānasūtras and Śāstras to make his point. In particular, he seems to be familiar with some of the contents of *Pramāṇavārttika* II. He evidently received logical training, too. The whole text is built around a series of proofs, all presented in form of proof-formulations (*prayoga*) some of which even are explained in their logical structure. These proofs are then defended and corroborated by means of quotations from authoritative scriptures, in this case from Tantra. But the whole development of his argument is jerky, surprising with unprepared changes in important concepts, and at the same time spiked with redundancies as if the author wanted to show off with his ability to compose a logically structured text in the paṇḍit fashion well-known, e.g., from treatises like those by Ratnakīrti. Beyond that, he commits at least one major logical blunder when he defines the reason of a *prayoga* that does not prove a negation as a *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*.[39]

In demonstrating his manner of applying Dharmakīrti's tool, I shall outline the major steps of the argument limited to the body of the proof proper.[40] All apologetic parts[41] of the text and the last chapter which deals with the nature of the liberating cognition are not taken into consideration. At the same time I shall demonstrate the author's close dependence on Dharmakīrti's formulations in the PVSV.

The text pronounces the purpose "to give some explanations by means of arguments and scriptures" (*yuktyāgamābhyām abhidhīyate kiñcit*) for those who know neither the principle of the Adamantine Being (*vajrasattvatva*) which is the exalted Great Bliss (*śrīmanmahāsukha*) and defined as the tantric attainment (*adhigama*), nor the Great Adamantine Vehicle (*mahāvajrayāna*) which is the means (*upāya*) for this attainment (B 182,4–183,6; Mi 1,3–13).

1. The proof starts with a first thesis: "Embraced by insight and means (*prajñopāya*) the (sense-)objects, matter etc. (*rūpādi*), are conveying qualified fruit (*viśiṣṭaphala*) when they enter

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[37] E.g., in Yamaguchi [1988: 266].

[38] Lindtner [1980: note 33]. In Lindtner [1997: 192, 195ff.] he takes this authenticity for granted. In Lindtner [199?: 22] he says that "the authenticity . . . should not be impeached," and that "internal evidence is provided by observation of style" with which I fully agree, but not with his following statement that "we are here dealing with the prose-style of Dharmakīrti . . ." Alas, far from it!

[39] B 195,1–4; Mi 12,5–10.

[40] Lindtner [199?: 22–26] gives a descriptive analysis of the *Tattvasiddhi*'s contents with which I disagree on some important points, however.

[41] Concerning, e.g., denial of 'matter etc.' (*rūpādi*) as 'cause for evil states' (*apāyahetu*) (B 186,2–188,4, Mi 3,13–5,10) defence of *sparśa* ('sexual contact') as an acceptable practice (B 189,3–194,6; Mi 6,14–12,2), or of 'passion etc.' (*rāgādi*) as being morally neutral by nature (B 205,1–207,5; Mi 20,6–22,5).

the state of enjoyment (*paribhoga*) [i.e. when they are enjoyed]."[42] For everybody knows that "a qualified (causal) complex certainly produces qualified fruit."[43] The following example of the bitter Āmalaka fruit which becomes sweet when sprinkled with milk has been also used by Dharmakīrti (PVSV 10,8f.). An additional causal factor added makes for qualified fruit. Thus the (sense-)objects, matter etc., cause a qualified fruit when the yogin can rely on *mantra* and *mudrā* in the consummation of the *mahāmudrā* (B 184,3f.; Mi 2,4–6). This is summarized in a first *prayoga* wherein the *pakṣadharmatā* is stated as "matter etc. are also influenced/consecrated (*abhisaṃskṛta*) by a qualified cause,"[44] when this additional causal factor consists in their being enjoyed in a tantrically proper way. After explaining the *prayoga*, the author concludes: "Everything whose nature has been influenced by an additional qualified cause is a necessarily qualified effect because of the influence from an additional qualified cause, when an impediment does not occur (and) when the causes are not incomplete. For (this effect) occurs with nothing else but this (qualified cause)."[45] Except for adding the additional tantric cause to the causal complex, this is pure Dharmakīrti with both conditions, absence of impediments and completeness of the causal complex expressed.

Then, after having solved the problem that matter etc. (*rūpādi*) may be a cause for attachment and evil states (*apāyahetu*) (B 186,2–188,4; Mi 3,13–5,10), the author concludes that there is no other means than enjoyment of the objects, now summarized under the term 'bliss' (*sukha*) for the attainment of the highest fruit 'Great Bliss' (*mahāsukha*) (B 188,4–6; Mi 5,11–6,4).

1a. The author, now, extends the first thesis into more concrete realms of tantric practice by saying that "As the Lord has called matter etc. and the developments of bliss produced thereby a cause of the highest fruit, so also the developments of bliss produced by touch (*sparśa*)."[46]

Here we are looking at the concept of a continuum which starts with the experience of matter etc., contains developmental stages of 'bliss' in its consequence, and ends in the final fruit, evidently of 'Great Bliss'. This original scheme is unequivocally said to be the same, when the continuum starts with the experience of 'touch' (*sparśa*). From the following apologetic section (B 189,2–194,6; Mi 6,14–12,2) it is clear that 'touch' refers to the bodily encounter with a female partner (*mudrā*). And that this encounter has no negative consequences is ensured by the 'purity of mind' (*akaluṣatvāc cittasya* B 190, 4; Mi 7,13), itself a result of the practitioner's knowledge of the true nature of the factors of existence (*paramārthadharmatattvāvabodhāt* B 190, 3; Mi 7,11)

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[42] *prajñopāyaparigṛhītā rūpādayo viṣayāḥ paribhogabhāvam āpadyamānā viśiṣṭaphalāvāhakā bhavanti.* (B 183,6f.; Mi 1,14. Em.: *āpadyamānāḥ* B, Mi)

[43] *viśiṣṭā hi sāmagrī viśiṣṭam eva phalaṃ janayati.* (B 183,7f.; Mi 1,15f.)

[44] *viśiṣṭakāraṇābhisaṃskṛtā rūpādayo 'pi.* (B 184,6f.; Mi 2,10f. Em.: *rūpādayaḥ* B)

[45] *yad yad viśiṣṭakāraṇāntarābhisaṃskṛtasvabhāvaṃ tad tad asati pratibandhaka akāraṇavaikalye viśiṣṭakāraṇāntarābhisaṃskārād viśiṣṭam eva kāryaṃ bhavati, tanmātrānubandhitvāt.* (B 185,1–2; Mi 2,13–16)

Cf. *tad ayaṃ bhāvo 'napekṣas tadbhāvaṃ prati tadbhāvaniyato 'sambhavatpratibandheva kāraṇasāmagrī sakalā kāryotpādane.* ("Therefore this [produced] thing which is independent with regard to that [vanishing] nature is restricted to that nature, like a complete complex of causes for which no impediment is possible with regard to the production of [its] effect." PVSV 98,20–22)

[46] *yathā bhagavatā rūpādayaḥ tannirjātāś* <*ca*> *sukhapariṇāmanāḥ anuttaraphalahetur uktāḥ, tathā sparśanirjātasukhapariṇāmanā api.* (B 189,2f.; Mi 6,13f.; *ca* added with Tib.)

and his ensuing pure mental disposition (*āśaya* B 190,4; Mi 7,13). In addition, a plethora of Tantra quotations in this section makes clear that the practitioner in focus is "one who acts out the enjoyments of all sexual desires" (*sarvakāmopabhogakṛt* in a quote from Guhyasamāja VII 4 in B 194,6; Mi 11,17).

Due to their selflessness the objects thus enjoyed have no continuous mode of being (*sthiti*). Why should it not be acceptable that mental developments of bliss and well-being (*sukha-saumanasya*) which originated in qualified enjoyment of these illusionary objects should finally lead to a qualified result?[47] There is nothing wrong with such developments of mental qualities if only they are subjected to qualified meditational cultivation (*viśiṣṭabhāvanābhyāsabalāt* B 193,5f.; Mi 10, 17f.).

2. The point is reached now, when the possibility of such developments to a highest possible degree has to be argued for. For only if that is possible, 'bliss' (*sukha*), tantrically speaking, may become 'Great Bliss' (*mahāsukha*). This proof occupies our author in the following, and he presents a second thesis which is formulated along the lines of Dharmakīrti's well-known explanation of the cultivation of compassion (*karuṇābhyāsa*) in PV II 120–131ab.[48]

His thesis is: "That particular developmental state (*abhisaṃskāra*) which is effected by matter etc. (or touch) and characterised as bliss and well-being in the naturally luminous and crystal-like mind reaches the highest degree of intensity in this [mind] by force of a specific cultivation of the (original object) that is embraced by insight and means."[49] *prayoga*-variations follow, and the topic of these mental qualities' becoming the very nature of the mind (*svātmalābhabhāva* B 196,5; Mi 13,5) is introduced, all this in accordance with the model of PV II as adapted to the tantric requirements.

A second major corollary of this part[50] of the argument is devoted to an explanation of what I would call 'the causality of transformation' (*pariṇāma*) including the topic of the 'irreversibility of what has been achieved'.[51] The introduction to this part, again, recalls Dharmakīrti's logical model: "Therefore, all this [scil. in terms of mental qualities] leads to a qualified fruit, when it is transformed through a qualified process of transformation (*pariṇāmanā*)."[52]

The last part of the *Tattvasiddhi*[53] deals with the question of whether the 'knowledge of the Omniscient ones' (*sarvajñajñāna*), now in place of the 'Great Bliss' of the preceding text, which occurs at the highest degree of intensity in those qualities' cultivation is conceptual (*savikalpaka*) or non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*). The author argues for its being conceptual. But this idiosyncratic idea does not concern us here and will be investigated at another occasion.

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[47] Cf. B 193,3–5; Mi 10,14–16.

[48] For a succinct interpretation of Dharmakīrti's ideas cf. Franco [1997: 6f.].

[49] *<yaḥ> prakṛtiprabhāsvarasphaṭikopalasadṛśe manasi rūpādibhir āhit<ābhi>saṃskāraviśeṣaḥ sukha-saumanasyalakṣaṇaḥ, saḥ tatra prajñopāyaparigṛhītasyābhyāsaviśeṣabalāt prakarṣaparyantarūpatām āsādayet.* (B 194,7–195,1; Mi 12,3–5. *yaḥ* and *abhi-* add. with Tib.)

[50] B 197,5–208,4; Mi 13,20–23,4.

[51] E.g., *ye prāptaprakarṣaparyantāḥ, na te vyāvartante.* (B 201,5f.; Mi 17,14)

[52] *tena sarvam etad viśiṣṭapariṇāmanayā pariṇāmyamāne viśiṣṭaphalāvāhakaṃ bhavati.* (B 197,5; Mi 13,20)

[53] B 208,4–215,2; Mi 23,5–29,3.

To conclude: the example of the *Tattvasiddhi* demonstrates once more, that Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* model was actually also used to prove the same old Buddhist issue which I consider to have been the reason for Dharmakīrti to develop the *kāryānumāna* theorem in the first place without, however, ever revealing this reason as far as I can see, namely the development of the good, i.e. salvific mental qualities to perfection, with the corollary of their becoming the very nature of the mind and, thus, irreversible.

Abbreviations and Literature

B Baroda Ms. of *Tattvasiddhi* (Baroda 56): See Baroda. [This is a convolute of several texts, "Bauddhatantrasaṅgraha," with Arabic page numbers.]

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HBṬ *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa): Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, eds. *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra.* Baroda, 1949.

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Mi Pre-print of *Ācārya-Śāntarakṣita-viracitā Tattvasiddhi*, 1–29. [Cf. fn. 31 of this paper.]

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NK *Nyāyakaṇikā* (Vācaspatimiśra): Tailaṅga Rāma Śāstrī, ed. *Vidhivivekaḥ śrīmadācārya-Maṇḍana-miśra-viracitaḥ, Pūjyapādaśrīmad-Vācaspatimiśra-nirmitayā Nyāyakaṇikākhyayā vyākhyayā samalaṅkṛtaḥ.* Kāśī, 1907.

NK_P See Pemwieser [1991]. [The critical text (pp. 109–115) corresponds to NK_S 544,5–554,7 and NK 141,22–146,23.]

NK_S Elliot Stern, ed. *"Vidhivivekaḥ" of Maṇḍanamiśraḥ, with commentary "Nyāya-kaṇikā" of Vācaspati-miśraḥ, and supercommentaries, "Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī" and "Svaditaṅkaraṇī," of Parameśvaraḥ, critical and annotated edition: The pūrvapakṣaḥ.* Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1988. [UMI, Ann Arbor, No. 8908395].

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PV I Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.

PV II, III Chapters 2 (Pramāṇasiddhi), 3 (Pratyakṣa): See PVV.

PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.

PVin *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti).

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PVin II *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.

PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes.* Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇa-vārttikam ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtayā vṛttyā saṃvalitam (Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin).* Appendix to *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna) 14–16 (1938–40).

SBET Ernst Steinkellner, ed. *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition: Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, June 11–16, 1989.* Wien, 1991.

SS *Sarvajñasiddhi* (Ratnakīrti): In *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ*, ed. Anantalal Thakur, 1–31. 2nd ed. Patna, 1975.

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REINSTATEMENT OF THE THEORY OF EXTERNAL DETERMINATION OF PERVASION (*BAHIRVYĀPTIVĀDA*): JÑĀNAŚRĪMITRA'S PROOF OF MOMENTARY EXISTENCE

by

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1. Reversing the assumed chronological order of Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrīmitra in Buddhist intellectual history: The confrontation of two proofs of momentary existence

It is commonly held that Ratnākaraśānti (c. 970–1020) wrote his *Antarvyāptisamarthana* with the intention of criticizing Jñānaśrīmitra's (c. 980–1030) and Ratnakīrti's (c. 1000–1050) *bahirvyāptivāda* (theory of external determination of pervasion), despite the fact that Ratnākaraśānti is the oldest among the three.[1] That the direct target of Ratnākaraśānti's refutation was Ratnakīrti has been approved by Mookerjee [1935], Kajiyama [1959, 1966, 1974], McDermott [1969] and Mimaki [1976, 1984, 1992].

Two objections were raised by Ruegg [1970, 1982] and Bhattacharya [1983, 1986]. Prof. Ruegg criticized Mookerjee's and McDermott's claim that Ratnākaraśānti was the disciple of Ratnakīrti, for, as Ruegg argued, Ratnakīrti's theory was in fact the forerunner of Ratnākaraśānti's *antarvyāptivāda* (theory of internal determination of pervasion). Prof. Bhattacharya observed that Ratnākaraśānti did not necessarily take Ratnakīrti as his opponent, for what later came to be known as *antarvyāptivāda* had already been accepted by Dharmakīrti. Bhattacharya [1986: Addenda] on the other hand accepts Prof. Kajiyama's interpretation.[2]

The most persuasive statement by Prof. Kajiyama on this matter runs as follows:

> "Buddhist logicians in general maintain *bahirvyāptivāda*; at the later stage of Buddhist logic Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti asserted it in contrast to *antarvyāptivāda* held by Ratnākaraśānti. The former two logicians recognized the necessity of a corroborative example even in the inference of the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, though they are not so far from Ratnākaraśānti in as much as they also rely on *viparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa*[3] when determining the *vyāpti* between existence and momentariness . . ." (Kajiyama [1966: 112 fn.302])[4]

Thus, Prof. Kajiyama locates Ratnākaraśānti's *antarvyāptivāda* at the final stage of the de-

[1] In this paper the dates of the three logicians are adopted from Kajiyama [1966: 7–10]. Cf. fn. 29 below and Steinkellner/Much [1995: 92, 96].

[2] Ruegg [1970: 305–306]. Cf. Ruegg [1982], Bhattacharya [1986: 96].

[3] Abbreviation: *svb-pramāṇa*. My translation: the valid determinant cognition as a negation of the property which is the reversal of what is to be proved.

[4] Cf. Kajiyama [1959: 219–220; 1974: 288–292].

velopment of Indian Buddhist logic, mainly for the reason that he considers *antarvyāptivāda* to be logically more developed from the perspective of contemporary formal deductive logic. From the same viewpoint, Prof. Mimaki justly criticizes Ruegg [1970] and Bhattacharya [1983]. His objection seems to be well founded.[5] Furthermore, Mimaki also observes that Ratnakīrti does not criticize *antarvyāptivāda*.[6]

Nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is to challenge the widely accepted opinion regarding the chronological order of those three Buddhist logicians by reconsidering this issue from a new perspective, based on evidence that Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes Ratnākaraśānti in the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*, not vice versa. This is not simply a naive counter-position. Needless to say, it is inspired by the thorough studies of Profs. Kajiyama and Mimaki.[7] In his later works, Dharmakīrti determines the essential relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) by means of *svb-pramāṇa* which, according to Steinkellner, implies that Dharmakīrti had adopted *antarvyāptivāda*.[8] Is there a regression, brought about by Jñānaśrīmitra, at the final stage of Buddhist logic? The answer to this question is no, because Jñānaśrīmitra in fact criticizes *antarvyāptivāda* from the standpoint of a newly developed *bahirvyāptivāda*.

1.1. Ratnākaraśānti's proof of the momentary destruction of existence based on *antarvyāptivāda*

According to Kajiyama [1959, 1988], Ratnākaraśānti's proof of momentary existence is based on the *vyatireka-vyāpti* (negative concomitance), i.e., "Whatever is not momentary is not existent," which is proved independently by *svb-pramāṇa* as follows: "Whatever is not momentary does not possess causal efficiency either in succession or in simultaneity." Thus, a non-momentary object, which does not possess causal efficiency, is not existent. Ratnākaraśānti's proof runs as follows:

> "Here, existence (*sattva*) means causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*), since definitions of existence other than this are incorrect. And the [existence] is pervaded by succession and simultaneity [of the causal operation], for since the two properties are characterized by mutual exclusion, no [causal] operation is possible in a third way.
>
> Neither succession nor simultaneity can occur if things are non-momentary, because two contradictory properties, such as agency (*kartṛtva*) and non-agency (*akartṛtva*), cannot occur with reference to a thing with the same essential property which remains undisturbed before and afterwards.
>
> Out of these [two properties], first, succession is impossible [for a non-momentary thing], for otherwise it would follow that [one and the same 'continuous' thing is] an agent before and a non-agent afterwards with regard to each of the successive things.
>
> Thus, since no succession is possible [for a non-momentary thing], there remains only the [possibility that it produces] all results simultaneously. But in that case, it would follow [even] more clearly

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[5] Mimaki [1984: 219–221].

[6] First, Prof. Mookerjee's statement that Ratnākaraśānti was Ratnakīrti's disciple is not without limitations. Second, it is possible that an elder contemporary criticize a younger one. Third, dPag bsam ljon bzang's description confirms that Ratnākaraśānti was Ratnakīrti's disciple. Fourth, there is no criticism of *antarvyāpti* in JNA and RNA. Cf. Mimaki [1976; 1992].

[7] Cf. Tani [1996a; b].

[8] Steinkellner [1991: 323].

that [one and the same 'continuous' thing is] an agent before and a non-agent afterwards. And two contradictory properties, such as agency and non-agency, cannot exist in one and the same locus. It is established: that which possesses one and the same essential property for some time is not momentary. There occurs neither succession nor simultaneity. In this way, in the non-momentary thing, the [existence] is negated by the non-cognition of its pervader [i.e., the succession and simultaneity] (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*), and it remains in the momentary thing. Thus, [existence] is pervaded by momentariness. This [existence] which is pervaded by that [momentariness] proves momentariness with reference to the locus where it [i.e., existence] is established."[9]

The above proof is fundamentally based on Dharmakīrti's proof of momentary existence in the *Vādanyāya*, his final work. Although Dharmakīrti eliminated the exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the formulation of *svb-pramāṇa*, he formulated the *anvaya-vyāpti* with an exemplification.[10] This ambivalence caused the controversy between *antarvyāptivāda* and *bahirvyāptivāda*. Though the locus (*pakṣa-dharmin*) of the *svb-pramāṇa*, i.e., a non-momentary object, cannot be real, Ratnākaraśānti observes that the *vyatireka-vyāpti* can be independently proved.[11] He added that the pervasion should be internally determined in the locus to be proved (*sādhya-dharmin*), not externally in the locus of the exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta-dharmin*).[12] The *anvaya-vyāpti* (positive concomitance) can be established in the locus to be proved. Therefore, the logical indicator, i.e., existence, becomes useless. Thus Ratnākaraśānti regards the excessively narrow logical reason (*asādhāraṇahetu*), which occurs only in the locus to be proved, as a proper logical indicator.[13]

1.2. Jñānaśrīmitra's main proof of momentary destruction by means of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*

Jñānaśrīmitra proves the *anvaya-vyāpti* of the momentary destruction of existence, i.e., "Whatever is existent is momentary, as, e.g., a rain cloud,"[14] by triple pairs of *prasaṅga* (*reductio*

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[9] AVS 103,3–18: *iha sattvam arthakriyākāritvaṃ taditarasattvalakṣaṇāyogāt / tac ca kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ vyāptaṃ parasparavyavacchedalakṣaṇatvād anayoḥ / prakārāntareṇa karaṇāsambhavāt / kramayaugapadye cākṣaṇikatve na staḥ / pūrvāparakālayor avicalitaikasvabhāvasya kartṛtvākartṛtve viruddhadharmadvayāyogāt / tatra na tāvat kramaḥ kramāṇām ekaikaṃ prati pūrvāparakālayoḥ kartṛtvākartṛtvāpatteḥ / evaṃ sarvakramābhāvāt kevalaṃ sakalakāryayaugapadyam avaśiṣyate / tatra ca sphuṭataraḥ pūrvāparakālayoḥ kartṛtvākartṛtvaprasaṅgaḥ / viruddhe ca kartṛtvākartṛtve ekadharmiṇi na sambhavataḥ / ekasvabhāvaś ca tāvatkālam akṣaṇika iti siddha etasmin kramayaugapadyayor ayogaḥ / tad evam akṣaṇike vyāpakānupalabdhyā niṣiddhaṃ kṣaṇika evā[va]tiṣṭhate iti kṣaṇikatvena vyāptaṃ / tat tena vyāptaṃ yat yatra dharmiṇi siddhyati tatra kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhayati /* For a Japanese translation see Kajiyama [1988: 8–9].

[10] VN 1, 13–14. Steinkellner [1991: 319–320]. Cf. Steinkellner [1968/69: 375].

[11] AVS 109,16–1: *bādhakāt sādhyasiddhiś ced vyartho hetvantaragrahaḥ / bādhakāt tad asiddhiś ced vyartho dharmyantaragrahaḥ //* Kajiyama [1988: 17]. Cf. Tani [1998a: 20–21].

[12] See fn. 11 above. Cf. Kajiyama [1988: 18–20], Tani [1997b: 47–50].

[13] Kajiyama [1988: 21–23]. Cf. Tani [1997b: 47–50].

[14] JNA 1,8–9: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṃ yathā jaladharaḥ santas tu bhāvā ime / sattā śaktir iha arthakarmaṇi miteḥ siddheṣu siddhā ca sā //* The text of JNA [*na*] should be corrected in accordance with SVR 747,9–12: *siddheṣu siddhā ca sā* (manuscript R). See Tani [1998a: 4–9]. ("Whatever exists is momentary, e.g., a rain cloud. These things exist. [Therefore, these things are all momentary.] Here, existence (*sattā*) [i.e., the logical indicator] is proved to be the power for an efficient causal operation which is proved by valid cognitions.")

ad absurdum) and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* (reversed formula from *prasaṅga*).[15] The former is a hypothetical negative reasoning which proves a contradiction within the opponent's statement. The latter is a direct reasoning which proves the momentary destruction of existent objects through the reversion of the *prasaṅga*.

[1A] *Prasaṅga* (*svabhāvahetu*) JNA 17,10–13:
yad yadā yajjananasamartham tat tadā taj janayaty eva / yathā 'ntyā kāraṇasāmagrī svakāryam, sa eva vā jaladharas tadavasthāyāṃ vāri dhārayan kṛṣībalavilocanotsavādikāryaṃ, vārivitaraṇakāle vā tatkriyām, śaktaś cāyam ubhayadaśāyām ubhayakāryam arjitum /
"Whatever is capable of producing a certain effect at a certain time surely produces that effect at that time, as, e.g., the causal complex in the final moment [of its continuum produces] its own effect.
[According to the opponent] one and the same rain cloud [, which is not momentary], [is capable of producing] its own effect, e.g., a farm laborer's eyes sparkling with delight, either while holding water in such a situation [i.e., before it rains] or [it is capable of performing] such an operation at the time of having sent forth the water [i.e., after it rains]. And it is capable of producing both effects in both situations.
[Therefore, it produces both effects at any time, which is absurd.]"

[1B] *Prasaṅgaviparyaya* (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) JNA 17,23–18,1:
yad yan na karoti na tat tatra śaktam, yathā śālyaṅkuram akurvan kodravaḥ / na karoti ca prathamakṣaṇasādhyāṃ kriyāṃ dvitīyādikṣaṇe, dvitīyādikṣaṇasādhyāṃ vā prathamakṣaṇe . . . /
"Whatever does not perform a certain operation is not capable of performing that operation; e.g., a grain seed, while not producing a rice sprout, [is not capable of producing a rice sprout].
And the [rain cloud] neither performs at the second moment onwards an operation to be accomplished at the first moment, nor does at the first moment those to be accomplished at the second moment onwards.
[Therefore, it produces at a certain moment only the effects belonging to that moment. Thus, it is momentary.]"

Since two different essential properties (*svabhāva-bheda*) cannot occur in one and the same thing, one essential property should be restricted to one moment and it cannot be extended to the next moment. The major premise of the above *prasaṅga* is proved by the simultaneity of semantic competency (*yogyatā*) between an action of producing an effect and speaking (*vyavahāra*) about the power of that action. The denotation of 'the power of action' is restricted to the real action, which is in turn restricted to a certain time, place and an essential property.[16]

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[15] JNA 1,10–11: *na apy ekaiva vidhānyadāpi parakṛn naiva kriyā vā bhaved / dvedhāpi kṣaṇabhaṅgasaṃgatir ataḥ sādhye ca viśrāmyati.* This text can be read in two different contexts: (a) determination of *anvaya* and (b) determination of *vyatireka*. (a) "At a different time [= at the second moment], the same kind of operation (i.e., the performance of causal efficiency) cannot occur. And neither the other operation nor a non-operation can occur. [There is of course no third possibility.] Both kinds of operation are reduced to momentary destruction. Therefore, the logical indicator, i.e., the existence (*sattā*), settles down in the property to be proved." This is further proved by the triple pairs of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. For (b), see fn. 24 below.

[16] JNA 17,13–17. Cf. Tani [1996b: 21–22]. Concerning *yogyatā*, see Matilal [1968: 19–20; 1985: 82ff.].

[2A] *Prasaṅga* JNA 17,18–19:

yad yadā yatkaraṇasamartham tat tadā tat karoty eva / yathā 'ntyā kāraṇasāmagrī / śaktaś cāyam sakalakriyātikramakāle 'pi . . . /

"Whatever is capable of performing a certain operation at a certain time, surely performs that operation at that time, as, e.g., the causal complex of the final moment [of its continuum produces its own effect].

[According to the opponent], this is capable [of performing an operation] even at the time when all the operations are over.

[Therefore, it performs an operation even at the time of non-operation, which is absurd.]"

[2B] *Prasaṅgaviparyaya* JNA18,3–4:

yad yan na karoti na tat tatra samartham yathā śālyaṅkuram akurvan kodravaḥ / na karoti cākaraṇakāle karaṇakālakāryām kriyām . . . /

"Whatever does not perform a certain operation is not capable of performing that operation; e.g., a grain seed, while not producing a ricesprout, [is not capable of producing a ricesprout].

And at the time of non-operation this does not perform an operation to be effected at the time of operation.

[Therefore, it is not capable of performing an operation at the time of non-operation; hence it is unreal.]"

[3A] *Prasaṅga* (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*) JNA17,20–22:

yad yatrāśaktam na tat tat karoti, yathā śālyaṅkuram kodravaḥ / aśaktaś cāyam udavāhano 'karaṇakṣaṇavat kṣaṇāntare 'pi . . . /

"Whatever is not capable of performing a certain operation does not perform that operation; as, e.g., a grain seed [which is incapable of producing a ricesprout does not produce] a ricesprout.

[According to the opponent,] this cloud is not capable [of performing an operation] at other moments, too, just as [it is not capable] at the moment of non-operation.

[Therefore, it does not perform an operation at any time, which is absurd.]"

[3B] *Prasaṅgaviparyaya* (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*) JNA18,5–6:

yad yat karoti na tat tatrāśaktam, antyasāmagrīvat / karoti cāyam toyadharas toyadhāraṇam . . . /

"Whatever performs a certain operation is not incapable of performing that operation.

And this cloud [performs] the action of possessing water.

[Therefore, it is capable of possessing water; hence it is real.]"

This conclusion can be generalized into a universally quantified pervasion (*sarvopasaṃhāravatī vyāptiḥ*) by the simultaneity of the semantic competency, because this semantic competency is not limited to the rain cloud.[17] Therefore the momentary destruction of existent entities can be universally proved.

Ratnakīrti reduces the above two pairs of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, viz. [1A, 1B] and [2A, 2B], into only one pair based on the identity of the underlying assumptions or major premises. On the basis of Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation, he inserts the term "*yogyatā*" into his

[17] JNA 18,10–13. While Ratnākaraśānti proves the universal quantification of momentary existence by the *svb-pramāṇa*, Jñānaśrīmitra proves it by semantic competency. Cf. Tani [1996a: 6–13].

formula.[18] He eliminates the third pair completely [3A, 3B].

Ratnākaraśānti, however, referred neither to Jñānaśrīmitra's complex proofs by *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* nor to Ratnakīrti's shortened versions. If Ratnākaraśānti had meant to criticize Jñānaśrīmitra's or Ratnakīrti's proofs, he would most probably have referred to their main proofs.

1.3. Jñānaśrīmitra's counter-argument: Criticism of the independency of *Svb-pramāṇa*

Jñānaśrīmitra refers to opponent(s) "who is(/are) absorbed only in negative concomitance."[19] The opponent(s), called *sādhyaviparyaye/a-bādhakapramāṇavādin/-vādinaḥ* (upholder(s) of *svb-pramāṇa*),[20] maintain/s that the pervasion (*vyāpti*) must be deduced from the *vyatireka* which can be determined only independently by *svb-pramāṇa*, and not by means of an exemplification.[21]

It seems reasonable to identify the opponent(s) with Ratnākaraśānti [/and his followers (see the sections 2–3 and 2–4 below)]. Although no direct citation of Ratnākaraśānti's text can be found, there is a parallel text concerning the independency of the *svb-pramāṇa*.[22] The important point to notice is that the core of Ratnākaraśānti's proof of momentariness is, as we have seen, based on the *vyatireka* which is proved independently by the *svb-pramāṇa*.[23]

Jñānaśrīmitra is not ignorant of the *svb-pramāṇa*—much to the contrary, he is well aware of it. He formulates the proof by *vyatireka* with an unreal exemplification, i.e., "turtle's hair," against Ratnākaraśānti as follows:

> "Whatever is not fit for perfroming an efficient operation either in succession or in simultaneity is not capable of performing an efficient operation, as e.g., a turtle's hair.
> That which is regarded as eternal [by the opponents] is not fit for performing an operation either in succession or in simultaneity.
> [Therefore, it is not capable of performing an efficient operation; hence, it is unreal].

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[18] See fns. 15 and 16 above. Ratnakīrti's formula has been translated into Japanese by Kajiyama [1961: 257–259] and Mimaki [1984: 241–243].

Ratnakīrti's *prasaṅga* = RNA 68,17–20: *yad yadā yaj jananavyavahārayogyaṃ tat tadā taj janayaty eva / yathā antyā kāraṇasāmagrī svakāryam /atītānāgatakṣaṇabhāvikāryajananavyavahārayogyaś cāyaṃ ghaṭo vartamāna-kṣaṇabhāvikāryakaraṇakāle sakalakriyātikramakāle 'pīti.*

Ratnakīrti's *prasaṅgaviparyaya* = RNA 69,11–13: *yad yadā yan na karoti na tat tadā tatra samarthavyavahāra-yogyam / yathā śālyaṅkuram akurvan kodravaḥ śālyaṅkure / na karoti caiṣa ghaṭo vartamānakṣaṇabhāvikāryakaraṇa-kāle sakalakriyātikramakāle cātītānāgatakṣaṇabhāvi kāryam iti.* Mokṣākaragupta cites only the first formula. He eliminates the expression "*vyavahārayogya.*" Kajiyama [1966: 15–116].

[19] JNA 63,16: *atrāpi tīrthikavacanavikrāntikṛtaṃ kautukam asti vyatirekarūpāyām eva vyāptau / . . .* Cf. SVR 278,22–749,12.

[20] JNA 60,16–20: *yathā viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādinām . . .*; JNA 62,19–20: *yady evaṃ viparyayabādhaka-pramāṇavādino 'pi samānaḥ paryanuyogaḥ . . .*

[21] JNA 60,3–4: *nanu viparyayabādhakapramāṇavaśād vyāptisiddhiḥ, tasya* [cf. SVR 748,13ff.] *ca nopanyāsa-vārtā / tat kathaṃ vyāptiḥ prasādhitety ucyate /*

[22] The underlined text in the above fn. 21 fits well with Ratnākaraśānti's parallel text. AVS 109,2–3: *viparyaye vyāptibalād eva vyāptisiddher . . .* Ibid., 108,17: *hetor vipakṣe bādhakavṛttimātrād eva vyāptisiddheḥ /.* Cf. Kajiyama [1988: 16]; Tani [1997b: 46].

[23] See above fn. 11.

This is a proof based on a non-cognition of a pervader."[24]

Jñānaśrīmitra, however, considers this *vyatireka*-formula as merely supplementary, even though it is equivalent with the *anvaya* within the logical space.[25] Furthermore, he does not regard the *viparyaya-bādhaka* as an independent *pramāṇa* [JNA 61,5–7] on the grounds that it lacks a real exemplification, i.e., a directly perceivable instantiation of an indicator and a locus [see section 3–1 below]. He refers to two kinds of *viparyayabādhaka*s which indirectly confirm both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. This interpretation is different from Ratnākaraśānti's.[26] Jñānaśrīmitra uses the term *sādhyaviparyaya-bādhaka* (*svb*), not *sādhyaviparyayabādhaka-pramāṇa* (*svb-pramāṇa*) throughout his text.

It is hard to find criticism that is directed against the *svb-pramāṇa* of the *antarvyāpti* doctrine in Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. Ratnakīrti eliminates the passages of Jñānaśrīmitra which criticize the *antarvyāptivāda*. In Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*, the proof on the basis of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is also mentioned parallel to the proof on the basis of the *svb-pramāṇa*, without any reference to the controversy.[27] Furthermore, Prof. Kajiyama first indicated that Ratnākaraśānti is criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra in the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, which was written before the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*.[28] Thus, it is possible to assume that Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes Ratnākaraśānti's proof, not vice versa.

1.4. Muktākalaśa as a Bahirvyāptivādin who is the target of Ratnākaraśānti's refutation

Who is the target of Ratnākaraśānti's refutation? It can be assumed that the opponent is neither Jñānaśrīmitra nor Ratnākīrti, but Muktākalaśa.[29] Muktākalaśa regards Dharmottara as a

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[24] JNA 65,9–11: *yad yat kramayaugapadyavatyām arthakriyāyāṃ nopayujyate tan nārthakriyāśaktam, yathā haripadāravindam / nopayujyate ca nityābhimato bhāvaḥ kramākramadharmiṇi karmaṇīti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ /.* Cf. RNA 83,13–14: *yasya kramākramau na vidyete na tasyārthakriyāsāmarthyam / yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya / na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramākramau.* For Mokṣākaragupta, see Kajiyama [1966: 115].

[25] While *anvaya* is *kartṛ-dharma*, *vyatireka* is *karma-dharma*. Cf. JNA 60,9–14. Cf. Cardona [1974: 240]: "One must conclude that the class of agents (*kartṛ*) includes anything which can be spoken of as functioning independently with respect to an action.

JNA 61,18–19: *asmābhis tu prakṛtasādhane niyamavān anvayaḥ prasaṅgaviparyayābhyāṃ paurastyābhyāṃ darśita eva.* Ibid., 61,3–4: *pramāṇavyāpāras tu mukhyato 'rthataś ceti dvidhā vyavahāraḥ /.* Ibid., 61,11: *sākṣād vyatirekānupadarśanāt /.*

[26] JNA 61,5–7: *viparyayabādhakaśabdena punar ubhayasaṃgraha eva / vyatirekarūpavyāptau hi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakaṃ sādhanasya, anvayarūpāyāṃ tu sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakaṃ sādhane satīti /* Cf. SVR 748,13–15, 19–23.

[27] Kajiyama [1966: 114–118].

[28] According to Kajiyama [1965: 419–420], PPU 167b8–168a3 is cited in JNA (*Sākārasiddhiśāstra*) 368,6–10, and PPU 168a4ff. are parallel to JNA 387,8–23 (cf. RNA 129,1–12). And according to Matsumoto [1980: part 2, 176 n. (1)], PPU 171b4–6 is cited in JNA 376,6–8. The notion of self-cognition is investigated in the fifth chapter of the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*. JNA 4,8–12: *evaṃ jñāne 'pi svarūpasaṃvedanaṃ sattvāvyabhicārīti sarvaṃ pūrvavat.*

[29] See Tani [1997a; b; c]. According to Frauwallner [1935], Dharmottara's proof of momentariness is based on *svb-pramāṇa*. Thus, he seems to be an Antarvyāptivādin. Moreover, his teacher, Arcaṭa, rejects the *bahirvyāptivāda*. Nevertheless, Dharmottara maintains that the *svb-pramāṇa* operates not only on the locus to be proved (*sādhya-dharmin*) but also on the locus of exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta-dharmin*).

With regard to Muktākalaśa the following is known: Bram ze Mu tig bum pa; Muktikalaśa (Frauwallner [1935: 219]); Date: after Dharmottara. Steinkellner/Much [1995: 5]; Muktākumba Vidyabhusana [1920: 331]. The Tibetan

Bahirvyāptivādin and criticizes the *antarvyāptivāda* in his commentary (i.e., *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhivivaraṇa*) on Dharmottara's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi.* Considering his sharp criticism, Ratnākaraśānti's opponent must be an upholder who intentionally enforced the *bahirvyāptivāda* against the *antarvyāptivāda*. Jñānaśrīmitra does not refer to the terms *bahirvyāpti* and *antarvyāpti.* Kamalaśīla and others disregarded the *bahir-/antarvyāpti* problem altogether.[30] Among the Buddhist logicians before Ratnākaraśānti, I have so far found nobody but Muktākalaśa who used the terms *bahirvyāptivāda* and *antarvyāptivāda* and who criticized the latter theory.

On the other hand, many commentators on PV before Ratnākaraśānti seem to negate the excessively narrow indicator as a proper indicator. One of them has been identified as Śaṅkaranandana (Śaṅkarānanda) [Steinkellner/Much [1995] c. 900 or 1000]. But the terms *bahir-/antarvyāptivāda* have not been found in these commentaries.[31] Although our information on the problem is rather limited at the present stage, we can say with fair certainty that Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvāptisamarthana* was written against Muktākalaśa.

2. The background of the two different proofs

2.1. Dignāga's ambivalence

As mentioned above, Ratnākaraśānti's proof is based on the priority of *vyatireka* supported by *svb-pramāṇa*, while Jñānaśrīmitra's proof is based on the priority of *anvaya* supported by *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya.* Although the positive and the negative concomitance are logically equivalent on the grounds of contraposition, their relation is asymmetric from an epistemological standpoint. The locus of *anvaya* can be real, but it is possible that the locus of *vyatireka* be unreal, as, e.g., in the proof of momentary existence. Dignāga identified the absence in the dissimilar locus with the non-existence of the dissimilar locus itself. Although his theory remains ambiguous, Dignāga said that the *vyatireka* did not need to be exemplified by a real object due to the equivalence of the two types of concomitance.[32]

2.2. The transformation of Dharmakīrti's theory from the early period until the final period

Early in his career, Dharmakīrti maintained the priority of *anvaya.* In order to avoid the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* (no instantiation of a locus of proof) in his criticism of the opponent's concept of *prasaṅga*, he stated that the proper locus of the proponent cannot be negated, even if

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translators Vinayaka and Grags 'byor śes rab (ca. 1100) serve as the upper limit for his dates (Naudou S.173,188f.) (Steinkellner/Much [1995]).

Muktākalaśa regards Dharmottara's theory as *bahirvyāptivāda* and confronts *antarvyāptivāda.* KBhSV P282b7–283a1, D264a1–3: *'di'i bar gyi gzhung gis yod pa zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs nye bar blangs pa'i don med pa'i klan ka nang gi bya bar lta ba de ni legs pa ma yin te / gzhan gyis bkod pa'i gtan tshigs mi mthun pa'i phyogs la gtan tshigs 'jug pa'i dogs pa las bzlog pa'i phyir ro // de la bzlog pa'i don du gzhan la 'jug pa'i phyir 'brel pa sgrub par byed* [P. *sgrub*] *pa'i tshad ma la nan gyis phyi'i khyab pa blangs pa yin no zhes nges par brjod pa yin no //* See Tani [1997a: 31–32].

Cf. Wayman [1985: 32]. Prof. Wayman considers the target of Dharmottara to be the Jaina theory of *antarvyāpti.*

[30] Cf. Bhattacharya [1986: 94].

[31] Wakahara [1987: 153–154] indicates that Śaṅkaranandana regarded the excessively narrow indicator as a pseudo-indicator in his commentary on PV [D85a5–86a6; P106b6–108a3]. Cf. Steinkellner/Much [1995: 80–84].

[32] *Pramāṇasamuccaya* P148b1–3, D60a6–7; Kitagawa [1965: 47, 242]. Cf. Katsura [1981: 71–73].

a merely hypothetical locus is negated.[33] The proponent's own locus should be real, which is based on Dignāga's definition of proof: "In the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) the indication of an object should be recognized by the proponent."[34]

In this context, *vyatireka* is indirectly defined by means of a *svabhāvahetu* (an essential property as a logical indicator) with a real locus. Thus, the negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) is fundamentally restricted to a *svabhāvānupalabdhi* (negative cognition of the essential property), i.e., *dṛśyānupalabdhi* (negative cognition of an observable object). From an epistemological standpoint, the negative cognition is based on *paryudāsa* (relative negation with a real locus). Furthermore, the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* (the negative cognition of the pervader) is also restricted to *dṛśyānupalabdhi*.

But Dharmakīrti in PV IV regards the *prasaṅga* as a valid proof because of the logical equivalence of the two types of concomitance. However, the opponent's locus cannot be recognized as the proponent's own locus.[35] There are two solutions. One is to recognize the proponent's own locus as the basic locus. The other is to recognize the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* without a locus as *svb-pramāṇa*, although this *vyāpakānupalabdhi* may transgress the border of the realm of empirically observable entities through the logical equivalence of the two types of concomitance.

In his final period, Dharmakīrti emphasizes the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* as a *svb-pramāṇa* which is an independent valid cognition. It can independently prove the priority of the *vyatireka* without an instantiation of the locus, e.g., non-momentary existence.[36] Thus, as mentioned above, Dharmakīrti eliminates the exemplification from the *svb-pramāṇa* in the *Vādanyāya*, although he adds the exemplification to the *anvaya*.[37] This ambivalence caused the conflict between *antar-* and *bahir-vyāptivāda*. Furthermore, there seems to occur a serious logical circularity between the *svabhāva-hetu* and the *anupalabdhi-hetu*. Here the *svabhāva-hetu* is defined by the negative cognition as a *vyāpakānupalabdhi*. But the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* is defined as a derivation of *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, i.e., *dṛśyānupalabdhi*, which in turn is defined as a negative derivation of the *svabhāvahetu* on the basis of identity (*tādātmya*) in his early period.[38]

2.3. Svabhāvānupalabdhivādin versus Vyāpakānupalabdhivādin: Prajñākaragupta as Sākāravijñānavādin and Dharmottara as Nirākāravijñānavādin

With regard to the interpretation of the concept of *prasaṅga*, there occurs a sharp conflict between Prajñākaragupta and Dharmottara. The former regards the proponent's own proper locus as the locus of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* with instantiation. But the latter states that in spite of the absence of a proper locus *vyatireka* can be proved by *prasajyapratiṣedha* (absolute negation) without locus. Thus, Dharmottara's interpretation of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* can evolve to the *svb-pramāṇa*.[39]

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[33] PV IV 136–148.
[34] PVin III 1ab = PS III 1ab.
[35] Tani [1991: 347].
[36] Steinkellner [1982; 1991: 319–320].
[37] See fn. 10 above.
[38] Tani [1991: 325–338]. Cf. Tani [1999a; b–d].
[39] Tani [1991: 347–366]. Cf. Iwata [1993].

With regard to negative cognition, a parallel controversy can be found. According to Yamāri, Prajñākaragupta is a Svabhāvānupalabdhivādin and Dharmottara is a Vyāpakānupalabdhivādin.[40] As mentioned above, Dharmottara regards *prasajyapratiṣedha* as a simple negation (*viraha-mātram*). Therefore, he can regard the *svb-pramāṇa* as an independent valid cognition. The superiority of the negative concomitance is needed for the universal quantification, because no exemplification can serve to bridge the inductive gap.

Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara's interpretation of the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* without a real locus. The negative cognition of a pervader without any instantiation is not regarded as an independent cognition. According to the Svabhāvānupalabdhivādin, the negative cognition of a pervader or the cognition of an incompatible object (*viruddha-upalabdhi*) should be proved by *paryudāsa* with a real locus, because only the perception of the real *pratiyogin* [-x] can imply the negation of the very object [x].

2.4. Kamalaśīla as another Vyāpakānupalabdhivādin

Kamalaśīla's proof of "neither one nor many" [i.e., the proof of *niḥsvabhāvatā*] has the same logical structure as Ratnākaraśānti's proof of momentariness based on the *svb-pramāṇa*. Kamalaśīla states that the *vyāpakānupalabdhi* can work without a real locus. From the standpoint of a Svātantrika-madhyamaka, he admits *anvaya* on the conventional (*vyavahāra/saṃvṛti*) level and *vyatireka* on the ultimate (*paramārtha*) level in his final work, the *Madhyamakāloka*.[41] Kamalaśīla ultimately intends to prove that there is no object on the conventional level. Jñānaśrīmitra's term "*svb-pramāṇavādinaḥ*" may include both Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara from the viewpoint of the superiority of *vyatireka*.

3. Jñānaśrīmitra's restricted logic with instantiation: a new concept of external determination of pervasion

3.1. External determination as a cognition of an empty locus

While Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation of the priority of *anvaya* is based on Prajñākaragupta's, Ratnākaraśānti's interpretation of the priority of *vyatireka* is an extension of Dharmottara's and Kamalaśīla's. Ratnākaraśānti as a Nirākāravijñānavādin ultimately intends to prove that there is no objective form (*ākāra*) in a cognition but only an illumination of the cognitive operation (*prakāśamātra*). He does not prove the existence of a momentary object but the momentariness of

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[40] See Tani [1996c]. The main argument presented therein can be outlined as follows: The controversy concerns the interpretation of PV IV 270, 273, 274ab [= PVin III 45–47ab] and PVin III [D206a5–6, P303b8–404a1]. Dharmakīrti interprets the negative cognition as the cognition of an object other than the object to be negated. (*tadviśiṣṭopalambhaḥ; rang las khyad par can gyi shes pa yod pa las te*). Prajñākaragupta conforms to this interpretation. But Dharmottara interprets the negative cognition as the determination of the non-existence of a cognition (*shes pa med par nges pa*). PVinṬ(Dh) D87b3–6, P103b6–104a2; D88a1, P104a5–6: *dmigs pa med pa nyid*. This is verified by Prajñākaragupta's citation [PVA 638,3–4; D272b1–2, P331a3–4] and Yamāri's commentary [PVAṬ(Ya) D233b6–7, P300a2–3: *'dis ni **slob dpon chos mchogs** la sogs pa yang gsal ba yin no //*]. Prajñākaragupta's criticism can be found in PVA 638,5–12; D272b2–5, P331a4–b1. He interprets the negative cognition not as *prasajyapratiṣedha* but as *paryudāsa* [PVA 638,12–15; D272b5–6, P331b1–2]. Cf. Tani [1991: 356–359]. Prof. Shaw's interpretation of *prasajyapratiṣedha* can be regarded as a 'locus-negation'. Shaw [1978: 63]; Tani [1991: 345–351].

[41] MĀ D172a4–b1, P188a1–6. Translated in Tillemans [1984: 375]. MĀ D219a7–b1, P243a3–4. Translated in Kobayashi [1989: 87]. MĀ D202b5–6, P223b2–3; 174b4–175a3, P190b8–191a8; Translated in Moriyama [1997: 376].

the cognitive operation. Ultimately he cannot approve that a logical indicator as an objective form is exemplified in the positive concomitance, because the objective form (*ākāra*) of an external object, which instantiates the locus, does not exist on the ultimate level. Thus, Ratnākaraśānti proves, as a Vijñānavādin, the momentariness of cognitive existence itself on the ultimate level. But Kamalaśīla as a Madhyamaka separates the momentary existence on the conventional level from *niḥsvabhāvatā* or *śūnyatā* on the ultimate level.

Jñānaśrīmitra as a Sākāravijñānavādin cannot separate the objective form from the cognitive operation itself. In his *Anupalabdhirahasya* he criticizes the *svb-pramāṇa* which is based on the *vyāpakānupalabdhivāda*, because the logical indicator is not instantiated in a real locus.[42] Although the priority of *anvaya* is accepted from an epistemological standpoint, the equivalence of the two types of concomitances should be proved from a logical point of view. Thus, Jñānaśrīmitra tries to prove the *vyatireka* by a *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, not by a *vyāpakānupalabdhi*, as follows:

> "For the very cognition of a locus (*dharmin*) is established as a negative cognition (*anupalabdhi*) elsewhere too. For instance, 'there is no Aśoka tree in this place because of the absence of a tree'. Here, the negative cognition of a tree is nothing but the cognition of the locus, i.e., a bare ground (*kevalapradeśa*, i.e., an empty space), with regard to a tree. With regard to an Aśoka tree, however, the cognition of the absence of an Aśoka tree is nothing but the bare cognition (*kevalapratīti*, i.e., an empty cogniton). In this way, the operation of the *vyāpakānupalambha* ends up as a *svabhāvahetu*. Similarly, the negative cognition of succession, etc., is nothing but the bare manifestation (*kevalasphuraṇa*), with regard to succession etc., of an eternal locus which is manifest in a conceptual cognition. With regard to an efficient operation (*arthakriyā*), however, the cognition of the lack of the efficient operation is nothing but the bare cognition (*kevalapratīti*).
> This is the difference [between the two cases]."[43]

As a Sākāravijñānavādin, Jñānaśrīmitra needs the external determination, i.e., instantiation, by the perception of an empty cognition itself. Though the proof is carried out by the proper indicator, i.e., *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, why does he not regard this proof of the negative concomitance as an independent proof? The reason is not hard to see: It is because Jñānaśrīmitra's theory

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[42] See Tani [1996c]. In his *Anupalabdhirahasya*, Jñānaśrīmitra shares Prajñākaragupta's view. [JNA 183,7: *paryudāsavṛttyā anyopalabdhir evānupalabdhiḥ* /] He interprets the negative cognition as the cognition of the *pratiyogin* that contradicts the object which is to be perceived. It is not an absolute exclusion/negation. [JNA 183,19–20: *anupalabdher iti pratiyogina upalabdher ity arthaḥ*; JNA 183,15–16: *etena na virahamātram, paryudāsavṛttyā tv anyaviśeṣabuddhir.*] The opponent can be identified with Dharmottara and others [JNA 185,19–24].

For the reason given above, Jñānaśrīmitra's proof of momentary existence which consists of *prasaṅga* and its reversed formula is supported by the perception of the counterpositive and the cognitive form (*ākāra*). On the contrary, Ratnākaraśānti conforms to Dharmottara and regards the negative cognition of the pervader as *Svb-pramāṇa* without a real cognitive form (*nirākāra*). Such an interpretation is criticized in JNA 43,11ff. Cf. Tani [1996c]. Concerning the theory of negative cognition in PVin III, see, Tani [1993; 1994ab].

[43] JNA 102,20–25: *dharmyupalabdher evānyatrāpy anupalabdhitayā vyavasthāpanāt / yathā hi neha śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvād ity atra vṛkṣāpekṣayā kevalapadeśasya dharmiṇa upalabdhiḥ vṛkṣānupalabdhiḥ, śiṃśapāpekṣayā ca kevalapratītir eva śiṃśapābhāvapratītir iti svabhāvahetuparyavasāyivyāpāro vyāpakānupalambhaḥ / tathā nityasya dharmiṇo vikalpabuddhau parisphurataḥ kramādyapekṣayā kevalasphuraṇam eva kramādyanupalambhaḥ, arthakriyāpekṣayā ca kevalapratītir evārthakriyāviyogapratītir iti viśeṣaḥ* / Cf. RNA 91,27–92,4. Kajiyama [1961: 268]. With regard to Jñānaśrīmitra's *Anupalabdhirahasya*, see Tani [1996c]. According to the theory of *sākāravijñānavāda*, the cognitive form cannot be negated.

of the bare manifestation or bare cognition (*kevala-sphuraṇa/pratīti*) is close to his opponent Ratnākaraśānti's theory of the illumination/manifestation only (*prakāśamātra*) without a cognitive form (*nirākāra*). Jñānaśrīmitra's external determinator, i.e., the perception of the formless empty locus, takes a risk of violating his own theory of *sākāravijñānavāda*—a risk which he seems to have recognized. Therefore, he regards *vyatireka* as supplementary. If Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana* were directed at Jñānaśrīmitra's theory, Ratnākaraśānti would certainly have criticized this weak point.

3.2. Criticism of purely formal and deductive logic

We should not overlook that a pure deductive logic without any external instantiation is criticized at the last stage of Indian Buddhist logic. The *bahirvyāptivāda* implies that logic is located within the real and empirical domain. A purely formal and deductive logic without any instantiation is admitted to prove the existence of a transcendental object and point out 'antinomies' regarding metaphysical concepts only on the basis of formal consistency. Although the purely internal determination which underlies the *antarvyāptivāda* can prove the consistency of the conceptually constructed system, which consists of *apoha*s (differentiations from other concepts), the system itself is separated from the real world of perception.

Jñānaśrīmitra tries to guard his *pramāṇa* theory from such a separation. Thus, he restricts logic by external instantiation. Here the *bahirvyāptivāda* is transformed from the inductive exemplification of Dignāga's logical system to the instantiation by a cognitive form (*ākāra*). The controversy about the priority of either *anvaya* or *vyatireka* derives from different interpretations of negative cognition. The *pramāṇa* theory serves as a metatheory of both logic and epistemology. Borrowing Prof. Frauwallner's and Prof. Steinkellner's phrase, it is a "logico-epistemology." At the final stage of Indian Buddhist logic, Jñānaśrīmitra criticized the tendency of the *antarvyāptivāda* towards a purely formal and deductive logic from his epistemological standpoint, which is the *sākāravijñānavāda*. This brings us to the second point: What is an instantiation in the epistemology of *sākāravijñānavāda*? And how can Jñānaśrīmitra's logical proof exclude the sectarianism of other epistemologists?

4. Remarkable distinction in Jñānaśrīmitra's proof of the momentariness of existence: Dharmakīrti's logico-epistemology freed from sectarianism

According to Frauwallner [1935], there are three types of proofs regarding momentary existence: (a) *ahetukavināśitvānumāna* (inference from spontaneous destruction of existence without cause), (b) *sattvānumāna* (inference from existence), (c) *pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam* (momentariness proved by perception).[44] Jñānaśrīmitra systematizes these three types of proofs.

Kamalaśīla as a Madhyamaka restricts his proof to the conventional level. And Ratnākaraśānti as a Nirākāravijñānavādin confirms it on the ultimate level. Against these interpretations, Jñānaśrīmitra's proof is based on Dharmakīrti's logico-epistemology as entirely free from sectarianism. Dharmakīrti's standpoint shifts along the line of Sautrāntika → *sākāravijñānavāda* → *nirākāravjñānavāda* → Madhyamaka in PV III. But his basic standpoint is consistently

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[44] Frauwallner [1935: 217].

pramāṇavāda. Although Jñānaśrīmitra's basic standpoint consists in *sākāravijñānavāda*, his shifting standpoint can be freed from sectarianism by his distinctive theory of a dynamic twofold truth (*satyadvaya*).

4.1. *Pakṣadharmatā*: *arthakriyāsāmarthya* is not a definition of existence but a precondition of the provableness by a valid cognition

The instantiation of the indicator and its locus (*pakṣadharmatā*) is proved by Jñānaśrīmitra as follows: Although the definitions of 'existence' are different due to a difference between dogmatic ontologies/epistemologies, only the ability to perform an efficient causal operation (*arthakriyā-sāmarthya/kāritva*) can be accepted as the logical indicator connoting 'existence'. Because without efficient causal operation, no one could refer to the existence of an object, nor does anyone in fact intend to refer to it.[45] Therefore, efficient causal operation should be accepted as the definition of existence on a metalevel by all schools, independent of any dogmatic theory. It is not an ontological/epistemological definition, but the precondition of the provableness by all valid cognitions.[46]

4.2. Two interpretations of PV III 4: *arthakriyā* and *satyadvaya*.

Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation of existence is based on Dharmakīrti's interpretation as it is expressed in PV III 3–4:

> "It is here maintained that whatever has efficient causal operation is ultimately existent (*paramārtha-sat*), and [that] what is other [than that] is conventionally existent (*saṃvṛti-sat*). . . . [Opponent:] Everything is inefficient. [Proponent:] No. It is observed that seeds, etc., are efficient with regards to sprouts, etc. [Opponent:] It [i.e., the efficiency] is assumed on a conventional level (*saṃvṛtyā*). [Proponent:] *astu yathā tathā*."[47]

How should the last Sanskrit sentence be translated? According to Matsumoto (1980), the two interpretations of Vijñānavādins and Madhyamakas are sharply different. From the standpoint of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla regard efficiency as conventional existence. They interpret the above text as "Yes, it is. [I agree with you]." On the other hand, from the standpoint of Vijñānavāda, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi regard it as ultimate existence. They interpret it as "In whatever manner, however [you would name it, e.g., the conventional level and so on, your naming would be out of the question]." While the former accepts momentary existence on a conventional level, the latter does so on an ultimate level.

Although Jñānaśrīmitra as a Sākāravijñānavādin regards efficient causal operation as the

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[45] JNA 1,12–14: *ayaṃ na tāvad asiddhaḥ / tathā hi yadi nāma pratidarśanaṃ sattvalakṣaṇabhedaḥ, tathāpi ihārthakriyāsāmarthyam eva sattvam abhipretaṃ hetutayopāttam / tatra nāsaṃbhavi sarvathā śakyam abhidhātum abhimataṃ vā keṣāñ cit /* Cf. RNA 83,10–11; 67,11–19 and Tani [1998a].

[46] *Arthakriyāsāmarthya* is not a definition of real existence (*vastulakṣaṇa*), but the precondition of provableness (*sādhanatvenāsya prastāvaḥ*). See tr. of JNA 4,5–7 in Tani [1998b: 36].

[47] PV III 3–4: *arthakriyāsāmarthyaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānya-lakṣaṇe // aśaktaṃ sarvam iti ced bījāder aṅkurādiṣu / dṛṣṭā śaktir matā sā cet saṃvṛtyā 'stu yathā tathā //* Cf. Tosaki [1979: 61–62].

ultimate,[48] he identifies the Vijñānavādins' theory of ultimate self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) with the Madhyamaka doctrine of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). He intends to reduce the Madhyamaka position to his *sākāravijñānavāda*. Thus, he has to exclude efficient causal operation from self-cognition, because an efficient causal relation between two successive object-moments is excluded from the momentary self-cognition.[49] This ambivalence brings about his dynamic theory of twofold truth.

4.3. The dynamic theory of twofold truth: transformation of the transposing boundary line

With regards to the theory of twofold truth, Jñānaśrīmitra defines the conventional level as the object which is favored without an investigation by a *pramāṇa*.[50] Therefore, the transformation from the conventional level to the ultimate level is determined only through the investigation by a *pramāṇa*. In order to avoid the contradiction between the conventional and the ultimate level on the same boundary line, he transforms the static theory of twofold truth into a dynamic one on the transposing boundary line. From the standpoint of the new and higher ultimate level, the precedent ultimate level is deemed conventional. The highest conventional level reveals itself as the ultimate level.[51] The ultimately valid cognition (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*) reveals itself upon the self-destruction of the conventionally valid cognition (*sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa*). This structure of a twofold *pramāṇa* can be found at the end of PVin I.[52] Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation corresponds to Prajñākaragupta's comments on Dharmakīrti's second definition of *pramāṇa*, i.e.,

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[48] JNA 4,17–25: *athārthaśakteḥ sarvathā sūkṣmavicārāsahatvād* <1-*aśaktaṃ sarvam*-1> *iti kva pakṣīkaraṇam, kiṃ vā sādhanam* <2-*iti cet*-2> *nanu* <3-*bījāder aṅkurādiṣu dṛṣṭā śaktiḥ*-3>, *na hi dṛṣṭe anupapannaṃ nāma / . . . durapahnavā tu śaktir artheṣu /* <4-*sābhāsā cet saṃvṛttyā, na paramārthena / astu yathā tathā*-4> *saṃvṛttyā paramārthena vā, kim atra nirbandhena?*

<1> PV III v.4a1. <2> PV III 4a2. <3> PV III 4a3–b1. <4> PV III 4c2–d.

Kyūma [1996: 71] indicates the parallel text JNA [418,24–419,9]. Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation is based on Prajñākaragupta's [PVA 184,29; P201b2; D170a4 (cf. PVAṬ(Ya) P65b8; D49b4): *matā sā cet samvṛtyā 'stu yathā tatheti /*] The parallel text [JNA 186,5–7] is indicated by Kyūma [1995: 48–49].

[49] See fns. 67–69.

[50] JNA 416,25–26: *avicāritaramyā dhīḥ saṃvṛtir yāvad anyavit / uttarottaradhīgrāhyaṃ tattvaṃ syād yāvad advayam //* Cf. PVA 185,25: *avicāritaramaṇīyā lokapratītis*; P202b6. D171a3; PVAṬ(Ya) D51b3, P68a8. Matsumoto [1981: 56f.]; MA 64a, 65a: *ma brtags gcig pu nyam dga' zhin; brtags pa ma byas nyams dga' ba'ang*, Ichigō [1985: CXXV].

[51] JNA 7,11–14: *evam uttarottaraparikalpeṣu balavatsu pūrvapūrvaḥ saṃvṛtir uttarottaraḥ paramārtho yāvad arthakriyāsthitiḥ / tadatikrame hi grāhyagrāhakabhaṅgād āyātaṃ pratibhāṣamātravyavasthānam iti kva saṃvṛter vārtā? tasmād saṃvṛtīnām antimārthakriyāśaktir eva paramārthaśabdavācyeti . . .* Cf. JNA 7,8: *niruttarārthakriyaiva saṃvṛtiḥ paramārtha . . .*

[52] JNA 419,11–14: *yady āryahṛdayānurodhaḥ, asmadīyahṛdayena tu sarvam asti, nipuṇena tu pratipattrā tathā pratipattavyam, yathā paritoṣamātre 'pi vipralabhyeta / ata evāha, sāṃvyavahārikasya cedaṃ pramāṇasya rūpam uktam ityādi /* This is a citation from PVin I; Vetter [1966: 100,20]: *'di ni kun tu tha sñad pa'i tshad ma'i rang bzhin brjod pa yin te.* Cf. NBhūṣ (Yamakami [1984: 137]): 162.: *cintāmayīm eva prajñām anuśīlayante vibhramaviveka-nirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇam abhimukhīkurvanti / [de'i yang cha tsam bstan pa yin no //]* Cf. Tosaki [1979: 52].

The *pāramārthikapramāṇa* corresponds to *svasaṃvedana*. Prof. Vetter regards it as *yogipratyakṣa*. Tani [1998c]. Jñānaśrīmitra cites PV III 209: *idaṃ vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ / yathā yatārthāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā //* JNA 426,21–22; cf. JNA 415,21–26.

revelation of a new object (*ajñātārthaprakāśa*), as the definition on the ultimate level.[53]

4.4. Logic with instantiation (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)

According to Jñānaśrīmitra, it is only the Sautrāntika who regards efficient causal operation as the characteristic of the ultimate existence. From a Vijñānavāda's standpoint, the ultimate existence for a Sautrāntika corresponds to a conventional existence. Thus, there seems to be a dogmatic stratification in the sense that Vijñāṇavāda occupies a higher level than Sautrāntika. Then, would the proof of momentary existence be primarily restricted to Sautrāntika ontology/epistemology and should it be at last negated by Vijñānavāda?

That is not the case because Jñānaśrīmitra, as mentioned above, releases the concept of the efficient causal operation from Sautrāntika sectarianism.[54] Jñānaśrīmitra says that the proof of momentary existence is based on Dharmakīrti's *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* ('inference which occurs by force of reality')[55] which is independent of the dogmatic authority of any sacred text. Thus, the proof is not only independent of the Sautrāntika dogma, but also of that of the Sākāravijñānavādin/Madhyamaka. So far as existence is admitted to be marked by causal efficiency, it is necessary that the momentariness of existence is proved. This proof cannot be rejected by the Vijñānavāda theory that efficient causal operation is excluded from self-cognition.

5. A challenge to the description of momentariness on the ultimate level

5.1. Reinstatement of the proof by spontaneous destruction without cause: unobservable destructing line

The last chapter of Jñānaśrīmitra's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* is named "Ahetukavināśādhikāra." Although the traditional *vināśitvānumāna* seems to have left the main stage due to the appearance of Dharmakīrti's new proof, i.e., *sattvānumāna*, as Steinkellner [1968/69] acutely pointed out, it is here revived.[56]

Non-existence as destruction, such as Naiyāyika's *abhāva*, cannot be regarded as a real object. Non-existence is interpreted as *prasajyapratiṣedha*, not as *paryudāsa*. The former affirms neither a locus nor *pratiyogins* which occur in that locus. As mentioned above, *prasajyapratiṣedha* excludes the empty locus itself. Thus, the destructing line cannot be observed. Therefore, the causal complex cannot be intervened by non-existence as an empty locus. But the new momentary existence can occur immediately and the causal complex can continue without the substantial identity as its basic locus.

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[53] PV II 5c: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*. Cf. PVA 30,19f.; P31a6f.; Katsura [1984: note 28]; Tani [1991: 378–380]; Inami [1992: 38]. Cf. also the interpretations by Profs. Lindtner, Dreyfus and Franco in SBEṬ.

[54] JNA 10,17–21: <1-*asaṃsṛṣṭakṣaṇamātravedanavādī hi prastutaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgavādī sautrāntika ity arthaḥ / tasya kāryakāraṇabhāvapratītiḥ mithyā pratītir*-1> *iti mahatī bhrāntiḥ / kāryakāraṇabhāvāpalāpī tu yogācāraḥ svasaṃvinmātravedanavād iti vaditum ucitam / na ca tasya dūṣaṇena kṣaṇabhaṅgavādinaḥ kiñ cit / hetu-phalāpalāpino 'pi yadi tadapalāpāya nyāyasaṃbhavaḥ tadā tad api na dūram iti kim atra nirbandhena? iti* / <1> NBhūṣ 519,26–27: *asaṃsṛṣṭaikakṣaṇamātravedanavādino hi vyavahārasyānādirabhyāsaḥ, tato vāsanā, tato mithyāpratītir ity etat sarvam andhaparamparāvadapramāṇakam iti* /

[55] JNA 7,3: *na ca vastubalapravṛttānumāne śāstrānurodhaḥ kaś cit* /

[56] See fn. 44. Steinkellner [1968/69] proves that the turning point to the *sattvānumāna* is found in Dharmakīrti's PVin II. Mimaki [1976] indicates that the *vināśitvānumāna* still occurs in Ratnakīrti's *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* in the context of criticizing the theory of destruction with a cause (*sahetukavināśa*).

This interpretation is based on Dharmakīrti's.[57] For Dharmakīrti in the early period, the *vināśitvānumāna* serves for the proof of logical necessity of the essential relation (*svabhāva-pratibandha*) as metatheory. It is not a mere exercise for the application of his logic.[58]

The spontaneous destruction of existence makes the momentary continuity of existence possible. No causal relation is possible for non-existence, because this relation is only applicable to a pair of positive existences. The relation of existence to non-existence (i.e., destruction of the existence) is independent of a causal relation. Thus, the destruction of existence is free from any cause. Non-existence as destruction should be regarded as the essential property of existence. Therefore, existence never fails to destroy its own existence. This spontaneous destruction proves the necessity of momentary destruction of existence from an epistemological standpoint. In this context, a moment does not have a fixed quantity, since linear time as a substance is ultimately rejected.

5.2. The self-difference of momentary existence on the ultimate level

From the standpoint of a conceptual dichotomy, non-existence is distinguished from existence. In other words, momentary existence is divided into two concepts: existence and non-existence. The implied claim that non-existence [-A] is the essential property of existence [A] seems to be self-contradictory.[59] Jñānaśrīmitra solves this contradiction by his theory of twofold truth as follows:

From the conventional standpoint, the apparent contradiction can be distributed between two moment-points. Thus, while existence is located on the first moment-point, non-existence resides on the second moment-point. These two ordered moment-points are located within linear time.[60] But from the ultimate standpoint (*paramārthataḥ*), the dichotomy into non-existence and existence should be eliminated by means of emptiness (*śūnyatā*).

As we have seen, momentary existence, the destruction of which is interpreted by *prasajya-pratiṣedha,* cannot be intervened by a real empty locus, i.e., non-existence as a real object (*abhāva*). Accordingly, it can immediately give rise to a new momentary existence. But strictly speaking, momentary existence or momentary destruction cannot be divided into two parts.[61] From this standpoint, the difference of essential properties (*svabhāva-bheda*: existence and non-existence), which is proved by the *sattvānumāna* within linear time, can be interpreted as the self-difference of momentary existence.

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[57] Jñānaśrīmitra cites Dharmakīrti's PV I 277cd. JNA 135,5: *na tasya* [PV I 277cd *kiṃcid.*] *kiñcid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam* / Cf. Ōmae [1991: 99–100]. This idea seems to be close to the mathematician Dedekind's cutting-theory of the continuity of real numbers.


[58] PV IV 280–285. See Tani [1991: 381 and 396, note 14].

[59] JNA 130,21–23: *ekatra tu kṣaṇe vibhāgābhāvān na virodho vyāvṛttibhedamātreṇaikatra bhāvāt / tathā hi sa eva bhāvakṣaṇaḥ prāgabhāvād utpadyamāna ucyate, paścādbhāvān nirudhyamāna ucyate* / Cf. JNA 146,17–21; PV I 269ab; PV I 278cd are cited. See Tani [1996d: 55–67].


[60] JNA 146,23–147,1: *saṃvṛttau tu yathā kālabhedena vikalpyamānaḥ kādācitka iti pratibhāti, tathā sarvopākhyāvirahārūpatayā bhāvād bhinna iva pratibhātīti nāvastutve 'pi lakṣaṇabhedākhyānavirodhaḥ / evaṃ ca sati saṃvṛttyā lakṣaṇabhede bhāvābhāvayor bhedasyeṣṭatvāt* / See Tani [1996d: 64–74].

[61] JNA 146,21–22: *tattvatas tāvad vastutvavirahāt tattvānyatvaśūnya evāsau bhāvo na bhavatīti tad bhāva-niṣedhamātrapātraṃ tu kharaśṛṅgādivat* /


Only one new event occurs. While from one point of view it is known as the occurrence of existence, from the other point of view it is known as the destruction of existence. Thus, from an epistemological standpoint, Jñānaśrīmitra's new proof by *vināśitvānumāna* should be located at a higher level of the proof of momentary existence than the *sattvānumāna*. The self-difference (*svabhāva-bheda*) of objects as momentary existence discloses the glitter of the conversion to the ultimate boundary line. Thus the momentary existence on the ultimate level is not to be understood by the following figure:



But by the figure below:



Strictly speaking, the static momentary point or place should be excluded as follows:




The slash [/] divides two parts at the conventional level.

(ON THE ULTIMATE LEVEL)

MOMENTARY EXISTENCE : MOMENTARY DESTRUCTION

[/]



5.3. Momentariness established by means of perception (*pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam*)

The above mentioned proof of momentary existence by perception (*pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam*) occurs in the last portion of Jñānaśrīmitra's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*.[62] He proves the momentariness of the perceived object by the momentary operation of perception from the standpoint of the *sākāravijñānavāda* theory of self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) as follows:

> "Whatever is manifest in a certain form is of that particular form, as the water of the Gaṅgā [which is manifest] brilliantly. Otherwise, no restriction of causal power to each real existence would be possible for mixed existent [entities].

[62] This is the most developed form of the third type of proof indicated by Prof. Frauwallner. See Tani [1996e: 75–80, 89–90].

And residual impressions (*saṃskāra*) which are manifest in sense-cognitions would stay [only] for one moment. Otherwise, an indistinct triple time-state (a confusion of past, present and future) would be perceived by a glance at one momentary [present object]."[63]

The momentariness of the present operation of a perception is determined by the immediately succeeding perceptual judgement (*īkṣaṇakṣaṇamātrānantaram avasāya-*).[64] The perceivable momentary existence is proved indirectly by the perception of momentary existence. From the standpoint of conceptualization, this proof is based on the postulation of the perception of momentary existence, because the perception itself excludes conceptualization (*kalpanāpoḍha*). It is remarkable that Jñānaśrīmitra never affirms a direct access to the perceivable momentary existence but instead merely denies the impossibility of access to the momentary existence.

5.4. The *pratyakṣa* of a yogin

In an article which deals with Jñānaśrīmitra's *Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa*, Steinkellner [1978] asserts that the object of a yogin's perception is an abstract property of realization, i.e., momentariness, "*kṣaṇikatvam*" and so on, and not an object which can be perceived by ordinary sense perception. "The lover's body which is directly perceived does not diminish affection, but only non-eternity, pain and so."[65] While the above mentioned proof by perception sets the course from the postulation of perception to inference, the objectifying operation of yogic perception sets it conversely from the inference based on a concept (i.e., *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) to the realization of a perception (*svalakṣaṇa*). Namely, the momentariness of existence destructs the ordinary world which is based on the self-identity of time as a substance. In conformity with Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrīmitra admits that the path of a yogin cannot be assumed; we should be satisfied with the boundary reality that we cannot cognize, whether the Buddha is omniscient or not.[66] This does not necessarily imply inscrutable mysticism, but only means that he holds fast to Dharmakīrti's logico-epistemology.

6. Dharmakīrti's logico-epistemological traces

6.1. Logico-epistemology freed from sectionalism: The proof of momentary destruction destructs the dogmatic doze of the ultimate truth

Without the proof of momentary existence, even ultimate truth would degrade into the dogmatic doze of naive idealism. Jñānaśrīmitra says, "When the cognition of causal relation contra-

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[63] JNA 155,17–21: *yan nirbhāti yathā tathā tad akhilaṃ gaṅgāmbu gauraṃ yathā no cen na prativastu śakti-niyamaḥ saṅkīrṇabhāve bhavet / saṃskārāḥ* [cf. SVR 750,14f.;749,14–17] *pratibhānti cendriyamatiṣv ekakṣaṇa-sthāyinaḥ syād ekakṣaṇavīkṣaṇād itarathā dṛṣṭas trikālī kalaḥ // liṅgarūpopapattivyavakīrṇo 'yaṃ svabhāva-hetuprayogaḥ /*

[64] There are two kinds of the conceptualization. One is called the conceptualization of the perceived in general (*dṛṣṭamātravikalpa*). The other is the conceptualization of a particular essential property (*svarūpaviśeṣavikalpa*). The latter can get access to the unique operation of the perception by means of excluding a similar subsequent operation of a conceptualization. The ultimate exclusion of the immediate conceptualization can deny the impossibility of approaching the ultimately unique object of perception (*svalakṣaṇa*). This exclusion is based on an extremely sharp cognition that is produced at the height of meditation (*abhyāsa*). JNA 157,2–7; for details, see Tani [1996e: 80–92].

[65] Steinkellner [1978: 132]. JNA 324,24f.

[66] Steinkellner [1978: 134]; PV III 530/2d; JNA 329,4 and 331,11f.; PVA ad PV II 375cd; JNA 330,12.

dicts the Vijñānavāda theory that the causal relation is excluded from self-cognition, you should not indulge yourself in the self-cognition. You should rather abandon Vijñānavāda theories!" [cf. JNA 415,12–14].[67]

Although efficient causal operation is excluded from self-cognition on the ultimate level, based on *sākāravijñānavāda*, the exclusion of efficiency must be proved by the efficiency of a *pramāṇa* itself.[68] The main logical reason is that the causal relation between two succeeding objects cannot be cognized by the simultaneous self-cognition.[69] But this proof implies that the simultaneous self-cognition itself can be proved as momentary by a higher *pramāṇa*.

The ultimate level cannot be proved as ultimate by itself, because it denies the proving operation as an efficient causal operation. The proving operation belongs only to the conventional level. The proof of momentary destruction destructs the eternally self-identical authority of the closed idealism of the Vijñānavādin's self-cognition and the Madhyamaka's timeless *śūnyatā*. To destroy self-identity, Jñānaśrīmitra needs the *bahirvyāptivāda*. Thus he never denies the relativized Sautrāntika's standpoint which postulates the external world. Without continuous investigation on the conventional level, the ultimate level could not reveal itself.

6.2. Logic with realization of timeness of momentary existence destructs the self-identity of conceptual objects

As we noted, Dignāga's *bahirvyāptivāda* with its inductive exemplification is transformed into the instantiation of a perceivable form (*ākāra*), e.g., the rain cloud. For Jñānaśrīmitra, "the rain cloud" is not a stock example for a concept, but the vivid perception of the rumbling of thunder, the swirling and spreading of dynamic black-color, heavy rain and the flash of lightning in front of one's eyes. The spontaneous self-destruction of a drop of water implies the momentary production of a new spontaneous and self-destructive drop of water. Non-existence without an empty locus changes the context of the cloud. He intends to destroy eternal self-identity of concepts by means of the temporal perception of the real rain cloud and the temporal semantic competency (*yogyatā*). Thus, he reinstates the *bahirvyāptivāda* as the external determination of a temporal realization.

In order to enter into enlightenment, self-identity of concepts must be ultimately destroyed by means of the proof of momentary existence on the basis of a *pramāṇa*. Ratnakīrti seems to heartlessly replace his teacher's instantiation of "the rain cloud" with the original stock-example of a "pot" in the *sattvānumāna*. Jñānaśrīmitra's logic is not based on a timeless and eternal logical truth on which the modern standard logic of formal deduction is based. Instead, his logic

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[67] JNA 415,12–14: *na khalu pūrvāparabhāvavyāptibhedagrahaṇavirodhini svasaṃvedane ca sthitiḥ pūrvāparībhūtahetuphalasvabhāvavedanaṃ ceti sacetasām ādaraviṣayaḥ, ta varaṃ hetuphalagrahaṇam āñjasaṃ mṛṣyatāṃ vijñānavādaviyasanaparityāga eva yuktaḥ /* This text was first translated into Japanese by Kyūma [1996: 67–68].

[68] JNA 415,19–20: *tatra ca hetum antareṇa kva siddhivārtā? tarhi hetunā hetvabhāvaḥ sādhya iti hetur ātmānam apākarotīty arthaḥ syāt / nāyaṃ virodhaḥ, parmārthe tāvad dhetor evābhāvāt /*

[69] JNA 416,6–9: *kathaṃ tarhi hetunā hetvabhāvasiddhir iti / ayam asyārthaḥ / hetudvārāyātaparamārtha-rūpānukāriṇi vikalpe yaḥ pūrvāparākāravirahapratibhāsaḥ sa eva hetuphalabhāvagrahābhāvaḥ, tataḥ savyāpāra-pratītatām upādāya nirvyāpāro 'pi svapratibhāsa etasmin savyāpāra iva lakṣyate / tataḥ sa hetur hetvabhāvahetur iti prakhyātiḥ /*

is based on the timeness of momentary and self-different realization on the boundary line of twofold truth.

We cannot say any more that eternity is truth and that the transitory is appearance. The *antarvyāptivāda* is apt to be restricted by the internal consistency of conceptual construction. Thus, Jñānaśrīmitra enforces the *sattvānumāna* with the revived *vināśitvānumāna* and the notion of *pratyakṣasiddhaṃ kṣaṇikatvam* which destroys the self-identical concept of momentariness. Dharmakīrti has marvelously discerned that *pramāṇa* itself is not an eternal criterion but momentary existence.[70]

Although modern temporal logic with a realization of linear time can be applied to *sattvānumāna*, it cannot be applied to the spontaneous self-difference of existence. The inference of the self-difference of the momentary existence paradoxically proves the destruction of the self-identity of the conceptual object on which the inference is based. I would like to call it a "negative dynamic logico-epistemology." This is the most remarkable distinction of the proof of momentary existence in the final stage of Indian Buddhist philosophical logic. If we evaluate the *bahirvyāptivāda* as an undeveloped logical theory only from the standpoint of modern formal and deductive logic, we lose the most important distinction of the proof of momentary existence.

Acknowledgments

I wish to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Kajiyama for his helpful suggestions regarding my original idea in the dissertation. When I first explained to him the reason for reversion of the chronological order in the Buddhist intellectual history, which is against his established theory, it seemed to me that he acknowledged the possibility. I am indebted to Prof. Mimaki for his encouragement of my proof. I wish to thank both of them for their learned impartiality and warm hearts. Thanks are due to Prof. Iwata for his valuable comments on my dissertation. Lastly I gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with Prof. Katsura, Prof. Oki, and the staff of Hiroshima University in February, 1997. Especially I am indebted to Prof. Katsura who gave me constructive criticism of some sections of my translation of JNA, although it is needless to mention that I am solely responsible for any error.

Abbreviations and Literature

AVS — *Antarvyāptisamarthana* (Ratnākaraśānti): In *Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts in Sanskrit*, ed. M. H. Shāstri, Bibliotheca Indica, 103–114. 1910. Reprint, Calcutta, 1989.

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BKT — *Kōchi Kōgyō Kōtō Senmon Gakkō Gakujutsu Kiyō* (Bulletin of the Kōchi National College of Technology).

[70] PV II 8–9: *nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ naivāsti prāmāṇyāt vastusaṅgateḥ / jñeyānityatayā tasyā adhrauvyāt kramajanmanaḥ // nityād utpattiviśleṣād apekṣāyā ayogataḥ / kathañcin nopakāryatvāt anitye 'py apramāṇatā //*

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JIP *Journal of Indian Philosophy.*
JNA Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Jñāṇaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist philosophical works of Jñānaśrīmitra.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna, 1959. 2nd ed. Patna, 1987.
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KBhS *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (Dharmottara) (Tib.): P 5751 (268a2–278b2). See also Frauwallner [1935].
KBhSV *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhivivaraṇa* (Muktākalaśa) (Tib.): P 5752 (278b2–295b7), D 4254 (259a5-275a2).
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MA *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (Śāntarakṣita) (Tib.): See Ichigō [1985].
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MĀ *Madhyamakāloka* (Kamalaśīla) (Tib.): D 3887 (Sa 133b4–244a7), P 5287 (Sa 143b2–275a4).

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NBhūṣ *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇāsī, 1968.

Ōmae, Futoshi.

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P Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.

PPU *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (Ratnākaraśānti) (Tib.): P 5579 (Ku. 151a4–184b6), D 4079 (hi 133b7–162b1).

PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti).

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PV III Chapter 3 (Pratyakṣa): See Tosaki [1979, 1985].

PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953. [Tib. D 42221, P 5719]

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PVin I Chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa): Tilmann Vetter. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam, Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 250. Band, 3. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 3. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1966.

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PVinṬ(Dh) *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara), chapters 1 (Pratyakṣa), 2 (Svārthānumāna) (Tib.): D 4229 (Dse 1b1–289a7), P 5727 (Dse 1a1–347a8); chapter 3 (Parārthānumāna) (Tib.): D 4227 (Tse 1b1–178a3), P 5727 (We 1a1–209b5).

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SBET Ernst Steinkellner, ed. *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition: Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, June 11–16, 1989.* Wien, 1991.

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1920. *A history of Indian logic.* Reprint, 1971.

VN *Vādanyāya* (Dharmakīrti): Michael Torsten Much. *Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāyaḥ.* 2 vols. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 581. Band. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens Nr. 25. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991.

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PHYA PA CHOS KYI SENG GE'S OPINION ON *PRASAṄGA* IN HIS *DBU MA'I SHAR GSUM GYI STONG THUN*

by

Helmut Tauscher, Vienna

Despite its title, the main purpose of this paper is to make this hitherto unknown text by Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) known to a larger audience.[1] It is a summary (*stong thun*) of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka teaching as it is presented by or in the *dbu ma'i shar gsum*, 'the three (teachers) from the East (i.e. Bengal)': Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla,[2] or, in another explanation, their main works: *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and *Madhyamakāloka*,[3] texts in which a strict distinction between Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa can hardly be drawn. These Indian masters probably contributed as much to the epistemological tradition as they did to the Madhyamaka school, and they are known to have introduced the strict method of independent syllogism (*svatantrānumāna*) in accordance with the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti into Madhyamaka argumentation. Their Tibetan successors must have been initially responsible for the well-known fact that ever since rNgog Lotsava (1059–1109) the epistemological school of Buddhism had a very strong impact on Tibetan Madhyamaka in general, not only on the Svātantrika. To my knowledge, Phya pa chos kyi seng ge's text represents the oldest extant evidence of their exegetical activities.

Being a disciple of rGya dmar pa Byang chub grags pa, whose teachers were Gangs pa she'u Blo gros byang chub and Khyung Rin chen grags pa, Phya pa chos kyi seng ge represents the third generation in the transmission lineage of rNgog Lotsava Blo ldan shes rab.[4] For 18 years he held the office of abbot at gSang phu sNe'u thog,[5] and he was doubtlessly one of the leading scholars of his time, which means that he was an expert in a particular tantric tradition as well as

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[1] I wish to express my gratitude to Leonard van der Kuijp, who not only discovered this manuscript, but also was generous enough to make it available to me for publication and translation.

[2] The common expression that usually denotes the three teachers is *rang rgyud gyi shar gsum* or simply *shar gsum*, in its full form *dbu ma rang rgyud gyi shar gsum*; Sum pa mkhan po gives the form *rang rgyud shar ba gsum* (Sarat Chandra Das, ed., *Pag Sam Jon Zang: History of the Rise, Progress and Downfall of Buddhism in India, by Sumpa Khan-po Ye çe Pal Jor*, part I (Calcutta, 1908), 112,15).

[3] See lCang skya Rol ba'i rdo rje, *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan* (Sarnath, 1970), 284,9f.: *dBu ma rgyan dang dBu ma bden gnyis dang dBu ma snang ba gsum la rang rgyud shar gsum du grag go.*

According to the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (3 vols, Beijing, 1985) both interpretations seem possible. S.v. *rang rgyud shar gsum* and *shar gsum mkhan po.*

[4] See Kuijp [1978: 355, n. 2 and 4].

[5] Byams pa kun dga' 'byung gnas in his *gSang phu gdan rabs* relates a 35-years-period of office; see Shunzo Onoda, "The chronology of the abbatial succession of the gSaṅ phu sNe'u thog monastery," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 33 (1989): 205f.

in Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa; how little the distinction between these two schools counted for Phya pa himself might be illustrated by the fact that he regarded Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika, although he follows the commentarial tradition of neither Bhāvaviveka nor Candrakīrti, simply because he explains emptiness (*śūnyatā*) as being characterised as mere negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*).[6]

Nevertheless little is known of his biographical data,[7] and his works were hitherto known exclusively from quotations and references in later texts, first of all by gSer mdog Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507). With the help of these Phya pa's contribution to the Tibetan epistemological tradition has been studied or acknowledged by various scholars.[8] The newly discovered *dBu ma'i shar gsum* now for the first time offers the possibility of comparing at least some aspects of his philosophical position as it is handed down with Phya pa's own writing.

The *Blue Annals* mention among Phya pa's works a "long" and a "short summary of Madhyamaka" (*dBu ma bsdus pa che chung*),[9] and these titles are also included in A khu Rinpoche's *Tho yig*.[10] Although the present text is called *dBu ma'i shar gsum gyi stong thun* on the title page and referred to as *dBu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po*—a title which is, with variants, quite common for Tibetan Madhyamaka treatises—in the colophon, it can with some certainty be assumed to be identical with one of those; from its length it can be supposed to be the longer version.

It consists of 45 fols. (+ 4 lines) of a 9-line manuscript most likely measuring 58 x 9 cm. As it is accessible to me only in the form of a photocopy reduced in size this is, however, merely an estimate. In the edition which I am preparing it will be some 150 pages. It is written in *dbu med* and displays an archaic orthography and style of writing according to which it seems possible to date the manuscript to the 12th century.

The text is structured in three main sections: ascertainment of the objects of cognition (*shes bya nges bar bya ba*), Mahāyāna practice and *buddhabhūmi*. The first, being a discussion of the two realities (*bden pa gnyis*), is by far the longest; it covers 39 fols., $34^1/_2$ of which are dedicated to the discussion of the definition or characteristics (*mtshan nyid*). Within this chapter great emphasis is laid on the "Valid cognition ascertaining the *mtshan nyid* being contained in the

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6 See Shākya mchog ldan, *Tshad ma'i mdo dang bstan bcos kyi shing rta'i srol rnams ji ltar 'byung ba'i tshul gtan du bya ba nyid byed snang ba,* in *The Collected Works (gSuṅ 'bum) of gSer-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan*, ed. Kunzang Tobgey, vol. 19 (Thimphu, 1975), 36,5f.: . . . *stong nyid med dgag tu mtshon pa yang bshad pas na / dbu mar 'grel lugs Legs ldan dang Zla ba'i zhabs kyi rjes su mi 'brang yang / dbu ma'i srol 'byed rang rkang tshugs pa zhig yin par bzhed do //*; cf. Kuijp [1983: 78].

The question of Dharmakīrti being a Mādhyamika is dealt with in detail by Ernst Steinkellner, "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" in *Early Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, ed. D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (Leiden etc., 1990), 72–90.

7 For these, see Kuijp [1978].

8 See David Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise* (Wien, 1987); Birgit Kellner, "Types of incompability (*'gal ba*) and types of non-cognition (*ma/mi dmigs*) in early Tibetan *tshad ma* literature," in *PIATS Graz*, vol. 1, 495–510; Kuijp [1978, 1983]; Onoda [1986]; Shunzo Onoda, "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's theory of *'gal ba,*" in *PIATS Narita,* vol. 1, 197–202; Tani [1992]; Tom Tillemans, "Formal and semantic aspects of Tibetan Buddhist debate logic," *JIP* 17 (1989): 265–297.

9 *The Blue Annals,* translated by G.N. Roerich, 2 vols. (Calcutta, 1949, 1953), vol. 1, 332.

10 Lokesh Chandra, *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature* (New Delhi, 1963; reprint, Kyoto, 1981), 656 (No. 11321).

mtshan gzhi (*mtshan gzhi de la rten par nges byed kyi tshad ma*)" ($20^1/_2$ fols.); this chapter is practically identical with the "Negation of an (absolutely) real entity (*yang dag pa'i dngos po dgag pa*)," which covers 20 fols. and thus almost half of the entire text, and in a way constitutes its core. This topic is divided into a refutation of the usage of *prasaṅga* for this purpose—comprising a presentation of the Prāsaṅgikas' position, a discussion why it is not justified <u>not</u> to accept an independent proof (*svatantrasādhana*), a refutation of the validity of *prasaṅga* (these two chapters are paraphrased and criticised by Shākya mchog ldan in his *Lung rigs rgya mtsho*)[11], and a short summary of Phya pa's position—as well as a detailed discussion of the independent syllogism suited to proving the all-pervading emptiness, structured according to its individual parts: *dharmin, sādhya, hetu, pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti.*

According to Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, the Madhyamaka method consists exclusively in this syllogism which proves that all objects of cognition are pervaded by emptiness. His position can be summed up: the logical reason of the pervading property of an '(absolutely) real entity', viz. 'truly one or many' etc., in its negated form (i.e. 'neither truly one nor many'), or the logical reason opposing the pervading property of an '(absolutely) real entity', viz. 'dependent origination' etc., directly negate an '(absolutely) real entity'; implicitly they negate an (absolutely real) implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), i.e. all individual objects of cognition.[12]

He defends the use of a *svatantra* proof by arguing that none of the usual reasons against it, viz. the fact that the *dharmin* is not accepted by both parties, that the Mādhyamika does not hold a thesis of his own, and that *liṅga, pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti* are not ascertained by valid cognition, applies to the refutation of the position of the realists. As Phya pa strictly follows Svātantrika teaching and in this particular text gives a summary of the Madhyamaka system according to *dbu ma rang rgyud gyi shar gsum*, this is to be expected.

However, it is striking that he strictly and completely denies the efficiency of *prasaṅga* altogether; he does not even accept them as the basis for a *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. He does distinguish between a valid (*rnal ma*) *prasaṅga*, where *liṅga* and *vyāpti* are acknowledged, and an invalid (*rnal ma ma yin pa*) one, but even the valid *prasaṅga* is either inefficient, or it is actually a *svantantrānumana*. In the chapter refuting the non-identity of nature of *śūnyatā* and *saṃvṛti* by authoritative scripture (*stong pa nyid dang kun rdzob ngo bo gcig ma yin pa lung gis dgag pa*, fol. 2b8–3a7) he refers to the four respective arguments of *Saṃdhinirmocana* III, 3–5, and in three cases he adds an 'implied *svatantra*-argument' (*rang rgyud 'phangs pa na*, and similar). In the passages actually discussing the validity of *prasaṅga* and *svatantra*, however, there is merely one short mention of a '*svatantraliṅga* implied by the *prasaṅga*/consequence' (*thal bas 'phangs pa rang rgyud gyi rtags*, fol. 23a4f.). Apart from that the term *prasaṅgaviparyaya* (or any related term) does not appear in this text, although some of its '*rang rgyud kyi rtags*' can very well be

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[11] *Lung rigs rgya mtsho* 14, 518,5–522,6; 522,6–533,2.

[12] Cf. fol. 24b5–7: *rang gi lugs rnam par gzhag pa ni yang dag pa'i dngos po'i khyab byed yang dag pa'i gcig dang du ma la sogs pa bkag pa'i rtags sam yang dag pa'i dngos po'i khyab byed dang 'gal ba rten 'brel la sogs pa'i rtags kyis yang dag pa'i dngos po dngos su bkag la des khyad par du byas pa shes bya la sogs pa'i ma yin dgag yang shugs la bkag ste / spros pa tsam bkag pa na spros pa'i bye brag mtha' dag shugs la khegs la gzhi shes bya tsam la spros pa srid pa dngos su bkag pa na shes bya'i bye brag shugs la khegs te /*

understood as *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. Like Dharmottara does in the case of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, Phya pa chos kyi seng ge gives non-perception of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) as logical reason in these cases.

Phya pa argues that the mode of negating of a valid *prasaṅga*, e.g.: "From eternal existence (*ye nas yod pa*) follows that origination is meaningless," can be assumed in two ways: the contradiction is established either (1) by the mere fact that the opponent accepts it, or (2) in the very nature of the objects of cognition.

(1) In the first case even the *liṅga* of 'dependent origination' could prove an absolutely real thing, because worldly cognition accepts a relation between these two.

(2) In the second case there are four alternatives: (a) initial origination (*da gdod skye ba*) is negated by showing that eternal existence is the nature of the objects of cognition, (b) eternal existence is negated by showing that initial origination is the nature of the objects of cognition, (c) only the combination of the two is negated, and (d) one of the properties is negated by accepting the other, although neither is established as the nature of the objects of cognition.

(a) and (b) are independent proofs, because the fact that the one property is established as the nature of the objects of cognition is the *pakṣadharma* and pervaded by the ascertainment of the contradiction, and the non-existence of the contradictory property is the *sādhyadharma*. In case (c) the formulation of a *prasaṅga* is meaningless, because this alternative has already been negated by the valid cognition ascertaining the contradiction, and both properties as such cannot be negated. In alternative (d) the negation is based upon a fallacious concept, which would actually mean that one non-existent thing could be negated by accepting another one.[13]

Or, to express it differently: provided that the impossibility of the four alternatives of origination is ascertained, as well as the fact that the they pervade all discursive development (*prapañca*),

[13] Cf. fol. 22b9–23a7: *ye nas yod pas skye ba don myed du thal zhes pa(r)* . . . *thal zhes pa la sogs pa thal ba rnal ma rnams la 'di ltar brtag ste / ye nas yod pa dang skye ba don yod pa 'gal bar pha rol po khas len pa tsam gyis 'gal zla rgyu mtshan du bkod nas 'gal zla 'gog gam / shes bya'i gshis la 'gal bar nges pas 'gal zla rgyu mtshan du bkod nas 'gal zla 'gog /*

dang po ltar na 'jig rten pa'i blo la rten 'brel snang ba dang don dam pa'i dngos po 'brel par khas len pas rten 'brel gyi rtags las don dam pa'i dngos por sgrub nus par 'gyur ro // . . .

shes bya'i gshis la 'gal bar nges na yang ye nas yod pa shes bya'i gshis su bsgrubs nas da gdod skye ba 'gog gam / da gdod skye ba shes bya'i gshis su bsgrubs nas ye nas yod pa 'gog gam / de gnyis 'gal bar nges pas de gnyiṣ tshogs pa tsam 'gog gam / gnyi ga shes bya'i gshis su ma grub kyang de nam khas len pa na de'i 'gal zla 'gog /

dang po ltar na ye nas yod pa shes bya'i gshis su grub pa phyogs chos yin la de dang da gdod skye ba 'gal bar nges pas khyab pa yin la de gdod skye bas stong pa nyid bsgrub bya yin pas dngos su brjod pa nyid rang rgyud kyi rtags su 'gyur ro //

gnyis pa ltar na da gdod skye ba shes bya'i gshis su nges pa phyogs chos yin la skye ba dang ye nas yod pa 'gal bar nges pa khyab pa yin zhing ye nas yod pas stong ba bsgrub bya yin pas thal bas 'phangs pa rang rgyud kyi rtags su 'gyur ro //

gsum pa ltar na 'gal bar nges pa'i tshad ma nyid kyis tshogs pa khegs pas thal ba'i ngag don myed pa dang / tshogs pa khegs kyang ye nas yod pa tsam dang da gdod skye ba tsam ma khegs pas spros pa phyogs gcig ma khegs par 'gyur ro //

bzhi pa ltar na 'gal zla khas len pa'i log rtogs yod na 'gal zla khegs la myed na mi khegs pas dgag bya 'gegs pa log rtogs la ltos pa dang / . . . */ khangs sgong du me khas blangs pas kyang grang reg khegs paṛ 'gyur ro //*

Lung rigs rgya mtsho 14, 520,5f. paraphrases alternative (d): *mo [g]sham gyi bu yod pas ri bong gi rwa yod pa 'gog nus par 'gyur ro //*

the negation is a *svantantrānumana*, because the unreality of the pervaded is established through the unreality of the pervading property, i.e. by the non-perception of the pervading property (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). In any other case there remains a doubt whether the four alternatives of origination are possible or not, or whether all discursive development is negated.[14]

With this absolute denial of the validity of a *prasaṅga* Phya pa chos kyi seng ge goes beyond all his predecessors.

Dharmakīrti's[15] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III acknowledges a *prasaṅga* as a valid proof, even though the *hetu* is untrue; it can—even if not necessarily in all cases—imply a *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, which is true in all its aspects and can serve as a principle for the proponent himself.

For **Dharmottara** the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* seems to be more prominent, but nevertheless the *prasaṅga*

> "is a proof (*sādhana*), although it merely shows the *vyāpti*, e.g. 'whatever exists in many things is manifold [i.e. not unitary]', because it implies the invalidating valid cognition (*bādhakapramāṇa*),"[16]

and its main function is to introduce the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*:

> "As [the logical reason] is imagined only by the opponent [to exist in the *dharmin*], the *prasaṅgasādhana* is not formulated in an independent way, as the *hetu* is not established [as existent in the *dharmin*]. It is [formulated] rather to show that the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is aimed at."[17]

Kamalaśīla, on whom Phya pa seems to rely in many aspects, in his *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* holds "that one can prove only *prasaṅgas* in the case of unacknowledged entities imputed by non-Buddhists."[18] In his *Madhyamakāloka*, however,—seemingly under the influence of Dharmottara—he argues for the use of a *svatantrasādhana* in such cases. He does, however, not explicitly find fault in the use of *prasaṅga*. Tsong kha pa gives a summary of his position in the *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*:

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[14] Cf. fol. 23b1–3: *thal ba 'di dag gis rang dang rgyu myed dang gzhan dang gnyi ga las skye ba 'gog pa ni skye ba bzhi po mi srid par nges sam srid par dogs / phyi ma ltar na spros pa srid pa ma khegs la / dang po ltar na skye ba bzhis spros pa mtha' dag la khyab par nges sam ma nges /*

dang po ltar na khyab byed myed par nges pas khyab bya myed par nges pa rang rgyud kyi rtags su 'gyur la / gnyis pa ltar na bzhi pas ma khyab pa'i spros pa ma khegs par 'gyur ro //

gzhan yang spros pa'i khyab byed thal bas khegs sam ma khegs / dang po ltar na khyab byed mi dmigs par 'gyur la / gnyis pa ltar na spros pa srid pa'i dogs pa mi chod par 'gyur ro //

[15] For Dharmakīrti's position cf. Iwata's contribution to the present volume and Iwata [1993: 19–35].

[16] *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (P 5727) 12b8f.: *gang zhig du ma la yod pa de ni du ma nyid do zhes khyab pa rab tu ston pa tsam yin yang gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma 'phen pa'i phyir sgrub par byed pa yin no //*; cf. Iwata [1993: 49].

[17] *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* 9a7: *gzhan gyis kun brtags pas thal bar sgrub pa gang yin pa ni rang rgyud du bya ba ma yin te / gtan tshigs ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'on kyang thal ba bzlog pa'i mthar thug pa yin no zhes bstan pa'i phyir ro //*; cf. Iwata [1993: 47].

[18] Tsong kha pa, *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* (P 6141) 77b4: *'di dKa' 'grel las gzhan sdes btags pa'i ma grags la ni / thal bar sgrub pa kho na yin* . . . (Text and translation of Tillemans [1984: 383, 365]); cf. *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* (Masamichi Ichigō, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, Kyoto, 1985) 27,9ff.: *re zhig gzhan dag gis brtags pa nam mkha' la sogs pa'i dngos po ma grags pa'i rang gi ngo bo gang dag yin pa de la ni thal bar bsgrub pa kho na yin* . . .

"In the *Madhyamakāloka* it is said that, on the one hand, it is not sufficient to refute *ātman, prādhana* etc. by just *prasaṅgas*, but these [pseudo-entities] should also be refuted by *svatantraliṅgas*. . . . [The irreality of those] is proven according to both ways (i.e. *prasaṅga* and *savtantra*) without fault."[19]

Here the expression 'by just *prasaṅgas*' (*thal 'gyur tsam gyis*) might be of some interest. The *Shar gsum stong thun* has a *sa bcad* division entitled "Inadmissibility /impossibility/ of refuting the realists by *prasaṅga* (*thal 'gyur gyis dngos por smra ba 'gog pa mi 'thad /nus/ pa*)." Shākya mchog ldan quotes this title with an amendment pointing to the direction of Kamalaśīla's position: ' . . . by *prasaṅga* alone (*thal 'gyur rkyang pas*)'.[20] Unfortunately however, he does not elaborate on this "little" addition.

Not only do I fail to find a real basis for Phya pa's position in his predecessors, it also seems to contradict what is related about him:

Tsong kha pa states in the *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* that "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge and other Tibetan scholars also said that a *svatantra* was inappropriate in the case of a [non-existent] subject imputed by non-Buddhists."[21]

According to Sa skya paṇḍita's *Tshad ma rigs gter,* Phya pa distinguishes 14 (or 13) kinds of *prasaṅga*, seven (or 6) of which he classifies as valid (*yang dag*), and a subdivision of one of those as implying (*'phen pa*) a *svatantra* proof, i.e. a *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.[22]

The *Shar gsum stong thun*, however, does not verify any of these. Tsong kha pa's rather casual statement could be considered simply as wrong, or as a topos in the Tibetan tradition, similar to the expression 'teaching of Hva shang', which has—in Seyfort Ruegg's words—"come to fulfil a practically emblematic function."[23] This, however, can be excluded with some certainty in the case of Sa skya paṇḍita, who is chronologically very close to Phya pa chos kyi seng ge and gives a detailed description of the latter's theory. So the question remains of why the idea—though not the use—of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is virtually absent from the relevant passages of this text; it can hardly be explained by the terseness of argumentation typical of the genre of *bsdus pa* or *stong thun* texts. At the present stage any attempt at an answer would be mere speculation, and it must therefore be left to future studies.

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[19] 78b1ff.: *'di yang dBu ma snang ba las bdag dang gtso bo sogs 'gog pa ni thal 'gyur tsam gyis mi chog gi rang rgyud kyi rtags kyis kyang dgag dgos pa dang / . . . / skyon ma yin pa'i tshul kyis bsgrub so //* (Text and translation of Tillemans [1984: 384, 367]).

[20] *Lung rigs rgya mtsho* 14, 519,7.

[21] 77b5f.: *Cha pa la sogs pa bod kyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyang / gzhan gyis btags pa'i chos can la rang rgyud mi rung bar 'chad do //* (Text and translation of Tillemans [1984: 383, 365]).

[22] See Onoda [1986] and Tani [1992]. In this context it is irrelevant whether all 14 divisions, or only 13 of them, are Phya pa's.

[23] David Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature: Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective—On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet* (London, 1989), 6.

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HOW MUCH OF A PROOF IS SCRIPTURALLY BASED INFERENCE (*ĀGAMĀŚRITĀNUMĀNA*)?

by

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It is well known that Dharmakīrti commented upon the phrase *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* in Dignāga as showing that quotations from authorities could be used to prove certain propositions inferentially. In particular, use of scripture or scriptural tradition (*āgama*) was supposedly not a separate means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but was said to be an inference because similar to other inferences in reliably representing its object, i.e. in 'not belying' (*avisaṃvāda*). This then is *āgamāśritānumāna*, 'scripturally based inference'. Of course, not just any scripture can be used as a basis for such an inference, nor can such inferences pertain to any and all objects. The main criterion separating reliable from bogus scriptures is the threefold analysis whereby it is determined that:

(a) The scripture does not describe verifiable perceptible matters (*pratyakṣa*) in a way which would be in contradiction with observation;

(b) The scripture does not describe rationally accessible, but imperceptible matters (*parokṣa*), like selflessness, the four noble truths, etc., in a way which would be in contradiction with 'inferences functioning by the force of real entities' (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*)—for convenience we will adopt a less literal translation, 'objective inference'. The point here, very briefly, is that the usual or paradigmatic type of inference in Dharmakīrti is one which functions objectively in the sense that it can and should be evaluated purely on the basis of facts and states of affairs and not in any way because of belief, acceptance or faith in someone or his words.

(c) The scripture's descriptions of matters inaccessible to either observation or objective inference (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) are not internally contradictory. That is to say, when the scripture treats of the 'radically inaccessible' (*atyantaparokṣa*) states of affairs, such as the details of the law of karman, the cosmology, the heavens, hells, etc., where the subjects (*dharmin*) can *only* be understood on the basis of scripture and not by other rational means, the scripture should not directly or indirectly contradict itself by ascribing properties to these subjects and then also ascribing or implying the opposite of such properties.

Now, if the scripture passes this triple test, it is fit to be used in 'scripturally based inferences', but with the all-important stipulation that such inferences are only to be used in the case of radically inaccessible matters (*atyantaparokṣa*), ones which are not in the domain of observation or objective reasoning, but are only accessible once we have accepted (*abhyupagata*) scripture. In short, *āgamāśritānumāna* works where objective inference and observation leave off. In this way Dharmakīrti rather effectively avoids the recurring conflict between reason and faith (more technically here, *viruddhāvyabhicāra*), for the type of inference which depends on acceptance

will only treat of things outside the domain of objective reasoning.[1]

So much for the bald outlines. It is fairly seductive to think that, on a Dharmakīrtian account, *abhyupagama*, acceptance of the scripture's words on radically inaccessible things, is something which naturally or invariably ensues, or even necessarily follows, from the scripture's satisfying the threefold analysis and that it is, in the final analysis, an objective matter whether the scripture does or does not pass such tests. This interpretation of Dharmakīrti's account of scripturally based inferences, which we shall term for short 'inference-like-any-other', is not just a hypothetical possibility. Indeed, with a few minor differences, the idea of scriptural inference as being just one amongst three kinds of inferences, but as full-fledged as the others, is the way Dharmakīrti has been interpreted by many, who have in one way or another taken Dharmakīrti's account of scripture to be a surprisingly rational approach to subjects which otherwise would be unknowable to us. Interestingly enough, although it is hard to pin down specific Indian writers on a question of just how rational or probative a Dharmakīrtian scriptural inference is, we do see major Tibetan writers clearly taking scriptural inferences as being as probative as any other inference, just different in subject matter. Nor is this approach restricted to just one Tibetan school.

Consider the following passage from the *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, where Tsong kha pa is trying to dispel a doubt (*dogs pa gcod pa*) about the possibility of scripturally based argumentation and where he answers with a clear, even very extreme, version of the 'inference-like-any-other' interpretation:

> *ston pas gsungs pa'i shin lkog gi blang dor la 'jug pa ni gang zag dbang rnon ni / dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i rtags las shin lkog ston pa'i lung rang gi bstan bya la mi bslu bar dpog pa'i yid ches pa'i rtags las 'jug la / de'i tshul gsum dngos stobs kyi rigs pas grub kyang bsgrub bya shin lkog yin pas yid ches kyi rtags su mi 'gal te / rtags kyi rigs 'byed pa ni bsgrub bya'i sgo nas 'byed kyi sgrub byed kyi sgo nas min pa'i phyir te / dper na 'gal dmigs kyi rtags rnams sgrub pa yin yang / dgag rtags su bzhag dgos pa bzhin no //*
>
> "As for [practical] engagement with regard to the radically inaccessible things (*shin lkog* = *atyantaparokṣa*) to be rejected and things to be realized spoken about by the Teacher [Buddha], intelligent people engage themselves by following a logical reason based on authority (*yid ches pa'i rtags*), one where they infer that the scripture teaching radically inaccessible matters is non-belying with regard to what it teaches from the logical reason of its being a scripture [judged] immaculate through the three [kinds of] analyses. Although the three characteristics (*tshul* = *rūpa*) of that [reason] are established through objective logic (*dngos stobs kyi rigs pa* = **vastubalayukti*), still there is no contradiction in [such a reason] being a reason based on authority since what is being proved (*bsgrub bya* = *sādhya*) is radically inaccessible. For, the classification of types of logical reasons is delineated in terms of what is being proved and not in terms of the means of proof (*sgrub byed* = *sādhana*), just as, for example, reasons which consist in the apprehension of oppositions (*'gal dmigs kyi rtags* = *viruddhopalabdhihetu*) are [themselves] positive entities (*sgrub pa* = *vidhi*), but should be classified as negative reasons (*dgag rtags*)."[2]

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[1] Several contributions have now appeared on these subjects. See e.g. H. Yaita, "Dharmakīrti on the Authority of Buddhist Scriptures (*āgama*)—an annotated translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti*," *Nanto Bukkyō* 58, 1987, and T. Tillemans, "Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on Scriptural Authority" *Tetsugaku* 38, Hiroshima, 1986.

[2] *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, (Vol. ba of *Collected Works*, Tashilhunpo edition, published by Nagwang Gelek

There is also the following passage from *Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo*:

> *gtan tshigs gsum po bsgrub bya'i ngos nas dbye ba yin gyi tshul gsum nges byed kyi tshad ma'i sgo nas ma yin te / kun kyang mthar dngos stobs kyi tshad mas nges pa la thug dgos pa'i phyir ro // des na shin tu lkog gyur gyi don bsgrub pa'i gtan tshigs la yid ches pa dang / brda' dang 'dod pa tsam gyis bzhag pa'i don bsgrub pa'i gtan tshigs la grags pa dang / dngos stobs kyis zhugs pa'i don bsgrub pa'i gtan tshigs la dngos stobs kyi gtan tshigs zhes bya'o //*
> "The three [sorts of] logical reasons are differentiated according to what is being proved (*sādhya*) and not on account of [differing] means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which ascertain the triple characteristic (*tshul gsum*) [needed for valid reasons], because all of them must in the end come down (*thug*) to ascertainments due to objective *pramāṇa*s (*dngos stobs kyi tshad mas nges pa*). Therefore, we term reasons which prove radically inaccessible matters 'reasons based on authority' (*yid ches pa'i gtan tshigs*), we term reasons which prove matters established by conventional agreements or by mere intentions 'reasons based on what is commonly recognized' (*grags pa'i gtan tshigs*) and reasons which prove objective matters, 'objective reasons' (*dngos stobs kyi gtan tshigs*)."[3]

We see in both these passages a very deliberate attempt to minimize or even virtually eliminate any special status for scripturally based inference. On this scenario, the only relevant feature differentiating a scriptural inference from one of the objective sort is the matter of what one is proving: is it *atyantaparokṣa* or not? All the other considerations are supposedly just as in the case of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. To look at some of the details in the Tsong kha pa version of scriptural inferences, the usual criteria for a valid reason, the so-called three characteristics (*tshul* = *rūpa*), are said to hold quite unproblematically, even objectively (*dngos stobs kyis*) in the case of scripturally based reasons, i.e. the 'reasons based on authority' (*yid ches pa'i rtags*). In other words, it is objectively so that the reason based on authority is a property of the subject (*pakṣadharma*) and that it has the two types of pervasion (*vyāpti*). In the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo* passage Tsong kha pa makes the point that all inferences (viz. those concerning objective matters, conventions and those based on scripture / authority) are in fact reliant on the certainty or ascertainments (*nges pa* = *niścaya*; *niścita*) due to objective *pramāṇa*s; there are no degrees or hierarchies of certainty amongst inferences: all inferences have the same degree of certainty coming from having the same type of *pramāṇa*s ascertaining the reasons' characteristics.

To sum up, Tsong kha pa's position, as we see in these two quotations, has the following key features:

Demo, 1975–79) f. 5b. Note that the parallel with reasons which consist in the perception of oppositions (*viruddhopalabdhihetu*) is that when we use a *viruddhopalabdhihetu* to prove that there is no long-lasting sensation of cold in some place because in that place there is a raging fire, the fact that the reason, i.e. "presence of a raging fire," is not an absence (*abhāva*) is irrelevant to its being a genuine negative reason or a reason consisting in a non-perception (*anupalabdhihetu*); what counts is that its *sādhya* is an absence. Equally, reasons in scriptural inferences or "reasons based on authority" (*yid ches pa'i rtags*) are supposedly like any other in satisfying the usual criteria of valid reasons, but just prove a different kind of thing, and that is why and only why they have the classification which they do.

[3] Vol. pha of *Collected Works*, f. 46b.

(1) Scriptural inference is just to be differentiated from others by its *sādhya*;
(2) Scriptural inference relies on a reason which can be shown objectively (*dngos stobs kyis*) to possesses the three characteristics;
(3) Scriptural inference is a bona fide, full-fledged inference leading to certainty (*niścaya*) that the reason proves the *sādhya*.

It should be said that Tsong kha pa is construing the scriptural inference in such a way that it is not actually the words of the scripture which prove anything, but rather the fact that the scripture passes the threefold analysis (*dpyad pa gsum*). And although Tsong kha pa's views certainly became the majority view in Tibet, there were dissenting writers, such as Tsong kha pa's great critic, the Sa skya pa, gSer mdog Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan, who took the logical reason to be the textual quotation itself.[4] However, although the ensuing debate between the two camps is interesting for other reasons (which we cannot go into now), there are no significant differences between the two camps about points 1–3 which I just mentioned. Both camps, *at one stage or another in scriptural argumentation*, rely upon exactly the same formal argument (*prayoga*) that such and such a scripture is non-belying with regard to what it teaches because it passes the threefold analysis. Moreover for both Tsong kha pa and Śākya mchog ldan, the characteristics (*rūpa*) of that latter logical reason (i.e. passing the threefold test) are objectively proven so that the conclusion ('non-belying') is utterly compelling and certain.[5]

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[4] Thus, on Tsong kha pa's view, the formal argument (*prayoga*) is to be constructed along the lines of: *sbyin pas longs spyod khrims kyis bde zhes pa'i lung chos can / rang gi bstan bya'i don la mi bslu ba yin te / dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i lung yin pa'i phyir //* "The scripture which says 'From giving comes wealth, from morality happiness' is non-belying with regard to the proposition which it teaches, because it is a scripture [judged] immaculate through the three [kinds] of analysis." Śākya mchog ldan's formulation is: *sbyin sogs chos can / spyad pa las bde ba 'byung ste / spyad pa las bde ba 'byung bar rin chen 'phreng bar gsung pa'i phyir /* "Take as the subject giving, etc.; happiness arises from their practice, because it is said in [Nāgārjuna's] *Ratnāvalī* that happiness arises from their practice." See Tillemans, *Persons of Authority*, Stuttgart, F. Steiner, 1993, 12–15.

[5] See the extensive discussion in Śākya mchog ldan's *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dgongs rgyan* (Vol. 10 of *Collected Writings*, Reprinted by Nagwang Topgyal, Delhi 1988). In I. 229.3–4 (= f. 115a), Śākya mchog ldan first gives the *prayoga* with the quotation of the scriptural passage figuring as the logical reason; see n. 4 above. He then on I.230.1 et sq. (= f. 115b) takes up the proofs of the *pakṣadharmatā, anvayavyāpti* and *vyatirekavyāpti*: *tshul sgrub pa la / phyogs chos mngon sum gyis 'grub ste / sbyin pas longs spyod khrims kyis bde // zhes gsungs pa mngon sum gyis mthong ba'i phyir rgol zhig la rtags 'di 'god pa yin pa'i phyir / khyab pa sgrub pa la rjes 'gro sgrub pa dang ldog pa sgrub pa'o // dang po ni / rin chen 'phreng ba chos can / rang gi bstan bya'i don la mi bslu ba yin te / dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i lung yin pa'i phyir /* "As for proving the [reason's three] characteristics, the *pakṣadharma(tā)* is established by perception, for this reason is presented to an opponent who perceptually observes the statement 'From giving comes wealth and from morality, happiness' [i.e. he sees that the statement is indeed present in the text of the *Ratnāvalī*]. As for the proof of the pervasion (*vyāpti*), there are the following two [subsections]: proving *anvaya* and proving *vyatireka*. We now take up the first [i.e. *anvaya*]. Take as the subject the *Ratnāvalī*; it is non-belying with regard to the propositions which it teaches, because it is a scripture [judged] immaculate through the three [kinds] of analysis." After further discussion on proving *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, Śākya mchog ldan concludes on I.233.3–4 (= f. 117a): *des na khyab pa sgrub byed kyi rigs pa bshad ma thag pa de ni / dngos stobs zhugs kyi rtags yang dag yin te / rin chen phreng ba rang gi bstan bya'i don la mi bslu ba de / dngos stobs kyi rtags yang dag gis grub pa'i phyir . . .* "Therefore, the afore-mentioned logic proving pervasion is a valid, objective logical reason, for the fact that the *Ratnāvalī* is non-belying with regard to what it teaches is established by means of a valid, objective logical reason." In short, what Tsong kha pa considered to be the "reason based on authority" (*yid ches pa'i rtags*), Śākya mchog ldan took to be the logic proving pervasion (*khyab pa sgrub byed kyi rigs pa*). But both agreed that the three characteris-

Now, earlier we had said that on the Tsong kha pa version of the 'inference-like-any-other' position, all the other considerations, besides the choice of objects for the *sādhya*, are just as in the case of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. The same remark will hold for Śākya mchog ldan. But what are these 'other considerations' which we were thinking of? Broadly speaking, they are all that pertains to the 'probative status' of the inference, i.e. how certain is it and how much can it compel people to believe in the truth of the conclusion when they do not fully share the same vision of the Buddhist spiritual path as that presented in the scripture or *a fortiori* when they are not members of the Buddhist community at all. Involved in this same question is the philosophical issue of what kind of theory of truth (or perhaps better, what kind of theory of justification of truth claims[6]) is being advocated, whether scriptural inference is turning on the same type of theory as the usual *vastubala* variety, or whether it leans towards a different type of theory, one which is more along the lines of a form of pragmatism, and one which might even allow dissent and criticism. In short, the real question at stake is whether Buddhist scriptural statements are true or can justifiably be thought to be true, because belief in their truth is useful, even crucial, to someone who wishes to attain a certain type of spiritual progress and liberation, or whether scriptural statements are true and justified objectively, in virtue of facts, and independently of the utility of believing in them. Saying that scriptural inferences are *vastubalapravṛtta* is (in a way which we will specify later) to lean towards the latter view and will have predictably conservative consequences.

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It is time to turn to Dharmakīrti and some of his Indian commentators. There are, I think, some clear passages which show that scriptural inference is not a full-fledged inference and that, as it functions inductively, it lacks the certainty (*niścaya*) which a real inference should have.

In *Pramāṇavārttika* I 213–217 and the *Svavṛtti*, Dharmakīrti develops the major points of his account of scripturally based inference:

(a) v. 213: Words do not have any necessary connection with entities; they just enable us to infer the intention of the speaker.

(b) v. 214: Scriptures are worth investigating, when they are coherent, present appropriate, practicable methods for gaining results, and when they focus on goals which are relevant to the spiritual life of people (*puruṣārtha*).

(c) v. 215 presents the threefold analysis (described above) which one applies to scriptures worth investigating.

(d) v. 216: Dignāga's point in saying that authoritative words were an inference was that when an authority's words (= scripture) have been found to be non-belying on rationally decid-

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tics of *that* reason were established objectively so that it was valid and objective (*dngos stobs zhugs kyi rtags yang dag*).

[6] The difference between a truth theory (i.e. the necessary and sufficient conditions defining the truth of P) and a theory of justification (i.e. the properties which allow us to reasonably determine that P is true and satisfies the definition) is not obvious in Dharmakīrti, and will have to be taken up in a later study. On this general difference, see R. L. Kirkham, *Theories of Truth, A Critical Introduction*. MIT Press, 1995, 41 et sq.

able matters, then we are justified to understand radically inaccessible matters based on that scripture. In this particular case, contrary to what was said in v. 213, we do infer something more than just the speaker's intention from his words: we also infer that the state of affairs obtains. This one 'exception' to v. 213 must be allowed because otherwise there would be no way (*agatyā*) for us to come to know radically inaccessible things.

(e) v. 217 elaborates upon aspects of v. 216: when the scripture is non-belying on important rationally accessible things it should also be so on the inaccessible things.

The logical status of scriptural inference is then summed up in the *Svavṛtti* to v. 217: the methods outlined mean that one infers states of affairs from words, with a resultant lack of strict necessity; these are not real inferences.

> *Svavṛtti* ad v. 217: *tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam / varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti / na khalv evam anumānam anapāyam anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām iti niveditam etat /*
> "This fact that scripture is an inference is asserted in both cases [i.e. in vv. 216 and 217] because of the lack of any [other] way. If one engages oneself on the basis of scripture, it is better to engage oneself in this fashion [on the basis of a correct scripture rather than on the basis of one which belies]. But [this understanding] is not at all a flawless inference, for words have no necessary relation to their objects—this has [already] been explained."[7]

In fact, what we see if we also look at later passages in *Pramāṇavārttika* is that there are two reasons as to why scriptural inference fails to have the requisite necessity of a *bona fide* inference. Not only do scriptural words fail to guarantee certainty because of their lack of connection with things, but the inductive procedure whereby one goes from observed correctness on testable things to correctness on otherwise untestable things is also inherently subject to error.

> *Svavṛtti* ad v. 318: *na kvacid askhalita iti sarvaṃ tathā / vyabhicāradarśanāt / tatpravṛtter avisaṃvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca / agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam / nāto niścayaḥ / tan na pramāṇam āgama ity apy uktam /*
> "It is not so that because [someone] is unmistaken about some things he will be so in all, for deviance is observed (*vyabhicāradarśanāt*) and it is not established that there is any pervasion (*vyāpti*) between his [verbal] activity and being non-belying. Now we accept this defining character of scripture for lack of any [other] way. There is no certainty from this [scripture]. Thus it was said that scripture is not a *pramāṇa*."[8]

The connection is explicitly made with vv. 215–217, a link which is expanded upon by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, their formulation of the argument being that observation of someone's correctness in one area does not ensure his correctness in all things, including radically inaccessible things, as deviance (*vyabhicāra*) from such a rule is, or could be, observed.[9] It is objected

[7] P. 109 in Sanskrit text edited by R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikaṃ of Dharmakīrti*, Rome 1960.

[8] Ed. Gnoli 167,25–168,3.

[9] *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* of Śākyabuddhi, Peking ed. nye 60a6–60b1, sDe dge ed. 51b7–52a2: *mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pas rtogs par bya ba'i don bslu ba med pa'i phyir shin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i don la yang de bzhin du nges pa yin no zhes bya ba yang log pa yin te / gang gi phyir blang bar bya ba dang dor bar bya ba'i don la lar tshad mas mi bslu bas 'khrul pa med par mthong ba'i phyir / des bstan pa gzhan rigs pa ma yin pa thams cad la yang de ltar*

that if this inductive procedure is uncertain, then also in the context of v. 215's threefold analysis there can be no certainty concerning *atyantaparokṣa*. To this the reply is simply to accept the opponent's objection without reservation: although the threefold analysis does not yield certainty, one should not and can not require such certainty either: we accept scriptural inference, not because it is a *pramāṇa*, but rather to be able to engage in the spiritual path. As Dharmakīrti had put it: "because there is no other way" (*agatyā*).[10] Karṇakagomin and Śākyabuddhi ad v. 216 are clear on the implications: scriptural inference is an inference because of the thought of people (*puṃso 'bhiprāyavaśāt*) who want to engage themselves (*pravṛttikāma*) on the spiritual path: it is not an inference objectively (*vastutas*).[11]

It looks distinctly then that the position of scripture being inference-like-any-other has very little support in Dharmakīrti, nor in Indian commentators such as Śākyabuddhi or Karṇakagomin. And it is not surprising to add that for these Indian writers scriptural inference is in no way *vastubalapravṛtta*, or objective, either. Scriptural inference, as is amply mentioned in Dharmakīrti and his commentators, depends upon *abhyupagama* 'acceptance', and that in itself is probably sufficient to show that it is not objective. At any rate, as if that were not enough, they explicitly tell us that it is not objective and not certain.[12]

Now, it is true that both Tsong kha pa and Śākya mchog ldan were aware of passages in the *Svavṛtti* which seemed to go against their position on scriptural inference being inference-like-any-other and hence felt obliged to explain why Dharmakīrti in vv. 215–217 spoke of scripture as

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'gyur ba ste / bden pa nyid du 'gyur ba ma yin no / ci'i phyir zhe na / yul la lar skyes bu rnams mi bslu bar mthong du zin kyang yul gzhan dag tu yang 'khrul pa mthong ba'i phyir ro // "Suppose it is said that because [an authority] is non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*) with regard to things which are to be understood by perception and inference, it is certain that he is so [i.e. non-belying] with regard to radically inaccessible things (*atyantaparokṣa*) too. This is wrong for the following reason: Given that one observes that [an authority] is non-erroneous due to [there being a] non-belying *pramāṇa* with regard to some things to be accepted or rejected, then in the case of all the other things which he teaches, [but] which are not correct, he would also have to be like that [i.e. non-belying]. This [however] would not be true. Why? Because, though we might observe that people are non-belying on certain objects, we also observe deviance [i.e. that they are in error] (*vyabhicāradarśanāt*) concerning other objects." Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* of Karṇakagomin 592,27–593,12 (ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Kyoto, Rinsen, 1982). The general theme of a finite number of observations not guaranteeing certainty or pervasion concerning other cases is of course a very well worn argument in Dharmakīrti. Cf. *Svavṛtti* ad v. 13 (ed. Gnoli 10): *na hi bahulapakvadarśane 'pi sthālyantargamanamātreṇa pākaḥ siddhyati vyabhicāradarśanāt* / "Although one might see that most [of the rice] is cooked, the fact of [all the rice] being cooked is not established through its merely being in the pot, for one does observe deviance (*vyabhicāradarśanāt*)." Not surprisingly, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin take the 'code-word' *vyabhicāradarśanāt* in the *Svavṛtti* ad v. 318 as also indicating the usual anti-inductive theme.

[10] *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* Peking 60b4–7; *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 593,13–18.

[11] *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* of Karṇakagomin, p. 394.20–22: *kiṃ tarhīṣṭasya pratyakṣānumānāgamyasyārthasyānantaroktena nyāyenāvisaṃvādād anumānam api pravṛttikāmasya puṃso 'bhiprāyavaśāt / vastutas tv ananumānaṃ śabdānām arthais saha sambandhābhāvāt /.*

[12] It might well be argued by a contemporary philosopher that it is a non-sequitur to say that if certainty, or even full-fledgedness are denied of a type of reasoning, so must be its status as 'objective'. Indeed it could be said that it is quite possible that in a system of inductive logic in some or another philosophy of science, uncertain reasonings would nonetheless give us objective knowledge. Quite true, but that is not Dharmakīrti's understanding of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, for semi-certain or uncertain inferences or quasi-inferences nonetheless being objective (*vastubalapravṛtta*) is never entertained as a possibility in his system. Maybe it ought to have been, but it wasn't.

not being an authentic inference (*rjes dpag mtshan nyid pa ma yin pa*). The move which we see both these Tibetan authors making is to say that citing the scripture's words lacks certainty and that it was only *that* which Dharmakīrti was talking about, as if vv. 215–217 and v. 318 were not talking about the actual authentic scriptural inferences, but only about quasi-inferences where words are cited to 'prove' things. The real inference, not surprisingly, turns out to be the proof that such-and-such a scripture is non-belying because it passes the threefold analysis. And this inference is supposedly certain and objective. I don't think that this move works at all. Although the argument that words don't prove things is indeed Dharmakīrtian, I think it is clear that one can't say that *this* is the only point which Dharmakīrti was making, and arguably it is not even the most telling point against scriptural inference being compelling and certain.

In fact, the threefold analysis constitutes a weak test of scripture and I think it should be clear that Dharmakīrti and his commentators knew it to be weak, not just because of the lack of necessary connection between words and things, but as we see in the *Svavṛtti* to v. 318 and the commentaries, because of the inherently inductive nature of the whole procedure. A limited number of observations of correctness does not guarantee that we subsequently won't find errors on testable things (nor I suppose would the fact that we don't see internal contradictions in a scripture mean that there aren't any). And a limited number of observations of correctness on perceptible and inferrable matters would not *imply* or *guarantee* anything about what is radically inaccessible. What emerges from the *Svavṛtti* to v. 318 and from the commentaries is that the first two stages of the threefold analysis, where the scripture is tested for correctness on rationally decidable matters, *guarantee* nothing—they are at most grounds for thinking that such and such a scripture is *as far as we can judge* trustworthy and to be relied upon. The key phrase, oft-repeated, is *varaṃ āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir* "If one engages oneself on the basis of scripture, it is better to engage oneself in this fashion." In short, if we make the move of accepting a scripture's statements on radically inaccessible matters, it is because we are not, as far as we can judge, precluded from doing so and because we want to or need to do so for our spiritual goals. That is all. What is striking in the Dharmakīrtian account, then, is that the threefold analysis does not compel us to accept scripture's accounts of radically inaccessible matters in the way in which a normal *vastubalapravṛtta* kind does compel us to accept the conclusion. Instead of logical compulsion, the Dharmakīrtian is making what could perhaps best be described as an informed, but fallible, choice.

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Let us go back to Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's idea of sriptural inference being a kind of inference, but one due to *puṃso 'bhiprāyavaśaḥ* ('the force of human thought/intentions'), this being contrasted with full-fledged inference which is objective (*vastutas*). What could this phrase 'human thought' or 'human intentions' mean? It certainly should not be taken as a trivialization of the role of scripture, for Dharmakīrti is quite clear that inspite of the problematic logical status of scriptural proof, there is no question about scripture's crucial importance to our lives: *nāyaṃ puruṣo anāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṃ samartho* . . . "Man cannot live

without relying on the validity of scripture."[13]

Put the problem another way. If we accepted the Tsong kha pa-Śākya mchog ldan position that scriptural inference was inference-like-any-other and was as objective as the smoke-fire variety, the question as to why one would believe in a scripture's propositions would become dead simple. One would perform the requisite threefold analysis and the game would be up: rationally there would be no alternative but to accept the scripture's propositions on *atyantaparokṣa*, just as one has to accept that the hill has fire once one knows how smoke comes about and once one sees that the hill does indeed have smoke. This simplicity is in a sense what some people are attracted to in Dharmakīrti, and not coincidentally they are often conservative Buddhists or even proselytizers: for them, it is Buddhism's force or even superiority that belief in scripture is wholly rational and logical and that acceptance (*abhyupagama*) follows easily and impersonally. But now let us imagine that a Buddhist is not a subscriber to the inference-like-any-other scenario, and that he realizes that the threefold analysis is fallible, that the inference is not a real one, and that it is not objective, not certain, etc. etc. Why and how would such a person, if he is of a Dharmakīrtian bent, nonetheless come to believe in scriptural propositions on radically inaccessible states of affairs? Does *abhiprāyavaśa* mean that after all the Dharmakīrtian account is little more than a type of leap of faith? No. I do think the Dharmakīrtian texts in speaking of *pravṛttikāma* ('desire to engage oneself') and *puruṣārtha* ('human goals') suggest an account which is more subtle than that of a camouflaged and excessively long path to arrive at a key step that is no more than blind faith. Briefly stated, Dharmakīrti's version as to why one chooses to accept a scripture's propositions, after having done the preliminary three-fold analysis, would seem to be best viewed as a type of pragmatism, one which is not of an objective or person-indifferent variety, but one which would take into account the interests and aims of a specific group of people, those who have an idea of what spiritual goals are and who wish to attain them. To use Nicholas Rescher's term, it would be a subjective pragmatism, in that it would involve something being accepted as true because doing so leads to (and may even be crucial to) the success of such and such a group of people in their specific aims.[14]

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Quite a number of years ago, Richard Hayes, in what was for many of us a very thought-provoking article, examined the 'question of doctrinalism' amongst Buddhist epistemologists.

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[13] *Svavṛtti* ad v. 213, ed. Gnoli 108,2–3.

[14] "One overarching fact pervades these divergences in the development of pragmatism: that the doctrine can be seen either as a validation of objectively cogent standards or as a subverter of them. There is a pragmatism of the right, a Peircian or objective pragmatism of 'What works *impersonally*'—through proving efficient and effective for the realization of some appropriate purpose in an altogether person-indifferent way ('successful prediction', 'control over nature', 'efficacy in need fulfillment'). And there is a pragmatism of the left, a Jamesian or subjective pragmatism of 'What works for *X*' in proving efficient and effective for the realisation of a particular person's (or group's) wishes and desires."—from p. 712 of N. Rescher, "Pragmatism," in Ted Honderich (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, Oxford 1995. Note that some type of pragmatism has also often been seen to be behind Dharmakīrti's theory of *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*. In a subsequent article I hope to develop my arguments against this attribution, which is more misleading than clarifying. Suffice it to say here, however, that the subjective form of pragmatism which seems to apply to scriptural inference does *not* convincingly apply to the *vastubala* variety.

One way, *inter alia*, in which Hayes formulated this question was "whether the Buddhist epistemologists should be characterized primarily as champions of reason or rather as champions of dogma."[15] Clearly, as Hayes himself recognized, one extremely important element in a response to these types of questions will be our account of how rational or dogmatic is the Buddhist belief in his own scriptures. Now, if we look at the two types of accounts that we have described so far, the first, i.e. what we have termed inference-like-any-other, makes an obvious attempt at ensuring rationality by stressing the idea of scriptural inference being certain, objective, etc., just as certain and objective as proving fire on the smoky hill. This attitude has a natural tendency toward a certain conservatism, even fundamentalism about scripture, for once the scripture has been determined to pass the three tests then logically any and all its propositions on *atyantaparokṣa* should be accepted—there is little or no possibility of a half-way house for skeptics who might want to accept some but not other such propositions, for all should be necessary, objective and compelling. It is no coincidence that the Tibetan, and especially dGe lugs pa, use of the ideas of scriptural inference in Dharmakīrti has been in such extremely conservative directions. Equally, it is not surprising that the subjective elements, the pragmatism, the uncertainty, the recognition of the problematic status of scriptural inference have been very much downplayed, in favor of watertight scriptural inferences which rationally must compel conviction. Dharmakīrti was somehow used to build a dogmatic edifice.

What was Dharmakīrti's own degree of dogmatism or doctrinalism? Arguably there could be different and much less conservative *applications* of a Dharmakīrtian methodological position on scripturally based inferences. The uncertainty and inductive character of scriptural reasoning might well allow a Buddhist to maintain that some or even many scriptural passages on karma, cosmology and other subjects *need* not be taken to be true simply because so much else, or so much else which is important, in the scripture seems to be true. There is the possibility that these would be precisely the areas where the inductive character of scriptural reasoning revealed its weaknesses. Someone could go one step further. A left-leaning Buddhist might then come to the additional conclusion that believing in such passages would no longer be of any use in a modern man's spiritual search, and that they could be rationally left to the past. In fact, I don't think that the interpretation of Dharmakīrti's methodology which I am setting forth does invariably place Dharmakīrti, or even Dharmakīrtians, in a left-leaning camp when it comes to applications. I have above all tried to argue against what I take to be an overly facile view of his rationality, one which does, in effect, yield a type of dogmatism in rational garb. What exactly is useful or essential for what kind of spiritual goals remains an open question.

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[15] P. 646 in R. P. Hayes, "The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52/4, 1984.

ON THE DEDUCTION OF *VYĀPTI* FROM THE SECOND CONDITION OF *HETU*

by

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It is not clear whether the Sanskrit '*sapakṣa*'/'*vipakṣa*' denotes an individual or a set of individuals. In order to preserve the ambiguity, J. F. Staal [1962] made use of the restricted-variables in formalizing '*sapakṣa*' and '*vipakṣa*'. (If the restricted-variables are not used, the syntactical formalization of '*sapakṣa*' or '*vipakṣa*' would be extremely difficult.) Although his deduction of the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) from the second condition of *hetu*—*sapakṣa eva sattvam*—contains an error, I believe that the formalization of the second condition of *hetu* by making use of the restricted-variable is to be highly recommended. The aim of this paper is to modify the deduction, and to investigate the logical relationships among the second condition, the third condition, and the *vyāpti*. The results obtained make it possible to examine some features of Dignāga's logic.

1. It was pointed out by Hans G. Herzberger [1986] that the soundness or validity of Dignāga's logic fails. For example, the conclusions of the following inferences are evidently false, while the *hetus* (logical reasons) of the inferences satisfy the three conditions of *hetu* which are stipulated by Dignāga.

(A.1) Every cetacean (aquatic mammal) is a land-dweller,
because of being mammal.
(*pakṣa*, *hetu*, *sādhya-dharma*) = (cetacean, being mammal, being land-dweller)

(A.2) Every odd integer is divisible by two,
because of being integer.
(p, h, s) = (odd integer, being integer, being divisible by two)

The cetaceans (whales, porpoises, etc.) are aquatic mammals, hence, the first condition of *hetu*—*pakṣadharmatva*—is satisfied. The property 'being mammal' exists in some land-dwellers (non-cetacean mammals), hence, the second condition of *hetu*—*sapakṣe (eva) sattvam*—is satisfied. And every non-land-dweller except cetacean is not a mammal, so, the third condition of *hetu*—*asapakṣe (= vipakṣe) asattvam*—is satisfied. But it is obviously not the case that every cetacean is a land-dweller.

As to (A.2), the property 'being integer' exists in the *pakṣa* (= odd integer); 'being integer' exists in every *sapakṣa* (= even integer); 'being integer' does not exist in any *vipakṣa* since there is no *vipakṣa* (= odd integer except the *pakṣa* = vacant). (For the time being, I adopt the standpoint of Dignāga that if there is no *vipakṣa* the third condition of *hetu* is automatically satisfied. cf. note 9.)

Similar inferences are already discussed by Dignāga himself.

(A.3) Sound (*śabda*) is not sound (*śabda*),
because of being produced immediately after effort (*prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*).
(A.4) Sound is not audible (*śrotavyaḥ*),
because of being produced immediately after effort (*prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*).

The *hetu prayatnānantarīyakatva* (being produced immediately after effort) of the inference (A.3) satisfies the first of the three conditions of *hetu*, for *śabda* is *prayatnānantarīyaka*. Since *prayatnānantarīyakatva* exists in something which is not *śabda*, for example, a *ghaṭa* (pot), the second condition of *hetu* is satisfied. And the third condition of *hetu* is satisfied since there is no *vipakṣa* (*vipakṣa* = what is not not-*śabda* and not the *pakṣa* = what is a *śabda* and not-*śabda* = vacant). In the same way the *hetu prayatnānantarīyakatva* of (A.4) satisfies the three conditions of *hetu*. Dignāga, however, denies the validity of these inferences on account of the contradictions with our experience.[1]

The non-soundness or invalidity of Dignāga's logic gives rise to the following antinomies (*viruddhāvyabhicāra*).

(B.1) Sound (*śabda*) is non-eternal (*anitya*),
because of being produced (*kṛtakatvāt*), like a pot (*ghaṭa*).
(B.2) Sound is eternal (*nitya*),
because of being audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*), like sound-ness (*śabdatva*).

The inference (B.2) satisfies the three conditions of *hetu* on condition that *śrāvaṇatva* exists in *śabdatva* as well as in *śabda*. (PSV(K), p. 495; PSṬ 167a7–b2)

(B.3) Every even number except 2 is not a prime number (is a non-prime number),
because of being divisible by a number that is neither 1 nor itself, like 9.
pakṣa: 4,6,8,10,12, . . .
sapakṣa: 1,9,15,21, . . . (non-prime odd number)
vipakṣa: 2,3,5,7,11,13, . . . (prime number)
(B.4) Every even number except 2 is a prime number,
because of being next to an odd number, like 2.
pakṣa: 4,6,8,10,12, . . .
sapakṣa: 2,3,5,7,11,13, . . . (prime number)
vipakṣa: 1,9,15,21, . . . (non-prime odd number)

While all of these inferences are valid under the three conditions of *hetu*, the conclusions of the inference (B.1) and (B.3) contradict those of (B.2) and (B.4), respectively.

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[1] *de bzhin du mthong ba la mi* (delete *mi* acc. to PSV(V)) *gnod pa ni chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo dang khyad par 'gal bar brjod par bya ste / dper na rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir sgra ma yin pa dang / mnyan par bya ba ma yin no zhes bya ba lta bu'o* (PSV(K), p. 500); in the same way, it is to be stated that [an inference that has] a counterexperience is [an inference that has] a contradiction with the nature or property of the proprietor (*dharmin*). For example, "[*śabda*] is not *śabda*, *prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*," and "[*śabda*] is not audible, *prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*."

Another example:

Universe of discourse except *pakṣa* is a set of natural numbers which comprises (1) multiples of 20 which are not multiples of 3 and (2) multiples of 3 which have the property S and are not multiples of 5. Here, S means the property of being a number whose remainder is 1 when divided by 4.

(1) = {20,40,80,100,140, . . . }
(2) = {9,21,33,57,69,81,93,117, . . . }

(C.1) 60 is a multiple of 4,
because of being a multiple of 5, like 20.
pakṣa: 60
sapakṣa: 20,40,80,100,140, . . .
vipakṣa: 9,21,33,57,69,81,93,117, . . .

(C.2) 60 has the property S,
because of being a multiple of 3, like 9.
pakṣa: 60
sapakṣa: 9,21,33,57,69,81,93,117, . . .
vipakṣa: 20,40,80,100,140, . . .

It is easy to see that the *hetus* of (C.1) and (C.2) satisfy the three conditions of *hetu*, and the conclusions of these inferences contradict each other. (Strictly speaking, the opposition between the property of being a multiple of 4 and the property S is not a contradiction but a contrariety.)

It seems to me that the non-soundness or invalidity has its root in the application of the *vyāpti* relationship (invariable concomitance: *yatra hetus tatra sādhyadharmaḥ*) to the *pakṣa*, for a *hetu* which satisfies the three conditions of *hetu* does not necessarily warrant the *vyāpti* relationship outside the domain of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. I shall call the domain of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* 'induction domain' borrowing R. P. Hayes' terminology.[2] Our problem is, then, whether the *vyāpti* relationship is warranted inside the induction domain.

2. From the modern logical point of view the *vyāpti* relationship is considered the basis of the Indian logical inference. Therefore, it is required to show that the *vyāpti* is implied by the three conditions of *hetu*, specifically, by the second or third condition.

Concerning the implication between the second or third condition of *hetu* and the *vyāpti*, it can be shown that there is no definite textual evidence in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In the first place, there seems to be two types of Dignāga's second condition of *hetu*. The one is such that a valid *hetu* exists in (all or some of) similar instances ("*tattulye sadbhāvo*", "*sapakṣe sattvam*"), the other is such that a valid *hetu* exists only in similar instances ("*sapakṣa eva sattvam*"). I shall term the former <u>the second condition of *hetu* N</u>, and the latter <u>the second condition of *hetu* EVA</u>.[3]

[2] Cf. Hayes [1988].

[3] One of the types of the second condition is stated in the following passage: *anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati* (PS II 5cd, Kitagawa [1965: 96]); [A valid inferencial mark (*liṅga*, *hetu*)] exists in the object of inference (*anumeye*) and in what is similar to that (*tat-tulya*), and does not exist in the thing which is not [similar to that].

Another passage which represents the same type is: *gang mthun phyogs med pa la med pa dang / mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa de gtan tshigs yin pa* (PSV(K) p. 491); A [valid] *hetu* is a thing which does not exist in what is not

There are several passages in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that refer to the implications between the second or third condition of *hetu* and the *vyāpti*. Some of them are as follows:

(a) *tshul gsum gtan tshigs zhes bshad pa'i /*
'dir ni phyogs chos bstan par ni /
gnas yin lhag ma'i tshul gnyis ni /
dpe yis rab tu ston par byed // (PS(K) IV 1, p. 512)
gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes 'gro ba /
bsgrub bya med la med pa nyid /
dpe gang la ni bstan bya ba /
de chos mthun dang cig shos gnyis // (PS(K) IV 2, p. 513)[4]
"Among the three conditions of *hetu*, the *pakṣadharmatva* (= the first condition of *hetu*) has been explained here. The remaining two conditions are shown by instances (*dṛṣṭānta*).
That the *hetu* is linked to the *sādhya*, and that [the *hetu*] does not exist where the *sādhya* does not exist, are expressed in the two instances (*dṛṣṭānta*), which are an instance of similar property (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) and the other (= *vaidhrmya-dṛṣṭānta*, Cf. PSṬ D213a6–7)."

(b) *gang gi tshe dpe gnyi ga sbyar bar bya ba de'i tshe mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa tsam bstan par bya ba yin la / khyab pa ni bsgrub bya med na med pa ston pas yin no* (PSV(K), p. 518)
"When both instances are used then only that [the *hetu*] exists in similar instances (*sapakṣa*) is shown [by the similar instance], and *vyāpti* is [shown] by showing that [the *hetu*] does not exist where the *sādhya* does not exist."

(c) *de ltar na rigs mthun pa nyid la yod* (PSV(V): *mthun pa'i phyogs kho na la yod for rigs mthun pa nyid la yod*) *ces bya bas bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba kho na gtan tshigs so zhes nges par bzung ba na / rigs mi mthun pa la yod pa dgag pa thob pas nges pa'i don du 'gyur te* (PSV(K), p. 518)[5]

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sapakṣa but exists in *sapakṣa*.

The other type of the second condition appears in Dignāga's commentary on the first passage. He comments as follows: *de'i rigs la yang mtha' dag gam phyogs cig yod pa nyid do // de gang las zhe na / de dang mtshungs pa kho na la yod pa zhes nges par gzung ba'i phyir yin gyi yod pa kho na zhes ni ma yin no* (PSV(K) p. 455), *de'i rigs dang mthun pa la yang spyi'i tshul gis phyogs thams cad dam phyogs gcig la yod par grub pa'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / de dang mthun pa kho na la yod ces nges par gzung ba'i phyir ro // de dang mthun pa la yod pa kho na'o zhes ni brjod par mi bya ba'i phyir ro* (ibid. PSV(V)); [A valid inferencial mark (*liṅga, hetu*)] exists in all of what is similar to that (*tat-tulya*) or in some of them, for the restriction [of the particle *eva*] means that it (*liṅga*) exists only in what is similar to that, and not that it necessarily exist in what is similar to that.

Kitagawa argues that Dignāga's second condition of *hetu* is not such that a valid *hetu* exists only in similar instances ("*sapakṣa eva sattvam*") but that a valid *hetu* exists in all or some of similar instances. If, he argues, the second condition of *hetu* is such that a valid *hetu* must exist only in similar instances, then the second condition and the third condition of *hetu* would mean the same, hence it would not be possible that a *hetu* satisfies only one of the two conditions. (Kitagawa [1965: 98])

It seems to me that whether the second and third conditions of *hetu* are logically equivalent or not depends on how we formulate these two conditions. Under our formalizations (7m) and (8m), the problem is not solved.

[4] In the second verse, '*rjes 'gro ba*' (*anvaya*) means '*thams cad du 'gro ba*', '*thams cad la 'gro ba*' (PSV(V, K) p. 513). So '*anvaya*' seems to mean in that passage the *vyāpti* relationship: yatra *hetus* tatra *sādhya-dharmaḥ*. Dignāga says also: that [the *hetu* is linked to the *sādhya*] is [stated] to negate that the *sādhya* is linked to the *hetu*; *'di yang bsgrub bya gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba bkag pa'i don du 'gyur ro* (PSV(K), p. 518).

[5] Kitagawa reads the passage (c) in such a way that the first part of the passage "*de ltar na rigs mthun pa nyid la yod*" is an objection from an opponent who considers that the second condition of *hetu* EVA is necessarily implied

"Thus when one restricts [the word by the particle *eva* (only)] in such a way that only what is linked to the *sādhya* is a [valid] *hetu* by saying that [a valid *hetu*] exists only in similar types (instances), one gets a definite meaning that the existence [of the *hetu*] in dissimilar types is denied."

From the passages cited above, the following implications among the second condition of *hetu*, the third condition of *hetu*, and the *vyāpti* seems to be affirmed by Dignāga.

1. *vyāpti (anvaya)* → second condition of *hetu* (N or EVA) [a,b]
2. second condition of *hetu* EVA → *vyāpti (anvaya)* → third condition of *hetu* [c]
3. third condition of *hetu* → *vyāpti (anvaya)* [b]

From (1) and the first half of (2), it may follow that *vyāpti (anvaya)* and the second condition of *hetu* EVA are equivalent, and from (3) and the second half of (2), it follows that *vyāpti (anvaya)* and the third condition of *hetu* are equivalent. Hence, it may follow that the second condition EVA and the third condition of *hetu* are equivalent. It is doubtful, however, that Dignāga confirms the equivalency, for the following inference cannot be valid under the three conditions of *hetu*.

(D) Sound (*śabda*) is sound (*śabda*),
because of being audible (*śrāvaṇatvāt*).

In the inference (D), there is no *sapakṣa* (similar instance) because the *hetu* (audibility) is a property only of the *pakṣa* (sound), while the third condition of *hetu* is satisfied. So, if one confirms the equivalency of the second and the third condition of *hetu*, the inference (D) must be valid, which would be rejected by Dignāga, because Dignāga states that if only a dissimilar instance is stated then the *hetu* (audibility) would be an *asādhāraṇa-hetu*, which is not considered valid by him.[6]

After all, since it seems to be impossible to determine only from the textual evidence whether the second condition of *hetu* EVA and the third condition of *hetu* is equivalent or not, I am going to analyze this conundrum by symbolic logic.

3. In his article "Contraposition in Indian Logic" (1962), J. F. Staal intended to prove that the second condition of *hetu* EVA (*sapakṣa eva sattvam*) logically implies the *vyāpti* relationship. Although his proof contains an error—in the introduction to his *Universals*, 1988, Staal admits, though not specifically, a fault in the proof—it is the method of proof that seems to be important. Though he formalizes the second condition of *hetu* which appears in *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti, I think that his formalization pertains essentially to the second condition of *hetu* EVA of Dignāga.

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by Dignāga's argument. As mentioned in note 3, since Kitagawa is opposed to the idea that Dignāga's second condition of *hetu* is the second condition of EVA, he cannot accept the words as those of Dignāga. Kitagawa, however, says, "In essence, Dignāga is obliged to accept the argument of the opponent." (ibid., p. 259) I read the whole passage as words of Dignāga.

[6] *gal te chos mi mthun pa nyid rjod par byed na ni bsgrub par bya ba'i rigs la yang med pas thun mong ma yin par 'gyur ro* (PSV(V), p. 520); If only a dissmiilar thing (*chos mi thun pa*) is stated then [the *hetu*] would be *asādhāraṇa* because there is nothing which is similar to the *sādhya*.

The following is Staal's proof:

"An inference in Indian logic can generally be written in the following form:

(1) $(x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x))$.

Here A(y,x) denotes the relation of occurrence of a term y in its locus x; h denotes the reason (*hetu*) and s denotes the thing-to-be-inferred (*sādhya*). In the stock example h denotes smoke and s denotes fire. The relationship of inference is often called *vyāpti*, 'pervasion', which may be written V(h,s). . . .

In order to formalize these conditions (note: the second and third conditions of *hetu*) in a manner which preserves as far as possible the structure of the Sanskrit expressions, use will be made of the expression $\alpha xF(x)$ for a restricted-variable denoting any of the values of x such that F(x). . . .

The use of the expression $\alpha xF(x)$, which may occur either free or bound, is governed by various laws, the following three of which will be utilized:

(2) $(\alpha xF(x))G(\alpha xF(x)) \leftrightarrow (x)(F(x) \rightarrow G(x))$,

(3) $(Ey)(y = \alpha xF(x)) \leftrightarrow (Ex)F(x)$,

(4) $(y)(y = \alpha xF(x)) \leftrightarrow (x)F(x)$.

The terms *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* can now be defined as follows:

sapakṣa:

(5) $\alpha x((x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x))$;

vipakṣa:

(6) $\alpha x{\sim}A(s,x)$.

If these two expressions are substituted, respectively, in the second and third conditions of Dharmakīrti mentioned above, the result is:

(7) $(y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow (y = \alpha x((x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x))))$,

(8) $(\alpha x{\sim}A(s,x)){\sim}A(h, \alpha x{\sim}A(s,x))$.

The question now arises whether (7) and (8) yield (1), as is the contention of Dharmakīrti. Starting from (7) we derive:

(8.0) $(y)A(h, y) \rightarrow (y)(y = \alpha x((x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x)))$,

and hence with the help of (4):

(8.1) $(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (y)((y \neq p) \wedge A(s,y))$,

(8.2) $(y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow ((y \neq p) \wedge A(s,y)))$,

(8.3) $(y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow A(s,y))$,

or (1), which has been thus derived from (7) only.

The expression (8), on the other hand, yields with the help of (2):

(9) $(x)({\sim}A(s,x) \rightarrow {\sim}A(h,x))$.

This is the contrapositive of (1), which has been thus derived from (8) only. Summarizing these results it may be said that the second condition implies (1) directly, whereas the third condition implies either (1) or the second condition through contraposition."

Staal [1962: 635–636; 1988: 94–95] (numberings 8.0, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 are mine.)

Meaning of symbols.

$\sim$: negation. ${\sim}A(s,x)$ is a negation of the proposition A(s,x).

$\wedge$: conjunction. $(x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x)$ means $x \neq p$ and A(s,x).

$\rightarrow$: implication. $A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x)$ means that if it is the case that A(h,x) then it is the case that A(s,x).

$\leftrightarrow$: biconditional. $F \leftrightarrow G$ means $(F \rightarrow G) \wedge (G \rightarrow F)$.

=: identity.

$\neq$: negation of identity. $x \neq y$ means $\sim(x = y)$.

(x): universal quantifier. (x)F(x) means that every x has the property F.

(Ex): existential quantifier. (Ex)F(x) means that at least one x has the property F.

αxF(x): anything which has the property F. Such a variable that denotes anything which has the property F is introduced by Hailperin [1957], and is termed a restricted-variable. The referent which is denoted by restricted-variable cannot be such an individual as is fixed by the definite article. (cf. Nakatogawa [1983: 49]; Staal [1988: 60].)

The error of the proof lies in the deduction of (8.2) from (8.1).

While

(SA) $(x)(F(x) \rightarrow G(x)) \rightarrow ((x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x))$

(If for every x if x has the property F then x has the property G, then if every x has the property F, then every x has the property G.)

is an axiom of the predicate logic, the converse of (SA), or

(SB) $((x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)) \rightarrow (x)(F(x) \rightarrow G(x))$

(If it is the case that if every x has the property F then every x has the property G, then it is the case that for every x if x has the property F then x has the property G.)

is not a theorem of the predicate logic.[7]

Hence, the deduction of (8.2) from (8.1) is not valid.

Although (SB) is not valid, it is proved that a qualified form of (SB) turns out to be valid. That is to say,

(SC) $(x)F(x) \rightarrow ([(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)] \rightarrow (x)[F(x) \rightarrow G(x)])$

is a valid formula.[8]

Our result is obtained through modifying Staal's proof by using (SC). In order to make it clear that our universe of discourse contains the *pakṣa*, I use (7m) instead of (7) (in Staal's proof) to formalize the second condition of *hetu* EVA.

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[7] A 'counter example' of (SB). Consider the following situation (a possible world).

A group of people plan an excursion to a beach. They have the following two rules as to the excursion.

Rule 1: If all the people who gather on the day planned are older than 9 years old, then all of them go to the beach.

Rule 2: If there is at least one youth who is lower than 10 years old among the people who gather on the day, the excursion is cancelled, that is to say, nobody goes to the beach.

Suppose that Taro and Jiro are among the people who gather on the day, and that Taro is 12 years old and Jiro is 9 years old. Then, by the Rule 2 the excursion is cancelled.

Let the predicate F be 'older than 9', and G 'go to the beach'. Then since $(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)$ is the Rule 1 itself, $(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)$ is true in that situation. On the other hand, since F(Taro) is true and G(Taro) is false $F(Taro) \rightarrow G(Taro)$ is false, hence $(x)(F(x) \rightarrow G(x))$ is false. Therefore, (SB) is false in that situation (possible world), thus (SB) is not a theorem of the predicate logic.

[8] Proof of SC.

SC: $(x)F(x) \rightarrow ([(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)] \rightarrow (x)[F(x) \rightarrow G(x)])$.

SC $\leftrightarrow (x)F(x) \wedge ([(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)]) \rightarrow (x)[F(x) \rightarrow G(x)]$. $(P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow R) \leftrightarrow (P \wedge Q) \rightarrow R)$.

$(x)F(x) \wedge ([(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)]) \rightarrow (x)G(x)$ is valid.

$(x)G(x) \rightarrow (x)[F(x) \rightarrow G(x)]$ is valid.

Consequently, $(x)F(x) \wedge ([(x)F(x) \rightarrow (x)G(x)]) \rightarrow (x)[F(x) \rightarrow G(x)]$ is valid.

Hence, SC is valid.

(This proof was suggested by K. Nakatogawa through personal correspondence.)

(7m) $(y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow (y = \alpha x F(x)))$.
$F(x)$: $[(x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x)] \vee (x = p)$.

(7m) means that for any locus y, if it is the case that A(h,y) then y is *sapakṣa* or *pakṣa*. In propositional logic, if $(Q \rightarrow P)$ then $P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow P)$. Therefore, from (7m) we derive:

(7mm) $(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow (y = \alpha x F(x)))]$.

Starting from (7mm), we modify Staal's proof as follows:

(mm0) $(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (y)(y = \alpha x F(x))]$, (SA)
$(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (x)F(x)]$, (using (4))
(mm1) $(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (x)([(x \neq p) \wedge A(s,x)] \vee (x = p))$,
$(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (x)([(x \neq p) \vee (x = p)] \wedge [A(s,x) \vee (x = p)]$, (law of distribution)
$(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (x)(A(s,x) \vee (x = p))]$, (law of excluded middle)
$(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (y)(A(s,y) \vee (y = p))]$,
$((x)(A(s,x) \vee (x = p)) \leftrightarrow (y)(A(s,y) \vee (y = p)))$
(mm2) $(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow [(y)(A(h,y) \rightarrow (A(s,y) \vee (y = p)))]$. (SC)

(mm2) means: If the *hetu* exists in every locus, then for any locus y if the *hetu* exists in the locus y there exists the *sādhya* in the locus y or the locus y is the *pakṣa*.

As for *vipakṣa*, I formalize it as (6m) instead of (6).

(6m) $\alpha x((x \neq p) \wedge \sim A(s,x))$.

Hence, (8) in Staal's proof is modified as follows.

(8m) $(\alpha x H(x)) \sim A(h, \alpha x H(x))$.
$H(x)$: $\sim A(s,x) \wedge (x \neq p)$.

(8m) is a formalization of the third condition of *hetu*, which means that the *hetu* does not exist in any *vipakṣa* ($\alpha x[\sim A(s,x) \wedge (x \neq p)]$). From (8m) we derive:

$(x)(H(x) \rightarrow \sim A(h,x))$. (using (2))

Namely,

(9m) $(x)([\sim A(s,x) \wedge (x \neq p)] \rightarrow \sim A(h,x))$.

From (9m) we derive:

$(x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow \sim[\sim A(s,x) \wedge (x \neq p)])$, (contraposition)
(1m) $(x)(A(h,x) \rightarrow (A(s,x) \vee (x = p))$. (de Morgan's law, law of double negation)

(1m) means: For any locus x if the *hetu* exists in the locus x, then there exists the *sādhya* in the locus x or the locus x is the *pakṣa*. Thus, the following results are obtained.

1. (7m)—the second condition of *hetu* EVA—logically implies (mm2).
2. (8m)—the third condition of *hetu*—logically implies (1m).

We notice that (1m) is the consequent in (mm2), which is implied by the second condition of *hetu* EVA. (1m) can be transformed into (1mm).


(1mm) $(x)[(x \neq p) \rightarrow (A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x))]$.

(1mm) means that: For every locus x, if x is not the *pakṣa* then the *vyāpti* relationship holds. In the same manner, (mm2) can be transformed into (mm20).

(mm20) $(y)A(h,y) \rightarrow (y)[(y \neq p) \rightarrow (A(h,y) \rightarrow A(s,y))]$.


(mm20) means that: If the *hetu* exists in every locus, then for any locus y, if y is not the *pakṣa* then the *vyāpti* relationship in the locus y holds.

Diagram 1.



When we represent (1mm) as U(h), (mm20) is represented as $(x)A(h,x) \rightarrow U(h)$. Hence, the diagram 1 is transformed into the diagram 2.

Diagram 2.



(T(h) = (mm20), U(h) = (1mm))

4. Now, our problem is that under a given situation, what kind of *hetu* warrants the *vyāpti* in the induction domain. We consider the four cases of the induction domain (the domain of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*).

W1: There exists at least one *sapakṣa*-case and at least one *vipakṣa*-case.
W2: There exists at least one *sapakṣa*-case but there exists no *vipakṣa*.
W3: There exists at least one *vipakṣa*-case but there exists no *sapakṣa*.
W4: There exists neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*.

Case W1: There exists at least one *sapakṣa*-case and at least one *vipakṣa*-case.

According to the diagram, every *hetu* that satisfies the second condition EVA (7m) or the third condition (8m) warrants the *vyāpti* relationship—U(h)—in the induction domain.

Case W3: There exists at least one *vipakṣa*-case but there exists no *sapakṣa*. (Every locus except *pakṣa* is *vipakṣa*.)

The second condition EVA (7m) is not satisfied, if there is at least one locus (except *pakṣa*) where *hetu* exists. In this case, *vyāpti* is derived from the third condition of *hetu*. An inference based on thus derived *vyāpti* is a so-called *kevalavyatirekin*.

Case W2: There exists at least one *sapakṣa*-case but there exists no *vipakṣa*. (Every locus except *pakṣa* is *sapakṣa*.)

As is well known, Dignāga affirms that when there is no *vipakṣa* the third condition of *hetu* (*asapakṣe 'sattvam*) is automatically satisfied. —Let us call his position standpoint-D.[9]—Therefore, from the standpoint of Dignāga any *hetu* in the case of W2 automatically satisfies the third condition of *hetu*. The formula of *vyāpti* U(h) that is derived from (and equivalent with) the formalization (8m) of the third condition of *hetu* holds if there is no *vipakṣa*. (Since there is no *vipakṣa*, if $x \neq p$ then A(s,x) is true, consequently $(x \neq p) \rightarrow (A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x))$ is true irrespective of whether A(h,x) is true or false.)

On the other hand, if we adopt the standpoint that the third condition of *hetu* is not satisfied when there is no *vipakṣa*—that position appears in *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra and let us call that position standpoint-K[10]—we are obliged to obtain the *vyāpti* relationship via a *hetu* which satisfies the second condition of *hetu* EVA. (From the standpoint-K, the third condition is formalized as (8m) $\wedge$ $(Ex)[(x \neq p) \wedge \sim A(s,x)]$.) In that case, however, it is not certain that a *hetu* which satisfies the second condition EVA always warrants the *vyāpti* U(h). According to the diagram 2, a sufficient condition of such a *hetu* as warrants the *vyāpti* is that the *hetu* satisfies both T(h): $(x)A(h,x) \rightarrow U(h)$ and the antecedent of T(h). The antecedent (x)A(h,x) means that the *hetu* pervades the universe of discourse (including the induction domain). If (x)A(h,x) holds, then U(h) is detached from $(x)A(h,x) \rightarrow U(h)$.

In the case of W2, the condition (x)A(h,x) amounts to saying that the *hetu* exists in every *sapakṣa*, since there is no *vipakṣa*, and it is clear that if the *hetu* satisfies (x)A(h,x) then it satisfies the second condition EVA (7m). Consequently, when we adopt the standpoint-K, if a *hetu* is such that it satisfies the condition (x)A(h,x) then it is valid. That is to say, a *hetu* of the second category of the nine divisions of *hetu* (in the *Hetucakranirṇaya* of Dignāga) is always valid even when we adopt the standpoint-K.

We consider the case W2 in greater detail. Since there is no *vipakṣa*, any locus except *pakṣa* is *sapakṣa*, that is to say, any locus (except *pakṣa*) has *sādhya-dharma*. Then the *vyāpti* relationship (*yatra hetus tatra sādhya-dharmaḥ*) is satisfied irrespective of what the *hetu* is. Therefore, from the standpoint-D, any kind of *hetu* warrants the *vyāpti*. Now, consider the following situation.

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[9] Standpoint-D.

de ltar ni gang gi (read: *gang gi tshe*) *mthun* (read: *mi mthun*) *pa'i phyogs nyid med par 'gyur te / mi rtag pa nyid phyogs yin pa na nam mkha' la sogs pa khas mi len pa'i phyir de'i tshe ji ltar de la med ces brjod par bya ste / de'i tshe the tshom nyid yod pa ma yin te de med pa'i phyir de la mi 'jug pas nyes pa 'di med do* (PSV(K), p. 492): [Opponent asks:] If so, when dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) itself does not exist, then why can you say that [the *hetu*] does not exist in that (= *vipakṣa*), for [you] do not accept [the existence of] the ether (*ākāśa*) and others [in the inference where] the thema (*pakṣa*) is non-eternity?

[Proponent answers:] In that case there does not arise any doubt, because as it (= *vipakṣa*) does not exists [the *hetu*] does not exist in it. [Hence] there is not such a fault [for us].

[10] Standpoint-K (*Tarkabhāṣā* ed. by Iyer).

tasya hi vipakṣād vyāvṛttir nāsti, vipakṣābhāvāt; They (= reasons which partake only the affirmative, *kevalānvayin*) do not satisfy the condition 'non-existence in negative instances' as there is no 'negative instance' in their case. (Iyer's translation, p. 89 section 50)

A group of people plan an excursion to a beach. They have the following two rules as to the excursion.

Rule 1: If all the people who gather are men, then they go to the beach.

Rule 2: If there is at least one woman among the people who gather, then the excursion is cancelled, that is to say, nobody goes to the beach.

Let us suppose that Taro and Hanako are among the people who gather, and that Taro is a man and Hanako is a woman. Then, by the Rule 2 the excursion is cancelled. Suppose, further, that Hiromi is a woman and that she is outside the induction domain. Then the following inference is valid under the three conditions of *hetu*.

(E) Hiromi does not go to the beach,
because of being a woman,
like Hanako.

The validity of E can be shown as follows:

First, the *pakṣa* Hiromi has the property 'being a woman' since she is a woman. Secondly, there is no *vipakṣa*, for everyone of the people who gather does not go to the beach. Hence, if we adopt the standpoint-D, the third condition of *hetu* is satisfied. And since the third condition of *hetu* logically implies the *vyāpti* relationship, the *hetu* 'being a woman' of E has *vyāpti* relationship with the *sādhya-dharma* 'not going to the beach'. (Let us set aside the problem of negative predication.)

On the other hand, if Hiromi is a man—the Japanese proper name 'Hiromi' is customarily used to refer to both a man and a woman—the following inference with the *hetu* 'being a man' is valid.

(F) Hiromi does not go to the beach,
because of being a man,
like Taro.

As is the case with E, it is easy to see that the *hetu* 'being a man' has *vyāpti* relationship with the *sādhya-dharma* 'not going to the beach'.

In these examples, each of the contradictory *hetu*s 'being a woman' and 'being a man' establishes the same *sādhya-dharma*. According to the propositional calculus, if both propositions P and not-P imply the proposition Q, then Q must be true. However, the *pakṣa* (Hiromi who is a woman) of the inference E is not identical with the *pakṣa* (Hiromi who is a man) of the inference F. Therefore our example is not strictly the same as the case where the contradictory propositions imply the same proposition. One weak point of the *hetu*s in E and F seems to be that they are not persuasive. Suppose that Hiromi, who is a woman, hears that another Hiromi, who is a man, is not allowed to go to the beach on account of his being male. Then she would believe that she can go to the beach. But E says that she is not allowed to go to the beach on account of her being female. She would be indignant, and want to know the real reason why she cannot go to the beach.

This awkward situation is due to the fact that we adopt the standpoint-D. Then what happens when we adopt the standpoint-K? In that case, a *hetu* which pervades the induction domain, that

is to say, a *hetu* of the second category of the nine divisions of *hetu*, warrant the *vyāpti*, and the inference based on the *hetu* is possible. In the Hiromi case, for example, the following inference based on the *hetu* 'human being' is valid under the standpoint-K.

(G) Hiromi does not go to the beach
because of being a human being,
like Hanako (or Taro).

It is true that the *hetu* 'human being' is not the real reason why people must not go to the beach—the real reasons are the Rules 1 and 2: under these rules a property (*dharma*: going to the beach) of an individual is affected by the property (*dharma*) of the assembly to which the individual belongs. The *hetu* 'human being', however, is not a *hetu* which stands side by side with the contradictory *hetu* 'non-human-being.' Although Hiromi is not in the induction domain, one may be able to persuade Hiromi that she must not go to the beach because she has the property of human being and which all the people who must not go to the beach have in common. In this sense, it seems to me that the awkwardness of the *hetu* 'human being' of G is less than that of the *hetu* 'being a man' of F, or 'being a woman' of E.

Thus the standpoint-K seems to have a raison d'être.

Case W4: There exists neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*.

In this case, from the standpoint-D, the *vyāpti* is logically obtained by any *hetu* (property) which exists in the *pakṣa*. Of course, in the case of W4, there is no locus except the *pakṣa* in the universe of discourse, and hence the validity of the *vyāpti* formalized as U(h) is not material but only formal. (The only assignment of individual to the variable x is such that x is p (*pakṣa*). Consequently the antecedent $(x \neq p)$ is false, hence the whole conditional $(x \neq p) \rightarrow (A(h,x) \rightarrow A(s,x))$ is true.)

On the other hand, if we adopt the standpoint-K, we have no means to obtain the *vyāpti* relationship, because there is no property which satisfies the second or third condition of *hetu*.

In the cases W2 and W4, since there is no *vipakṣa*, if we adopt the standpoint-D the third condition of *hetu* is satisfied by any *hetu* which exists in the *pakṣa*, hence, the *vyāpti* relationship is logically obtained from the third condition of *hetu*. I believe that Dignāga is committed to the standpoint-K when he asserts that the fifth category of the nine divisions of *hetu*, namely *asādhāraṇa-hetu*, is invalid, as is the case with *śrāvaṇatva* in the inference of *nityatva* of *śabda*. For under the standpoint-D, *śrāvaṇatva* of *śabda* automatically satisfies the third condition of *hetu* as there is no *vipakṣa*, hence, *śrāvaṇatva* of *śabda* warrants the *vyāpti* relationship in the induction domain. (Although the induction domain is vacant in the case of W4.) From the logical point of view, Dignāga could have stuck to his position (standpoint-D) that if there is no *vipakṣa* the third condition of *hetu* is automatically satisfied, and thence classified the fifth category of the nine divisions of *hetu* as a valid *hetu*.

Concluding remarks:

One of the characteristic features of Dignāga's logic seems to be that it is not a deductive reasoning, but rather a presentation of a *hetu* (reason) which logically confirms the fact (of experience or ideology) and hence makes the fact a reasoned fact.[11] Sometimes the presentation of

hetu succeeds in attaining the purpose of persuading another person (*para*), sometimes fails. Success and failure depends on the situation (possible world) where the reasoning or presentation is made. A successful *hetu* must satisfy at least the *vyāpti* relationship in the induction domain, but considering the antinomy that may be given rise to, it is probable that any presentation of *hetu* cannot be fully persuasive. According to our considerations, when there is no *vipakṣa*, the most successful *hetu* seems to be the *hetu* which pervades the universe of discourse, namely the *hetu* of the second category of the nine divisions of *hetu*. And for such an inference α there seems to be no possibility of antinomy, for a *hetu* of the inference β which establishes the absence of the *sādhya-dharma* of the inference α must not reside in *vipakṣa*, which is *sapakṣa* of the inference α, hence it is an *asādhāraṇa-hetu*, since there is no *vipakṣa* of the inference α.

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PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Kitagawa [1965].
PS(K) *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib. tr. Kanakavarman): See Kitagawa [1965].
PSṬ *Viśālāmalavatī-nāma-pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4268.
PSV(K) *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib. tr. Kanakavarman): See Kitagawa [1965].
PSV(V) *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib. tr. Vasudhararakṣita): See Kitagawa [1965].
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[11] On 'the reasoned fact', see M. Veeraiah [1988: 26].

ONTOLOGICAL AFFINITY BETWEEN THE JAINAS AND THE MĪMĀṂSAKAS VIEWED BY BUDDHIST LOGICIANS*

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0. Introduction

As is well known, a central doctrine of Jainism is the 'theory of many-sidedness' (*anekānta-vāda*). This doctrine, often thought to be unique to the Jainas, holds that reality, by nature, is many-sided (*anekānta*)—that is, that every real entity (*vastu*) is supposed to have innumerable characters, or natures, even ones which are mutually incompatible.

Although Dharmakīrti rejects this doctrine,[1] he says little about it. However, his followers, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri, fiercely attack it.[2] Basing themselves on Dharmakīrti's logical theory, they reject the Jaina view that incompatible characters, such as 'permanent' (*nitya*) and 'impermanent' (*anitya*), 'generic' (*sāmānya*) and 'specific' (*viśeṣa*) and so forth, can be attributed to a single entity.

In their explanation of the Jaina doctrine of many-sidedness, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri quote several statements from the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the most well-known and influential author of the Mīmāṃsā school.[3] Moreover, the very same verse as the one quoted by Jitāri is

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I am most grateful to the following institutes for permission to make use of the valuable manuscripts and transcripts: the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, the Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, the Sarasvati Bhavan Library, the Asiatic Society, the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, the Adyar Library, the Bodleian Library and the Prajñā Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍala. As for the text of the *Ślokavārttika* Ātmavāda, I am planning to provide its critical edition including the *Śarkarikāṭīkā* and the *Kāśikāṭīkā* which have never been published up to the present. For the information about the manuscripts and the transcripts utilized for writing this paper, please see my critical edition in preparation.

[1] See PVSV 90: *tatphalopādānabhāvalakṣitasvabhāvaṃ hi vastu dadhīti / sa ca tādṛśaḥ svabhāvo 'nyatra nāstīti / pravṛttyabhāvād arthinaḥ / tasmāt tan nobhayarūpam ity ekāntavādaḥ /*. Cf. Shah [1967: 123–124] and Wakahara [1995: 69–71].

[2] Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri are the only two authors I know of who have composed independent works or chapters to refute the Jaina theory of many-sidedness. Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri criticize the said theory in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Chapter 20: Syādvādaparīkṣā) and the *Anekāntavādanirāsa* respectively. We are not concerned here with the Buddhist theory upon which is based the refutation of the Jaina view. For such details, see Wakahara [1995; 1996], Shirasaki [1974] and Tamaru [1978].

[3] In the 20th Chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita quotes the ŚV, Vanavāda, vv. 21–23 as TS 1777–1779. Jitāri quotes the ŚV, Vanavāda, v. 23. See Wakahara [1996: 80–82] and Tamaru [1978: 27]. We shall return to the investigation of these verses later.

quoted by Karṇakagomin, one of Dharmakīrti's commentators, to explain the Jaina view.[4] Indeed, a careful study of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika* shows that he does invoke an assumption, very similar to, if not identical with, the Jaina doctrine of many-sidedness to defend his theory of the soul (*ātman*).

The first modern scholar to remark on this affinity between the Jaina doctrine of many-sidedness and the assumption used by Kumārila to defend his belief in the existence of the soul seems to be Sukhlal Sanghavi. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that Kumārila's assumption just is the Jaina doctrine of many-sidedness.[5]

Though several scholars subsequent to Sanghavi have made the same remark as he,[6] no one has undertaken either to detail the affinity between the Jaina doctrine of many-sidedness and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's assumption, or to explain how the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas thought they could justify the view that one and the same real entity might have mutually incompatible characters, or even to explain why these thinkers maintained the doctrine of many-sidedness in the first place. In this paper, I would like to address these questions, but only insofar as they pertain to the theories of the soul of the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section explains how Kumārila uses the assumption of many-sidedness to defend his theory of the soul. The second section sets out how the very same doctrine is used by the Jaina authors to defend their theory of the soul. And the third section shows that even their contemporaries, the Buddhist, judged Kumārila's assumption to be essentially the same as the Jaina doctrine. This section also provides the reason why the Jaina authors and Kumārila think that a real entity can have mutually contradictory characters, such as permanence and impermanence.

1. Kumārila's view on the permanence of the soul

1.1. *avasthā* ('state')

The Mīmāṃsakas, like many other Indian philosophers, including the Jainas, reject the doctrine which denies the existence of the soul (*nairātmyavāda*), espoused by the Buddhists. In his treatment of the permanence of the soul, Kumārila addresses the following objection by Dignāga to the soul's existence.[7]

> "If the soul should be transformed (**vikṛti*) at the time of the origination of knowledge, it would be impermanent. And if [the soul] should not be transformed, it would not be proper that the soul is a cognizer (**pramātṛ*)."[8]

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[4] See PVSVṬ 333.

[5] See Sanghavi [1939: 57, 60].

[6] See Shah [1967: 86–87] and Matilal [1981: 39].

[7] In the ŚV, Ātmavāda, Kumārila introduces the following objection which is apparently depending on the statement of Dignāga. See ŚV, Ātmavāda, vv. 20–21: *tava nityatvavibhutvābhyām ātmāno niṣkriyā yadi / sukhaduḥkhāvikāryasya kīdṛśī kartṛbhoktṛtā // atha kartṛtvavelāyāṃ duḥkhādeś cāpi janmani / prāgrūpād anyathātvaṃ syān nityatāsya virudhyate //.*

[8] PS I 44: *blo skye ba na skyes bu yang // gal te rnam 'gyur mi rtag nyid // ci ste bdag la rnam 'gyur med // 'jal bar byed par mi rigs so //* Skt.: *buddhijanmani puṃsaś ca vikṛtir yady anityatā / athāvikṛtir ātmāyaṃ*[1] *pramāteti na yujyate //* (1. TṬ: *ātmānyaḥ*, TSP: *ātmākhyaḥ*). The Sanskrit fragment is found in TṬ on ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 53, KṬ on ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 53, NR on ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 52 and TSP on TS 273. See Hattori [1968: 171–172].

Here Dignāga asserts that the soul is a cognizer if and only if it is transformed. He assumes that nothing permanent can be transformed. It follows, then, that if the soul is a cognizer, it is transformed, and so it is not permanent.

In the Pratyakṣasūtra, Kumārila responds to this argument simply by asserting that the transformation of the soul is not incompatible with its permanence.[9] Later, in the Ātmavāda, he explains this response as follows:

> "If the word '*anitya*' means mere transformation (*vikriyāmātra*), we do not deny the fact that the soul is called 'impermanent' (*anitya*). For, by the mere [transformation,] it never perishes. If the [soul] were to perish completely, [two ethical fallacies, i.e.,] the 'disappearance [of a result] for one who has performed an action' (*kṛtanāśa*) and the 'appearance [of a result] for one who has not performed an action' (*akṛtāgama*), would arise. However, if [the soul is supposed] to assume another state (*avasthāntaraprāpti*), [the said fallacies] never arise. Just as, in daily life, [we can observe various states, such as] 'being a baby' and 'being a child', [for the very same person]."[10]

In this passage, Kumārila argues that the soul is not destroyed on the ground that, if the soul were to perish completely, the agent of an action (*kartṛ*) would not be identical with the experiencer of the action's fruits (*bhoktṛ*), and so no one would experience any result of the action he performs. He does, however, concede that the soul can be transformed from one state into another. And he concedes further that the soul may even be called 'impermanent', provided that the word 'impermanent' means mere transformation. He denies, however, that the soul's being transformed means that it is thereby completely destroyed. Kumārila underscores his point by observing that the very same person can enjoy in his adulthood the result of the action he performs during his infancy.[11] Thus, according to Kumārila, the transformation of the soul should not mean 'complete destruction' (*atyantanāśa*), but only 'assuming another state'.

On this point, Sucaritamiśra, author of the commentary *Kāśikāṭīkā*, elaborates further.

> "[Thesis]: By the mere transformation, [the soul] must not be destroyed.
> [Reason]: For it is recognized (*pratyabhijñānāt*) as a possessor of various states (*avasthāvat*).
> [Example]: Just like the ocean (*sāgara*). And just like a flag (*patākā*)."[12]

The ocean is never destroyed by origination and destruction of the waves. It changes only its states, such as 'being stormy' and 'being calm'. A flag can assume various forms by the wind, but it keeps its identity. In the same manner, the soul changes only its states, e.g., from 'being happy' into 'being unhappy'. Even though the state of the soul may change, the soul as a 'possessor of various states' is never destroyed.

An important feature of Sucaritamiśra's exposition is his use of the word 'recognition'

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[9] See ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 53ab: *vikriyā jñānarūpāsya na nityatve virotsyate /.*

[10] ŚV, Ātmavāda, vv. 22–23: *nānityaśabdavācyatvam ātmano vinivāryate / vikriyāmātravācitve na hy ucchedo 'sya tāvatā // syātām atyantanāśe 'sya kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau / na tv avasthāntaraprāptau loke bālayuvādivat //.*

[11] Cf. KṬ on ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 23: *avasthāmātrānyatve tu tau na sta eva / na hi loke bālena kṛte bhujyamāne yūnā kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau pratipadyete /.*

[12] KṬ on ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 22: *na tāvatā vikāramātreṇocchedo bhavet, avasthāvataḥ pratyabhijñānāt, sāgaravat patākāvac ca /.*

(*pratyabhijñāna*). He regards recognition as that which justifies the ascription of permanence to the 'possessor of various states', namely, the soul itself.[13] Then, how do we recognize the soul as the selfsame entity? This question is answered by Kumārila himself in the following passage:

> "Moreover, even though my soul assumes various states, such as 'being happy' and 'being unhappy', it never renounces its characters: 'intelligence' (*caitanya*), 'substantiality' (*dravyatva*), 'existence' (*sattā*), and so forth."[14]

Kumārila's view is that, while various states of the soul, such as 'being happy', are transitory, the soul also has the characters of being intelligent, being a substance, or being existent, and so forth, which are permanent. These permanent characters enable one to recognize that the soul which has one transitory state is the very same as the one which has another.[15] Thus Kumārila and his followers use the concept of the transitory state to account for the transformation of the soul and they use the concept of the possessor of various states to account for the permanence of the soul.

1.2. Division of viewpoints

The question of how the soul can be both transitory and permanent is addressed by both Umveka and Jayamiśra in the following passages:

> "For, one and the same soul appears in the following manners: 'It (the soul) has perished in a certain respect (*kenacid ātmanā*)', 'It has arisen in a certain respect' and 'It has lasted in a certain respect'. Just like the serpent in the coiled and other [states]."[16]
>
> "Therefore, giving up the view that [the soul] perishes in its entirety, the soul should be accepted as follows: '[The soul] has perished in a certain respect (*kathaṃcit*)', '[It] has lasted in a certain respect' and '[It] has arisen in a certain respect'. Just like the serpent in the coiled and other states. . . ."[17]

Here, it is maintained that one and the same soul can perish, arise and last. To explain this, Uṃveka and Jayamiśra relativize these properties as follows: When the soul transforms from, say, the state of being happy to the state of being unhappy, the soul perishes insofar as it gives up being happy; it arises insofar as it becomes unhappy; and it lasts insofar as it never renounces its 'intelligence' and other such characters. Thus, by invoking three different viewpoints, the authors are able to attribute the triple character, i.e., origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vināśa*) and

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[13] Both Uṃveka and Sucaritamiśra mention this fact in the Pratyakṣasūtra too. Cf. TṬ on ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 53: *buddhāv utpannāyām utpadyata evātmano jñātṛrūpo vikāraḥ, tathāpi nāsau nityatvaṃ vināśayati, pratyabhijñāpratyayenāvasthādvaye 'py anusandhānāt* / and KṬ on ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 53: *na kiñcid vikāramātreṇa vastu naśyati, tatpratyabhijñānāt / etac cātmavāda eva bhāṣyakāreṇa vakṣyate /.*

[14] ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 26: *sukhaduḥkhādyavasthāṃ ca gacchann api naro mama / caitanyadravyasattādirūpaṃ naiva vimuñcati //.*

[15] Cf. ŚṬ on ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 26: *atra kiṃ ekaṃ pratyabhijñāyamānam asti / astīti brūmaḥ / atrāpi hi sukhiduḥkhyavasthānugatacaitanyasattādirūpam ātmanaḥ pratyabhijñāyata eva /.*

[16] TṬ on ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, v. 53: *sa evātmā kenacid ātmanā naṣṭaḥ, kenacid utpannaḥ, kenacid āsta iti tathāvabhāsanāt kuṇḍalādiṣu sarpavad iti /.*

[17] ŚṬ on ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 28: *tasmāt parityajyemaṃ sarvātmakavināśagrahaṃ kathaṃcid vinaṣṭaḥ kathaṃcit sthitaḥ kathaṃcid utpannaḥ puruṣo 'bhyupagamyatāṃ kuṇḍalādyavasthāsv iva sarpa ity . . . /.*

stability (*sthiti*), to one and the same entity, the soul.

In the next passage, Kumārila goes on to ascribe apparently incompatible characters to the soul:

> "Therefore, by giving up the two [extreme views,] we have to admit that the soul has two characters: exclusive (*vyāvṛttyātmaka*) and inclusive (*anugamātmaka*). Just like the serpent in the coiled and other states."[18]

Here, Kumārila ascribes to the soul both an 'exclusive character' and an 'inclusive character'. The soul has an exclusive character insofar as its individual states are exclusive of one another; and it has an inclusive character insofar as it includes all the various states into which it transforms. In short, we can understand the exclusive character of the soul from the viewpoint of 'states', and its inclusive character from the viewpoint of 'state-possessor'. To put it the other way round, if the soul were absolutely destroyed—if it completely excluded all other states—, then it would exclude its perpetual characters, too. And if it were absolutely permanent—if it completely included all different states in it—, then it would always have contradictory states.[19] Since the both views, i.e., absolute impermanence and absolute permanence, would cause difficulty, the soul should be understood not only from one but from both viewpoints, and should have both characters: exclusive and inclusive, impermanent and permanent.[20]

Of course, the said two characters, i.e., exclusive and inclusive, or permanent and impermanent, are incompatible with each other. But we can now recognize that the dividing of viewpoints plays an important role in justifying the two contradictory characters of the single soul. If we predicate two contradictory characters to one and the same soul from two different viewpoints, then this predication will not involve any contradiction. This is how Kumārila establishes the transformation of the soul from the agent of an action into the experiencer of its results as well as the identity between them.

2. Ontological theory of the Jainas

2.1. *dravya* ('substance'), *guṇa* ('quality') and *paryāya* ('mode')

According to Umāsvāti, author of the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, the soul (*jīva*) belongs to a category of 'substance' (*dravya*)[21] and the substance is regarded as permanent.[22] Thus, the soul

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[18] ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 28: *tasmād ubhayahānena vyāvṛttyanugamātmakaḥ / puruṣo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ kuṇḍalādiṣu sarpavat //.*

[19] Cf. ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 27: *duḥkhinaḥ sukhyavasthāyāṃ naśyeyuḥ sarva eva te / duḥkhitvaṃ cānuvarteta vināśe vikriyātmake //* and KṬ on ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 27: *yas tu kiñcidvikāramātrād vināśam ātiṣṭhate, tasya duḥkhinaḥ sukhyvasthāyāṃ duḥkhābhāvāc caitanyādīnām api vināśo bhavati / . . . / api caikāntavādino vikriyātmako vināśaḥ, tatra caikarūpānuvṛttāv atyantābhedād dharmāṇāṃ, caitanyānuvṛttau duḥkhitvam apy anuvartetety āha duḥkhitvam iti /.*

[20] According to Pārthasārathimiśra, the idea of viewpoint should be applicable to these two features of the soul. See NR on ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 28: *tasmād aikāntikīṃ anuvṛttiṃ vyāvṛttiṃ ca hitvā kathaṃcid anuvṛttiḥ kathaṃcid vyāvṛttiḥ sarpasyeva kuṇḍalādiṣu puṃso 'bhyupagantavyety āha tasmād iti /.*

[21] See TAAS 5.1: *ajīvakāyā dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ //*, 5.2: *dravyāṇi //* and 5.3: *jīvaś ca //.* The following explanation is mainly based on the Digambara tradition, for the Buddhist logicians who suggest the ontological affinity between the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas criticize the view of Digambara authors.

[22] See TAAS 5.4: *nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi //.*

is permanent, according to Jainism. But then how do the Jainas explain the transformation of the permanent soul? In order to answer this question, we have to inquire into the concepts of substance, quality (*guṇa*) and mode (*paryāya*) from the Jaina perspective.

Umāsvāti asserts that a real existent (*sat*) has the nature of substance.[23] Therefore, whatever exists can be called a substance. And he defines substance as that which is possessed of many qualities and many modes.[24] A substance's qualities are coeval with it (*yugapadavasthāyin*), while its modes, existing instead temporarily in it (*kādācitka*), are not (*ayugapadavasthāyin*).[25] Thus, a substance's qualities can be said to be permanent, but its modes impermanent.

According to Pūjyapāda, author of the commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi*, a substance's qualities are its various intrinsic natures and its modes varieties or particular forms.[26] Umāsvāti, in the *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya,* also defines the mode as 'another state' (*bhāvāntara*) or 'another name' (*saṃjñāntara*) for substance.[27] Now, the concept of 'mode' accounts for the transformation of a substance through various phases of time. Thus, for example, the substance 'clay' (*mṛd*) has various intrinsic natures, 'corporeal form' (*rūpa*) and 'color' (*varṇa*). Clay can, over time, change its 'corporeal form' by changing from the state of 'being a Kapāla' (or 'Kapāla') to the state of 'being a pot' (or 'Pot'). It can also, over time, change its 'color' by changing from 'having a dark color' to 'having a light color'. Notice that, though the color of the clay may change, the fact that it has color does not. Thus, color is a permanent feature of clay. In this way, a substance's quality, on the one hand, is regarded as permanent in it, while its mode is regarded as impermanent.

2.2. The triple character

We now turn to the question of how the three categories of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* explain the permanence and the transformation of a real existent. Umāsvāti asserts that every real entity has the triple character, origination (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and stability (*dhrauvya*), and invokes stability to account for the permanence of a real entity, and both the origination and the destruction account for its transformation.[28] Commenting on Umāsvāti, Pūjyapāda makes it clear how the three categories are related to the triple character as follows:

> "A substance, whether conscious or not, assumes another state by means of both [the internal and external] causes, without renouncing its 'essential nature' (*jāti*). The word 'origination' (*utpāda* = *utpādana*) means ['assuming another state' (*bhāvāntarāvāpti*)]. Just as a lump of clay [can assume another] mode, i.e., 'being a pot'. In the same manner, the word 'destruction' (*vyaya*) means the

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[23] See TAAS 5.29: *sad dravyalakṣaṇam //.*

[24] See TAAS 5.38: *guṇaparyāyavad dravyam //.*

[25] See TAASṬ 428: *yugapadavasthāyino guṇā rūpādayaḥ, ayugapadavasthāyinaḥ paryāyāḥ /* and TARV on TAAS 5.38: *nityaṃ dravyam āśritya ye vartate te guṇā iti / paryāyāḥ punaḥ kādācitkā iti /.*

[26] See SAS on TAAS 5.38: *tataḥ sāmānyāpekṣayā anvayino jñānādayo jīvasya guṇāḥ pudgalādīnāṃ ca rūpādayaḥ / teṣāṃ vikārā viśeṣātmanā bhidyamānāḥ paryāyāḥ / ghaṭajñānaṃ paṭajñānaṃ krodho māno gandho varṇas tīvro manda ity evamādayaḥ /.* Cf. TARV on TAAS 5.38: *tenānvayino dharmā guṇā ity uktaṃ bhavati / tad yathā jīvasyāstitvādayaḥ jñānadarśanādayaś ca / pudgalasyācetanatvādayaḥ rūpādayaś ca / paryāyāḥ punaḥ ghaṭajñānādayaḥ kapālādivikārāś ca /.*

[27] See TAASBh 427: *bhāvāntaraṃ saṃjñāntaraṃ ca paryāyaḥ /.*

[28] See TAAS 5.30: *utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat //.*

'disappearance of the previous state [without renouncing essential nature]' (*pūrvabhāvavigamana*). Just as, at the time of the origination of a pot, the form of the lump [of clay] disappears. [The substance] has neither destruction nor origination as that which has the nature of being transformed from the beginningless time. Therefore, the word '*dhruva*' means that which is fixed or stable. [And] the word '*dhrauvya*' means the 'property of being stable' (*dhruvasya bhāvaḥ*) or the '[characteristic] action of that which is stable' (*dhruvasya karma*). Just as the clay stuff and so forth (i.e., *dravyas*) must follow all states, such as 'being a lump of clay' and 'being a pot'."[29]

Here, stability is attributed to the substance, while origination (*utpāda*) and destruction are attributed to the modes. Even though a substance such as 'clay' loses one state and assumes another, it can be stable because it is common to both states. Notice that Pūjyapāda maintains that a substance never renounces its 'essential nature' (*jāti*) at the time of transformation. Pūjyapāda explains what he means by the word '*jāti*' as follows:

"[In the aphorism '*tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam*' (TAAS 5.31),] what does the word '*tadbhāva*' mean? It means 'being a cause of recognition' (*pratyabhijñānahetutā*). 'Recognition' is a kind of recollection, such as 'This is that very thing [which I saw yesterday]' (*tad evedam*). It could not arise without its cause. [And] its cause is regarded as '*tadbhāva*'. . . . A real entity, which was observed in a certain respect before, still exists in the same respect. For this, the recognition, such as 'This is that very thing', can arise. If [a real entity] should be destroyed completely, or if it should arise as a completely new thing, then [the existence of] the recollection could not be reasonably explained. This is incompatible with our daily behavior which depends on the [recollection]. Therefore, [the meaning of the aphorism (TAAS 5.31)] should be ascertained as follows: [The substance, by which a real entity is characterized, should be regarded as] permanent which means 'not being destroyed from the viewpoint of being that' (*tadbhāvenāvyayaḥ*). It, however, must be understood in a certain respect (*kathaṃcit*). For, if [the substance] were absolutely permanent, it could not be transformed into another state and therefore, the transmigration and the good conduct which causes someone to cease the transmigration would be incompatible with [the absolute permanence]."[30]

Pūjyapāda appeals to one's experience of recognition to justify the view that a substance is permanent. In the passage above, the word '*jāti*' means the 'property of being that' (*tadbhāva*). The idea is this: When one observes some object, one does so through one of its features. Thus, for example, one observes that the object in question is clay or that it is a corporeal thing (*rūpin*). Later, the object can be recognized as the very same one through the same aspect. Thus, one

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[29] SAS on TAAS 5.29: *cetanasyācetanasya vā dravyasya svāṃ jātim ajahata ubhayanimittavaśād bhāvāntarāvāptir utpādanam utpādaḥ mṛtpiṇḍasya ghaṭaparyāyavat / tathā pūrvabhāvavigamanaṃ vyayaḥ / yathā ghaṭotpattau piṇḍākṛteḥ / anādipāriṇāmikasvabhāvena vyayodayābhāvād dhruvati sthirībhavatīti dhruvaḥ / dhruvasya bhāvaḥ karma vā dhrauvyam / yathā mṛtpiṇḍaghaṭādyavasthāsu mṛdādyanvayaḥ /.*

[30] SAS on TAAS 5.31: *kas tadbhāvaḥ / pratyabhijñānahetutā / tad evedam iti smaraṇaṃ pratyabhijñānam / tad akasmān na bhavatīti yo 'sya hetuḥ sa tadbhāvaḥ / . . . / yenātmanā prāgdṛṣṭaṃ vastu tenaivātmanā punar api bhāvāt tad evedam iti pratyabhijñāyate / yady atyantanirodho 'bhinavaprādurbhāvamātram eva vā syāt tataḥ smaraṇānupapattiḥ / tadadhīno lokavyavahāro virudhyate / tatas tadbhāvenāvyayaṃ tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam iti niścīyate / tat tu kathaṃcid veditavyam / sarvathā nityatve anyathābhāvābhāvāt saṃsāratadvinivṛttikāraṇa-prakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt /.* As for the understanding of the aphorism ("*tadbhāvenāvyayaṃ nityam*"), there is a difference between the interpretation of the Śvetāmbara and that of the Digambara. For the detail of the Śvetāmbara explanation, see Dixit [1974: 210–211].

says, "This is that clay" or "This is that corporeal thing." The object in question never gives up being 'clay' (*mṛttva*) or being 'corporeal' (*rūpitva*). In this way, the features of being clay or of being corporeal are essential natures, and are thereby permanent in the object to which they belong, even though it can be transformed into a pot and so forth. In other words, insofar as an object keeps its property of being 'X', it can be permanent as 'X' (*tadbhāvenāvyayaḥ*, e.g., *mṛttvenāvyayaḥ* or *rūpitvenāvyayaḥ*).

It must be noted that, in the structure of the recognition, the qualities play a roll in giving an aspect to cognizers or observers. Since the substance never renounces its qualities, we can recognize it as the very same substance. By observing the qualities which inhere in a substance, the recognition of the substance can be justified. In short, when we observe an object as a substance, which is always possessed of qualities, the object can be supposed to be permanent.

Notice, however, that the permanence ascribed to an object by virtue of its perpetual qualities does not preclude impermanence from being ascribed to it. After all, the clay which is a pot at one time may no longer be a pot at some subsequent time. Since the clay may lose the property of being a pot (*ghaṭatva*), it is impermanent as a mode, i.e., the pot (*ghaṭatvena vyayaḥ*). In this way, being a pot is a mode of the object in question, and hence impermanent in it. Therefore, whether the object in question is permanent or not depends on the intention of observer or speaker.[31]

2.3. The theory of viewpoint (*nayavāda*)

Notice that the two viewpoints of substance and of mode can be traced back to the Jaina Canon. In the *Viyāhapaṇṇattisutta*, for example, the soul is treated in the following manner:

> "Oh, Bhagavan! Is the soul permanent or impermanent?"
> "Gotama! The soul is permanent in a certain respect, and it is not permanent in another respect."
> "What do you mean by the statement, 'The soul is permanent in a certain respect, and it is not permanent in another respect'?"
> "Gotama! It is permanent from the viewpoint of substance, and it is not permanent from that of mode."[32]

Thus, in Jainism, from the time of the Canonical literature, it is quite common to be told that an object can be observed from the two viewpoints. Needless to say, in Jainism, the technical term '*naya*' is used to refer to a viewpoint. There are six or seven viewpoints, of which two are basic, namely, 'that of substance' (*dravyārthikanaya*) and 'that of mode' (*paryāyārthikanaya*).[33]

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[31] Cf. SAS on TAAS 5.32: *anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ prayojanavaśād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivakṣayā prāpitaprādhānyam*[1] *arpitam, upanītam iti yāvat / tadviparītam anarpitam / prayojanābhāvāt sato 'py avivakṣā bhavatīty upasarjanībhūtam anarpitam ity ucyate / arpitaṃ cānarpitaṃ cārpitānarpite / tābhyāṃ siddher arpitānarpitasiddher nāsti virodhaḥ* / (1. SAS: *prāpitaṃ prādhānyam.* I corrected the text on the basis of the intrepretation of Akalaṅka. See TARV on 5.32: *anekātmakasya vastunaḥ prayojanavaśād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivakṣayā prāpitaprādhānyam artharūpam arpitam upanītam iti yāvat /*).

[32] VPS 7.2.36: *jīvā ṇaṃ bhaṃte kiṃ sāsatā asāsatā / goyamā jīvā siya sāsatā, siya asāsatā / se keṇaṭṭheṇaṃ bhaṃte evaṃ vuccai, jīvā siya sāsatā, siya asāsatā / gotamā davvaṭṭhatāe sāsatā, bhāvaṭṭhayāe asāsatā /.* [Skt.: *jīvo nūnaṃ bhagavan kiṃ śāśvato 'śāśvataḥ / gotama jīvaḥ syāt śāśvataḥ, syād aśāśvataḥ / atha kenārthena bhagavann evam ucyate, jīvaḥ syāt śāśvataḥ, syād aśāśvataḥ / gotama dravyārthena śāśvataḥ, bhāvārthenāśāśvataḥ /*].

[33] Cf. Dixit [1974: 60–61] and Matilal [1981: 41–46].

With reference to the two basic viewpoints, Pūjyapāda equates the word '*dravya*' with 'univesality' (*sāmānya*), 'generality' (*utsarga*) and 'inclusion' (*anuvṛtti*), and the word '*paryāya*' with 'particularity' (*viśeṣa*), 'speciality' (*apavāda*) and 'exclusion' (*vyāvṛtti*).[34] This theory of viewpoint supports the theory of many-sidedness and it is the doctrine whereby apparently mutually contradictory views can be rendered compatible.[35] The permanence and impermanence appear to be mutually contradictory. If, however, the attention of observer is fixed on the inclusive character of the soul, it can be viewed as permanent. Moreover, if one concentrate upon its exclusive character, he can regard the soul as impermanent. By dividing viewpoints, we can ascribe various characters, even incompatible with each other, to a single entity.

3. Affinity between the two schools

3.1. Evidence from the Buddhist treatises

From what we have seen so far, it is clear that there is a close correspondence between the Jaina concepts of substance, mode and quality, on the one hand, and Kumārila's concepts of 'state-possessor', 'state' and 'permanent characters', on the other. Moreover, both the Jainas and Kumārila use their respective concepts to overcome apparent contradictions in the very same way, namely, by relativizing mutually contradictory properties to different viewpoints.

This close correspondence was not lost on the Buddhist logicians Śāntarakṣita, Jitāri, and Karṇakagomin, who availed themselves of several verses from the *Ślokavārttika* to set out certain Jaina objections. These verses run as follows:

> "Moreover, if a gold dish (*vardhamānaka*) is destroyed and a gold necklace (*rucaka*) is made out of it, one who wishes the former will grieve and one who wishes the latter will be happy. One who wishes the gold stuff, however, will be indifferent. Therefore, every real entity has the triple character. If it were neither originated, retained nor destroyed, the three notions, [i.e., grief, happiness and indifference,] would not occur. There is no grief without destruction, no happiness without origination, and no indifference without stability. Therefore, universal (*sāmānya*) must be permanent."[36]

In this passage, Kumārila does not, of course, intend to explain the ontological theory of the Jainas here, rather he intends to explain his view of 'word-meaning' (*śabdārtha*), which holds that a word's meaning is '*ākṛti*', where '*ākṛti*' is to be understood, not as 'configuration' (*saṃsthāna*), which is impermanent, but as 'universal', which is permanent. Notice that Kumārila applies here the very same three way distinction he applies to overcome the problem of the soul being permanent yet having transitory features. Thus, he treats configurations such as being a gold dish as transitory states and the gold stuff as the possessor of various states. And in this way, the property of being gold (*hematva* or *suvarṇatva*) can be treated as a permanent feature of the

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[34] SAS on TAAS 1.33: *dravyaṃ sāmānyam utsargaḥ anuvṛttir ity arthaḥ / tadviṣayo dravyārthikaḥ / paryāyo viśeṣo 'pavādo vyāvṛttir ity arthaḥ / tadviṣayaḥ paryāyārthikaḥ /.*

[35] See Dixit [1974: 55–57] and Matilal [1981: 32–34].

[36] ŚV, Vanavāda, vv. 21–23 = TS 1777–1779: *vardhamānakabhaṅge ca rucakaḥ kriyate yadā / tadā pūrvārthinaḥ śokaḥ prītiś cāpy uttarārthinaḥ // hemārthinas tu mādhyasthyaṃ tasmād vastu trayātmakam / notpādasthitibhaṅgānām abhāve syān matitrayam // na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham / sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṃ tena sāmānyanityatā //.*

gold stuff, just as intelligence can be treated as a permanent feature of the soul.

Further elucidation comes from Karṇakagomin and Jitāri who quote, in addition to the last verse cited immediately above, several verses from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, Digambara Jaina author. Karṇakagomin says:

> "Therefore, real entity is defined as follows: 'The real existent is simultaneously endowed with the triple character: origination, destruction and stability'. Therefore, [our predecessors (Samantabhadra and Kumārila)] said as follows:
> '[If a gold pot is destroyed and a gold crown is made out of it,] the person who wishes the pot (*ghaṭa*) will grieve when it is destroyed, and he who wishes the crown (*mauli*) will be happy when it arises, and he who wishes the gold stuff (*suvarṇa*) will be indifferent because of its continuity. These three notions have their own causes, [i.e., origination, destruction and stability]'. [ĀM 59]
> 'There is no grief without destruction, no happiness without origination, and no indifference without stability. Therefore, every real entity has the triple character'. [ŚV, Vanavāda, v. 23]
> 'The person who is under a vow to have only milk (*payovrata*) does not eat yogurt, he who is under a vow to have only yogurt (*dadhivrata*) does not drink milk, and he who is under a vow not to have any product from cow (*agorasavrata*) does not eat either of the two. Therefore, every real entity has the triple character'. [ĀM 60]
> 'The following is quite evident: A real existence (*sat*), from the viewpoint of its generic nature, neither comes about nor perishes, for [a substance] must follow [all modes]. From the viewpoint of its specific nature, [on the other hand,] it arises and perishes. [Thus,] it [i.e., the real existence] is nothing but the origination and so forth (i.e., *udaya*, *vyaya* and *sthiti*) which occur simultaneously in one and the same entity'. [ĀM 57]"[37]

Clearly verse 59 of the *Āptamīmāṃsā* says much the same thing as verse 21 of the Vanavāda. Moreover, like Kumārila, Samantabhadra, in verse 57 of his *Āptamīmāṃsā*, maintains that every

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[37] PVSVṬ 333: *tena yugapadutpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sad iti vastuno lakṣaṇam iti / tad āha /*
ghaṭamaulisuvarṇārthī vināśotpādasthitiṣv ayam /
śokapramodamādhyasthyaṃ[1] *jano yāti sahetukam //* [ĀM 59]
na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham /
sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṃ [2→]*tasmād vastu trayātmakam*[←2] // [ŚV, Vanavāda, v. 23]
payovrato na dadhy atti na payo (')tti dadhivrataḥ /
agorasavrato nobhe [3→]*tasmād vastu*[←3] *trayātmakam //* [ĀM 60]
na sāmānyātmanodeti na vyeti vyaktam anvayāt /
vyety udeti viśeṣeṇa[4] *sahaikatrodayādi sad //* [ĀM 57] *iti /*
(1. PVSVṬ: *śokapramodamādhyasthaṃ* I corrected the text depending on the reading of ĀM (b). 2. ŚV: *tena sāmānyanityatā* 3. ĀM (ab): *tasmāt tattvaṃ* 4. ĀM (ab): *viśeṣāt te*).

Jitāri does not quote the ĀM 60. See AVN 81: *yathā ghaṭaṃ bhañjayitvā mauliḥ kriyate tathā ghaṭo naśyati maulir utpadyate, suvarṇaṃ tu nodeti na vyeti / iti utpādavyayadhrauvyātmakaṃ vastu / yad āha /*
ghaṭamaulisuvarṇānāṃ[1] *vināśotpādasthitiṣv ayam /*
śokapramodamādhyasthyaṃ[2] *jano yāti sahetukam //* [ĀM 59]
na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham /
sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṃ [3→]*tasmād vastu trayātmakam*[←3] // [ŚV, Vanavāda, v. 23]
na sāmānyātmanodeti na vyeti vyaktam anvayāt /
vyety udeti viśeṣeṇa[4] *sahaikatrodayādi sad //* [ĀM 57] *iti /*
(1. ĀM (ab): *ghaṭamaulisuvarṇārthī* 2. ĀM (a): *śokapramohamādhyasthyaṃ* 3. ŚV: *tena sāmānyanityatā* 4. ĀM (ab): *viśeṣāt te*). Cf. Shirasaki [1974: 126], Tamaru [1978: 27] and Fujinaga [1989: 60–61].

real existent can perish and arise from the viewpoint of mode, which has the specific nature, yet lasts from the viewpoint of substance, common to all modes, which has the generic nature.[38] And this sort of idea can be justified only by applying the triple character to a real entity. Clearly, then, these Buddhist authors see Kumārila and Samantabhadra as advocating the same doctrine.

3.2. The reason for asserting the *anekāntavāda*

We shall now confine our attention to the problem as to why Kumārila was compelled to hold the view that a real entity is both permanent and impermanent. On the one hand, Kumārila must affirm that the soul is permanent in order to satisfy the Vedic injunction (*codanā*) that the person who performs an action, and in particular a sacrifice, be the same as the person who experiences the fruit of the action, or sacrifice.[39] If, however, the soul were regarded as mere knowledge (*vijñāna*), and were momentary, no identity between the performer and the experiencer could be established. For knowledge is momentary and may not persist up to the time of the results of the action it takes. On the other hand, Kumārila cannot admit the absolute permanence of the soul either. If the soul were permanent, incapable of undergoing any change, it could not become the agent of an action. This too would put into jeopardy the Vedic injunction to perform sacrifices.

The Jainas have a difficulty with the doctrines of permanence and impermanence, similar to the one Kumārila has. Consider the following statement by Siddhasena Divākara:

> "According to the doctrine of absolute permanence, it is not proper [for the soul] to connect with happiness and unhappiness. According to the doctrine of absolute impermanence, on the other hand, it is not proper [for the soul] to struggle for happiness and unhappiness."[40]

If, on the one hand, the doctrine of absolute permanence were accepted, the soul could not change, and so it could neither experience happiness nor be an agent. On the other hand, if the doctrine of absolute impermanence were accepted, the fact that we perform an action in order to enjoy a certain result could not be reasonably explained. For, if one cannot experience the result of the action performed by himself, no one would perform any action. Just like Kumārila, the Jainas also have to establish the identity between the agent of an action and the experiencer of its result.[41] Therefore, like Kumārila, the Jainas cannot admit that the soul is momentary. To overcome this dilemma, both Kumārila and the Jainas resort to the doctrine of many-sidedness.

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[38] ĀMV on ĀM 57: *sāmānyātmanā dravyarūpeṇa nodeti notpadyate na vyeti na vinaśyati / kuto, anvayāt, sarvaparyāyeṣv anugataikākāreṇa vartanāt / . . . / viśeṣāt paryāyarūpeṇotpadyate vinaśyati ca /.*

[39] Cf. ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 3: *nairātmyenātra cākṣiptāḥ sarvā eva hi codanāḥ / sādhyasādhanasaṃbandhas tadukto na hi sidhyati //.*

[40] STP I 18: *suhadukkhasampaogo ṇa jujjae ṇiccavāyapakkhammi / egaṃtuccheyammi ya suhadukkha-viyappaṇam ajuttaṃ //.* [Skt.: *sukhaduḥkhasaṃprayogo na yujyate nityavādapakṣe / ekāntocchede ca sukhaduḥkha-vikalpanam ayuktam //*].

[41] Later Jaina Logicians, such as Prabhācandra and Hemacandra, refer to the very same two soteriological problems which accrue to the doctrine of absolute impermanence, as Kumārila does in ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 23. It is interesting to note that they try to establish the permanence of the soul by quoting the statements from the *Ślokavārttika* and the verses of the Mīmāṃsā objection of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Prabhācandra quotes ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 28 and v. 136. Hemacandra quotes TS 223–227 (TS 226ab = ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 23ab; TS 227 = ŚV, Ātmavāda, v. 29). See PKM 521–522 and PM 32.

4. Conclusion

To summarize, we observe the following. First, both Kumārila and the Jainas ascribe the apparently mutually contradictory properties of being permanent and being impermanent to the soul. Second, both Kumārila and the Jainas appeal to the doctrine of many-sidedness to avoid the two extreme doctrines, 'absolute permanence' (*kūṭasthanitya*) and 'absolute impermanence' (*kṣaṇika*). In particular, they conceptually distinguish between 'state', or 'mode', on the one hand, and 'possessor of states', or 'substance', on the other, though they hold that they are not different from each other. They then say that the soul is impermanent, when regarded from the viewpoint of its states or modes, and that it is permanent, when regarded from the viewpoint of state-possessor or substance. Finally, both Kumārila and the Jainas appeal to recognition as that which justifies belief in the permanence of state-possessor or substance, i.e., the soul itself.

Abbreviations and Literature

AVN — *Anekāntavādanirāsa* (Jitāri): In *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*, ed. R. Iyengar, 81–85. Mysore, 1952.

ĀM — *Āptamīmāṃsā* (Samantabhadra): (a) Gajādhar Lāl Jain, ed. *Āptamīmāṃsā Pramāṇaparīkṣā ca*. Sanātan Jain Granthamālā 10. Varanasi, 1914. (b) Text with the *Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānandin and the *Tātparyavivaraṇa* of Yaśovijaya. 1937. Reprint, Bombay: Sri Jinashasana Aradhana Trast, 1989.

ĀMV — *Āptamīmāṃsāvṛtti* (Vasunandin): See ĀM (a).

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NR — *Nyāyaratnākara* (Pārthasārathimiśra): See ŚV.

PKM — *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (Prabhācandra): Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, ed. *Prameyakamala-mārtaṇḍa by Shri Prabha Candra*. 1912. Reprint, Bombay: Satyabhamabai Pandurang, 1941.

PM — *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (Hemacandra Sūri): Sukhlal Sanghavi, Mahendra Kumar and Dalsukh Malvania, eds. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Kalikāla Sarvajña Śrī Hemacandrā-cārya with Bhāṣāṭippaṇa of Pandita Sukhlalji Sanghavi*. Singhi Jain Series 9. Ahmedabad and Calcutta: Singhi Jain Granthamala, 1939.

PS — *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib. tr. Kanakavarman): See Hattori [1968].

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, ed. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes*. Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome, 1960.

PVSVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed. *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam*. Allahabad, 1943. Reprint, under the title of *Karṇakagomin's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982.

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SAS *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Pūjyapāda): Pt. Phūlcandra Shastri, ed. *Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda.* 1944. Reprint, Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Granthamālā, Sanskrit Grantha 13. Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Publication, 1971.

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STP *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa* (Siddhasena Divākara): Sukhlal Sanghavi and Bocardas Doshi, eds. *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇam.* Vol. 3. Ahmedabad: Gujarāt Purātattva Mandir, 1928.

ŚṬ *Śarkarikāṭīkā* (Jayamiśra): See ŚV.

ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa): Rāmaśāstrī Tailanga, ed. *Mīmāṃsāślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa with the Commentary called Nyāyaratnākara by Pārtha Sārathi Miśra.* Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 3. Benares, 1889–99. [For the readings of the *Ślokavārttika* Ātmavāda and the commentaries on it (the *Śarkarikāṭīkā*, the *Kāśikāṭīkā* and the *Nyāyaratnākara*), see my critical edition in preparation.]

TAAS *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* (Umāsvāti): (a) See SAS. (b) Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia, ed. *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (A treatise on the fundamental principles of Jainism).* Part 1. Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series 67. Bombay, 1926.

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TAASṬ *Tattvārthādhigamasūtraṭīkā* (Siddhasena Gaṇi): See TAAS (b).

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TARV *Tattvārtharājavārttika* (Akalaṅka Deva): Mahendra Kumar Jain, ed. *Tattvārthavārttika of Śrī Akalaṅkadeva.* Part 2. 1957. Reprint, Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā, Sanskrit Grantha 20. New Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha Publication, 1990.

TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Embar Krishnamacharya, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla.* 2 vols. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30. 1926. Reprint, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1984–88.

TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS.

TṬ *Tātparyaṭīkā* (Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa): S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, ed. *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa.* Rev. K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Madras University Sanskrit Series 13. Madras: University of Madras, 1971. [1st ed. in 1940.]

VPS *Viyāhapaṇṇattisutta* (or *Bhagavaīsutta*): Bechardas J. Doshi, ed. *Viyāhapaṇṇattisuttam.* Jaina Āgama Series 4. Bombay: Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, 1974.

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DOES THE BUDDHIST 'MOMENTARY' THEORY PRECLUDE ANYTHING PERMANENT?

by

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Indian books frequently treat somewhat the 'momentary theory' of Buddhism, asserting that Buddhism insists on a universality of momentariness, and denies anything permanent, so in effect denying the Hindu permanent Ātman belief. Without requiring this 'Ātman' topic, it can be shown that Buddhism does accept some permanent things. Here I shall treat this matter both according to Dharmakīrti and according to earlier texts.

It should be mentioned that sometime back Mimaki put out a work in French with translation and study of two texts: Refutation of the Permanence of Things (*sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*) and Proof of the Momentariness of Things (*kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*).[1] Both these works are by Ratnakīrti, who is of course later in Buddhist logic than Dharmakīrti. This work is excellent as far as it goes, and yet the other side of the argument, which I shall give, is not treated. Recently, a book has come out by von Rospatt on momentariness,[2] which is excellent as far as what is treated therein is concerned; but while saying a lot about 'impermanence' (*anityatā*), he has no treatment of permanence, the adjective for which is *nitya*. Both those books have useful bibliographies.

The present paper intends to deal with both these sides of the issue—the impermanence and the permanence. Students of Buddhist Logic, in particular on the works of Dharmakīrti, know that there are two objects of Pramāṇa—the *svalakṣaṇa* (which I render 'individual character'—not 'a particular' as do some others), the generally acknowledged 'momentary' object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*); and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (which I render 'generality character'—not 'a universal' as do some others), the object of inference (*anumāna*)—and that the direct perception and the inference are two kinds of Pramāṇa.[3] One can easily find out which of the ones just mentioned are 'momentary', because Miyasaka has made a fine Sanskrit-Tibetan index to Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*,[4] with the 'momentary' entries as *kṣaṇa*, *kṣaṇika*, *kṣaṇikatva*, and *kṣaṇabhaṅga*. Having consulted every one of those entries in Dharmakīrti's text, I not only found confirmation of the granted 'momentariness' of Pratyakṣa's object, but some others that deserve mention.

Thus, in *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, the Index's 239 (Skt. edn. *241), he says

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[1] Katsumi Mimaki, *La Réfutation Bouddhique de la Permanence des Choses* (*Sthirasiddhidūsaṇa*) *et La Preuve de la Momentanéité des Choses* (*Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*) (Paris: Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 1976).

[2] Alexander von Rospatt, *The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness* (Stuttgart, 1995).

[3] I have used those renditions for the two objects of Pramāṇa in my work issued with date 1999 by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, entitled *A Millennium of Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1.

[4] Yūshō Miyasaka, compiler, "An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā", *Acta Indologica* 3, (Narita, Japan: Naritasan Shinshoji, 1975).

that the *mati* lasts a moment; and in *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣa chapter, 496cd, *buddhi* is declared 'momentary'. These words, *mati* and *buddhi*, along with *dhī*, may be used with the meaning 'cognition', and are momentary, presumably as objects of the Introspective Perception (*svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*), since Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu* I 10, mentions "every *cittacaitta*," and Stcherbatsky presents *mati* as equal to the *prajñā* (understanding, discriminating) of the *citta-mahābhūmika* group present in every moment of consciousness, although he himself mistranslated *Nyāyabindu* I 10.[5] Then, Mānasa-Pratyakṣa has as object what Dignāga has called *sāmānya-gocara* (which I render 'global scope'),[6] the mental form of each external sense object. This Pratyakṣa was in Abhidharma Buddhism called *manovijñāna*, and Dharmakīrti uses this term in his *Nyāyabindu* I 9. This agrees with *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣa chapter, 417, where Dharmakīrti associates momentariness with *jñāna* (knowledge), *śabda* (language), and *pradīpa* (lamp), where 'lamp' presumably stands for objects of externally directed Pratyakṣas, the 'language' for objects of Mānasa-Pratyakṣa, and 'knowledge' for objects of Svasaṃvedana-Pratyakṣa. And the same Pratyakṣa, verse 417, associates momentariness with *pratyakṣa*, adding *itarasya vā* (meaning 'or a different' *pratyakṣa*); thus also attributing momentariness to all four kinds of *pratyakṣa*—that of the five outer sense organs, the mental one (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*), the introspective one (*svasaṃvedana-p.*), and that of the yogin (*yogi-p.*). In short, the entire set of Perceptions and their objects are momentary in Dharmakīrti's position.

But not attributed momentariness in the verses of *Pramāṇavārttika* is the pair, inference (*anumāna*) and its inferable (*anumeya*) which is often called (as I render it) 'generality character' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). One may be surprised to read some of the previous literature on the topic. For example, Stcherbatsky, supposedly following a comment by Dharmottara, labels the objects of inference "no realities at all, but pure imagination and mere names."[7] But notice that neither Dignāga nor Dharmakīrti is cited to support such conclusions. It seems that they were in part misled by Dharmakīrti's calling inference *bhrānta*—which means subject to mistakes. But since the object of inference is usually not visible (or touchable, etc.) to it, one would have to be omniscient to fully characterize that domain, so we may generously describe Stcherbatsky's comment as 'an unreliable speculation'. Also, I found when reading Bu-ston's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (f. 10b6) that Inference has two objects—beyond the senses (*parokṣa*) and further beyond the senses (*atyantaparokṣa*), the latter directed to the scriptures. So this puts a new light on Inference (*anumāna*).

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[5] Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, third ed., 1961), p. 86. Then, Stcherbatsky, in his rendition of the *Nyāyabindu* with Dharmottara's commentary: *Buddhist Logic*, vol. 2, p. 29, puts for I 10: "Every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-conscious." But the Sanskrit, which I give alongside my translation, in the forthcoming work mentioned above (n. 3), reads: *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam /.* According to the Sanskrit, the introspection is of every *cittacaitta*, making them the object of the introspection.

[6] Cf. Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 89 (bottom), that are notes for his p. 26 (also bottom), what he labels k. 4cd, thus incorporating that Sanskrit passage into the *kārikā*, whereas in my own study of it, using Bu-ston's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, I take to be part of Dignāga's commentary. In either solution, it is Dignāga's terminology.

[7] Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1, p. 240.

Besides, if this possible non-momentariness of the inference set should hold up, it would provide a striking support to the Buddhist logic insistence that the inference set and the perception set are separate in nature—what the opponents of Buddhist logic often criticized.

Before presenting my verdict in this matter, let us examine the situation in early Buddhism. When I was reading the translation of the *Kathāvatthu* (*Points of Controversy*), section on "the duration of Consciousness" I noticed the Theravādin arguing with the Andhaka who claimed that in Jhāna, Skt. Dhyāna, successful meditation, there is a continuity of consciousness, so also in the subconsciousness.[8] In the Dharmakīrti system, this Dhyāna is given as Yogipratyakṣa, which along with its meditative object is attributed momentariness. The Theravādin, thinking it could contradict these Andhaka, cited both *Aṅguttara-Nikāya* i 10, and *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* ii 95. I found that von Rospatt also cited these,[9] first AN i 10, that the Buddha says he "does not perceive a single other entity which moves on as quickly as the mind," but von Rospatt then cites a *Vibhāṣā* (extant in Chinese) that the Buddha only intended here the series (*saṃtāna*). Then SN ii 95, as von Rospatt renders it, "As, oh monks, a monkey roaming through the jungle, the forest, grasps one branch and letting go of it grasps another one, just so that which is referred to as 'thinking' (*citta*) or also 'mind' (*manas*) or also 'consciousness' (*viññāṇa*) after night and after day arises as another and passes away as another." But von Rospatt refers to Buddhaghosa, his *Sāratthappakāsinī* commentary "that the mind arises as another and passes away as another entity, does not imply that the mind, after having originated, changes its identity and perishes as another one." We notice that these early Buddhist scriptural passages refer to the speed of mind, and to changes more in the object. Thus the mind as a monkey speedily goes from one branch to another—remaining a monkey—so it is the object, the branches, which constantly change. Of course, early Buddhism had emphasized impermanence rather than the momentariness. I shall revert to this Theravādin-Andhaka dispute below.

Also in the background of the Buddhist logicians' treatment of momentariness is the Abhidharma arguments between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, for which I refer to the exposition by Collett Cox.[10] Her topic required much treatment of momentariness, since it is an important feature of the arguments. She presents two definitions of a 'moment'. 1. Vasubandhu's: "What is the limit of a moment? That during which a factor acquires its own nature when there is an assemblage of conditions." (*samagreṣu pratyayeṣu yāvatā dharmasyātmalābhaḥ*).[11] 2. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika's which Vasubandhu does not accept: "According to our [that is, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika view], a moment is precisely [that time] during which [the activity of these characteristics] is completely realized." (*eṣa eva hi naḥ kṣaṇo yāvataitat sarvaṃ samāpyata iti*). Yaśomitra glosses this: "This means that [a moment] is defined as [a factor] accomplishing its activity; it is not defined as destruction immediately after production." (*kāryaparisamāptilakṣaṇo*

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[8] Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, trs., *Points of Controversy*, a tr. of the *Kathāvatthu* (London: The Pali Text Society, 1915), pp. 124–7.

[9] See n. 2 above, pp. 114–5.

[10] Collett Cox, *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995).

[11] Cox, p. 156, referring to Vasubandhu's commentary on his *Abhidharmakośa*, III 85c.

na tūtpattyanantaravināśalakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ).[12] What Cox renders as 'activity' (*kārya*) can also be understood as 'result'.

The Cox work has much valuable information on (as I render it) 'the constructions dissociated from thought' (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), and also from 'form' (*rūpa*). She gives variant lists, using Chinese sources for a list of 16, as well as Vasubandhu's commentary on his *Abhidharmakośa* for a list of 14. They all agree on most of the included items, and I will mention here only the no. 1, the 'possession' (*prāpti*) and the last three—the name set (*nāmakāya*), the phrase set (*padakāya*), the syllable set (*vyañjanakāya*),[13] and cite her remark: "The existence of these factors is proven through inference from the particular activity that each performs."[14] Her expression 'inference' agrees with the logic terminology that those three sets are kinds of inference's object—the 'generality character' (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which along with the 'possession' (*prāpti*), are dissociated from thought (as well as from 'form').

But the discussion of 'possession' shows a contrast between this one of the list and the set of three *kāyas*. The 'possession' may be described by its 'moments', and there is a disagreement between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. "Vasubandhu emphasizes the perspective of the relationship between a factor and the life-stream [the *saṃtāna*] said to possess it in each instance of possession. Further, by implying a distinction between the first and the second and subsequent moments in the possession of a given factor, Vasubandhu's interpretation also de-emphasizes the strictly momentary character of each impermanent factor; the emphasis is instead on the stream of each individual instance of possession."[15] "For Saṅghabhadra, however, the apparent, continued connection of a factor to a life-stream, which would enable one to speak of a first moment and subsequent moments of possession, must be seen as a succession of distinct arisings of factors representing a particular class, all of which are characterized by a particular intrinsic nature. The first instance of a factor representing a particular class is unique; it alone should be referred to as acquisition . . . In this way, Saṅghabhadra's interpretation preserves the identity of intrinsic nature among all arisings of a given class of factors as well as the strictly momentary character of each factor's activity."[16] With the foregoing information, one may conclude that Vasubandhu's position goes with the first definition of a 'moment', and possibly Saṅghabhadra's goes with the second definition. Besides, Vasubandhu apparently identifies the 'moments' with the possession, while Saṅghabhadra transfers the momentary character to the possessed factors in a class of the factors. This interpretation of classes of factors puts Saṅghabhadra's position about possession in line with the three *kāya* sets.

Of course, much more could be said about this difference between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, but I must continue with this problem of the inference pair. We may refer to an

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[12] Cox, p. 369, referring to Vasubandhu's commentary on his *Abhidharmakośa*, II 46b; and to Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* (Wogihara ed.), p. 178, 18ff.

[13] Cox, pp. 70–3, and notes thereto.

[14] Cox, p. 74. In her note thereto, she informs that Saṅghabhadra suggests that a certain member of the list, the 'homogeneous character' (*sabhāgatā*), can also be known through yogic direct perception—which in the Dharmakīrti system would be therefore a momentary object.

[15] Cox, p. 84.

[16] Cox, p. 85.

early Buddhist scripture, *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* i 43. The Buddha explains: *rūpaṃ jīrati maccānam, nāmagottaṃ na jīrati*. "The physical body (*rūpa*) of mortals decays, their name and genus (*nāma* and *gotta*) do not decay." By 'name' the Buddha of course means the transmigrating entity—for our present essay just as important as is the 'genus', *gotta*, Skt. *gotra*. If the non-momentary status of inference should hold up, it would be included in the transmigrating entity. As to the 'genus', notice that we can perceive individual trees, but cannot perceive the tree species, its *gotra*. In the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system it has to be included in the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, the generality character; for example, in Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*, he gives an example, "It is a tree, because it is a Śiṃśapā (Aśoka)," meaning, we infer "It is a tree," giving as reason, "because it is an Aśoka", so "It is a tree" refers to the tree species, the inferable. And Dharmakīrti himself refers to the species, using the word *jāti* for it, so in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna chapter, verse 234cd: *nityatvād āśrayāpaye 'py anāśo yadi jātivat*. "Should the basis be lost, through permanence there is no loss if it is like the 'species'." Dharmakīrti appears here to be alluding to the ancient scripture cited above, "their name and genus do not decay."

Now that we have found at least one non-momentary element in Dharmakīrti's system, the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, perhaps some other non-momentary things can be figured out. It seems that certain ones in the variant lists of 'constructions dissociated from thought'—to the extent that they be explainable as groups or sets, would be non-momentary even if members of those sets are momentary.

To be informed of something that stays is easy in Buddhism, for in my new book *Untying the Knots in Buddhism*, I cite Daṃṣṭrasena: "The staying of *dharma* is said to be defined as remaining as was told: 'Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, the rule of *dharma*, the staying of *dharma*, remains'. Being absolute (*paramārtha*) and inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*), (this) *dharma*, which has the former soiled phase and the later unsoiled phase also exists in all times (= past, present, and future). This is the staying of *dharma*."[17] Since this is under the topic of Dharmadhātu, I should cite a recent essay by Takasaki that treats this very matter: "The idea of *dhātu-vāda* takes as its model terms such as *anādhikāliko dhātuḥ* (a beginningless substance or basis), as expounded in the verses of the *Mahāyāna-abhidharma Sūtra*, or *eko dhātuḥ* (the one realm), as found in the even older *Anūnatvāpurṇatvanirdeśaparivarta*. [He gives references for those two texts.] These terms refer to the idea that *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* exist together or share a single 'place' or 'realm'. This 'place' is the context within which one passes, through practice, from *saṃsāra* to *nirvāṇa*. Those who experience this place as *saṃsāra* are ordinary sentient beings; those who experience it as *nirvāṇa* are Buddhas."[18] Takasaki wrote this essay to defend his position that there is a Tathāgata-garbha (embryo of the Buddha) that goes with this Dhātu (realm) position, namely, against certain Japanese scholars who were attacking this position. Anyway, this Tathāgata-garbha is also something that is ever-lasting.

Reverting to that argument between the Andhaka and the Theravādin, I could support the Andhaka in the theory that something could continue in the subconsciousness, for in that new

[17] A. Wayman, *Untying the Knots in Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997), p. 271.

[18] Jikidō Takasaki, "Thoughts on *Dhātu-vāda* and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies," in *Pruning the Bodhi Tree*, ed. by J. Hubbard and P. Swanson (University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 315.

book of mine I cite the *Dharmasamuccaya*, chapter XI, k. 101:

> *nāśaṃ prayāti vasudhā sāgaraś cāpi śuṣyati /*
> *cittena yat kṛtaṃ citraṃ tad anubhavanasthitam //*
> "The kingdom crumbles and the lake dries up, but the
> painting created by the mind remains in experience."

This passage was discussed as referring to a kind of seed consciousness.[19]

Well, after presenting several things that are not 'momentary', I still have left the problem of inference (*anumāna*), since the mere fact that Dharmakīrti did not mention it, or its object, as 'momentary', still does not, in the case of inference, prove its character to be 'non-momentary', even though I have shown its object to be so. I should mention here that Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣa chapter, verse 5 plus commentary, contrasts the *svalakṣaṇa*—which is *paramārtha-sat* (existent in an absolute way) and has *arthakriyā* (activity toward a goal)—with the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*—which is *saṃvṛti-sat* (existent in a conventional way) and lacks *arthakriyā* (activity toward a goal). The mere fact of the *svalakṣaṇa*'s being existent in an absolute way does not keep it from being 'momentary', while its momentariness is a change toward a goal, and can be understood as a cause of a momentary direct perception. Also the mere fact of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*'s being existent in a conventional way does not keep it from being 'permanent', while its non-momentariness lacks a change toward a goal, and so cannot be understood as a cause of an inference. Since both the *svalakṣaṇa* and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as *prameya*s precede the *pramāṇa*s, as fundamental to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school, this preceding character is independent of causation. This information enables us to interpret a certain verse from the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, what the Shastri edition labels 180cd and 181ab,[20] while I follow the Sāṅkṛtyāyana edition of Prajñākaragupta's commentary, which labels it verse 179:[21]

> *kāryānutpādato 'nyeṣu saṅgateṣv api hetuṣu /*
> *hetvantarānumānaṃ syān naitan nityeṣu vidyate //*
> "Given the non-arising of a result even when other causes
> are combined, if there were an inference of a different
> cause, it would not be among the permanences."

Dharmakīrti here agrees with what I presented just above, namely, that the *sāmānyalakṣaṇas*, even as combined 'causes', cannot give rise to a result; and observing what the opponent insists, namely, that an inference could be of a different sort of cause, the *svalakṣaṇa*, one that has an effect. Dharmakīrti of course disagrees, because the *svalakṣaṇa* is not among the 'permanences', namely, the *sāmānyalakṣaṇas*—the *svalakṣaṇa* being among the 'momentaries'; and it is only the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*s that precede the inferences according to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system.

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[19] Wayman, *Untying*, p. 255.

[20] Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., *The Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti with the Commentary of Manorathanandin* (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968).

[21] Rāhula, Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed., *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam of Prajñākaragupta* (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953).

Observing that the 'generality character' (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) cannot cause an inference, even though preceding it—since an inference requires an inferable—we may conclude that the inference capacity must be there already—something permanent. Indeed, since the set of 'illusions', i.e. the trees moving when our vehicle starts moving, called *pratyakṣābhāsa* (my rendering) 'semblances of perception' [which Prof. Hattori years ago told me are *not* Perceptions (*pratyakṣa*)], it may be that these are also objects of Inference if there are generalities about them.

Finally, there is the *saṃtāna*, and in the compound *cittasaṃtāna* it has been rendered 'stream of consciousness' and said to be momentary. Also, in my new book (*Untying the Knots*), I discuss the alternate term *saṃtati*, having noted from my lexical studies that this term is used to define *syūti*, meaning 'sewing', whereby I concluded that *saṃtati* is in Buddhist usage a 'stitched continuity'.[22] So when we consider the alternate term *saṃtāna*, we could take it as a stream of both the momentary (the Perceptions) and the permanent (the Inferences); and who knows what else?

So we may have noticed several things that are not 'momentary': the Buddhist Dharmadhātu (including the Tathāgata-garbha), the subconscious current of seed consciousness, the 'generality character' (including various sets that are 'dissociated from thought'), and Inference.

Those modern Indian writers who attributed to Buddhism a universal momentariness seem to regard their words as true because they uttered them.

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[22] Cf. Wayman, *Untying*, pp. 539–40. As to my own lexical studies, it is Alex Wayman, tr. *Abhidhānaviśvalocanam of Śrīdharasena* (Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji, 1994).

YOGĀCĀRABHŪMI AND DHARMAKĪRTI ON PERCEPTION

by

Hideomi Yaita, Narita

The *Yogācārabhūmi* (= YBh) is a very important work in the study of dogmatic, religious and philosophical theories of Buddhism in Indian thoughts. The YBh also presents important materials on logical and epistemological theory before Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who were the most conspicuous developers thereof. I discussed previously some logical theories described in the Śrāvakabhūmi (= ŚBh), the thirteenth chapter of the YBh, namely, the theories of the four kinds of *yukti* and of proof by the three means of knowledge (*tri-pramāṇa*) which includes a proof of momentariness, *kṣaṇikatva-anumāna* or *kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi.*[1] The *kṣaṇikatva-anumāna* in the ŚBh is primitive and not different from the so-called "*vināśitva-anumāna.*"

I have edited the Sanskrit text of the *hetuvidyā* section in the Śrutamayībhūmi (= ŚruBh),[2] the tenth chapter of the YBh, on the basis of the Skt. Mss. the facsimile edition of which has been published recently (= ŚBh_{Ms}). *Pratyakṣa*[3] is defined there, essentially the same way as Dharmakīrti defines it, i.e. as "*kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam.*" I will discuss this presently. I have found the *indriyasaṃvara* section in the ŚBh very interesting, as it presents an important epistemological theory. The term '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' defined there will be discussed later. The term is reminiscent of Dignāga's or Dharmakīrti's definition of conception (*kalpanā*), namely, '*nāmajātyādi-yojanā*' or '*abhilāpasaṃsarga-*'.

In the present paper I would like to discuss the perception theories described in the above-mentioned two sections in the YBh (= *hetuvidyā* section in the ŚruBh and *indriyasaṃvara* section in the ŚBh), comparing them with the perception theory of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, especially their definitions of *pratyakṣa* and *kalpanā*, and to point out a small affinity between them.

First, the *hetuvidyā* section in the ŚruBh. This section is important in the history of Indian logic and has often been studied by modern scholars.[4] It reveals the methodology of debate. It consists of seven parts, among which the third part, named 'foundation of debate (*vādādhiṣṭhāna*)', is the most important from a logical as well as epistemological point of view. Here, three kinds

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[1] Cf. Yaita [1989ab].

[2] HetuV (Yaita [1992]). Cf. Yaita [1993]; H. Yaita and M. Takano, "Index to the Hetuvidyā Text in the *Yogācārabhūmi*," *Bongo Bukkyō Bunken no Kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1995), 217–284.

[3] Normally the Sanskrit words '*pratyakṣa*' and '*anumāna*' mean perception and inference, respectively. But, as will be mentioned later, in this section of the ŚruBh the former means an object perceived, and the latter, either an object inferred or inference. Cf. fn. 14, 15 below.

[4] Cf. H. Ui, "Jinna izen ni okeru bukkyō no ronrisetsu" [Buddhist logical theory before Dignāga], *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 5 (1929; repr. 1982), 387–503; G. Tucci, "Buddhist Logic before Dignāga," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* (1929): 451–488; A. Wayman, "The Rules of Debate according to Asaṅga," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 78/1 (1958): 29–40, etc.

of proofs (*sādhana*), that is, *pratyakṣa, anumāna* and *āptāgama* (sacred teachings), are fully explained.[5] These three proofs occupy such an important position that the author has required forty percent in volume of the whole *hetuvidyā* section to explain them.

Pratyakṣa is defined there in a negative sense like this:

> "It is not indirect, neither already inferred nor to be inferred, and not illusive." (*pratyakṣaṃ katamat. yad aviparokṣam anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam avibhrāntañ ca.* HetuV 6*,8–9.)

In this definition of *pratyakṣa*, the second item "neither already inferred nor to be inferred (*anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam*)" is essential. This item is just opposite to the definition of *anumāna.*[6] The item is explained in two ways (HetuV 3.2621/3.2622). To illustrate the essence of *pratyakṣa* as such in one way (HetuV 3.2622), the author of the ŚruBh adduces the case of a certain kind of *yogin*'s meditation similar to the so-called *pṛthivī-kṛtsnāyatana* meditation, i.e. earth-pervasion meditation. Looking at water, for example, a *yogin* meditates on earth (*pṛthivī*). As he goes on developing this meditation, ultimately only the perception of earth is manifested in him. The earth manifested at this moment is regarded as *pratyakṣa* in the ŚruBh.[7]

Dharmakīrti defines *pratyakṣa* in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (= PVin) and *Nyāyabindu* (= NB) in a negative sense as follows:

> "Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free from conception and not illusive." (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam.* PVin I v. 4a; NB I 4.)

The term "not illusive"(*abhrāntam*) is not included in Dignāga's definition, which says just as follows:

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[5] Eight kinds of proofs (*sādhana*) are enumerated there. They are *pratijñā* (proposition), *hetu* (reason), *udāharaṇa* (exemplification), *sārūpya, vairūpya, pratyakṣa, anumāna* and *āptāgama*. The latter five proofs are adduced in support of a syllogism consisting of the former three. The right *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* establish the *pratijñā*,[a] and that is why these two, perhaps including the latter five which support the two to establish the *pratijñā*, can be called '*pramāṇas*' (right means of knowledge); see HetuV 16*,14–22. The word '*pramāṇa*' seems to be sometimes used in a different sense, namely just for "*pratyakṣa*." This is because the word '*pratyakṣa*' is used together with the word '*pramāṇa*' three times (HetuV 7*,22; 9*,5–6; 11*,3. Tibetan translation same), but such is not the case with the words '*anumāna*' and '*āptāgama*', etc. This is reminiscent of the work titled 「方便心論」 (*Fāng biàn xīn lùn, *Upāyahṛdaya*) where *pratyakṣa* is regarded as the best of the four *pramāṇas* (= *pratyakṣa, anumāna, āptāgama, upamāna*); see H. Ui "*Upāyahṛdaya no chūshakuteki kenkyū" [An annotated study of the **Upāyahṛdaya*], *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* 2 (1925; repr. 1982), 514; G. Tucci, "Upāyahṛdayam, Retranslated into Sanskrit," in *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources* (1929; repr. Madras, 1981), 13,3–5. In the ŚBh and Bodhisattvabhūmi, *pratyakṣa, anumāna* and *āptāgama* are regarded as more important and called 'three *pramāṇas*'; see ŚBh[1] 119*,16; Yaita [1989a: (69)ff.]. In this manner it seems that the word '*pramāṇa*' is used in at least three different senses in the YBh.

[a] The author of the ŚruBh very clearly points out that *udāharaṇa* (exemplification) is of basic importance to the proposition (*pratijñā*) which is to be established by a right reason (*hetu*). See HetuV 5*,3–8; 16*,10–14; Yaita [1993: 536–537].

[6] Note also that inference (*anumāna*) is included as pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) in Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's system. See PS I 7cd–8ab; PV III 288ff.; Katsura [1982: 90] <NMu>. *Anumāna* is defined in the ŚruBh as follows: *anumānaṃ katamat. sahābhyūhayābhyūhito 'bhyūhyaś ca viṣayaḥ* (HetuV 11*,4–5).

[7] This is called *viṣayapratiṣṭhitopalabdhyāśrayo viṣayaḥ*. See HetuV 8*,10–9*,6 (3.2622) and my translation (Yaita [1992: 555f.] Cf. Yaita [1993: n. 13]. The other explanation of the item ("*anabhyūhitam anabhūhyam*")

"Perception is free from conception." (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham.* PS I 3c; NMu v. 15a = Katsura [1982: 84].)

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) has been classified by Dharmakīrti into four types (Cf. NB I 8–11.). The fourth is a certain kind of *yogin*'s intuition. In explaining the freedom from conception (*kalpanāpoḍhatva*) in this intuition, he takes the case of the *yogin*'s *pṛthivī-kṛtsnāyatana* meditation and *aśubhā* meditation, etc., which he does not recognize as proper perception.[8] It is to be noted that Dharmakīrti regards the *yogin*'s *pṛthivī-kṛtsnāyatana* meditation, etc., as attesting to the fact that the yogin's intuition, which is the fourth perception, is clear and free from conception (*kalpanāpoḍha*). This means that he takes it for granted that these meditations such as the *yogin*'s *pṛthivī-kṛtsnāyatana* meditation are definitely not accompanied by a conception (*kalpanā*). Therefore, it can be said that the above-mentioned *pratyakṣa* in the ŚruBh is free from conception, i.e. *kalpanāpoḍha* in terms of Dharmakīrti and also of Dignāga.[9]

This is not surprising, because Dignāga himself states in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (= PS) that the freedom from conception (*kalpanāpoḍhatva*) has been suggested in some *abhidharma* works preceding him.[10] Such a statement by Dignāga might support my conjecture. These passages in *abhidharma* treatises point out the essence of sense-cognition.[11] It is noteworthy that the ŚruBh defines *pratyakṣa* as one of the proofs (*sādhana*) in this section.[12]

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which takes the case of medicine prescribed by a doctor is seen at HetuV 8*,1–9 (3.2621). The *pratyakṣa* in this case is called *grahaṇamātraprasiddhopalabdhyāśrayo viṣayaḥ.*

[8] He does not recognize them as proper perception, namely as fourth perception, because they are illusive (*bhrānta*) though being free from conception (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Cf. PV III 284: *aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādy abhūtam api varṇyate / spaṣṭābhaṃ nirvikalpañ ca bhāvanābalanirmitam.* Cf. PV III 281–286; Tosaki [1979: 376f.]; PVin I 72,26–76,2. I wonder, the author of the ŚruBh also does not recognize *yogin*'s *pṛthivī-kṛtsnāyatana* meditation, etc. as proper *pratyakṣa*, because these could be contradictory to the third item in the definition, i.e. '*avibhrāntam*'. See, for example, HetuV 9*,15–16: *atallakṣaṇe tatsaṃjñā, tad yathā marīcikānimittāyāṃ mṛgatṛṣṇikāyām apsaṃjñā.*

[9] In the AKBh 35,3–14 (ad I v. 33), the five sense-cognitions are regarded as free from conception (*avikalpaka*) as far as *(abhi)nirūpaṇa-* and *anusmaraṇa*-conception are concerned. The *(abhi)nirūpaṇa-vikalpa* is defined as "*mānasī vyagrā*" (v. 33c), and the word '*vyagrā*' is explained as '*asamāhitā*', regarding which term the AKV (65,6–7) comments: "*samāhitā tu bhāvanāmayī nāmānapekṣyālambane pravartate.*"

[10] He quotes the following two passages: *cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam iti*; *arthe 'rthasaṃjñī na tv arthe dharmasaṃjñī.* (Hattori [1968: 26 and 88, nn. 1.36–37]). The former passage is parallel to VijK 559b27–29: 「眼識唯能了別青色、不能了別此是青色」 (This identification was suggested to the present writer by Prof. S. Katsura. Cf. E. Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 8 (1964): 90). VijK 559b27–c28 explains the six kinds of cognitions, i.e. five sense-cognitions and mental cognition. The translation of the two passages by Prof. Hattori is as follows: "One who has the ability to perceive perceives something blue, but does not conceive that 'this is blue'"; "In respect to an object, he has the sense of the object itself, but does not possess any notion of its name." (Hattori [1968: 26]). These passages will be dealt with later (See fn. 30, 31 below). They are disregarded and not commented on by Dharmakīrti in his PV or PVin.

[11] Criticizing Dignāga in his *Prasannapadā* (PrP 74,8f.), Candrakīrti says that the former passage ("*cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī*...") does not define perception (*pratyakṣa*). Cf. T. Tanji, *Akirakana Kotoba I* [*Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* I, translated into Japanese with notes] (Suita, 1988), 66.

[12] A question arises: if Dignāga knew the *hetuvidyā* section in the ŚruBh, why did he quote as evidence such *abhidharma* passages and not the definition of *pratyakṣa* in the ŚruBh, the latter of which is, according to my opinion, essentially nearer Dignāga's theory than the former? The following answer is one possibility: These *abhidharma* works were more authoritative in this context for Dignāga than the ŚruBh. It may also be possible that he did not know the ŚruBh.

'Avibhrāntam', the third item in the definition in the ŚruBh, and *"abhrāntam"* in Dharmakīrti's PVin and NB accord not only in wording but also in essence. Each term is supplementary to the essential character of *pratyakṣa* in each case. The examples adopted in the ŚruBh, e.g. multiple moons, a fire-wheel (*alātacakra*), are consistent with the explanation of the term *'abhrāntam'* in the PVin and NB.[13]

In this way it seems that *'pratyakṣa'* as defined in the ŚruBh and *'pratyakṣa'* as defined in Dharmakīrti's works are not essentially different. But there is a notable difference between them, namely, the *'pratyakṣa'* described in the ŚruBh is not the perception of an object as described by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but a perceived object (*viṣaya*), just as in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.[14] Such a difference must be very important epistemologically. *Pratyakṣa* is evidently nowhere described as the perception of an object in this section of the ŚruBh. But such is not the case with *anumāna*. It is true that *anumāna* is defined as an object (*viṣaya*) in the ŚruBh, but it is sometimes paraphrased as an inferential cognition of an object, i.e. *viṣaya-abhyūhana,* in the same text.[15] In this manner, it seems that *anumāna* is understood by the author in two ways, that is, as an object of inference and also as an inferential cognition of an object. There is a possibility that this could also be the case with *pratyakṣa*.

Secondly, the *indriyasaṃvara* section in the ŚBh (ŚBh^{1} 50*–57*; ŚBh$_{Sh}$: 63,14f.). I shall discuss Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's definitions of the term 'conception' (*kalpanā*). *'Indriyasaṃvara'* means control of the sense-organs. This section examines how the sense-organs become out of control, and how they can be controlled. The epistemological theory described in this section may be summarized as follows—An eye-cognition arises owing to the eyes and colors (*rūpāṇi*). Immediately after the eye-cognition, a mental cognition (*manovijñāna*) arises which is accompanied by a conception or an erroneous conception (*vikalpaka/ayoniśovikalpasahagata*). Such a conception causes afflictions (*saṃkleśa*) to arise. This is because ill factors (*akuśaladharma*) begin streaming into a person as he grasps signs (*nimittagrāha*) and grasps sub-marks (*anuvyañjanagrāha*) from colors, sounds, and so forth.[16]

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[13] Cf. HetuV 9*,15f.: . . . *tad yathā marīcikānimittāyāṃ mṛgatṛṣṇikāyām apsaṃjñā. . . . tad yathā taimirikasyaikasmiṃś candre bahucandradarśanam. . . . tad yathālāte cakrasaṃsthānadarśanam. . . . tad yathā kāmalena vyādhinopahatendriyasyāpīte rūpe pītarūpadarśanam*; PVin I 40,3f.; NB I 6: . . . *timirāśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādyanāhitavibhramam* . . . ; PV III 293f. *"Aviparokṣam,"* i.e. the first item in the definition of *pratyakṣa* in the ŚruBh, is explained there as follows: *aparibhinnendriye pratyupasthite manaskāre* . . . (HetuV 6*,10f.)

[14] See e.g. HetuV 9*,7: *avibhrānto viṣayaḥ pratyakṣaṃ katamat* (Cf. L. Schmithausen, "The Definition of pratyakṣam in the Abhidharmasamuccayaḥ," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 16 (1972): 153–163). It is not a thing existing there, but color, etc., perceived. This is in accord with the terms *'sva-'* and *"akṣam akṣaṃ prati"* in the definitions of *pratyakṣa* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Nyāyamukha*, respectively (see fn. 27 below). It is unclear whether this is in accord with the perception theory of the ŚBh which will be dealt with later in the present paper. I would like to study these problems further in future.

[15] On the one hand, see HetuV 11*,4–5: *anumānaṃ katamat. sahābhyūhanayābhyūhito 'bhyūhyaś ca viṣayaḥ.* On the other hand, see ibid. 11*,7–9: *liṅgato 'numānaṃ katamat. yat kenacid eva cihnanimittasambandhena vartamānena vā pūrvadṛṣṭena vā viṣayābhyūhanam. Āptāgama* is defined as what was preached by the omniscient (see ibid. 14*,7–8: *"āptāgamaḥ katamaḥ. yat sarvajñabhāṣitaṃ tato vā śrutvā tadanudharmaṃ vā."*)

[16] *cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam. cakṣurvijñānānantaram utpadyate vikalpakaṃ manovijñānam. . . . kathaṃ punas tasmād ayoniśovikalpāt saṃkleśasamutthāpakān mānasaṃ rakṣati. na nimittagrāhī bhavati teṣu rūpeṣu śabdeṣu gandheṣu raseṣu spraṣṭavyeṣu dharmeṣu nānuvyañjanagrāhī, yato 'dhikaraṇam asya*

These two terms, namely, '*nimittagrāha*' and especially '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' are worthy of notice, being closely related with the term '*vikalpa*' in the content.[17] Both terms often appear in the same context, namely, in the '*indriyasaṃvara*' or '*indriyasaṃvaraśīla*' section, in *āgama* and *abhidharma* literatures, but they are seldom explained there.[18] The explanation of both terms is given in the *Visuddhimagga* (= VisM).[19] '*Anuvyañjanagrāha*' is explained there as "to apprehend any aspect classed as hand, foot, smile, laughter, talk, looking ahead, looking aside, etc. . . ."[20] This explanation in the *Visuddhimagga* is interesting. Here appears no word like '*nāman*' or '*abhilāpa*' which are used in Dignāga's or Dharmakīrti's definition of conception (*kalpanā/vikalpa*), but the above-mentioned passage, especially "aspect classed as hand, foot, smile, etc." suggests these Skt. words.

We see a development of epistemology in the fact that both terms are explained more in detail in the ŚBh, which gives two interpretations to each. On the one hand, "*nimittagrāha*" is explained as the grasping of colors, etc., by an eye-cognition, etc.,[21] and '*anuvyañjanagrāha*', the grasping of colors, etc., by a mental cognition (*manovijñāna*).[22] On the other hand,[23] '*nimittagrāha*' is explained as "to see the colors manifested by means of the eyes with attention (attracted) (*manaskāra*)."[24] '*Anuvyañjanagrāha*' is explained like this: to see the colors in the same manner and further to conceive an idea (*vikalpayati*) of the colors with the help of names, sentences, and syllables (*nāma-pada-vyañjana*) as they were heard before from other people.[25] '*Anuvyañjana-*

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pāpakā akuśalā dharmāś cittam anusraveyuḥ. (ŚBh[1] 51*,2–52*, 5. Cf. $ŚBh_{Ms}$ 9b1f.; $ŚBh_{Sh}$ 66,4f.)

[17] Rhys Davids in his translation of the *Dīghanikāya* translates "*na nimittaggāhī hoti nānuvyañjanaggāhī*": "he is not entranced in the general appearance or the details of it"; see T. W. Rhys Davids (tr.), "*Dialogues of the Buddha,*" pt. 1 (London, 1899; repr. 1977), 80.

[18] Cf. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (ed.), *Dīgha-Nikāya*, 1 (London, 1890; repr. 1975), 70,7–24: *kathañ ca mahārāja bhikkhu indriyesu guttadvāro hoti? Idha mahārāja bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhī hoti nānuvyañjanaggāhī. yatvādhikaraṇam enaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ tassa saṃvarāya paṭipajjati, rakkhati cakkhundriyam, cakkhundriye saṃvaraṃ āpajjati*. . . . The parallel passages are seen in *Dīghanikāya* (III 225f.); *Saṃyuttanikāya* (IV 104); *Aṅguttaranikāya* (I 113; II 16; 152; III 99); *Dhammasaṅganī* (1345); *Mahāvastu* (III 52); *Abhidharmasaṃgītiparyāya* (T vol. 26, 372b15f.), etc. The term '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' is not found in the *Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)*.

[19] *na nimittaggāhī ti, itthipurisanimittaṃ vā subhanimittādikaṃ vā kilesavatthubhūtaṃ nimittaṃ na gaṇhāti, diṭṭhamatte yeva saṇṭhāti. nānuvyañjanaggāhī ti. kilesānaṃ anu anu vyañjanato pākaṭabhāvakaraṇato anuvyañjanan ti laddhavohāraṃ hattha-pāda-sita-hasita-kathita-ālokita-vilokitādi-bhedaṃ ākāraṃ na gaṇhāti, yaṃ tattha bhūtaṃ tad eva gaṇhāti*. . . . (VisM 17,18f.).

[20] The text is given in note 19 above. See B. Ñāṇamoli, *Path of Purification: Visuddhimagga* (1956; repr. Kandy, 1991), 23. Cf. Nyanatiloka, *Visuddhi-Magga: Der Weg zur Reinheit* (1927; repr. Konstanz, 1989), 25: ". . . daß er nicht festhält an den verschiedenen Nebenmerkmalen, wie Hand, Fuß, Lächeln . . ."

[21] *nimittagrāha ucyate, yac cakṣurvijñānagocaro rūpaṃ tasya gocarasya grāhī bhavati cakṣurvijñānena*. . . . (ŚBh[1] 52*,19f. Cf. $ŚBh_{Ms}$ 6a4f.; $ŚBh_{Sh}$ 68, 2f.)

[22] *anuvyañjanagrāha ucyate, yas teṣv eva cakṣurvijñeyeṣu rūpeṣu cakṣurvijñānasyaiva samanantara-sahotpannasya vikalpakasya manovijñānasya yo gocaraḥ . . . tasya grāhī bhavati manovijñānena*. . . . (ŚBh[1] 53*,5f. Cf. $ŚBh_{Ms}$ 6a5f.; $ŚBh_{Sh}$ 68,11f.) Cf. fn. 32 below.

[23] See ŚBh[1] 53*,14 ($ŚBh_{Ms}$ 6a7; $ŚBh_{Sh}$ 68,17f.): *aparā jātir nimittagrāhasyānuvyañjanagrāhasya ca*. It is not clear whether this alternative is based on Buddhist sectarian differences or not.

[24] *nimittagrāho yac cakṣuṣā rūpāṇy ābhāsagatāni tajjaṃ manaskāraṃ saṃmukhīkṛtya paśyati* (ŚBh[1] 53*,14f. Cf. $ŚBh_{Ms}$ 6a7; $ŚBh_{Sh}$ 68,18f.)

[25] *anuvyañjanagrāhaḥ . . . api tu parato 'nuśravapūrvakam, śṛṇoti "santy evaṃrūpāṇy evaṃrūpāṇi cakṣur-*

grāha' here means: to conceive an idea ('*vikalpayati*') of an object in relation with its name, etc.[26] This accords with the definition of conception (*kalpanā/vikalpa*) in the PS of Dignāga, namely "association of name, genus, etc., [with a thing perceived] (*nāmajātyādiyojanā.* PS I 3d.),"[27] and also in the PVin and NB of Dharmakīrti (*abhilāpasaṃsarga-*).[28]

The definition of '*kalpanā*' by Dignāga as such may not be traced back to this idea of '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' in the ŚBh directly, but it seems possible to say that such a theory in the Buddhist tradition as seen here in the ŚBh had influence on Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This conjecture may be supported by the perception theory in the Vijñānakāya (= VijK), preceding Dignāga[29] and by the post-Dharmakīrtian scholars' (= Kamalaśīla's and Jinendrabuddhi's) interpretation of the two passages, one of which may belong to the VijK. The two passages are quoted by Dignāga in his PSV from *abhidharma* literatures in order to show that the idea of '*kalpanāpoḍha*' in his definition of *pratyakṣa* can be traced back to them, as previously mentioned.[30] The VijK has a passage parallel to the one of the two passages, i.e. "*cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam iti.*" In the VijK the passage is followed by this argument: "Also by a mental cognition (**manovijñāna*) he perceives blue. As long as he cognizes no name of a thing, he does not conceive 'this is blue'. Once he cognizes its name, then he perceives blue and also conceives 'this is blue'."[31] The last sentence seems to mean cognition in the sense of a mental cognition. The name of a thing affords the key to the difference between a sense-cognition and a mental cognition. Words like '*kalpanā*', '*vikalpa*' or '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' are not used there in the VijK. But, because Dignāga is quoting the passage: "*cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī* . . ." being included in the same paragraph in the VijK in order to show that his idea of '*kalpanāpoḍha*' is consistent with the passage of the VijK, the above-mentioned theory of a mental cognition in the VijK must essentially be consistent with Dignāga's theory of '*kalpanā*'.[32]

Kamalaśīla says that the two phrases "*na tu nīlam iti*" and "*na dharmasaṃjñī*" in the above-

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vijñeyāni rūpāṇi" iti yāni tāni tadanugatāni nāmāni padāni vyañjanāni yāny adhipatiṃ kṛtvā yāni niśritya yāni pratiṣṭhāyāyaṃ puruṣapudgalo yathāśrutāni cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi vikalpayati. ayam ucyate 'nuvyañjanagrāhaḥ. (ŚBh[1] 53*,17f. Cf. ŚBh_{Ms} 6a7f.; ŚBh_{Sh} 68,20f.)

[26] In the ŚBh the terms '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' and '*vikalpayati*' seem to be used in the same meaning, namely: to conceive an object in relation with the name of the object perceived.

[27] See Hattori [1968: 25]. Cf. PSV ad PS I 3d: *yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti* (Hattori [1968: 25 and 83, nn. 1.26; 27]); NMu: *yaj jñānam arthe rūpādau viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam* (see Katsura [1982: 84]; T. Funayama, "A Study of *kalpanāpoḍha*: A Translation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* vv. 1212–1263 by Śāntarakṣita and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla on the Definition of Direct Perception," *Zinbun: Annals of the Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University* 27 (1992): 89).

[28] Cf. NB I 5 (PVin I 40,8f.): *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā* (. . . *-pratibhāsā pratītiḥ* . . .); PV III 174: *saṃketasmaraṇopāyaṃ dṛṣṭasaṃkalpanātmakam / pūrvāparaparāmarśaśūnye tac cākṣuṣe katham //*; PV III 123: . . . *vikalpo nāmasaṃśrayaḥ.*

[29] Cf. also fn. 9 above (AKBh, AKV).

[30] See fn. 10 above.

[31] VijK 559b28–c2: 「意識亦能了別青色。乃至未能了別其名、不能了別此是青色。若能了別其名、爾時亦能了別青色、亦能了別此是青色」.

[32] It is probably in accord with the term '*anuvyañjanagrāha*' in the ŚBh, which is described in it as the grasping of colors, etc., by a mental cognition (*manovijñāna*). See fn. 22 above.

mentioned two passages remove the cognition of an object in relation to its name.[33] Jinendrabuddhi interprets the term '*dharma*' in the latter sentence as name, '*ming*' in Tibetan, and probably '*nāman*' in Skt.[34] These post-Dharmakīrtian scholars suggest that the idea of *kalpanā* was considered to be related with name/word before Dignāga. Such interpretations by the two Buddhist scholars are suggestive in our context, although they are chronologically after Dharmakīrti.

In conclusion, I have tried to point out, by studying two sections in the YBh, that the essential points of the definitions of *pratyakṣa* and *kalpanā* by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were already present in the earlier Buddhist tradition, and also that the YBh is important for the study of pre-Dignāga Buddhist logic and epistemology.

Abbreviations and Literature

AKBh — *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu): Y. Ejima, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa*. Tokyo, 1989.

AKV — *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (Yaśomitra): U. Wogihara, ed. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra*. Tokyo, 1932–36. Reprint, 1971.

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1968. — *Dignāga, on perception: Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, translated and annotated*. Harvard Oriental Series 47. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

HetuV — The Skt. text of the *hetuvidyā* section in the ŚruBh: See Yaita [1992: 1*–27*].

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1982. — Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū [A study of Nyāyamukha]. Part 5. *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 42: 82–99.

NB — *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): Th. Stcherbatsky, ed. *Nyāyabindu*. Bibliotheca Buddhica 7. 1918. Reprint, Tokyo, 1977.

NMu — *Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): See Katsura [1982].

PrP — *Prasannapadā* (Candrakīrti): L. de la Valleé Poussin, ed. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti*. 1903–13. Reprint, Tokyo, 1977.

PS — *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Hattori [1968].

PSṬ — *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi) (Tib.): D 4268.

PSV — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga) (Tib.): See Hattori [1968].

PV — *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): Yūshō Miyasaka, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72): 1–206. [Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the order followed here correspond to the chapters 3, 1, 2 and 4 in Miyasaka's edition.]

PVin — *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti).

[33] In his *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta*, Kamalaśīla interprets both "*na tu nīlam iti*" and "*na dharmasaṃjñī*" as follows: "*nāmānuviddhārthagrahaṇapratikṣepāt kalpanārahitatvam.*" See TSP 16,4–5; H. Tosaki, "Kamalaśīla saku *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣesaṃkṣipta*, Genryō shō no tekisuto to wayaku" [Kamalaśīla's *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣesaṃkṣipta*, *pratyakṣa*-chapter], *Acta Indologica* 6 (1984): 481; PrP 74f., fn. 6.; Hattori [1968: 88, fn. 1.36.]

[34] PSṬ (sDe dge) 21a3–4: *don la chos su 'du shes pa ni ma yin zhes pa don la* ***ming*** *gi 'du shes pa ma yin no zhes pa'i don to*. Cf. Hattori [1968: 88, fn. 1.37].

PVin I — *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa): Tilmann Vetter. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam, Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 250. Band, 3. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 3. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1966.

ŚBh — *Śrāvakabhūmi.*

ŚBh[1] — Shōmonji Kenkyūkai, rev. ed. and tr. *Yugaron, Shōmonji dai ichi yugasho, sansukurittogo tekisuto to wayaku* [Śrāvakabhūmi, revised Sanskrit text and Japanese translation, the first chapter]. 1998.

$ŚBh_{Ms}$ — 『瑜伽師地論聲聞地梵文原文影印本』(*Yú qié shī dì lùn shēng wén dì fàn wén yuán wén yǐng yìn běn*) [Facsimile edition of the "Śrāvakabhūmi" Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscript]. Beijing and Tokyo, 1994.

$ŚBh_{Sh}$ — K. Shukla, ed. *Śrāvakabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga.* Patna, 1973.

ŚruBh — *Śrutamayībhūmi.*

T — J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds. *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō.* 85 vols. Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai.

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TSP — *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): S. Dvarikadas Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalshīla.* 2 vols. Varanasi, 1968.

VijK — *Vijñānakāya*, 『阿毘達磨識身足論』(*Ā pí dá mó shí shēn zú lùn*) : T 1539 (vol. 26).

VisM — *Visuddhimagga* (Buddhaghosa): H. C. Warren, ed. *Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosacariya.* Rev. D. Kosambi. Cambridge, 1950.

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1989b. Shōmonji ni okeru sanryō setsu [On threefold *pramāṇa*s in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*]. *Taishō Daigaku Sōgōbukkyōkenkyūjo Nenpō* 13: (78)–(85).

1992. Yugaron no inmyō, bonbun tekisuto to wayaku [Hetuvidyā in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Sanskrit text and Japanese translation]. *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Kiyō* 15 (2): 505–576.

1993. Yugaron inmyō no chishikiron [On logical and epistemological theory in the Hetuvidyā section in the *Yogācārabhūmi*]. In *Indogaku mikkyōgaku kenkyū: Miyasaka Yūshō Hakushi koki kinenronbunshū*, pt. 1, 533–548.

YBh — *Yogācārabhūmi.*

DHARMAKĪRTI VS. BHĀSARVAJÑA ON PERCEPTION*

by

Shodo Yamakami, Kyoto

When we look into Bhāsarvajña's critique of the Buddhist doctrines, we are surprised at his profound study on Buddhism and his incisive argumentation, which always grasps the key point of a problem and hits the opponents in a vulnerable spot. For example, his keen insight into the positions of Dharmakīrti will be clearly understood when we look at the following list of quotations from Dharmakīrti found at the beginning of each discussion in the first chapter of the NBhūṣ.[1]

A.1. *pramāṇa = meyarūpatā*
(PVin I 78,16–80,17 = NBhūṣ 46,15–47,12)
2. *pramāṇa = pramāṇaphala*
(PVin I 80,18–27 vv.35cd–37 = NBhūṣ 49,15–19)
B.1. Denial of *avayavin*
(PVin I 84,18–86,9 = NBhūṣ 104,8–16)
2a. *svasaṃvedana*
(PVin I 86,12–15 v. 38 = NBhūṣ 107,4–5)
2b. *sahopalambhaniyama*
(PVin I 94,17–25; 96,10–17; 96,23–98,5 = NBhūṣ 107,8–108,3; 108,5–9; 108,10–14)
2c. *svayam anubhavas*
(PV III 432 = NBhūṣ 109,5–6)
3. *vijñaptimātratā*
(PVin I 88,1–8 vv.39–40 = NBhūṣ 109,12–15)
C.1. *yogipratyakṣa*
(PVin I 72,26–74,4; PV III 282; PV III 285–286 = NBhūṣ 171,12–16; 171,18–19; 172,3–6)
2a. *kalpanāpoḍha* and *avisaṃvāditva*
(PVin I 40,2–9; 76,26–78,9 = NBhūṣ 176,19–20; 177,4–13; 178,3–4)
2b. *kalpanāpoḍha* is known by *svasaṃvedana*
(PV III 123–125 = NBhūṣ 178,10–15)
2c. Proving of *kalpanāpoḍha*
(PVin I 40,10–46,20 = NBhūṣ 178,19–180,14)

A glimpse at the above list assures us what Bhāsarvajña refutes. Namely, he criticizes the

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* I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Peter Schwabland who kindly checked my English and gave me useful suggestions.

[1] All quotations from PVin I are identified by E. Steinkellner: "New Sanskrit-Fragments of *Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ*, first chapter," *WZKS* 16 (1972).

Sautrāntika theory which, despite accepting the existence of external objects, keeps *sākārajñānavāda* (the view that knowledge possesses the image of its object); he criticizes the Vijñānavāda theory, which rejects all the reality of all external objects and accepts knowledge as only self-cognizing (*svasaṃvedana*); and he examines the nature of the ultimately true perception and criticizes the Buddhist perception of *kalpanāpoḍha*.

In this paper, I will sketch out Bhāsarvajña's criticism of Dharmakīrti's theory of perception.

A. On the Sautrāntika view

1. *pramāṇa = meyarūpatā*

Bhāsarvajña divides the equation "*meyarūpatā* (the objective image in knowledge) = *pramāṇa* (a means of true knowledge) = *pramāṇaphala* (the resultant knowledge)" into two parts, i.e. the former "*meyarūpatā* = *pramāṇa*" and the latter "*pramāṇa* = *pramāṇaphala*." No discussion worthy of special mention is to be found out in his refutation of the latter.[2] With respect to the former equation, however, Bhāsarvajña represents a series of discussions between Dharmakīrti and himself in order to point out Buddhist inconsistencies that will drive Dharmakīrti into self-contradiction.[3] The outline of these discussions as reconstructed in NBhūṣ is as follows:

Bhāsarvajña: Is it correct to insist that *meyarūpatā* is a *pramāṇa* even in case of *bhrānti* (erroneous cognition) such as *keśoṇḍuka*?

Dharmakīrti: It was already stated that knowledge which lacks *avisaṃvāditva* (being not contradictory with the experience) is not a *pramāṇa*.

Bhāsarvajña: Then why do you maintain that *anumāna* (inference) is a kind of *pramāṇa*, because it was also stated by yourself that *anumāna* is a kind of *bhrānti*?

Dharmakīrti: Regarding *anumāna*, knowledge has *avisaṃvāditva* with *adhyavaseya* (what is to be determined).

Bhāsarvajña: If *adhyavaseya* is previously unknown, *adhyavasāya* (determination) of all beings of past, present and future would be possible.

Dharmakīrti: Since *adhyavasāya* is not possible without recollection, *adhyavasāya* of what is previously unknown is not possible. A *bhrānti* arises in such cases in which something (A) which is seen is determined to be something else (B) [which was seen before] (*anyadarśane anyad adhyavasīyate*).

Bhāsarvajña: Then every perception would absurdly be a *bhrānti*. For as long as you stick to *kṣaṇikatvavāda* (the doctrine that everything is momentary), you can not confirm *avisaṃvāditva*, because the moment you confirm it (= *avisaṃvāditva*) is subsequent to the original moment of perception.

2. *avisaṃvāditva* and *kṣaṇikatva*

Pointing out the inconsistency between *avisaṃvāditva* and *kṣaṇikatva* is certainly a cutting criticism of the Sautrāntika theory. *Avisaṃvāditva*, which is based on the fulfillment of a human purpose (*arthakriyā*), is a criterion in testing the truth of knowledge.[4] The Sautrāntikas, therefore, find themselves in the critical predicament in which *kṣaṇikatvavāda* prevents them from

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[2] Cf. NBhūṣ 50,1–53,7.

[3] Cf. NBhūṣ 54,13–55,20.

[4] S. Katsura, "Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12 (1984): 215.

ascertaining the truth of cognition. This problem, as Dr. Tosaki states, "can not be solved by Dharmakīrti."[5]

Bhāsarvajña quotes the Buddhist rejoinder to this as follows: "The same *santāna* (continuum) which was perceived is to be determined."[6] This may have the same meaning as Dharmottara's phrase: "the same *santāna* of existence that is to be determined (*adhyavaseya*) to be non-different is the object of action [of fulfilling a human purpose]."[7] But Bhāsarvajña rejects this answer, claiming that without the moment (*kṣaṇa*) there is in reality no *santāna*, either.[8]

Bhāsarvajña seems to regard the Sautrāntika theory as completely collapsed by his refutation, because he thereafter quotes from PVin some passages in which Dharmakīrti declares that his final standpoint is that of the Vijñānavādins, who reject external reality and accept only knowledge itself as ultimately real.[9] This quotation is clearly a cynical retort by Bhāsarvajña, implying that there is no way out of self-contradiction left for Dharmakīrti other than resorting to the Vijñānavāda.

Bhāsarvajña, who rejects introducing the idea of two realities, i.e. *paramārthasat* (the ultimate reality) and *saṃvṛtisat* (the conventional one) into the realm of logic, can not help arguing from the conventional standpoint that even the ultimately real knowledge is not able to be ascertained either through perception or through inference,[10] which is in fact not really a discussion but a one-sided affair. It is, however, noteworthy that Bhāsarvajña compels Dharmakīrti to take the Vijñānavāda as his final resort, because it reconfirms to us that the final standpoint of Dharmakīrti is not that of the Sautrāntikas but that of the Vijñānavādins.[11] The above-mentioned discussions, thus, prove to be a prologue to Bhāsarvajña's criticism of the Vijñānavāda.

B. On the Vijñānavāda view

1. Non-differentiation of knowledge from its object

Bhāsarvajña, of course, examines and rejects every doctrine of the Vijñānavādins, but in his treatment of Dharmakīrti, he focuses specifically on the problem of the self-cognition (*sva-*

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[5] H. Tosaki, "Ninshiki" [Cognition], in *Iwanami-kōza Tōyōshisō, Indobukkyō* 3 (Tokyo, 1989), 175; Katsura, *op. cit.*, 220.

[6] NBhūṣ 55,20–21: *ya eva santānaḥ pratyakṣeṇa dṛṣṭaḥ sa evādhyavasīyate iti /*

[7] PVinṬ 31a6: *'on kyang tha dad pa med par lhag par zhen par byas pa dngos po de nyid kyi rgyud 'jug pa'i yul yin la /* Cf. Tosaki, *op. cit.*, 184.

[8] NBhūṣ 55,21–22: *kṣaṇavyatirekeṇa santānasyāpi vastuto 'saṃbhavāt /*

Dr. Tosaki also says that one challenging attempt the Buddhists have made to solve this problem is *ūrdhvatā-lakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyam* (the universal of an individual) as described by Mokṣākaragupta, which refers to the idea of a certain kind of power in a series of continuing moments of a similar kind (Tosaki, *op. cit.*, 184). Dr. Kajiyama writes as follows: "Of these, the universal of an individual is constructed through the accumulation of a series of moments of an individual object, say a jar, which is distinguished from the others of the same class; and this universal is the object of the perception ascertaining [an object] (*sādhanapratyakṣa*)." Cf. Y. Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* (Kyoto, 1966), 58–59.

[9] PVin I 100,14–24 = NBhūṣ 57,14–19. Cf. Ch. Lindtner, "Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's PVin I–II," *WZKS* 28 (1984): 156–157.

[10] NBhūṣ 57,21–58,3.

[11] Cf. H. Tosaki, *Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū* [A Study of Buddhist Epistemology], vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1979): 51–54.

saṃvedana) theory.[12]

In his critique of the Vijñānavāda, Bhāsarvajña begins by criticizing Dharmakīrti's PVin I v. 55 and succeeding prose explanations in which Dharmakīrti asserts the Buddhist position of non-differentiation of knowledge from its object.[13]

(1) Firstly, regarding the well-known logical reason "*sahopalambhaniyamāt* (because of necessity of being perceived together)" of v. 55ab, which is so important in Vijñānavāda theory as to be fully discussed among the Buddhist logicians, Bhāsarvajña follows the arguments of his predecessors such as Śubhagupta and so on,[14] which shows that the discussion on *sahopalambhaniyama* had been stereotyped by the time of Bhāsarvajña.

(2) Secondly, regarding v. 55cd (*apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati* / "If cognition were itself not perceived perception of an object is never possible"), which is put to reject the opinion that perception of an object should precede that of cognition, Bhāsarvajña interprets '*upalambha*' and paraphrased '*prasiddhi*' in two ways each, i.e. '*upalambha*' = a̲ *arthadṛṣṭi*, b̲ *tajjanakaṃ jñānam*, and '*prasiddhi*' = A̲ *utpatti*, B̲ *upalabdhi* respectively to make three (although theoretically four) alternative sentences.[15]

a̲A̲ will make the following sentence: *arthadṛṣṭer apratyakṣatve saty utpattir na saṃbhavati* / (If perception of an object is not perceived occurrence [of perception of an object] is never pos-

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[12] Regarding the problem of *arthākāra* (an objective image within knowledge) of the Vijñānavādins, there was a well-known theory of *citrādvaitavāda*, which seems to have been developed by Prajñākara. Consequently, in discussing the problem of *citrādvaita* Bhāsarvajña picks up Prajñākara's view. And regarding another important topic among the Vijñānavādins, i.e. *nirālambanavāda*, Bhāsarvajña also quotes a lot of passages from Prajñākara. It seems to be Kumārila who, for the first time, picks up the *nirālambanavāda*, in the form of a logical syllogism, which may originally "have its roots in mystical experience" (John A. Taber, "Kumārila's Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: The nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa," in *Studies in Mīmāṃsā* (Delhi, 1994), 48, note 8). Dharmakīrti disregards Kumārila's discussion, probably because Kumārila's discussion and succeeding Naiyāyika's are not based on any statement of the famous Buddhist scholars before him. Instead Prajñākara makes an extensive argumentation on this problem citing a lot of *śloka*s from *Ślokavārttika*. That is why Bhāsarvajña regards Prajñākara as his opponent on this problem also, although Bhāsarvajña does not make any comments on the discussion between Prajñākara and Kumārila.

[13] PVin I 94,17–25; 96,10–17 = NBhūṣ 107,8–108,3; 108,5–9

(1) *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* / v. 55ab

na hi bhinnāvabhāsitve'py arthāntaram evaṃrūpaṃ nīlasyānubhavāt tayoḥ sahopalambhaniyamāt, dvicandrādidarśanavat / na hy anayor ekānupalambhe 'nyopalambho 'sti na caitat svabhāvabhede yuktaṃ pratibandhakāraṇābhāvāt /

(2) *atha paścād arthopalambhasya jñānāntareṇa saṃvedanam, tad apy ayuktaṃ, yasmāt,*

apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati /

(= *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭeḥ prasiddhiḥ*) / v. 55cd

(3) *na hi viṣayasattayā viṣayopalambhaḥ, kiṃ tarhi, tadupalambhasattayā, sā cāprāmāṇikī na sattānibandhanāṃs tadvyavahārān anuruṇaddhi* / (A)

tadaprasiddhau viṣayasyāpy aprasiddhir iti sadvyavahārocchedaḥ syāt, na hi sad apy anupalambhyamānaṃ sad iti vyavaharttuṃ śakyate / (B)

[14] Cf. S. Matsumoto, "Sahopalambhaniyama," *Sōtōshū Kenkyūsei Kiyō* 12 (1980); E. Mikogami, "Śubhagupta no yuishikisetsuhihan" [Śubhagupta's critique of Vijñaptimātravāda], *Nanto Bukkyō* 48 (1982); T. Iwata, *Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schulusses von der Tatsache, dass Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschliesslich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit*, Teil 1–2 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991).

[15] NBhūṣ 133,21–134,11.

sible.)

bA: *arthadṛṣṭijanakajñānasyāprayakṣatve arthadṛṣṭir notpadyate* / (If knowledge able to raise perception of an object is not perceived perception of an object never occurs.)

aB/bB: *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthopalambhaḥ pratyakṣaḥ* / (If cognition is itself not perceived cognition of an object is never perceived.)

Naturally, Bhāsarvajña regards all of the above sentences as meaningless.

(3) Thirdly, Dharmakīrti's prose explanations on v. 55cd are closely investigated by Bhāsarvajña.

As for the former portion (A), Bhāsarvajña insists that it is because of existence of its object that cognition can arise.

As for the latter one (B), he refutes as follows: if they argue that verbal expression of an object is not possible unless the object is known to exist, any verbal expression would not be possible to the Vijñānavādins because they do not accept any external reality.[16]

It is clear that these arguments of Bhāsarvajña are all based on Naiyāyika position that existence precedes its cognition.[17] To Bhāsarvajña, however, the more important argument is, as we see next, the one regarding the self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) theory.

2. On the *svasaṃvedana* (the self-cognition of knowledge) theory

According to Dharmakīrti, the self-cognition of knowledge means nothing but an appearance of knowledge, as it is said in PVin I v. 38: "*svayaṃ saiva prakāśate.*" Despite its glittering by itself and having no function of "illuminating," a lamp is said to illuminate itself. Just like this, the knowledge is also expressed to cognize itself although it illuminates by itself and has no function of cognizing.[18] Consequently the necessity of self-cognition theory is explained by Bhāsarvajña as follows: if the self-cognition theory is rejected, knowledge can not illuminate itself, and that which does not illuminate itself can not illuminate anything else, which means that knowledge lacks its nature of cognizing just like the external object such as a pot, knowledge in another continuum (*santānāntarajñāna*) and so on.[19]

Against this opinion, Bhāsarvajña, who highly estimates the function of cognizing, denies the necessity of self-cognition. Instead he claims that knowledge can cognize something other than itself, while not cognizing itself, just like a fire and a sickle, both of which can burn or cut any other things while not burning or cutting themselves respectively.[20] Moreover, it is only

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[16] NBhūṣ 135,6–25.

[17] Although they do not seem to have given a great blow to the Vijñānavādins, Bhāsarvajña's refutations (2) and (3) may have been well-known among the logicians in those day, because NVV quotes the whole of the discussion with mentioning the name of Bhāsarvajña. Cf. NVV I 209,28–210,11; 215,9–12; 227,19–21 = NBhūṣ 133,21–135,5; 135,15–18; 135,11–13.

[18] PV III 328–329.
nīlādirūpas tasyāsau svabhāvo 'nubhavaś ca saḥ /
nīlādyanubhavaḥ khyātaḥ svarūpānubhavo 'pi san //
prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ /
yathā prakāśo 'bhimatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī //

[19] NBhūṣ 135,26–27; 137,4–5.

[20] NBhūṣ 136,9–11 = NVV I 215,2–4.

because of its lack of connection with its nature that knowledge loses its nature of cognizing. And, furthermore, the reason why knowledge is not external is not because it is self-cognizing, but because of its appearance inside by dint of its own total collection of causes (*svasāmagrī-sāmarthyāt*) and because of its being an attribute (*guṇa*) of *ātman*. If, on the other hand, the Vijñānavādins stick to the self-cognition theory, knowledge never loses its nature, which absurdly implies that some knowledge occurs constantly and never ends.[21]

Lastly Bhāsarvajña represents the following inference attributed to some *ācārya*,[22] who is not identified: knowledge is cognized by another knowledge, because of being cognized, just like color and so on.[23]

It is to be noted that Bhāsarvajña concludes this discussion as follows: "Since the self-cognition theory is not established in this way, *sahopalambhaniyama* is also not established, which leads one to the conclusion that knowledge and its object are different."[24] This shows us Bhāsarvajña's view that *sahopalambhaniyama* is presented by Dharmakīrti to prove the non-differentiation of cognition from its object and that *sahopalambhaniyama* itself is based on the *svasaṃvedana* theory.[25] Bhāsarvajña, therefore, regards the repudiation of *svasaṃvedana* as the fatal blow to the Vijñānavādins and adds the finishing strokes to his refutation by rejecting the bifurcation of *grāhyākāra* (the image of cognitum) and *grāhakākāra* (the image of cognizer).

3. *grāhyākāra*, *grāhakākāra* and *adhyavaseya*

According to Dharmakīrti, although there is no distinction between knowledge and its object, confused people construct *grāhakākāra* and *grāhyākāra* within the undifferentiated act of knowing as if they were knowledge and its object respectively.[26]

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[21] NBhūṣ 137,6–18.

[22] The text and the Ms. of Śrīhemacandrācārya Jñāna Mandira (Ms. no. 10717) read "... *kiṃ pramāṇam iti ced yad eva devāryair uktam*..." But the Ms. of Banaras Hindu University (Ms. Serial no. 3C/2433; Accession no. C6) reads "... *kiṃ pramāṇam iti vedyād eva ācāryair uktam*..." With the aid of the latter, the former reading should be emended as "... *kiṃ pramāṇam iti ced yad eva ācāryair uktam*..."

[23] NBhūṣ 139,20–21: *jñānaṃ svavyatiriktavedanavedyaṃ vedyatvāt rūpādivat iti /*

According to NVV, there seems to have been debates on this inference between the Naiyāyikas and the Jainas or the Bauddhas. Against this inference of the Naiyāyikas, i.e. "*jñānaṃ jñānāntaravedyaṃ vedyatvād ghaṭavat*," the Jainas point out the fallacy of *anaikāntika* from the following three reasons; firstly because *vyāptijñāna* is not known by another knowledge (otherwise *anumāna* would not be established); secondly because *sukha* is not known by another knowledge; and thirdly because *īśvarajñāna* can not be known by another on account of *īśvara* being the one and only. Bhāsarvajña only refers to the third case and in order to evade the fallacy he presents three ways of solution; firstly *īśvarajñāna* should be accepted to be known by another knowledge as well as by itself; secondly *īśvara* should be accepted to be *sarvajña*; or thirdly the restrictive phrase of "*anitye satī*" should be added to the *hetu* of "*vedyatvāt*" like "*jñānaṃ jñānāntaravedyam anitye sati vedyatvāt*." (NBhūṣ 139,22–24) This solution of Bhāsarvajña is quoted in NVV I 218–222.

[24] NBhūṣ 139,24–25.

[25] After the session Dr. Iwata kindly suggested me that Bhāsarvajña's interpretation is not necessarily in accord with Dharmakīrti's intention. In this paper, however, I try to follow closely Bhāsarvajña's description.

[26] PVin I vv.39–40 = PV III 330cd–332ab.
avedyavedakākārā yathā bhrāntair nirīkṣyate /
vibhaktalakṣaṇagrāhyagrāhakākāraviplavā //
tathākṛtavyavastheyaṃ keśādijñānabhedavat /
yadā tadā na saṃcodyagrāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇā //

But Bhāsarvajña argues as follows: "If their distinction is not real, it is not acceptable that another knowledge can be cognized in any *santāna*. How can *santānāntara* be established (*kutaḥ santānāntarasiddhiḥ*)?"[27] This sounds like a cynical play by Bhāsarvajña on Dharmakīrti's work titled "*Santānāntarasiddhiḥ*." More importantly, however, the failure to establish *santānāntara* necessarily leads to a grave consequence that neither religious salvation nor proving emancipation is possible.[28]

Bhāsarvajña again reconstructs Dharmakīrti's answers that there is no distinction between *grāhyākāra* and *grāhakākāra*, but that the *grāhyākāra* is different from *adhyavaseya*[29] because the latter, despite being actually not appearing in knowledge, is imagined to be an object whereas the former does appear in knowledge and because action can be possible through *adhyavaseya*, as it is said in PVin II.[30]

Bhāsarvajña, however, rejects *adhyavaseya*, claiming that as long as they, the Vijñānavādins, do not accept the external reality they can not identify *adhyavaseya* with the real object, and that, moreover, if they accept distinction between *grāhakākāra* and *adhyavaseya* they should also accept the distinction between knowledge and the external object.[31]

By this refutation, Bhāsarvajña regards the *svasaṃvedana* theory completely uprooted.

C. On the ultimately true perception

1. *yogipratyakṣa* (yogic perception)

Now that the Vijñānavāda doctrine that this whole world is nothing but *vijñāna* has been repudiated, there remains the problem of the ultimately real knowledge that the Vijñānavādins hold to exist as the final reality. Accordingly, Bhāsarvajña quotes some passages on *yogipratyakṣa* from PVin I and PV III, and the point of Dharmakīrti's view is summarized in PV III 285–286.[32]

What is stated there is quite clear, i.e. there is no ultimately true and non-conceptual (*kalpanāpoḍha*) knowledge except that of the ultimate reality of *caturāryasatya* (the fourfold noble reality) attained by the yogins who have accomplished their meditation practice (*bhāvanā*).

Bhāsarvajña refutes the above view from his conventional standpoint as follows:[33]

(1) At first, it is not acceptable that knowledge has as its object the *caturāryasatya*, since the Vijñānavādins assert that knowledge is only self-cognizing. Therefore the knowledge of *caturāryasatya* can not be true, just like that of a dream.

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[27] NBhūṣ 140,16–17.

[28] Cf. NBhūṣ 152,2–8.

[29] After the session Prof. Funayama kindly suggested me that Dharmakīrti does not declare that *grāhyākāra* is different from *adhyavaseya*. This reconstructed answer of Dharmakīrti may be, therefore, quoted from Dharmottara.

[30] PVin II 24,8–10 = NBhūṣ 140,25–26: *svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravarttanād bhrāntir apy arthasaṃbandhena tadavyabhicārāt pramāṇam iti /* Cf. PVin II: 25.

[31] NBhūṣ 140,26–141,2.

[32] PV III 285–286.
tasmād bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evābhibhāvyate /
bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphuṭ ākalpadhīphalam //
tatra pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi yat prāṅnirṇītavastuvat /
tad bhāvanājaṃ pratyakṣam iṣṭaṃ śeṣā upaplavāḥ //

[33] NBhūṣ 172,11–173,8.

(2) Next, Bhāsarvajña reiterates that even a yogin's cognition can not avoid the contradiction of *avisaṃvāditva* with *kṣaṇikatva*. This refutation by Bhāsarvajña is quoted and counterattacked by Jñānaśrī, who considers perceptive knowledge attained by a perfect yogin as the final reality.[34]

(3) What is to be noted, however, is that a tactful retort to the above arguments of Bhāsarvajña is given by Jñānaśrī in another place on another topic, i.e. *arthakriyā*. Jñānaśrī, in replying to Bhāsarvajña who raises questions on double reality of *saṃvṛtisat* and *paramārthasat* or on double standard of Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda, classifies *saṃvṛtisat* into lower and upper (or *bālasaṃvṛti* and *paṇḍitasaṃvṛti*) to regard the lower as *saṃvṛtisat* and the upper as *paramārthasat*. To put it concretely, comparing Nyāya theory with Sautrāntika one, he considers the former to be *saṃvṛtisat* and the latter *paramārthasat*, but on the other hand, comparing Sautrāntika theory and Vijñānavāda one, he regards the former to be *saṃvṛtisat* and the latter *paramārthasat*. And according to him the final standpoint of *paramārthasat* is the establishment of mere manifestation (*pratibhāsamātravyavasthāna*).[35] This can be described as the classification of Buddhist *saṃvṛtisat/paramārthasat* based on Mādhyamika standpoint. Although this viewpoint itself is already found among Dharmakīrti's and Prajñākara's texts, it is noteworthy that Bhāsarvajña's refutation of Dharmakīrti and Prajñākara probably accelerates this classification among Buddhist logicians.[36]

2. *kalpanāpoḍha* (being free from the conceptual construction)

Lastly Bhāsarvajña rejects the notion of *kalpanāpoḍha* in the Buddhist perception theory. Since *kalpanāpoḍha* cognition of the Buddhists is, as mentioned above, nothing but the ultimately true knowledge, it would convey no meaning for Bhāsarvajña to examine it from the conventional standpoint. Yet the assertion of *kalpanāpoḍha* comes into conflict with the Naiyāyika theory of perception which is inevitably conceptual in principle. Therefore, Bhāsarvajña refutes *kalpanāpoḍha* for the purpose of protecting the Naiyāyika theory of perception. However, I already discussed this in another paper,[37] and would therefore like to conclude my paper with the following synopsis.

Bhāsarvajña's criticism of Dharmakīrti's position follows the progression of Dharmakīrti's sequence of philosophical phases, from the Sautrāntika to the Vijñānavāda and then to the ultimate reality. At first, in Sautrāntika phase, the contradiction of *avisaṃvāditva* and *kṣaṇikatva* is to blame; secondly, in the Vijñānavāda phase, *svasaṃvedana* and *santānāntara* are main targets of criticism, and thirdly, even in the phase of the ultimate reality, Bhāsarvajña claims that logical consistency should be required, and his argumentation on double reality accelerates the classification of *saṃvṛtisat/paramārthasat* among Buddhist logicians.

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[34] JNA 341,16–342,7; RNA 15,28–16,27. Cf. G. Bühnemann, *Der Allwissende Buddha: Ein Beweis und seine Probleme, Ratnakīrtis Sarvajñasiddhi, Übersetzt und Kommentiert* (Wien, 1980): 43–45, 129–131.

[35] JNA 6,6–11; 7,7–12. Cf. T. Kyūma, "Jñānaśrīmitra ni okeru arthakriyā" [Arthakriyā as described by Jñānaśrīmitra], *Bukkyō Bunka* 32/33 (1995): 50–55; do.: "Kyōryōbusetsu to yuishikigakusetsu tono kankeizuke" [The Relationship between Sautrāntika Theory and Yogācāra Theory exposed in Jñānaśrīmitra's Works], *Bukkyōgaku* 38 (1996): 70–72.

[36] After the session Dr. Katsura pointed out the importance of this role Bhāsarvajña plays and kindly informed me of the above papers of Mr. T. Kyūma.

[37] S. Yamakami, "Nyāya-gakuha no chishikiron" [The Theory of Knowledge in Nyāya School], in *Iwanami-kōza Tōyōshisō, Indoshisō* 1 (Tokyo, 1988), 222–225.

Abbreviations

JNA	Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist philosophical works of Jñānaśrīmitra.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna, 1959.
NBhūṣ	*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña): Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ, ed. *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam.* Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1. Vārāṇāsī, 1968.
NVV	*Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* (Vādirāja Sūri).
NVV I	Mahendra Kumar Jain, ed. *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri.* Vol. 1. Benares, 1949.
PV III	*Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 3 (Pratyakṣa): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirti with the commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathanandin.* Bauddha Bharati Series 3. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. [Chapter 2 in Shastri's edition.]
PVin	*Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti).
PVin I	Chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa): Tilmann Vetter. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam, Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 250. Band, 3. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Komission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 3. Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1966.
PVin II	Chapter 2 (Svārthānumāna): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte.* Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 287. Band, 4. Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, Heft 12. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973.
PVinṬ	*Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) (Tib.): P 5727.
RNA	Anantalal Thakur, ed. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ: Buddhist nyāya works of Ratnakīrti.* Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 3. Patna, 1957. 2nd ed. Patna, 1975.
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*

DṚŚYA AND *VIKALPYA* OR *SNANG BA* AND *BTAGS PA* ASSOCIATED IN A CONCEPTUAL COGNITION*

by

Chizuko Yoshimizu, Tokyo

Recent contributions to the Tibetan development of Dharmakīrti's epistemology by Georges Dreyfus [1992, 1994 and 1997] and Tom Tillemans [1995] have presented a detailed picture of the dGe lugs pa realists who propounded the existence of real universals (*sāmānya, spyi*) as well as the Ṣa skya pa critics thereof. This remarkable move in a realistic direction is considered to have originated with some Indian post-Dharmakīrtians and to have been carried over by Tibetan scholars of the gSang phu and dGe lugs pa traditions.[1] Despite its obvious theoretical deviation, the dGe lugs pas insist on the consistency of their idea of real universals with Dharmakīrti's own teachings. In this regard, I have assumed that most of the arguments appearing in their works such as the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, i.e. rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's notes of Tsong kha pa's lectures on valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*), and lCang skya's *Grub mtha'* are actually grounded in Dharmakīrti's exposition of *anyāpoha* in PV I and PVSV thereon.[2] The aim of this paper is to confirm this assumption [1] by indicating a structural and thematic parallel in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* to the *Thar lam gsal byed*, i.e. rGyal tshab's commentary on Dharmakīrti's PV,[3] and [2] by analysing the idea of *snang btags gcig tu 'dres nas snang ba*, meaning that a real particular (*rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa*)[4] and the meaning of words (*sgra don, śabdārtha*) appear to

*I am indebted to Prof. G. Dreyfus, Prof. L. van der Kuijp and Prof. T. Tillemans for their valuable suggestions, as well as to Mr. R. Giebel, who corrected my English.

[1] Cf. Zwilling [1976: 273 n. 1], Tillemans [1984: 64 n. 5], [1995: 857ff.], Dreyfus [1992: 42f., 45f.], [1994: 5–11] and [1997: 193–200], according to which such Indian scholars as Bhavyarāja (11c.) and Śaṅkaranandana (9–10c.) are mentioned by later Tibetans as a source of the dGe lugs pa realistic interpretation of universals, and Dharmottara (8c.) too seems to have taken a similar position. Franco [1984] has indicated that in Jayarāśi's TUS as well as in the TS(P) certain Buddhist logicians who accepted real universals based on their understanding of PS(V) I 3d appear as opponents. As regards Śaṅkaranandana, cf. also note 19 below.

[2] Cf. Yoshimizu [1997: 1112 n. 37] and [1998: Introduction].

[3] Some parallel passages found in rGyal tshab's *Thar lam gsal byed* are also cited in Tillemans [1995: 859, 863f., 876 n. 28]. From this viewpoint, it is conceivable that it was rGyal tshab rather than Tsong kha pa who actually contributed to framing discussions in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*. At any rate, this small treatise is a certain source for the presentations of later dGe lugs pas, for most ideas appearing there are repeated in later compositions such as mKhas grub's *Yid kyi mun sel*, dGe 'dun grub's *Rigs pa'i rgyan*, and the *lCang skya Grub mtha'*. The idea of real universals is, however, to be considered to have already been widely accepted among Tibetan epistemologists at the time of Tsong kha pa (cf. e.g. Dreyfus [1994: 7f.] and Tillemans [1995: 857ff.]).

[4] I render the word *rang mtshan* in terms of dGe lugs pa realists by 'real particular', for it is first of all an ontological concept meaning "an entity that is not merely conceptually imposed but established as intrinsically real" (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*). In this sense, impermanence, for instance, is also regarded as *rang mtshan*. Cf. e.g. *Thar lam gsal byed* 45a6: *des na rang mtshan gyi don ni rtog pas btags pa tsam min par yul rang gi ngo nas grub*

a conceptual cognition mixed as one, which well represents the realistic position of the dGe lugs pas.

1. The *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* and the *Thar lam gsal byed*

Two thirds of the entire *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* are devoted to the establishment of the two kinds of reality (*bden pa gnyis kyi rnam gzhag*), and half of this to removing doubts and misconceptions about Dharmakīrti's teachings on conceptual cognition (*rtog pa, kalpanā*) related to the *anyāpoha* doctrine (see Appendix 1, 1 and 2). One might first wonder why Tsong kha pa and rGyal tshab linked the *apoha* theory to the two kinds of reality. It is firstly because, as I have previously indicated, their establishment of the two kinds of reality is presumably based on Dharmakīrti's own statements in PV I 68–91, especially 68–70,[5] and secondly because it may reflect rGyal tshab's intention, who interprets not only PV I 68–91 but the whole *apoha* section of PV I 40–185 as contributing to the establishment of the two kinds of reality. rGyal tshab, namely, subsumes Dharmakīrti's discussions in PV I 40–185 under the title "Explanation of the establishment of the conventional and ultimate [realities] through eliminating [the objection that the condition of a logical reason's] being a property of the subject of a thesis (*pakṣadharmatva*) is not established with regard to an essential property as a logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*)" (*rang bzhin rtags kyi phyogs chos ma grub pa spong ba'i sgo nas kun rdzob dang don dam gyi rnam gzhag bshad pa*) (*Thar lam gsal byed* 41b5f., see Appendix 2), in contrast to other main Tibetan commentators,[6] who describe it as a section just for refuting the objection stated in the PVSV to PV I 39cd that an essential property as a logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) is not established since a logical reason is a part of the object of a thesis insofar as the properties to be proven and to prove are substantially not different.[7]

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pa'i don no ("Therefore, '*rang mtshan*' means a thing that is not merely imposed by a conceptual cognition but established from the side of the object itself."); *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 24a2f.: *sgra byas mi rtag pa gsum rang mtshan yin yang sgra shes 'dod chos can yin pa dang byas pa gtan tshigs yin pa dang / mi rtag pa bsgrub bya'i chos yin pa sogs ni sgro btags yin te /* ("The three, *viz.* sound and [the properties of] being produced and impermanent, are real particulars, whereas it is superimposed that sound is a subject (*dharmin*) about which one wants to know, [the property of] being produced a logical reason (*hetu*), the impermanence the property to be proven (*sādhyadharma*), and the like.")

[5] Yoshimizu [1998: Introduction]. The definition and explanation of the two kinds of reality given by dGe lugs pas are most likely to have been adopted from PV I 68–70 and its self-commentary. The *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, in fact, adduces PV I 68cd–69a as a textual evidence for the definition of the two kinds of reality and explains that PV III 3 is not to set forth the definition but to teach the instances of the definition (*mtshan gzhi, lakṣya*) (33b2–34a2). Cf. also Yoshimizu [1997: 1110 n. 35].

[6] Cf. *sa bcads* of the commentaries on PV I 40 *infra* in *Comparative Table* 4.

[7] PV I 39cd (cf. e.g. Steinkellner [1971: 206 n. 97]): *tadabhāve svayaṃ bhāvasyābhāvaḥ syād abhedataḥ //* ("If the [essential property] does not exist, the property would not exist by itself [either], since they are [substantially] not different.") The objection is as follows (PVSV 24,16f.): *ya eva tarhi kṛtakaḥ sa evānityo bhedābhāvāt. pratijñārthaikadeśo hetuḥ syāt.* ("Then, whatever is produced is exclusively impermanent, since there is no difference [between these two properties]. [Supposing so] a logical reason would be a part of the object of a thesis."); cf. PVSVṬ 108, 14ff.: *tasyā artho dharmadharmisamudāyas, tasyaikadeśaḥ sādhyadharmātmako hetuḥ syāt. tathā hi yāvad uktam anityaḥ śabdo 'nityatvād iti tāvad anityaḥ kṛtakatvād iti tathā cāsiddho hetur iti bhāvaḥ.* ("Its object [i.e. the object of a thesis] consists in the collection of properties and [their] locus. A logical reason would be a part of it, [in other words] something that has the property to be proven as its essence. Accordingly, it means that, for it is said that

Let us see how both texts proceed in their discussions (see Appendices 1 and 2). The *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* begins by investigating the doubts as to conceptual cognition and logical reasoning in the subsection called "postulation of the ground of doubts" (Appendix 1, 1), as does the *Thar lam gsal byed* (Appendix 2, 111 and 112). At the next stage both texts refer to the Madhyamaka system (Appendix 1, 21 and Appendix 2, 113).[8] The doubts are further divided into two kinds, i.e. the doubts which occur to people who have an intellect (*rtogs ldan*) and those which occur to people who do not have the ability to investigate Dharmakīrti's real intention (Appendix 1, 11 and 12 and Appendix 2, n. 35). The people of the second group can be said to maintain wrong conceptions owing to their superficial reading of Dharmakīrti's statements.[9]

Moreover, not only the *Thar lam gsal byed* but also the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* open their *anyāpoha* discussion with a question which conforms to the above-mentioned objection to *svabhāvahetu* in PVSV 24,16f. (see note 7 above.) The *Thar lam gsal byed* sets forth the question as to whether an essential property as a logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) is something substantial or merely imposed by a conceptual cogniton.[10] This properly follows the PVSV objection, for, if the property of being produced (*kṛtakatva*) as a logical reason is real or substantial, the logical reason would be a part of the object of a thesis since it must be identical with the property of being

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[sound] is impermanent since it is produced to the same extent that it is said that sound is impermanent since it is impermanent, the logical reason [i.e. being produced] is not established either.")

[8] As regards details of the comparison with the Madhyamaka system in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, cf. Yoshimizu [1997: 1109ff.]. The 'another system' (*lugs gzhan*) referred to in subsection 113 in the *Thar lam gsal byed* is also considered to be the Madhyamaka according to its contents. Cf. *Thar lam gsal byed* 43b6–44a2: *lugs gzhan nas . . . / gzugs sgra sogs rang bzhin gyis stong pa don dam pa'i bden pa dang 'bras bu bskyed pa'i bya ba byed nus pa'i gzugs sgra la sogs pa kun rdzob kyi bden par rnam par bzhag pa mdzad do* ("In another system . . . it is established as ultimate reality that visual matter, sound and so forth lack self-nature; and the visual matter, sound, and so forth which have the ability to perform the action of producing an effect are established as conventional reality.") Cf. also the parallel passage in *Rigs pa'i rgyan* 190b2–191a3.

[9] *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 17b6–18a5, where, in my observation, eight misconceptions are pointed out: 1) Conceptual cognitions are exclusively wrong since ultimate reality cannot be the object of a conceptual cognition; 2) No basis of establishing the existence of real things is admitted; 3) The establishment of real particulars is impossible; 4) Something produced has no capacity for efficacy (*don byed nus pa, arthakriyāśakti*) since it is a logical reason; 5) A universal is neither identical with nor different from the particulars which are its individual instances (*gsal ba, vyakti*), and a cause is neither identical with nor different from its effect; 6) Being a real particular contradicts being a universal; 7) There is no application of verbal agreement (*brda, saṃketa*) to a real particular; 8) Neither causal relationship nor difference between properties (*chos, dharma*) is genuine (*mtshan nyid pa*). Among these, 5) is said to have been caused through misunderstanding of PV I 135ab, 167cd, 166d and 71ab, 6) PV I 78ab, and 8) SP 1cd. Cf. also *Rigs pa'i rgyan* 189b5–190b2, which is very close to this passage. The *Thar lam gsal byed* (43a2ff.), on the other hand, indicates the following two conceptions, which might be contradictory: 1) Whatever is the object of a valid cognition is pervaded by being a real particular; 2) There are the two kinds of valid cognition (i.e. perception, which cognizes a real particular, and inference, which cognizes a universal).

[10] *Thar lam gsal byed* 42a5f.: *byas pa'i rdzas dang mi rtag pa'i rdzas tha dad med par thal / byas mi rtag rdzas tha dad med pa'i phyir / 'dod na / rdzas su gyur pa'i byas pa gtan tshigs yin nam / rtog pas btags tsam gyi don gtan tshigs yin /* ("It follows that the substance which is produced (*kṛtaka*) and the substance which is impermanent (*anitya*) are not different [from each other] since [according to PV I 39cd] [the property of] being produced and [that of] being impermanent are substantially not different. Which is the logical reason—[the property of] being produced, which is a substantial [existent], or a thing that is imposed by a conceptual cognition?")

impermanent (*anityatva*).[11] In addition, rGyal tshab reveals the non-establishment of the logical reason in the second alternative: if the logical reason is unreal and merely conceptually imposed, it cannot prove impermanence since whatever is conceptually constructed is permanent.[12] In any case, the logical reason does not meet the condition. The *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, on the other hand, examines the problem in its more general aspect by speaking of not only logical reason, but also universal (*spyi, sāmānya*), what is to be proven (*bsgrub bya, sādhya*), example (*dpe, dṛṣṭānta*), and so forth.[13] Yet the fundamental issue also lies in the question as to whether a logical reason, etc., are real or merely conceptually constructed. If they are unreal and merely imposed, it follows that there is neither capacity to perform an action (i.e. to prove something through inference) nor a basis for establishing something [imperceptible] like impermanence and omniscience.[14] In other words, if such ascertained objects of conceptual cognitions are unreal, no inference would be able to establish the reality of entities.[15] If they are established as real, the inference would be needless since any conceptual cognition would be non-erroneous.[16] Moreover, as in the case of

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[11] *Thar lam gsal byed* 42a6f.: *dang po ltar na / dam bca'i don gyi phyogs gcig chos rtags su bkod pa'i ma grub par thal / byas pa'i rdzas dang mi rtag pa'i rdzas tha dad min pa'i phyir /* ("Supposing the first [alternative is right], there is [the fault of a logical reason's] non-establishment, [for] a property that is a part of the object of a thesis is posited as a logical reason since the substance which is produced and the substance which is impermanent are not different [from each other].")

[12] *Thar lam gsal byed* 42b1f.: *phyi ma ltar na / byas pa mi rtag bsgrub pa'i gtan tshigs yin na mi rtag pa yin par 'gal bas / khyab pa 'gal nas ma grub par 'gyur zhing / rjes dpag gis lkog gyur gyi don rang mtshan go ba mi srid pas phra ba'i mi rtag pa dang rdul phran la sogs pa tshad mas mi 'grub par 'gyur te / mngon sum gyis kyang mi rtogs pa'i phyir ro //* ("Supposing that the second [alternative is right], [the property of] being produced contradicts [the property of] being impermanent insofar as it is a logical reason for proving impermanence. Therefore, the pervasion (*vyāpti*) is contradictory and there is [the fault of a logical reason's] non-establishment. Then, an imperceptible object that is a real particular can never be understood through inference, so that a subtle impermanence [i.e. momentariness], atoms, and so forth, cannot be established through valid cognition since they are not to be cognized through direct perception either.")

[13] *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 16b2–17a2 (cited and translated in Tillemans [1995: 860f.] and Yoshimizu [1997: 1107f.]). Cf. also *Rigs pa'i rgyan* 189b1–5, where the same problem is discussed.

[14] See *loc.cit.*, where "omniscience" (*kun mkhyen, sarvajña[tva]*) is to be considered to refer to one of the Buddhist goals or an imperceptible object to be proven through an inference. Cf. Yoshimizu [1997: 1107 n. 27].

[15] *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 16b6f.: . . . *nges yul rang mtshan du grub pa bkag na rang mtshan de dag nges pa'i yul du 'jog tshul de dag shin tu dka' zhing nges pa'i yul du ma gyur na yod nges su mi rung bas rnam gzhag thams cad byar mi rung bar 'gyur te / de med par ni dngos po dang // dngos med rnam gzhag gang gis nus // zhes bshad pa ltar ro //* ("If one denies that the ascertained object [of conceptual cognition] is established as a real particular, the ways of postulating these real particulars as ascertained objects are very difficult. If then the [real particulars] are not ascertained objects, it is inappropriate to ascertain the existence [of real entities]. Consequently, all establishments would be inappropriate, as [Dharmakīrti] explains, 'without [valid cognition], who can establish existence and non-existence?'"*) *PV IV 215cd (Miyasaka [1971/72: 194]): *aniṣṭañ cet pramāṇaṃ hi sarveṣṭīnāṃ nibandhanam / **bhāvābhāvavyavasthāṃ kaḥ kartuṃ tena vinā prabhuḥ** //*; cf. *Thar lam gsal byed* 43a4f. (cited and translated in Tillemans [1995: 863 n. 14]): *rtog pa la bum pa ma yin pa las log par snang ba rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa bkag pa na rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa'i bum pa ma yin pa las log par snang ba yang khegs nas 'jog mi shes par 'gyur la /* ("In the case that it is denied that the appearance to a conceptual cognition as distinguished from non-pot is established as intrinsically real, that which is established as intrinsically real appearing as distinguished from non-pot is negated too; it follows that one would be unable to postulate the [existence of this real particular].")

[16] *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 16b5f.: *khyad par du bum 'dzin rtog pa dang kun mkhyen nges pa'i rtog pa la sogs pa'i nges yul rang mtshan du grub na rtog pa de dag ma 'khrul bar 'gyur bas dgag sgrub thams cad cig car bya dgos pa* . . . ("Especially, if the ascertained objects of the conceptual cognitions that apprehend pot[ness], omniscience,

the *Thar lam gsal byed* (cf. Appendix 2, 12 and 2), the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* gives the answer to this question by adopting the topics and arguments from Dharmakīrti's *apoha* presentation in PV I 40–185 (cf. Appendix 1, 222–224).

Accordingly, it might be safe to say that the discussion in the section on the two kinds of reality in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* developed from an interpretation of the *apoha* section in PV I preceded by the objection to *svabhāvahetu* in PVSV 24,16f. ad PV I 39cd, which rGyal tshab adopted in his own commentary on the PV. rGyal tshab himself was probably aware of this, although it is unknown which work, the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* or the *Thar lam gsal byed*, he composed first.[17]

2. *snang btags gcig tu 'dres nas snang ba*

Thus considered, one might next wonder if there is any textual ground in Dharmakīrti's works even for supporting the realistic position of the dGe lugs pas. In the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, besides the verses from PV I, Śākyabuddhi's commentary thereon as well as Kamalaśīla's TSP are also mentioned as textual authorities.[18] Among the citations, however, there does not seem to exist any crucial statement justifying the idea of a real universal that appears to a conceptual cognition. Although the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* does not mention it, Śaṅkaranandana's comment on the above-mentioned objection to *svabhāvahetu* might be a potential source.[19] With

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and so on, are established as real particulars, it follows that these conceptual cognitions are non-erroneous. Hence, all negations and affirmations would have to be simultaneously given."); cf. *Thar lam gsal byed* 43a5f. (cited and translated in Tillemans [1995: 863 n. 14]): *bum pa ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i rang mtshan yod par bsgrub pa na rtog pa la bum pa ma yin pa las log par* snang ba yang rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa ma khegs shing rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub par khas len dgos la rtog pas btags pa tsam du 'jog mi shes par 'gyur /* (*corrected: *bum pa ma yin par*) ("In the case that a real particular which appears to a conceptual cognition as being distinguished from non-pot is affirmed to be existent, it cannot be denied that the appearance to the conceptual cognition as distinguished from non-pot too is established as intrinsically real. [On the contrary] it must be admitted that the [appearance] is established as intrinsically real. Then, it follows that one would be unable to postulate that [the appearance] is merely imposed by a conceptual cognition.") "The appearance to the conceptual cognition as distinguished from non-pot" here corresponds to "the ascertained object of the conceptual cognition that apprehends pot[ness]" in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*.

[17] It is known that rGyal tshab met Tsong kha pa at the age of 34 (c. 1397) at Ra gron in gNyal (cf. Nagao [1954: 66], Kaschewsky [1971: 136f., 216], Khetsun Sangpo [1975: 115], *Sa bcad* 2: v). Nagao suggests that the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* and other epistemological works by rGyal tshab may have been composed in accordance with Tsong kha pa's lectures given in c. 1404 (Nagao [1954: 62]).

[18] See *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 22a6f. and 23a1.

[19] PVṬ(Śa) D152b6 (cited in Zwilling [1976: 273 n. 1], Tillemans [1984: 64 n. 5], and Dreyfus [1997: 197]): *'di spangs pa'i phyir nyes pa de ni med de zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o // gang phyir dngos kun te / gsal ba 'ba' zhig tu ni mi zad de / spyi yang yin no zhes bya ba'i don no //* ("In order to refute this [objection in PVSV 24,16f.], [Dharmakīrti] says, 'there is no such fault [in our theory of *svabhāvahetu*]' (*naiṣa doṣaḥ* PVSV 24,17) and so on. [He says in PV I 40] 'all things . . . , therefore' (*sarve bhāvāḥ . . . yasmād*) and so on, which refers not only to individuals (*vyakti*) but also to universals.") PV I 40 states (cf. Vetter [1964: 48], Steinkellner [1971: 198], Zwilling [1976: 86]): *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ //* ("Since all things by nature consist in their respective essential property, they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]. Therefore, . . .") Śaṅkaranandana further comments on this verse (D153a2ff.): *des na shing shing gi bdag nyid kyi rang bzhin gyis rang gi ngo bo la gnas pa des na ba lang la sogs pa shing ma yin pa la med pa de'i phyir shing ma yin pa las ldog pa la brten pa yin no // de bzhin du de nyid sha pa'i rang bzhin gyis seng ldeng la sogs pa la med pas seng ldeng la sogs pa las ldog pas na rigs mthun pa las kyang ldog pa yin no // gsal ba ni gsal*

regard to Dharmakīrti's own thought, it is interesting to see that Tsong kha pa and rGyal tshab attribute to him the following four propositions:[20]

1) The ascertained object of conceptual cognition is not established as a real particular.
2) Real particulars are to be posited as ascertained objects of conceptual cognition.
3) A conceptual cognition operates on an object through mixing as one that which appears with a conceptual construct (*snang btags gcig tu bsres nas rtog pa yul la 'jug pa*).[21]
4) It operates on an object determining its own appearance that does not correspond to any real object as a real object.

Although no textual evidence is suggested, these ideas, in my conjecture, can be traced back to PV I, especially the PVSV ad PV I 60–91. The fourth proposition apparently refers to the idea of determination (*adhyavasāya*).[22] Nothing needs to be said about the first proposition. The second is also to be understood to refer to Dharmakīrti's assertion that a conceptual cognition does not deviate from real entities.[23] In this sense, it is not totally wrong to posit that real particulars are indirectly ascertained through conceptual cognition. Also for the third proposition, I would like to suggest the following passage from the PVSV as its textual source:

"[Objection:] Those which are different [from each other] are external [particulars], are they not? And any conceptual cognition does not operate on them. How then would it arise with respect to them? [Answer:] Indeed, those who explain [the reality of things] draw distinctions in this way

ba'i bdag nyid kho nas ldog pa yin gyi / spyi'i bdag nyid kyis ni 'dre bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i dogs pa blzog pa'i phyir / kun zhes smos so // ("Hence, insofar as a tree consists in its own nature by its own essential property of being a tree, it does not [consist] in a non-tree such as a cow. Therefore, it relies on the distinction from that which is non-tree. In the same manner, if the same [tree] is distinguished from Khadira and so on by its essential property of being a Śiṃśapā, it is also distinguished from those which are homogeneous. [Dharmakīrti] says 'all [things]' [including universals] in order to eliminate the suspicion that individuals are distinguished by their own nature of being individual and yet become mixed by the nature of being universal.") Here Śaṅkaranandana illustrates PV I 40 using the example of tree. Both "tree" and "Śiṃśapā" are, however, universals, although the latter is an individual instance (*vyakti*) of the former. The distinction of Śiṃśapā-tree from Khadira-tree is also to be regarded as a distinction from heterogeneous things. Thus, he speaks of the distinction between universals alone, but not between particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). This does not seem to follow Dharmakīrti's intention. Nor does his explanation that Dharmakīrti speaks of "all things" including universals, since not universals but only particulars do exist having their own nature.

[20] *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 17a1–5: *des na* 1) *rtog pa'i nges yul rang mtshan du ma grub pa dang* 2) *rang mtshan rtog pa'i nges yul du bzhag pas chog pa'i rnam gzhag dang /* 3) *snang btags gcig tu bsres nas rtog pa yul la 'jug pa dang* 4) *rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du zhen nas 'jug par lan cig ma yin par gsungs pa la /* Cf. also the parallel passage in *Rigs pa'i rgyan* 189b3–5.

[21] I render the word *snang* by "that which appears" since it is assumed to originally correspond to the Sanskrit word *dṛśya*, as will be seen below.

[22] Cf. e.g. PVSV 42,12–22 cited and translated in Vetter [1964: 55f.], Zwilling [1976: 136f.], Vora-Ota [1982: 2], and Yoshimizu [1997: 1112 n. 37], as well as *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 21b3ff. and Tillemans [1995: 854, 856 n. 3].

[23] Cf. e.g. PVSV 43,2ff. cited and translated in Vetter [1964: 56], Zwilling [1976: 138], Vora-Ota [1982: 3f.], and Yoshimizu [1997: 1112 n. 37]. In *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 21a6 Dharmakīrti's statement in PVSV 25,17f. is adduced as another potential source through its puzzling Tibetan version (discussed in Yoshimizu [1997: 1113 n. 27]).

[between conceptual objects and external particulars],[24] but not those who apply verbal convention. The latter, contrary [to the former], consider the very object of their own (i.e. the conceptual representation of a real object) as being capable of producing an effect, and they operate on [external particulars], having identified visible objects (*dṛśya*) (i.e. particulars) with a conceptual object (*vikalpya*) (i.e. the appearance of a universal)."[25]

The words *dṛśya* and *vikalpya* are rendered by the Tibetan words *snang ba* and *rnam par brtag par bya ba* respectively in the Tibetan version of the PVSV, and they are explained by both Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin as a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the appearance of a universal (*sāmānyapratibhāsa*).[26] It is therefore to be assumed that the word *snang* of *snang btags* has been adopted from this passage of the PVSV and interpreted as meaning a particular in accordance with Śākyabuddhi's commentary.[27] To this extent, however, the third assertion is not realistic either, since it is solely concerned with the manner of the practical application or operation (*pravṛtti*, *'jug pa*) of a conceptual cognition based on its function of determination (*adhyavasāya*). The verb *sre pa* in the expression *snang btags gcig tu bsres nas* in the third assertion is a transitive form of the intransitive verb *'dre pa* and means literally "to mix X with Y," but in this case it might suggest the erroneous character of conceptual cognition. Namely, a conceptual

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[24] According to Karṇakagomin, it refers to the distinction between *vikalpabuddhipratibhāsa* and *svalakṣaṇa* (see PVSVṬ 170,21: *anyo vikalpabuddhipratibhāso 'nyat svalakṣaṇam iti*).

[25] PVSV 39,4–8 ad PV I 68–70: *nanu bāhyā vivekino na ca teṣu vikalpapravṛttir iti kathaṃ teṣu bhavati. vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti, na vyavahartāraḥ. te tu svālambanam evārthakriyāyogyaṃ manyamānā* ***dṛśyavikalpyāv*** *arthāv ekīkṛtya pravartante*; cf. PVSV D282b5f.: *phyi rol pa rnams tha dad pa yin na de dag la ni rnam par rtog pa mi 'jug pa yin nam / ji ltar de dag la skye zhe na / 'chad par byed pa rnams de ltar rnam par 'byed par byed kyi / tha snyad 'dogs par byed pa rnams ni ma yin te / de dag ni rang gi dmigs pa kho na don byed par rung bar sems shing* ***snang ba dang / rnam par brtag par bya ba****'i don dag gcig tu byas nas 'jug go //*

[26] PVṬ D88a6f.: *snang ba ni rang gi mtshan nyid do // rnam par brtags par bya ba'i don ni spyi snang ba ste / de dag gcig tu byas nas rang gi mtshan nyid kho na rnam par rtog pa can gyi blo yul du byed cing sgras kyang brjod do zhes de ltar mos par byas nas don bya ba byed pa'i don (la) 'jug go //*; PVSVṬ 170,23ff.: *dṛśyo 'rthaḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ vikalpyo 'rthaḥ sāmānyapratibhāsas, tāv ekīkṛtya svalakṣaṇam evedaṃ vikalpabuddhyā viṣayīkriyate śabdena codyata ity evam adhimucyārthakriyākāriṇy arthe pravartante.*

[27] Although there are of course some small textual variations, I do not think that they run counter to this assumption. 1) The word *btags* of the phrase *snang btags* is usually used for the Sanskrit word *prajñapti*, *upacāra* and the like rather than *vikalpya*. However, there is no essential difference between them, since both *btags pa* and *rnam par brtag par bya ba* refer to something conceptually constructed; 2) This *vikalpya* is understood by the commentators as *sāmānyapratibhāsa*, i.e. the appearance of a universal, whereas it is explained as *sgra don* (*śabdārtha*), i.e. the meaning of words, in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*. Karṇakagomin, however, interprets it as *śabdārtha* too in PVSVṬ 171,5. Also, for the authors of the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, the meaning of words is not different from the appearance of a universal. Namely, they explain *sgra don* as both the appearance of a universal and its being excluded from others. Cf. *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 19b4f.: *sgra don gang la bya zhe na / bum mtshan ni rtog pa'i mdun na 'dug pa lta bur snang ba'i gser bum bum par snang ba de dang snang ba de nyid bum ma yin las log par snang ba gnyis ka'o /* ("What is called 'the meaning of words'? It is both the appearance of a golden pot as a pot [in the sense that] the characteristic of a pot appears as if it existed before a conceptual cognition and the appearance of this very appearance as being excluded from non-pot.") Cf. also the parallel explanations in *Yid kyi mun sel* 35a5f. (cited and translated in Dreyfus [1997: 252]) and *lCang skya Grub mtha'* (mDo sde pa) 74b3f. (Klein [1991: 128]); 3) The subject of the verb *pra√vṛt* or *pravartante* in Dharmakīrti's statement is the ordinary people who follow verbal convention (*vyavahāra*), whereas for Tsong kha pa and rGyal tshab it is a conceptual cognition. In the objection in the PVSV, however, that which has an action (*pravṛtti*) is a conceptual cognition called *vikalpa*.

cognition erroneously associates or confuses real particulars with a fictional universal. This idea is accepted as it is by non-realist Sa skya pa scholars too.[28]

The problem lies in the dGe lugs pas' modification of the idea of "*snang btags gcig tu bsres nas rtog pa yul la 'jug pa*" into the idea of "*snang btags gcig tu 'dres nas rtog pa la yul snang ba*." The subject is changed from 'conceptual cognition' to 'object' and the verb is changed from *'jug pa* or 'to operate' to *snang ba* or 'to appear'. The realistic position represented by the notion of *snang btags gcig tu 'dres nas snang ba* is to be formed in this manner. The *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* actually begins to answer the doubts by explaining the manner of an object's appearing to a conceptual cognition and of a conceptual cognition's operating on an object (*rtog pa la yul ji ltar snang zhing 'jug pa'i tshul*, Appendix 1, 221). That is to say, it speaks of not only the manner of *'jug pa* but also that of *snang ba*, whereby the theory that a real particular appears to a conceptual cognition is well established. This is stated in the following passage:

> "The manner of an object's appearing(v) to a conceptual cognition and of [the conceptual cognition's] operating on [the object] are [as follows]: A golden pot appears(v) as a pot to the conceptual cognition apprehending a golden pot as a pot. So appears(v) its own actual object of apprehension as a pot to the [same] conceptual cognition. These two (i.e. a golden pot and the concept 'pot') appear(v) mixing as one in the aspect of appearance(n), and because they are not to be distinguished from each other in the aspect of appearance(n), it is said that <u>that which appears</u>(n) and a conceptual construct are mixed together as one. <u>That which appears</u>(n) is a real particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and a conceptual construct is the meaning of words (*śabdārtha*)."[29]

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[28] Cf. e.g. *Rigs gter rang 'grel* 31b1 (Fukuda *et al.* [1993: 18f.]): *snang ba dang sel ba gnyis thog ma med pa'i bag chags kyis gcig tu bsre ba yin pas mu stegs byed dbang shes la rtog pa'i log rtog 'byung ba'ang de yin no //* ("Since the things, i.e. that which appears and exclusion, are mixed together as one owing to the residue which has no origin, [one cannot make a distinction between them.] For this [reason], non-Buddhists erroneously take sensory cognition for conceptual cognition."); *ibid.* 32a3 (Fukuda *et al.* [1993: 20–23]): *'chad pa po dang tha snyad sbyor ba gnyis tha dad par gsungs te / 'chad pas rnam par 'byed la tha snyad la 'jug pa na 'khrul nas (gcig tu) 'jug pa'i phyir ro //* ("[Dharmakīrti] teaches [in PVSV 39,4–8, see note 25 above] that those who explain [the reality of things] and those who apply verbal convention differently [take operation]. One distinguishes [the meaning of words from particulars] through explaining [the reality of things]. When applying verbal convention, on the other hand, one applies [it] having erroneously taken [them as identical]."); *ibid.* 43b4f. (cf. also Fukuda [1994: 24f.] and Tillemans [1995: 869 n. 19]): *'chad dang 'jug pa'i gang zag gi // dbye bas gnyis gnyis rnam pa bzhi // 'chad pa dang 'jug pa'i dus kyi brjod bya rjod byed gnyis gnyis bzhi'o // 'chad tshe rnam par phye bas mkhas // 'jug tshe gcig tu 'khrul pas thob //* ("There are four kinds [of object to be signified and signifier], i.e. two [types of object to be signified (*brjod bya, vācya*)] and two [types of signifier (*rjod byed, vācaka*)], according to the distinction between the person who explains [the reality of things] and the person who applies [verbal convention]. [The verse teaches:] There are four kinds [of object to be signified and signifier], i.e. two types of object to be signified and two types of signifier, according to the time when one explains [the reality of things] and when one applies [verbal convention]. When explaining, one learns [the reality of things] through distinguishing [the meaning of words from particulars]. When applying, one obtains [particulars] through erroneously taking [them] as identical.") Cf. also Tillemans [1995: 869 n. 19] and Dreyfus [1997: 256].

[29] *Tshad ma'i brjed byang* 19a3f.: *rtog pa la yul ji ltar snang*(v) *zhing 'jug pa'i tshul ni / gser bum bum par 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gser bum yang bum par snang*(v) *zhing rang gi dngos kyi gzung bya de'ang bum par snang*(v) *la snang ba*(n)*'i ngo na de gnyis* ***gcig tu 'dres nas*** *snang*(v) *zhing snang*(n) *ngor so sor dbyer med pas* <u>*snang*</u>(n) *btags gcig tu bsres pa zhes bya ste* <u>*snang ba*</u>(n) *rang mtshan dang btags pa sgra don no //* Cf. the parallel passages in *Yid kyi mun sel* 35a3ff.: *gser bum bum par 'dzin pa la / gser bum yang bum par snang zhing / rang gi dngos kyi gzung bya de yang bum par snang la / de yang gser bum bum par snang ba'i snang ba dang / rang gi dngos kyi gzung bya de*

Here the authors use the word *snang ba* in three ways. The *snang*(v) is to be interpreted as a verb meaning 'appear' (*prati√bhā*), and the *snang*(n) as a noun, among which the normal *snang ba* denotes an actual appearance of a universal (*sāmānyapratibhāsa*), which is identified with the meaning of words (*sgra don*, *śabdārtha*). The underlined noun *snang* in *snang btags gcig tu bsres pa* corresponds to the Sanskrit word *dṛśya* as discussed above, which is identified with a particular (*rang mtshan*, *svalakṣaṇa*).[30] That is to say, a golden pot or golden pots are particulars, and their being a pot is a real universal, which is ontologically not differentiated from the particular pots. The concept 'pot', which refers to something having a round belly and capable of containing water and so on, is the appearing object of the conceptual cognition, that is, the meaning of the word 'pot'. These two kinds of pot appear mixed as one (*gcig tu 'dres nas snang ba*). In this sense, it is said that a real particular appears to a conceptual cognition mixing with a conceptual construct. Here the verb *'dre pa* is not to be understood as meaning 'associate' or 'confuse', for it is intransitive and its subject is not a conceptual cognition but an object that appears mixing with a conceptual construct.

We have already identified a potential textual source of the notion of *snang btags gcig tu bsres pa* in the PVSV and Śākyabuddhi's PVṬ. With regard to the notion of *'dres nas snang ba*, which may have transformed Dharmakīrti's original thought into the dGe lugs pa realism, Tillemans

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bum par snang ba'i snang ba gnyis so sor yod pa ma yin gyi / rtog pa rang gi snang ngo na de gnyis gcig tu 'dres nas snang zhing / snang btags gnyis snang ngor so sor dbyer med pas snang btags gcig tu 'dres pa zhes bya la snang ba ni bum pa rang mtshan dang / btags pa ni bum pa'i sgra don no //; *lCang skya Grub mtha'* (mDo sde pa) 74b1ff. (translated in Klein [1991: 128], Kimura [1993: (42)], which, however, read *snang* in *snang btags* as 'appearance'): *gser bum bum par 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la / gser bum yang bum par snang zhing rang gi dngos kyi gzung bya de'ang bum par snang la / snang ba'i ngo na de gnyis gcig tu 'dres nas snang zhing snang ngor dbyer med pas snang btags gcig tu bsres pa zhes bya ste / snang ba ni rang mtshan dang / btags pa ni sgra don no //* Another version by rGyal tshab in *Thar lam gsal byed* 59b5–60a3 is cited and translated in Tillemans [1995: 876 n. 28]. It is interesting to note that dGe 'dun grub does not seem to have agreed with his predecessors on this point. While adducing this passage, he speaks solely of the manner of a conceptual cognition's operating on an object, mixing real particulars with a universal. See *Rigs pa'i rgyan* 191a3–6: ***rtog pa yul la 'jug tshul**... / gser bum 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gser bum yang bum par snang zhing / rang la gser bum du snang ba de yang bum par snang ba yin la / rtog pa de'i ngo na* snang ba de gnyis gcig tu 'dres nas so sor ma phyed pa yin pas / **snang btags gcig tu bsres nas 'dzin pa** zhes bya'o // 'o na snang ba gang / btags pa gang zhe na / gser bum rang mtshan pa snang ba dang / gser bum gyi sgra don ni btags pa yin no //* (*corrected: *don*)

[30] Dreyfus [1997: 322f.] has pointed out that, on the basis of this twofold meaning of the noun *snang ba* as the appearance of an object and something appearing or that which appears, the Tibetan realist thinkers assert that real particulars appear to conceptual cognitions. Cf. also his discussion in [1997: 252f.]. The usage of the word *snang ba* is indeed very puzzling. In the PVSV it is also used for *khyāta*. Cf. e.g. PVSV 43,13f. (Vetter [1964: 56], Zwilling [1976: 139], Vora-Ota [1982: 5]): *nāvastudharmatā, tatsvabhāvasyaiva tathā khyāteḥ*. ("[Impermanence and so forth are] not the non-essence of a real entity, for only its essential property is known as such [i.e. as impermanent].") Its Tibetan version reads (PVSV D285a6): *dngos po med pa'i chos nyid kyang ma yin te / de'i rang gi ngo bo kho na de ltar snang ba'i phyir ro /* ("[Impermanence, etc.,] are not the essence of a non-existent either, for only its essential property appears as such.") This might also lead to the interpretation that the property of impermanence directly appears to a conceptual cognition. According to Karṇakagomin, however, the function of determination (*adhyavasāya*) is implied by the word *khyāta* (PVSVṬ184,30f.: *teṣām anityatvādīnāṃ **nāvastudharmatā**. kiṃ kāraṇam. **tatsvabhāvasyaiva tathā** 'nityādidharmatayā khyāteḥ pratibhāsanād adhyavasāyād iti yāvat*). Śākyabuddhi also says that it does not mean that a property of a real entity appears to a conceptual cognition (PVṬ D97a3f.: *rnam par rtog pa la dngos po'i chos snang ba ni ma yin no*).

has made a very significant suggestion [1995: 872f. n. 22]: the idea of *'dres nas snang ba* may have been formed through their misreading of Dharmakīrti's definition of conceptual cognition (*kalpanā*) in his PVin as well as NB, which says, "Conceptual cognition is a cognition in which a representation is capable of being associated with a verbal expression," or "Conceptual cognition is a cognition of a representation which is capable of being associated with a verbal expression." Tillemans argues that irrespective of the reading of the Sanskrit compound as *tatpuruṣa* or *bahuvrīhi*, the word *saṃsarga* here does not have the sense of being "indistinguishably mixed up," nor is it commented upon in that way by Dharmottara. The Tibetan version, however, has the verb *'dre* for *saṃsarga*,[31] and the word *snang ba* for the noun *pratibhāsa* can be interpreted as a verb. Furthermore, *rung ba* is often replaced by *rung bar* in Tibetan texts. In consequence of this, it is conceivable that Tibetans may have misinterpreted this definition as "a cognition to which (something) appears as capable of being mixed together with a verbal expression."[32] This suggestion of Tillemans' makes it possible to explain how the full notion of *snang btags gcig tu 'dres nas snang ba* has possibly been formed by Tibetans on the basis of Dharmakīrti's own words. As he has indicated, one should take account of the possibility that such a probable misinterpretation of Indian original texts was one of the possible factors in the modifying of Dharmakīrti's original thought into its Tibetan realistic version.

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[31] The word *'dre* appears for the Sanskrit verb *saṃ√sṛj* in the Tibetan version of the PVSV, which basically means "to associate particulars of the same kind with one universal." Cf. e.g. PVSV 38,17–20 (Vetter [1964: 52], Zwilling [1976: 128], Vora-Ota [1980: 8]): *buddhiḥ khalu tadanyavyatirekiṇaḥ padārthān āśrityotpadyamānā vikalpikā svavāsanāprakṛtim anuvidadhatī bhinnam eṣāṃ rūpaṃ tirodhāya pratibhāsam abhinnam ātmīyam adhyasya tān saṃsṛjantī saṃdarśayati.* ("Arising in dependence on real objects which are distinguished from their dissimilars in accordance with the nature of its own residue, a conceptualizing cognition, indeed, removes the distinct nature of these [real objects], imputes a united representation [of a universal upon them], which belongs to [the cognition] itself, and then associates them [with this united representation] and makes [them collectively] understood.")

[32] PVin I 40,8.: *rtog pa ni brjod pa dang* ***'drer*** *rung ba* ***snang ba****'i shes pa*; NB I 5: *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā / abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā.* As regards the Indian development of this definition, cf. e.g. Funayama [1992: 47f., 63f]. According to *Yid kyi mun sel* 57a4f. and *lCang skya Grub mtha'* (mDo sde pa) 75a2, Tibetans propose another definition as *sgra don 'dzin pa'i blo* or *sgra don 'dzin pa'i zhen rig* (a [conceiving] cognition which apprehends the meaning of words) on the basis of PV III 287ab (*śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā*). Both mKhas grub and lCang skya criticize some scholars who maintain the definition as *sgra don 'dres rung du 'dzin pa'i(/par) zhen rig* (a conceiving cognition which apprehends term-universal and object-universal as capable of being mixed together), interpreting the word *sgra don* as *sgra spyi* (*śabdasāmānya*) and *don spyi* (*arthasāmānya*) (*Yid kyi mun sel* 57a1–57b1, *lCang skya Grub mtha'* [mDo sde pa] 75a2–76b5). rGyal tshab, for instance, takes this position, for he says, commenting on PV III 287ab, "a cognition which apprehends (an object) having taken its term-universal and object-universal as an apprehended object is pervaded by being a conceptual cognition for the object" (*Thar lam gsal byed* 283b3: *de'i sgra spyi dang don spyi gzung yul du byas nas 'dzin pa'i shes pa de ni yul de la rtog pa yin pas khyab pa*). As regards this controversy among Tibetan scholars, cf. Kimura [1993: (47)ff.], Tillemans [1995: 873 n. 22], and Dreyfus [1997: 220–223].

Appendix 1: *Sa bcad* Titles of the Section "Confirmation of the establishment of the two kinds of reality" (*bden pa gnyis kyi rnam gzhag gtan la phab pa*) (16a6–47a5) in the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*[33]

1 (16b2–18a6) Postulation of the ground of doubts (*dogs pa'i gnas 'god pa*)
- 11 (16b2–17a5) Postulation of the ground of doubts which occur to those who have an intellect (*rtogs ldan la skye pa'i dogs pa'i gnas 'god pa*)
- 12 (17a5–18a6) Postulation of the ground of doubts which occur to those who lack a fine intelligence for investigation (*rnam dpyod kyi blo mi zhib pa dag la skye pa'i dogs pa'i gnas 'god pa*)

2 (18a6–33b2) Explicit presentation of the answer to these [doubts] (*de'i lan rgyas par bshad pa*)
- 21 (18a6–19b1) Identification of the ground of error in both Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa systems (*dbu tshad gnyis ka'i skabs kyi 'khrul gzhi ngos bzung*)
- 22 (19b1–33b2) Actual answer (*lan dngos*)
  - 221 (19b1–21b5) Manner of an object's appearing to a conceptual cognition and of [a conceptual cognition's] operating on [an object] (*rtog pa la yul ji ltar snang zhing 'jug pa'i tshul*)
  - 222 (21b5–25a5) Refutation of the establishment of an object of a conceptual cognition in ultimate (reality) (*rtog pa'i yul don dam par grub pa dgag pa*)
    - 2221 (21b5–23a4) Refutation of the establishment of ascertained objects [as] universal (*sāmānya*) and co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) in ultimate [reality] (*spyi dang gzhi mthun nges pa'i yul don dam par grub pa dgag pa*)
    - 2222 (23a4–25a5) Refutation of the establishment of ascertained objects [as] what is to be proven (*sādhya*) and what is to prove in ultimate [reality] (*sādhana*) (*sgrub bya sgrub byed nges pa'i yul don dam par grub pa dgag pa*)
  - 223 (25a6–27a5) Identification of the object [as] a ground of the verbal application of [such designations as] 'universal' and 'co-reference' (*spyi dang gzhi mthun la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'jug pa'i gzhi yul ngos bzung ba*)
    - 2231 (25a6–26a4) Confirmation of the object of the verbal application of [such designations as] 'universal' and 'co-reference' (*spyi dang gzhi mthun gyi tha snyad 'jug pa'i yul gtan la phab pa*)
    - 2232 (26a4–27a5) Confirmation of the object of verbal agreements (*brda sbyar ba'i yul gtan la phab pa*)
  - 224 (27a5–33b2) Establishment of an exclusion from others (*anyāpoha*) that is to be understood relying on these [previous discussions] (*de dag la brten nas gzhan sel ba'i rnam gzhag rtogs par bya ba*)
    - 2241 (27b1–28b1) Exposition of each system of those who assert that a word has an exclusion as its object and those who assert that [a word] has a positive affirmation as its object (*sgra sel ba'i yul can dang sgrub pa'i yul can du smra ba rnams kyi lugs so sor brjod pa*)
    - 2242 (28b1–31b2) Logical establishment [of the position that] words and conceptual cognitions have an exclusion as their object (*sgra rtog sel ba'i yul can du bsgrub pa*)

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[33] As regards the *sa bcad* titles of the subdivisions of section 342 "Establishment of each [effect of valid cognition]" (*so so'i rnam gzhag*), which are omitted here, see *Sa bcad* 1: 43f.

22421 (28b1–30b6) Arrangement of the ground of exclusion (*sel ba'i gzhi 'ding ba*)
22422 (30b6–31b2) Actual logical establishment of an exclusion [as the object of words and conceptual cognitions] (*sel bar sgrub pa dngos*)
2243 (31b2–33a5) Division of the exclusion from others (*gzhan sel ba'i dbye ba*)
2244 (33a5–33b2) Definition of the exclusion from others (*gzhan sel ba'i mtshan nyid*)
3 (33b2–47a5) Actual establishment of the two kinds of reality (*bden gnyis kyi rnam gzhag dngos*)
31 (33b3–35a2) Definition of the two kinds of reality (*bden pa gnyis kyi mtshan nyid*)
32 (35a2–35b1) Necessity of establishing [the existence of] external objects (*phyi rol don gyi rnam gzhag mdzad pa'i dgos pa*)
33 (35b1–36b4) Manner of elucidating the intention of [Buddha's] teachings through confirming the selflessness of things (*chos kyi bdag med gtan la phab pa'i sgo nas gsung rab kyi dgongs pa 'grel ba'i tshul*)
34 (36b4–47a5) Establishment of an effect of valid cognition (*tshad 'bras kyi rnam gzhag*)
341 (36b4–38a4) Establishment of a general [effect of valid cognition] (*spyi'i rnam gzhag*)
342 (38a4–47a5) Establishment of each [effect of valid cognition] (*so so'i rnam gzhag*)

Appendix 2: *Sa bcad* Titles of the Section "Explanation of the establishmentof the conventional and ultimate [realities] through eliminating [the objection] that [the condition of a logical reason's] being a property of the subject of a thesis (*pakṣadharmatva*) is not established with regard to an essential property as a logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*)" (*rang bzhin rtags kyi phyogs chos ma grub pa spong ba'i sgo nas kun rdzob dang don dam gyi rnam gzhag bshad pa*) (42a4–87a3) ad PV I 40–185 in the *Thar lam gsal byed*[34]

1 (42a4–47a2) Summarized explanation (*mdor bstan pa*)
11 (42a4–45a6) Thorough investigation (*mtha' dpyad pa*)
111 (42a5–43a4) Explanation of how doubts derivatively occur as to an essential property as a logical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) (*rang bzhin rtags la 'phros pa'i dogs pa skyes pa'i tshul bshad pa*)[35]
112 (43a4–43b6) Identification of the main difficult point to understand, that is, the cause of the arising of doubts (*dogs pa skye pa'i rgyu mtshan rtogs dka' ba'i gnas kyi gtso bo ngos bzung ba*)
113 (43b6–45a6) Reference to another system for a comparison with regard to this [point] (*de la lugs gzhan dper brjod pa*)
12 (45a6–47a2) Meaning of [Dharmakīrti's] statement [in PV I 40–42] (*tshig don*)
121 (45b1–46a3) Mode of existence of real things (*dngos po'i gnas lugs*)
122 (46a3–5) Mode of apprehension by a cognition which has an object (*yul can blo'i 'dzin stangs*)

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[34] As regards the *sa bcad* titles of the subdivisions of sections 211, 2121, 212213, 212215, 2123, 213, 22, which are omitted here, see *Comparative Table* 4–11 and *Sa bcad* 2: 245–248.

[35] This section is further divided into two, which respectively discuss 1) the doubts which occur to those who have an intellect (*rtogs ldan la skye pa'i dogs pa*) (42a5–43a2) and 2) the misconceptions which occur to those who are fully satisfied with seeing the [literal meaning of] sentences alone (*tshig tsam mthong bas legs par tshim pa dag*) (43a2ff.)

123 (46a5–47a2) Manner of how the object is cognized by this cognition (*blo des yul de ji ltar rtogs pa'i tshul*)

2 (47a2–87a3) Detailed explanation (*rgyas bshad*)

21 (47a3–86a5) Detailed logical establishment [of the position] that words and conceptual cognitions which affirm [something] have an exclusion as their object (*sgrub pa'i sgra rtog sel ba'i yul can du rgyas par bsgrub pa*)

211 (47a3–53b4) Refutation of [the assertion that] words and conceptual cognition operate solely on a positive affirmation (*sgra rtog bsgrub pa kho na la 'jug pa dgag pa*) [ad PV I 43–58]

212 (53b4–70b4) Logical establishment [of the position that words and conceptual cognitions] operate on an exclusion from others (*gzhan sel la 'jug par bsgrub pa*)

2121 (53b4–56b1) Elimination of the objection that what is distinguished [from others] (*vyāvṛtta*) and distinction [from others] (*vyāvṛtti*), as well as universal (*sāmānya*) and particulars (*vyakti*), would be the same (*log ldog dang spyi gsal mtshungs pa'i rtsod spang*) [ad PV I 59–67]

2122 (56b1–64a5) Identification of the universal that is an exclusion from others (*gzhan sel gyi spyi ngos gzung ba*) [ad PV I 68–91]

21221 (56b2–59a6) Mode of existence of the universal that is an object (*yul spyi'i gnas tshul*)

212211 (56b3–57a2) Explanation of the word '*kun rdzob*' in [the expression] '*kun rdzob bden pa*' (*kun rdzob bden pa'i kun rdzob gyi sgra bshad*) [ad PV I 68–69]

212212 (57a2–57b1) Logical establishment [of the position that] the appearance in this [conventional cognition] is real solely on the side of thought (*de la snang ba bsam ngo'i bden pa tsam du bsgrub pa*) [ad PV I 70ab]

212213 (57b1–58b2) Refutation of its being ultimate reality (*don dam du bden pa dgag pa*) [ad PV I 70cd–71]

212214 (58b2–3) Logical establishment of [the position that a cognition] which apprehends this [appearance] is accordingly erroneous (*des na de 'dzin 'khrul par bsgrub pa*) [ad PV I 72ab]

212215 (58b3–59a6) Elimination of the [inappropriate] consequence that an erroneous [cognition] arises groundlessly (*'khrul pa gzhi med du 'byung bar thal ba spang pa*) [ad PV I 72cd–75]

21222 (59a6–64a5) Manner of how the cognition to which the [universal] appears operates (on its object) (*de snang gi blo'i 'jug tshul*) [ad PV I 76–91][36]

2123 (64a5–70b4) Identification of the object of verbal agreements (*saṃketa*) (*brda'i yul ngos gzung ba*) [ad PV I 92–113ab]

213 (70b4–86a5) Elimination of the objections to the [position that words and conceptual cognitions operate on an exclusion from others] (*de la rtsod pa spang ba*) [ad PV I 113cd–184]

22 (86a5–87a3) Manner of how it is established without difficulty that words and conceptual cognitions which negate [something] have a negation as their object (*dgag pa'i sgra rtog rnam gcod kyi yul can du 'bad med par grub pa'i tshul*) [ad PV I 185]

[36] Cf. Tillemans [1995: 876 n. 28], where the passage of this section is partly cited and translated.

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PV I Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV (also Miyasaka [1971/72]).

PV III, IV Chapters 3 (Pratyakṣa), 4 (Parārthānumāna): See Miyasaka [1971/72].

PVin I *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti): See Vetter [1966].

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